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HISTORICAL SURVEY.

HISTORICAL SURVEY
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

FROM
KANT TO HEGEL;


DESIGNED AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE OPINIONS OF THE
RECENT SCHOOLS:

BY
HEINRICH MORITZ CHALYBÄUS,
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE
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TRANSLATED FROM THE FOURTH EDITION OF THE GERMAN

BY
ALFRED TULK.

ANDOVER:
W. F. DRAPER AND BROTHER.



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
SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.,

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

WE have much pleasure in being enabled to insert the following Note from Sir William Hamilton, addressed to the British publishers :

"I have been requested by the Publishers, — as the character and even name of the Author of these Lectures may be unknown to many British Students of Philosophy, — to state, in what estimation Author and Lectures are held in Germany. I find no difficulty in compliance; and beg leave to say, — that to those acquainted with the Philosophical Literature of that country, it is known that Chalybaeus has, by more than one work, established for himself the reputation of an acute speculator, a fair critic and a lucid writer; and, in particular, that these Lectures are there universally recognized as affording a perspicuous and impartial survey of the various modern systems of German Philosophy, at once comprehensive and compendious. And, though the author be intimately familiar with the several schemes, both in themselves and in their polemical relations, he has, however, here skilfully avoided the tedium of detail; and this without thereby becoming superficial. The select character, indeed, of his audience, — a Dresden audience, — allowed him to accomplish this. For it consisted, as he informs us, of enlightened hearers, — partly state officials and practical politicians, partly men of letters and even distinguished literary authors, — who, without being philosophers by profession, had been originally trained in philosophical studies at the University, and were now desirous of information touching the more recent movements in the battle-field of metaphysics. In Germany these Lectures are considered as popular, but not as superficial. They are viewed as even supplying a desideratum; and, in particular, are accounted an excellent introduction to a more extended and detailed study of the recent philosophical systems. Accordingly, since they were first published in 1837, at least four editions have appeared. In this country the book, assuredly, will not be deemed too elementary."

EDINBURGH, NOVEMBER, 1853.



TRANSLATOR'S NOTICE.

THE Author himself having stated at sufficient length in his Preface the object of the present work, the Translator does not feel it incumbent upon him to do more than observe that he has endeavoured throughout to remain *faithful* to his text; particular regard having being paid to the rendering of the metaphysical terms employed by the different writers, so that the unity of thought pervading their respective systems might be adequately preserved. If, however, despite his best efforts, obscurities of language should be found to exist, the Translator cannot take the burden of such wholly upon himself. It is well known to all students that difficulties of no ordinary kind have to be encountered in German Philosophy—difficulties not only of subject-matter, but of form,—in dealing with which as literal a translation as possible becomes oftentimes the last resource.

March, 1854.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE present work originated in a series of Discourses delivered before a select circle at Dresden, in the winter of 1835-6; the majority of my audience consisting of persons fulfilling important offices of State, all of whom honoured Philosophy; while some were even distinguished in different departments of literature, and belonged in their university career to the blooming period of the Kantian-Jacobian philosophy, but had no longer any leisure, amid the weight of professional duties, for keeping pace with the progress of the science, or making themselves acquainted with what had been published upon the highest matters that concern humanity in the field of philosophy; added to which, the strange terminology of objective speculation in the recent school had become difficult of comprehension for those accustomed to the ordinary modes of thought and expression adopted by the earlier subjective writers.

If it was impossible to set aside these difficulties—at all events it was worth making the attempt to lighten them—

and at the same time to supply the wants of several younger students who had joined my class. The approbation with which the oral discourses were received, encouraged the author to lay them before a wider circle in a printed form, and in doing this to remain as true as possible to the original mode of exposition. Hence comes the style of lecture in which they are written, and together with this style repetitions that are not wholly justifiable, and which by many readers will be viewed in the light, perhaps, of so many tedious digressions. Still, in subsequent editions it seemed impossible wholly to do away with this feature, without injuring the original character and bearing of the whole work; for it was above all needful for me to take into consideration the requirements of the younger portion of my audience, so that they might, during the intervals snatched from their studies at the academies, find in this book an agreeable guide—not one indeed that should thoroughly satisfy their minds, but which might serve, to a certain extent, to set them to rights upon the conflict of philosophic opinions which is now being waged, and so incite and place them in a position to consult the original authorities. This Historical Development is intended throughout to call forth the mental activity of the reader; and instead of leading him to anticipate at any early stage of inquiry the more mature judgments of a later one, to allow him, on the contrary, to make trial of his own powers

of thought, for in this alone an unprejudiced judgment and philosophical knowledge consists.

As regards myself, my own philosophical opinions insured to me, as I thought, a free standing-point external to the conflicting parties; I resolved therefore upon intruding them as little as possible into the body or historical portion of the work and only at the end of my labours, where the systems of the present day cease to criticise each other, or where criticism itself is still a matter *sub iudice*, did I feel myself fully justified in letting them appear together with some concluding remarks, in order that my own impartiality might not appear to be an ambiguous virtue, which had brought the reader into a state of sceptical indecision, only to leave him to himself without counsel of any kind, and, consequently, in the end more dismayed than encouraged. Still, however, these critical additions must not even in this new edition be by any means regarded as forming a basis for any views of my own, as though the whole book had been written with this design. It is not long since I laid before the public such a groundwork in my "Entwurf eines Systems der Wissenschaftslehre," Kiel, 1846; but such neither was nor is the tendency of the present work, which, setting out in a manner quite independent of the former, or upon purely historical grounds, attempts, in a negative or unprejudiced manner, to assist in dispelling the delusion pre-

valent in the schools formerly, and still to a certain degree at present — namely, that philosophy in its last development is a finished and perfected science.

Next to impartiality, clearness was the first rule to be observed in my work; and then, wherever this was no longer attainable, owing to the nature of the subject and the peculiar terminology of the schools, cautious limitation became the second rule that had to be kept in view. Only it seemed to me indispensable to enter deeply into the principles of the different systems, their further development being for the most part summed up in general characteristics; for it did not lie in my original plan to give a survey, uniform as regards its extent in all parts, and diverging into practical questions, any more than a perfect historical consideration of all the connecting and complementary links that lie between the main systems, excellent though the former may be of their kind.

No important objections having been made to my impartiality and clearness, this part of the book, which is and ought to be the chief matter, has met, to my great satisfaction, with an approval almost beyond expectation, considering how relative always are the wants of readers and the notion of a popularity, which should satisfy all demands, and not at the same time dispense too much with scientific accuracy. I have, therefore, as in the second edition, which appeared in 1839, and in the third,

of 1843, so also in this fourth edition, endeavoured to remain as faithful as possible to the original character of the work, and have in certain parts left it quite unaltered; though upon the whole an attempt has been made to gain a further step, by letting the popular style gradually give place towards the end to a stricter form of exposition, so that more is certainly required of the reader in the sequel than in the beginning of the work. This does not only seem admissible as a piece of didactics, but to be imperatively demanded by the content. Besides, since the period of the first publication of these lectures, ten years ago, the mental wants and mode of thinking of the public have made such a rapid revolution, that the Kantian method of regarding philosophy is now no longer that which generally prevails, but rather a return must be made to it from another more modern point of view. Accordingly, if it appeared already indispensable in the third edition to perfect for cotemporaries the representation of the Kantian system, and if, upon the other hand, the author was induced by the direction taken by Philosophy subsequent to Hegel, and especially by Schelling's latter opinions, to round off the whole development of the subject since Kant's time in a more definite manner than had been done in former editions; so also did the present seem the time for directing attention, not only to the above-mentioned Neo-Schellingian philosophy, but also to the

so-called second doctrine of Fichte, and for inserting in its proper place a brief characteristic of Schleiermacher's philosophic views, which were omitted in the earlier editions.

Even the remaining portions of the work have not been left without improvement, so that the present edition may be justly regarded as "thoroughly revised and enlarged."

Kiel, Jan. 1. 1848.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

INTRODUCTION.—Object of the present Discourses, p. 1. Idea of Philosophy, p. 3. Scientific sketch of the History of Philosophy, p. 6. Its connection with the Empiricism or Sensationalism of Locke, p. 9. Scepticism, and its vindication upon empirical grounds, p. 12. Hume's Theory of Causation, p. 14.

LECTURE II.

KANT.—General problem of his critical investigations, p. 21. Critick of Pure or Theoretical Reason ; its principle, p. 32. Categories of the Understanding, p. 27. Ideas of the Reason, p. 35.

LECTURE III.

Critick of the proofs of the Existence of God, p. 43. Critick of Practical Reason, p. 49. Critick of the Faculty of Judgment, p. 52. A fresh problem for Philosophy, p. 55. Divergence of Philosophy into opposite directions, p. 57. JACOBI, p. 58. His difference from Kant, p. 59. The Reason a faculty of perceiving positive truths, p. 61. Uncertain character of Jacobi's philosophy, p. 63.

LECTURE IV.

General remarks upon the two-fold direction taken by Philosophy towards Being and Reality upon the one hand, or Origination (movement) and Thought (ideality) upon the other, p. 68. HERBART, p. 70. Principles of his system, p. 71. The notion of Being, p. 74. The absolutely simple elements of material phenomena, or the Reals, p. 75. Their immateriality, p. 77. Connexion free from contradiction of the Existent with the given phenomenon, p. 80. Arrangement of Herbart's system, p. 83. Its method, p. 85. Its problem, p. 88.

LECTURE V

Methodical solution of the Contradictions, p. 90. The Accidental Views, p. 94. Ontology, p. 95. Synechology, p. 103. Problem of Organization, p. 113.

Eidology, p. 116. Theory of the Representative process (*Vorstellen*), p. 121. Its Statics and Mechanics, p. 122. Soul-monad, p. 127. Glance at the Practical Philosophy, p. 132. Criticism of Herbart's system, p. 137.

LECTURE VI.

J. G. FICHTE's individual Subjectivism, p. 148. Object of the "Wissenschaftslehre," or Theory of Knowledge, p. 149. The Ego as principle, p. 158.

LECTURE VII.

FICHTE's philosophic views of Religion and Morality, p. 164. Criticism of his System, p. 171.

LECTURE VIII.

FICHTE's more recent views, p. 176. SCHLEIERMACHER, p. 183. The Absolute, p. 185. The Egoes, p. 186. Relation of the Absolute and the Egoes, p. 187. Schleiermacher's Idea of Philosophy, p. 190. His Theology, Ethics, and the Criticism of his system, p. 192.

LECTURE IX.

SCHELLING's universal Objectivism in opposition to the subjective Idealism of Fichte, p. 198. Real or objective principle, p. 199. Method and Theory of Cognition, p. 201. Intellectual Intuition, p. 215. Identity of Being and Thinking, p. 217. Differentiation of the Absolute into Subjectivity and Objectivity, p. 218.

LECTURE X.

SCHELLING's Philosophy of Nature, p. 221. The blind working of the immediate Subject-Object, p. 222. The preponderating Objectivity, or nature-side of the Absolute, p. 228. Inorganic nature in its first potency, Matter, p. 231. Light and Gravity, p. 232. Magnetism and Electricity, p. 234. The second potency, or Chemical process, p. 236. Organic or living nature in the third potency, p. 237.

LECTURE XI.

Animal Sensibility and its transition into Consciousness, p. 243. Immanence of the Spirit in real nature, p. 246. Analogous to the artistic power or productivity, p. 248. Ideality, *per se*, in the human being, p. 251. Art, Religion, and Philosophy, p. 252. Pantheism of Schelling, p. 253, which, being discerned by the author himself, becomes again the problem, p. 257. Of human Freedom and Sin, p. 258.

LECTURE XII.

SCHELLING's recent views, p. 265. The world has its ground in that which in God is not God, p. 266. Difference between Schelling and Hegel, p. 272. Doctrine of Potency, p. 277. Origin of the present state of the world through the "fall" of the first man, p. 285. Retrospective view of that process, as exemplified in History, p. 287.

LECTURE XIII.

HEGEL, p. 295. The Immanent Idea, potential object (*Begriff*), or negativity as principle of his system, in contradistinction to Schelling's doctrine of Intellectual Intuition, p. 299. The Phenomenology, p. 300.

LECTURE XIV.

HEGEL's system, p. 312. Its general Arrangement, p. 313. The Logic, Categories of Being, p. 315. Categories of Essence, p. 323.

LECTURE XV.

Continuation of the Categories of Essence, p. 328. Categories of the Idea, or potential object (*Begriff*), p. 332. The Subject or subjective Logic, p. 336. The Object, p. 338, and the Idea in its Identity (*Idee*), p. 349.

LECTURE XVI.

Continuation of the Idea in its Identity, or Identity of Subjectivity and Objectivity, p. 350. Relation of the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature, p. 354. Survey of the Philosophy of Nature, p. 356. Philosophy of the Mind, p. 359.

LECTURE XVII.

Concluding remarks upon the pretended completion by Hegel of all philosophical systems, p. 364. External crisis and division of his school into opposite tendencies, p. 365. Conditioned by internal and unsolved contradictions present both in the Principle, p. 370. Method, p. 373, and Result, p. 379. Criticism of Hegel's System, p. 382. Comprehensive Survey of the whole historical development of Philosophy, p. 385.

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HISTORICAL SURVEY,

ETC.

LECTURE I.

INTRODUCTION. — SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. —
ITS CONNECTION WITH THE DOCTRINE OF SENSATIONALISM.

HAVING offered to deliver, before the present circle, a series of discourses upon the progress and character of the recent Speculative Philosophy, the proposal has, I find, on its very first announcement, attracted far more attention than I could have promised myself, — a proof, to my mind, that the want of instruction upon this subject has been so generally and vividly felt both by the learned of a former school, and by those of the rising generation, that it cannot be owing to any want of readiness in the hearers, if the attempts which have been already made to divulge to a wider circle of educated persons the mystery of the recent speculative school, have hitherto met with but little success. Meanwhile, if some have failed in the clearness and simplicity of language, so necessary in treating such a topic, while others, in the endeavour to render themselves generally intelligible, have proved far too deficient in scientific profundity; as for myself, it is the time which, I feel, has been wanting (considering the few winter evenings devoted to my audience amid the press of other manifold duties) for expatiating with proper repose and caution over this boundless field of inquiry.

But, apart from these considerations, the chief difficulty lies, without doubt, in the subject itself. For the new school has of late expressly declared its philosophy to be an esoteric science, which will always remain confined to a narrow circle of the initiated, and ought to be so, because it can only be called philosophy so long as it retains its scientific form as a veil impenetrable to the unpractised eye.

Certainly (and let us not in this matter be deceived by our expectations)—certainly it is perfectly true, that philosophy

only deserves its name in so far as it strictly preserves its own scientific form, and that we do not philosophise when we treat philosophic subjects historically, and imagine that philosophy itself can be understood from the results of a philosophical system. For this is just as impossible, as to gain a clear idea of arithmetic from learning by heart certain ready-made calculations, such as tables of interest, &c.

Every thing here depends upon the independent activity and freedom of thought. Hence the method of teaching this science differs altogether from the exposition of any positive branch of knowledge: it cannot indeed impart or suggest any thing positive; but it can merely, to speak with Socrates, deliver as a *μαieύτρια* the power of thought in the listener, so that this may act freely and *of itself*.

Philosophy is not opposed to the healthy common sense of humanity, but its demands continually transcend the ordinary powers of the latter, and require of it much more than it is conscious of being able to perform. Common sense alone shall have the right to understand and judge of every thing; nor must it believe any thing which it has not experienced in itself, *i. e.* in the internal consciousness: in the sphere of philosophy nothing is to be taken as a matter of faith, but all and every thing, which we admit, is to be admitted only because we have attained to an internal conviction upon the subject, or because we *know* it.

Theoretical philosophy is nothing more than the self-acquired insight into the method by which we may attain to a certain knowledge of any thing; hence it is *science* or knowledge pre-eminently so called. In every thing which can be known, philosophy must not support mere opinion and faith, but must rather abrogate them as such, and change them into certain knowledge: within its sphere it tolerates no uncertainty, but its sphere reaches only so far as knowledge extends. Every thing, which in the strictest sense of the word we cannot be said to know, it must separate, and can allow it no other importance than that of the ultra, the transcendent, which, lying beyond the boundary line of philosophy, is only serviceable in order to mark out its limits.

In what this special kind of knowledge consists, whether it has any necessary limits, and what these may be, cannot be indicated beforehand, for on this point the different philosophic systems are not agreed. There are systems,—and we shall find the most recent ones to be such,—which essentially indeed ac-

knowledge no such limits ; and every philosophy, even the least pretending, strives, at least, to remove these limits further off ; its aim being constantly a more perfect and expanded sphere of knowledge. But as yet philosophy has not attained to perfect knowledge ; it is not yet the *ἐπιστήμη*, after which Plato strove ; and it must still content itself with the modest name of a longing endeavour after, or love of wisdom.

This love of knowledge is innate. It does not, properly speaking, depend upon man at all, whether he will philosophise or not ; he must do it, and he does it instinctively, each one in his own way : but it still depends upon himself how far he will go, and how soon in his inquiries he will give way more or less to indolence and habit. "With a thousand to one," says *Lessing*, "the goal of their reflection is the point at which they have become weary of reflection," but still such persons will at least possess a phantom of knowledge, call it their conviction, and believe they possess in it something genuine.

But as the true science pursues a course which is remote from ordinary minds, so the latter perceive only the results of the philosophic inquiry of the preceding age ; and these results now ferment among the masses, as opinions imbibed, knowledges acquired, principles adopted, in fact, only as an inherited belief ; and this supplies subjectively, for each individual, the place of self-acquired convictions. For the possessors such opinions are philosophy, because a certain activity of mind was necessary in order to obtain them ; but, by one who takes a higher point of view, they cannot certainly be regarded as such. For — and this appears to me the most trenchant distinction between the really learned and the so-called uninstructed man — the really learned man, or scholar, as he ought to be, is once and for ever withdrawn from the element of blind faith ; he is one who would *know* what others believe, judge what others accept without proof, and from whom a judgment of his own is expected, for which he may even be made answerable to the state itself. The judge, the teacher, the physician — must each act according to his own convictions ; this is not only allowed them, but has become a matter of conscience, and in so far as they ground this conviction upon certain ultimate fixed principles, they are philosophers, and move within the sphere of that science which, properly speaking, is the scientific of all disciplines.

The scientific, reflecting man, is, I said, for ever withdrawn

from the dominion of mere authoritative belief and unreflecting opinion, and can never return to his old state of conviction, peace, and satisfaction, but by passing through the whole range of the science of philosophy.

First, and in the greatest degree, is this shown in the sphere of faith, so called, in its more restricted sense, — *i. e.* that of religious conviction. We regard, indeed, generally the three ideas, God, freedom, and immortality, as the chief subject-matter or content of philosophy, and this again as the means by which to arrive at a settled conviction upon these highest concerns. Thus philosophy becomes, at the same time, a business of the heart; it must, it ought to be so, at least for every one who has once outgrown his childish faith, and yet not become on that account indifferent to the highest, holiest truth, and who has not been led astray by that common irony, which exclaims, “What is Truth?”

It was, indeed, the tree of *knowledge* which was tasted at the beginning; and had this fruit been really a forbidden fruit for man, he ought never to have indulged himself in thinking. But now, since Adam, we are all bewitched; we cannot desist from thinking, and so, unable to retrace our steps, we must press forward or advance.

Faith, by which is here meant especially blind faith upon authority, has, so to speak, vanished from the mind of the educated man, and there no longer exists any formula that shall succeed in conjuring it back again; in truth, this vain attempt must be denominated the especial torment of our age. Thus, then, in all high and holy things nothing more will remain but free and rational self-conviction; and this, philosophy, both in its theoretical and practical departments, must finally bring about. This is the obscurely felt reason why we should be so willing to trust her as a guide, if she only performed what is her office. But most men demand of her, not only truth, but also prescribe to her what truth is to be; she must plead and win the cause of their wishes and pretensions, however impure and alloyed these may be; she must pronounce that to be just and holy which is advantageous and convenient for themselves.

But even the best frequently pursue the path of this science only in order to regain the lost, the faith of childhood; they would have not so much a higher and purer, but they would have again that gentle twilight, the old, wonted, and agreeable truth; their eyes ache, if philosophy imparts more light than these can bear, and they call it a consuming fire.

If, however, it is frequently neither light nor fire that proceeds from philosophy, but rather darkness and cold, what then remains for us, who have once tasted of that fruit of knowledge, what else, we would ask, but bravely to endure this ordeal, whether of fire or frost? When a philosophical system, by which is to be understood a mere step on this wide path of inquiry, does not appear to conduct us at once to the goal, but in place of leading us perceptibly nearer to it, seems rather to lead us astray, then, most of us complain, very justly, of the deception; for few men have time enough to advance more than a step forward in the course of their life; thus, they reject or cast aside this or that system of philosophy as false, and after some vain attempts, despairing entirely of any success, disengage themselves from their guide, and plunge back into that state of faith, that absence of philosophy, in which they felt as happy as children at home. But alas! this late return to home is invariably followed by more sorrowful than appeasing results, for it is not at the same time a return into the period of childhood; and thus every attempt to reproduce or bring back artificially that *naïve* faith, proves nothing but a poetic dream, that serves only to remind us of what we have irrevocably lost.

There was a time when in the Sabbath's calm
 Heaven's kiss of love fell on me like the spring;
 Then full of mystery was the deep-toned bell,
 And then a prayer—it was a blessed thing.
 I may not seek those spheres beyond all strife,
 From whence the gentle message hath descended,
 Yet with the wonted sound my youth is blended,
 And even now it calls me back to life.

If, however, we have once given up, like Faust, the hope of finding in philosophy a clear demonstration of those ideas, then it ceases to be of general human interest. This remarkable change in the views and confidence of the public appears during the last thirty years to have actually taken place; whereas, previous to that time, the science was long studied with feelings of hearty participation and comfort. When, however, philosophy on the one hand tacitly admitted, and on the other openly declared, that she could and would do nothing but render first of all nature comprehensible, and presumed to draw down even the highest ideas within the circle of natural necessity, then was she forsaken, for the most part, by her admirers; men were content with a little logic and psychology for the purposes of the school and pulpit; and metaphysics found with

some few natural philosophers and physiologists but a scanty and precarious subsistence. To the majority of educated persons, the muse of Plato, clad in the drapery of the so-called nature-philosophy and pantheism, appeared like a dismal somnambulist, and every one who was unwilling to fall out with his Christian conscience held himself far aloof from her, and kept his peace.

On a sudden, however, philosophy stripped off her fantastic raiment, and reassumed an independent position, as strict discipline, as thoroughly pure and dry logic, in the professor's chair. The scholar rejoiced in her renewed scientific dignity as his teacher, and readily encased himself within the narrow formulæ of logic, for this constraint was ever more agreeable to the Germans than a loose or slovenly mode of expressing their thoughts. But, unfortunately, philosophy had adopted a language so unintelligible and almost foreign, that for a long time no one was able freely to translate her discourse into his own mode of thought, nor did most of the philosophers by profession, — not to mention the public, — understand how to interpret her with certainty, and that which the few initiated reported openly concerning her sounded, in detached sentences, as nonsensical and blasphemous. Certainly, the misunderstanding and variance between the schools and ordinary life could not be greater.

Nevertheless, that very man who, it is said, has left the whole of philosophy to congeal into an impenetrable ice, has given prevalence to a certain view of the history of philosophy, or the successive development and connection of the different systems, from which, as a right view, we cannot withhold our approbation, though we might not at present be able to enter into the deeper grounds of this phenomenon, or might probably explain it in a very different manner from Hegel.*

For while the customary view is this, that all systems have been hitherto only unsuccessful attempts to solve the riddle of the universe, that men have struck at random into this or that path of inquiry, but have hitherto missed the right one at the very outset, and have on that account been always compelled to begin the same work anew; while this, I say, was, and still is in part, the customary opinion, we shall have, according to that new view of Hegel, to discover a very close, nay, even organic,

*. Hegel's *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Werke, Bd. xiii. p. 22. *et seq.*; *Phänomenologie*, Vor. p. 3.

connection among the different systems; in so far as it is evident that the human mind, always advancing (but especially since the emancipation of philosophy from the fetters of the positive theology, in which it had lain bound during the scholastic period), has been incessantly engaged in its self-development. For just as the awakening of the consciousness in every individual passes through certain stages of development, at first contents itself with an unthinking and sensational intuition, but soon desiring to understand what it sees, enters upon the region of the understanding, which evokes an unexpected light, though at the same time doubts and contradictions, and entangles itself in its own theorems, so that it is constrained to take a higher stand-point, by which the consciousness shall be finally elevated into pure rationality,—just as this is the psychological process in the individual, so is it also in the race, *i. e.* in the historical consciousness of humanity, manifesting itself most distinctly upon each stage of the formation of the *science* properly so called.

If Hegel had regarded his system as constituting the ultimate and highest stage, or as the completion of this historical consciousness, beyond which no further progress were, in essentials, possible, the same would have happened to him as to most great philosophers, who, each in his turn, imagines that he has brought the stone of Sisyphus to a stand-still,—he would have erred; while his disciples, in proclaiming this supposed triumph with all earnestness, would have done neither more nor less than what at different periods of philosophy the faithful adherents of all masters have done, though by these very means they have plainly injured both the master and his art.

Hegel's system, like all preceding ones, is rather to be regarded as a period or individual step in the progressive movement of mental inquiry; and if in this system, philosophy in its progress has really planted one foot firmly, it now only remains for her, supported upon this, to make a new and onward step.

For why should philosophy be the only stationary thing in the wide world of matter and spirit? As in the whole of nature there is no standing still, but only movement, nay, when closely regarded, in the very movement itself no perfect repetition takes place; as even the life of nature has its epochs or periods, and, consequently, a history in the proper sense of the word; epochs too that lie at an incomparably greater distance from each other than those of human history,—thus, as

nature herself has progressed, and still progresses in vast periods of creation, which, after a length of time, are first rendered visible in some measure to our dawning intelligence in the strata and fossil deposits of the earth's crust, or in the change of position in the earth's axis in reference to the polar star,—so also has the human mind steadily passed through its phases of history or development, a fact already proved by our comparatively short history of the world, and the still shorter history of philosophy.

As we see that, in the organism of nature, one antagonism constantly presupposes the other,—that one leaf upon a branch evokes an opposite,—as it were, to maintain the balance or equilibrium of growth,—so also is this law in operation in the growth of the mind, in the organic development of the consciousness. While on the whole a certain progress is attained, the change in particulars is evoked by opposites; for we see how constantly one philosophical fundamental view, if only definitely expressed, of necessity exhibits a *one-sided* character. Then immediately arises, evoked by the law of contradictions, an opposite system; the struggle of opponent criticism begins, but both extremes serve only to elicit a new view,—to set a fresh bud or eye, as it were, upon the tree of knowledge,—which is again destined to pass through the same process of development. Whether and at what time this development may lead to a blossom, which would be at the same time its consummation or ultimate development, is for us at present an unanswerable question: for, with an actual completion of the consciousness, the human race would at the same time have attained the goal of its possible development; and the planet itself, at least in its present form, have served out the time allotted for the general economy of minds, and what might happen further upon it would belong to a future period of the *world's* history, concerning which we cannot at present indulge in any conjectures.

After the great deluge of nations and gradual regeneration of political life during the Middle ages, philosophy was naturally obliged, like every other art and science, to begin a new structure upon old foundations. In the writings of the ancients the outer works were, so to speak, raised for a philosophy of the consciousness; and to the Greeks we should and must go to school for the purposes of preliminary instruction. But, in this case, the instructors were heathens and the scholars Chris-

tians ; and so from this spiritual marriage sprung of necessity an off-shoot of a peculiar nature, which in the beginning stood decidedly under the surveillance of the mother theology, ere it could emancipate itself at a later period, and freely emulate its Hellenic father. There exists, historically speaking, only a Grecian and German philosophy : the latter has sprung up within the bosom of Christian education ; for every thing that was new and not ancient in the mental reformation of Europe is of Teutonic origin.

That antagonism of the philosophical systems which has been alluded to above, which had already declared itself among the Greeks as Platonism and Aristotelism, and, in the dominant age of scholasticism, as realism and nominalism, reappeared at a later period in the writings of Descartes and Locke. Descartes, as the originator of a Platonising view of the so-called doctrine of innate ideas, adopted the spiritualistic tendency in philosophy, and had for his followers Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibnitz. Locke was driven, through opposition to Descartes, to become the champion or defender of sensationism, and was followed in France by Condillac, Helvetius, and others, who, in the most cultivated language of that period, procured for their system the most general diffusion.

The cause, however, of this general diffusion was by no means of a merely external character, dependent upon the language and cotemporaneous position of the French literature, but was rather of an internal nature, and concealed within this form of philosophy itself.

The *Sensationism* of Locke may be characterised in general as that view which presents itself as the first and most natural to the human being upon reflection, and one with which it may be said we all content ourselves in the ordinary matters of life, domestic or otherwise.

Now, in approaching nearer to my present purpose, and first of all looking around me for a basis that may serve as a common starting-point for the investigation, this view of Locke at once presents itself to my mind, both as that mode of thinking which is to be presupposed upon the part of the understanding, when it has advanced no further in reflection, and, at the same time, as representing a phase that constitutes a definite moment or period in the historical development of philosophy. But, seeing that this view is to serve, as aforesaid, only as a basis for bringing into mutual illustration and connection the further de-

velopment of philosophy, I shall enter upon no comprehensive delineation of its features, but only allude to them in so far as is sufficient for our present purpose.

In every child, says Locke*, it is evident, that only those representations or images enter the mind, whose objects lie within the circle of its outward vision. Originally, the mind is to be regarded as a blank table (*tabula rasa*), which is gradually painted over and filled up by the images of outward objects that impinge upon it. All images come originally, without any exception, through the senses into the consciousness; in the mind there resides, originally, not a single idea, developed or undeveloped; in a word, none are innate. The mind comports itself, in reference to the images of all kinds, only as a power of apprehension, and that indeed, in the commencement, more in a passive than an active manner. The external object must work upon our soul, exercise upon it some impetus or pressure, which propagates a movement, through our nerves or vital spirits, to the brain, and there produces corresponding copies or representations of the objects.

The objects are thus reflected in the consciousness, as in a mirror; or directly affect the nerves of smell, taste, &c., by the medium of dissolved particles. So also with the movements and changes that occur only in our soul; to observe these we have a special, or what has been called *inner sense*. In short, every representation depends originally upon a mechanical impression, conveyed through or by means of the body, into the soul. And here the impressions are treasured up in the memory, and, as opportunity offers, recalled.

But, at the same time also, the human understanding manifests itself as a faculty of judgment, seeing that it distinguishes and compares the images that have been conveyed to it from the outer world, unites those that are similar, and separates those that are dissimilar. We now arrange the innumerable individuals together, according to the resemblance observed between them, into entire classes; the names for which we apply, without distinction, to every individual of its class as a generic name, and by these means avoid the impossibility of giving each single object a separate title. Thus originate, as is well known, the general conceptions from the special representations or images of individual beings, by means of the abstracting and reflective activity of the understanding. For while we

* An Essay concerning the Human Understanding, London, 1690.

comprise very many similar beings, *e. g.*, under the general notion or idea of *animal*, we, in doing this, take note only of those signs which occur to all as common or characteristic, and abstract from these those that are peculiar to each in particular, and by which it is distinguished from all the rest; designating those signs that have been adopted to form the notion the *essential*, in contradistinction to the others as *unes-sential* or accidental signs or definitions.

We have not, however, merely ideas of definite *objects* and their properties, but also of the *relations* in which the former stand to us and to each other; *e. g.* those of proximity or distance—*i. e.* of space, of time, number, unity, multiplicity, and such like. Thus, the idea of infinity originates from the perception that, in the act of numbering, or the adding together of individual spaces and times, we cannot come to an end. Thus, for example, a sailor may think the sea has no bottom, when he has sunk his sounding-lead, and found none. It is the same with the so-called moral ideas, and—to mention the two following particularly, as they are of special importance for our present object—with the ideas of substance and cause.

We remark, in one and the same thing, different properties, *e. g.*, the cubic form, weight, yellow colour, &c. Now, these properties must inhere or be attached to something internal, be supported, and, as it were, kept together by something; and this internal aliquid or something, that unites them, we term the subjacent, sustentant, or substantia, although nothing further is known as to what this said something in itself—*i. e.* apart from all those properties—may be. Now, in this same manner originates the notion of cause and effect, from those relations of things that are perceptible by the senses; since we observe that the origination and passing away of innumerable things in nature is dependent upon the activity of other accessory and antecedent things.

Thus, general judgments must finally be referred to sensations, and must rest upon actual experience, in which, by means of observation, we perceive the contradictory and concordant; and in the latter of these two, the ground of all certainty.

The certainty of our actually beholding things out of ourselves does not indeed admit of demonstration, but depends upon our perceiving and being conscious that it is quite a different matter whether we see things before us, which we could not see otherwise than they are, or whether, on the contrary, we represent things before us of our own accord, in

which case we can change in the idea or representation whatever we please. The certainty thus depends on the perception of our own passivity and want of freedom during the sensational intuition; did we ourselves evoke these ideas from an internal disposition and power, we could never then be certain of the objective existence of objects. That, however, our intuitions or copies of things agree truly with, or are adequate to, the things out of us, results from the fact that, were they not to proceed from the things themselves, we should have to engender them by means of our understanding. Now the understanding can deal with every thing that has been brought to it by means of the senses; it can analyze all images, and put together their parts in a far more varied manner than as they occur in nature; but it cannot create the single parts from out itself. No blind person, for example, has an idea or representation of colours, no deaf person of sounds, and so on. Now, as the understanding can merely separate and put together what has been given it, the origin of our ideas,—even the mathematical,—must depend upon the regular influence of things and their relations upon ourselves. Now, as our knowledge is merely limited to experience, nothing can at bottom be asserted as generally valid, because experience never becomes wholly exhausted, and that which has not hitherto happened may probably happen in the future, because that might become true which has at present been held to be impossible.

Such is empiricism or sensationalism in its fundamental outlines. It did not occur to us, in tracing these, to say any thing new, but rather to point out how diverse kinds of natural suggestions, which we may encounter in the sequel, have been already brought forward long ago, but are so constituted as not to admit of our resting content with them, although that very system remained even in Germany, for a considerable time, the undisputed basis upon which philosophy was built.

Scepticism, which certainly never builds any thing for itself, but only demolishes what is threatening to fall in, applied itself at length to this old, crumbling edifice; and it was the Scotchman, David Hume, who, as Kant says, “struck the spark with which a light might well have been kindled, had it come in contact with any combustible matter.”*

* Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, p. 7. Sämmtl. Werke, iii. d. Ausg. v. Rosenkranz.

But why, we ask ourselves, before proceeding further, — why enter upon the present road, and to what end is the inquiry concerning the origin of our cognitions? The question is one upon whose solution depends, first of all, the certainty of all cognitions, the treatment of which constitutes the substance of all theoretical philosophy. How so? it may be asked, and why cannot we rest content with the simple natural view given by Locke, as being that which prevails almost universally in ordinary life? We cannot content ourselves with it for this reason, that when the truth of all our convictions is made to depend ultimately upon sensational impressions, and thus upon external experience, there can be (as is shown at the conclusion of Locke's statement) no irrefragably certain knowledge, no unshaken credulity, no point in the whole compass of our consciousness, that might be considered firm and persistent; but every thing, being devoid of order and law in the manifold series of ideas, would pass by us and within us as an unmeaning jugglery. With such a doctrine we could not presuppose with any certainty an order and connection in the actual world, much less elevate ourselves with confidence to the transcendent, or to the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality; since these ideas do not depend at all upon sensational impressions, and would consequently appear only as a fiction or scheme of the understanding devoid of all external authority.

That we have varied acquirements, inward perceptions and ideas, is a well known matter of fact; but then the question arises, does any thing in reality correspond to these ideas? And if any thing does correspond to them, is it constituted just as these ideas denote? With regard to many—nay, most—of the sensuous images, a slight degree of reflection serves to teach us that the reality cannot so correspond to them, as we ordinarily concede, *e. g.*, the colours which are produced by the refraction of light, the sounds engendered by the vibrations of air, can they indeed be said to exist apart from us as colours and tones, or are they such only in relation to our eye and ear? And still more, the sweetness and acidity, the warmth and cold that we feel, are they not obviously mere subjective conditions? Does the sweetness exist elsewhere than upon our tongue, or in our act of tasting? and the feeling of cold, is it not obviously an affection, a disposition of our body? These affections may certainly depend upon something definite in nature, but that which *we* perceive on their occurrence upon and in ourselves, is only *our* behaviour in reference to those natural powers, and

what these natural conditions are *in themselves*—*i. e.* apart from our sensations, — remains at present perfectly unknown to us. The question has been ever this, — whence come all our inward perceptions or ideas? What is their true origin? Are they produced within us, and by the mind itself, only upon the occurrence of certain external causes? or are they at least partly derived from the objects, so that we have in them an apt and perfectly corresponding, *i. e.* true likeness, or not? And granted that such were the case, how do we discover it, and how can we attain to the *certainty* that the matter is actually so? Where lies the surety for it?

Such then is the fundamental question, which must precede all metaphysics. Locke has said, all our representations or inward perceptions are derived originally from the objects; from these inward perceptions the understanding forms its general conceptions; from the general conceptions are compounded the judgments, conclusions, the whole of logic, and finally the entire system of our thought and belief. Thus the whole system ultimately and fundamentally depends upon the truth of the sensational impressions; but if an assumption does not admit of being ultimately referred to such or such an impression, then the assumption itself and all that should follow from it turns out to be a fiction. That, for example, a general connection takes place in the world among things and events, that consequently there is a general concatenation of cause and effect, we know merely on this account, because we can point to this connection in reality, and frequently enough experience it ourselves.

Now David Hume* subjected this proposition especially to a closer examination. Do we actually see the connection between two things, or phenomena, of which the one is regarded as the cause, the other as the effect? By no means. The internal connection, the mysteriously acting invisible power, not only eludes our observation, but there is also no principle that might reveal to our understanding with certainty and necessity, upon the occasion of every phenomenon that we witness, the constantly present and hidden cause. Many thousand times do we witness phenomena in nature of which we cannot discover the cause, and such is even the ordinary case; nevertheless we presuppose each time a cause, although it is unknown to us.

* David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, &c. London, 1738. *Essays*, vol. ii. *Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, Edinb. 1748.

Nothing without a cause, we say,—and in thus expressing ourselves we appeal to a law of the understanding, the law of the sufficient reason. But if we thus allow the understanding to transport its laws without more ado into nature, how then do matters really stand? We have first of all assumed that the understanding ought only to adopt that as certain and true which admits of demonstration by or from experience, and now we would pursue the reverse course, and allow the understanding to prescribe to experience what it has firmly settled *à priori* to be true. As the hidden working forces are represented neither to the internal nor the external perception, the rule of cause and effect must be originally abstracted from the succession or sequence of time, within which things are wont to occur, and so it becomes an instinctive habit to presuppose a certain regular sequence in every day phenomena. This sequence, however, is by no means necessary and certain; for nature rather exhibits just as much irregularity in her course; and if, accordingly, the general validity of this rule, as being without exception, is to depend merely upon experience, why then it is false. Granted, that since the commencement of our history, we may have observed in certain phenomena the strictest regularity, as, *e.g.*, that the sun rises every morning; does it follow *necessarily* from the many thousand years during which this phenomenon has been repeated, that it must always proceed in the same way? Is it not conceivable that at some future time, about the usual hour of morning, the sun may be absent? From experience, at least, we could not prove such to be an impossibility.

LECTURE II.

KANT.

IN order that we might become certain of the truth of our inward perceptions, it appeared above all things requisite to know their origin. Locke had already found himself called upon to make the attempt to investigate or trace this origin, and so to institute a Critick, which, in its tendency, bore the greatest resemblance to the later undertaking of Kant, although both led to wholly different, nay, opposite results. If Kant, as we shall presently see, sought to base the certainty of our cognition of outward objects upon the subjective necessity of thought, Locke had rather derived the necessity of thought from the objects themselves. Inward perceptions, which we do not voluntarily produce, must, according to him, be produced by the objects; and thus things must be present and be constituted like their copies, the representations; for otherwise their existence and content would not be explicable. Thus the inward perceptions are directly true *in so far as they depend upon the things, and are not produced by ourselves*; in a word, in order to recognise truth, thought must wholly accommodate itself to things, and retain their impressions pure and free from its own additions and alterations. So far Locke.

Hume set out from the same principle, but he showed that we only perceive through impressions the coexistence and sequence of outward things. These single impressions are clear and defined, and are to be well distinguished from each other; but of their *essential connection*, there is found to be no impression, and yet there must be an impression, if, according to the above rule, such a connection is to be for us a matter of *certainty*. The forces which we adopt and regard as occult causes, from which the effects must proceed, are only products of our imagination; they serve, properly speaking, only as a testimony and confession upon our part that we do not know the source of the phenomena. Cause, effect, and force are inward perceptions or ideas devoid of all objective signification, for experience furnishes only the simple elements, which the memory within us disposes and connects together; thus, the connection which we term causality, is only a product familiarised by habit or custom, only our subjective addition to phenomena,

but is not derived from any thing of an objective character, and is consequently devoid of any objective validity.

Thus we know nothing of universal and necessary laws, by which the connection of things and the course of the world may be governed; all our calculations and expectations are consequently built upon a baseless supposition: we cannot here speak of absolute certainty, for at the most the analogy of certain frequently repeated series of phenomena admits only of a higher or lower degree of probability. Added to this, that experience but too frequently contradicts that supposition, for the irregular course of events often sets at defiance all regularity and calculation. If, however, there is no causal nexus cognisable between the objects of experience, still less is one cognisable between them and a transcendent cause; so that one is not in the least degree justified in thence concluding as to the existence of a Divine Author.

Through this scepticism, all the foundations of philosophy became at once, as is seen, of an unsettled character; for if the necessary connection of singulars with each other is denied, then all the foundations and deductions of reason are done away with, and a groundless uncertainty is put in the place of objective knowledge.

Hume had consequently shaken the empiricism of Locke to the very foundation; but Hume himself stood, in doing this, upon one and the same ground with Locke; for by that which was empirical he shook the fabric of empiricism. *Kant* was just busied at that time with the Wolfian metaphysics, which had adopted the sensationalism of Locke into the system of Leibnitz; so that, through this channel, the above shock was directly communicated to the philosopher of Königsberg. He perceived it, and traced it to its source. For a long time he wrote nothing of a speculative nature, until finally, in the year 1781, he could come forward with his principal work, matured in silence, and creating subsequently an epoch in philosophy, the *Critick of Pure Reason*.*

While Locke and Hume had critically investigated the origin of the individual representations, and had reverted to ex-

* "I wrote," he says in a letter to Moses Mendelsohn, "this product of at least twelve years of diligent reflection within a period of from four to five months, paying indeed the greatest attention to the content, but unable, borne away, as it were, upon the wings of thought, to bestow that care upon the style which might have promoted a readier insight into my meaning on the part of the reader."

perience as their source, Kant now proceeded to make the *origin of experience* the main subject of his critical investigation; this grand extension of the philosophical horizon at once testifying to the elevated position of his new point of view. From empiricism, as soon as it is made the foundation and principle of all certainty, springs scepticism; and this Kant had fully recognised. Thus he could not contradict the objections of Hume, which were derived from the same source, but he rather availed himself of them, suffered them to hold good, and took up, as perfectly well grounded, the fundamental position of that sceptic, namely, that *experience* teaches us nothing of causality and a necessary conformity to law in nature. Of this position, however, he made a wholly different and unexpected use, since he discovered therein the negative confirmation of an ideal and subjective certainty. "I freely confess," he says, "that it was David Hume who first roused me from my dogmatic slumber, and gave a different direction to my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy. Hume threw no light upon this mode of cognition, but still he struck a spark, at which a light might have been kindled had a sufficiently inflammable substance been met with, whose faint smouldering might have been gradually fed and fanned into a flame." It is quite correct to affirm that causality is a notion, which *we* add to and bring to bear upon phenomena; for this notion is not abstracted from experience itself, as from a plurality of cases and according to analogy; but from all this there follows the direct opposite of what Hume would maintain; for this philosopher concluded that, because that notion does not originate or proceed from objectivity, but from ourselves, it is not universally and necessarily valid. But the direct contrary to this conclusion must be inferred, for if this notion originated in experience, then it would be accidental and wanting in necessity and universality; for experience does not always remain the same, is not the same to every one, and is not perfected at any one moment of time. Thus a notion can only be necessary and universal, when it is derived from the nature of our thought, *i. e.* from our reason, for this last is *one*, universal and common to all men. Experience is a product consisting of two factors; and in so far as it is produced by the factor of our common laws of intelligence, it is of necessity universally valid and elevated above all casualty or contingency. This it is which philosophy has opposed to the scepticism which throws doubt upon the pos-

sibility of a generally valid science. Hence the renowned declaration of Kant (in the preface to the second edition of the *Critick of Pure Reason*), "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our cognition must regulate itself according to the objects; but all attempts to make any thing out of them *a priori*, through notions whereby our cognition might be enlarged, proved, under this supposition, abortive. Let us, then, try for once whether we do not succeed better with the problems of metaphysics, by assuming that the objects must regulate themselves according to our cognition, a mode of viewing the subject which accords so much better with the desired possibility of a cognition of them *a priori*, as being one which must decide something concerning objects before they are given us. The circumstances are in this case precisely the same as with the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, finding that his attempt to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies did not succeed, when he assumed the whole starry host to revolve around the spectator, tried whether he should not succeed better if he left the spectator himself to turn, and the stars on the contrary at rest."

This explanation contains, in fact, the programme to that idealistic revolution which, no less rich in results for the domain of philosophy than that of Copernicus for astronomy, was begun by Kant, perfected by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and recently reappears with Schelling, as brought back to the starting-point of Kant. Whence this retrograde step in philosophy, and whether or no it was necessary, we are not yet able, in the commencement of our inquiries, distinctly to recognise: but we already see thus much beforehand, that Kant's philosophy rests upon *two* principles, an idealistic subjective, and an empirical objective principle; if, however, he was convinced as of a fundamental truth, that all scepticism was derived from empiricism, why did he, along with that idealism just proclaimed, again have recourse to the dangerous element of empiricism?

Were we to set before him the decisive alternative, as to whether the thinking subject *produces* the whole world of phenomena purely from itself, or receives the latter from the objects or things, his reply would be; neither of the two factors work exclusively, but both together. The combinations and relations of the single component parts are contributed by the subject, from out its thinking understanding: and this Kant terms the *Form*; while, on the other hand, the

material, *i. e.* the elements of the content of our inward perceptions, are contributed by objects external to us; and this he calls the matter of *Sensation*. Accordingly, it must be said; that were no objects present, there would be no phenomena; but if there were no understanding to apprehend them, if these individual phenomena were to find no common point of union in man's inward nature, but even here were to appear and disappear in a fugitive and unconnected manner — then there would be no experience. Thus, *in case* or *if* phenomena are present, they must admit of being adjusted and fashioned according to the laws of the understanding, in order that a coherent or connected experience, — a knowledge, as it is generally called, — may originate; but *that* such phenomena, and the things which lie at their basis, are present, does not admit of being proved *a priori* from any law of the understanding. It only admits of being said *a priori*, of what kind (*quomodo*) all possible experience may be, in case it is; not, however, whether and *that* (*quod*) it is. In short, the notions of things, but not their existence, the *essentia* only can be conceived *a priori*, but not the *existentia* proved *a priori*; “from the mere representation of a thing, we cannot in any way elicit the reality.”

This is the other, non-idealistic moment of the philosophy of Kant. But this, though *seeming* to be the only real and certain point, can only teach us unquestionable truth in the single case in which it is present, and where its presence is felt. This truth, however, reaches only so far as this very perception goes, *i. e.*, to the accidental existence of a definite finite object; for, as to any thing universal, conformable to law, or necessary, this empirical moment of itself can teach us nothing. Besides, after so long and mature an experience, the possible case always remains, *i. e.* is conceivable, that at one time or other the directly opposite may happen, as in the example of the sunrise afore-mentioned. That very something, which is to be immoveably true, absolutely necessary, and universally valid, with and for all men, can directly depend upon nothing else but the original constitution of our own thinking faculty. Hence, for example, the propositions of mathematics are not of such constraining certainty, because they may be to a certain extent abstracted from the forms and relations of nature, but inversely, because they depend only upon the subjective necessity of our thought. As to whatever can and may occur in nature, this does not admit of being known; it merely admits of being

known for certain, how, through all eternity, men do regard nature, what they will in general discern therein as laws so long as men are men, *i. e.* so long as they preserve the present constitution of their understanding and reason. From this constitution then, when once recognised, we may conclude as to what will constantly and eternally be true and certain for all men. Were we, for example, to compare the mode of intuition common to all men, to an eye-glass polished or coloured in a certain manner, with which they originally came into the world, and were we to call this glass the constitution of the human understanding, why then we should know for certain that all who look through it must discern objects in this and in no other manner; and every individual man, *e. g.* a philosopher, would be forced to conclude from his own mode of intuition, or from his understanding, how all his fellow men *must* view the same nature. Thus it is only from a subjective constitution of the mind that we can determine what, with all the diversity and uncertainty of individual cases of experience, so soon as they occur, must still appear, without exception, necessary and universally valid for all men, as truth.

In this case, truth and certainty will not so much be founded upon the agreement of the representations or images, with their objects, as upon the *universality* and *necessity* of certain representations and modes of representation for the human understanding. We can indeed, according to Kant, merely know how all men *must* of necessity *represent* the things or objects to themselves, not, however, whether these representations are fully adequate to the objects to which they are to correspond. With that certainty man must be content; it expresses that which for him and his kind must be irrefragably true. And what more would we have? It is true that man merely knows how things appear to him; he has before him, and is acquainted only with their manifestations or phenomena, with, as it were, the image of outward things variously refracted through that above-mentioned glass of the understanding upon the mirror of his soul: on *his* part, he is acquainted only with the relation that subsists between himself and external things; he knows merely how he comports himself in reference to objects, not, however, as to what the things are, and how they may be constituted in themselves, and apart from this relation; for whatever way he begins his inquiry, through whatever sense he seeks to set himself in relation with things, he still

sees and feels them constantly through his sense alone, and the one sense, *e. g.* the organ of touch, may serve well enough to rectify or correct the affection of another, such as that of sight; but he never can pass out of himself above the sphere of the senses, nor by means of them, nor draw the things themselves directly within the pale of his consciousness. The things in themselves, by which with undeniable certainty impressions are made upon our senses, are not to be demonstrated away; but we know nothing further of them than that they *are*, and that they are the cause of our momentary sensations; from them, indeed, we derive nothing more than these sensations, but these are altogether of a subjective character, *i. e.* involuntary as to their origin, but still in their nature nothing more than certain states of our psychical nature.

Turning now from this preliminary view of Kant's system, to a closer examination of its most important points, it is necessary to state beforehand, that we intend, in the following sketch, strictly to confine ourselves to the pure and original theory of Kant, and to separate from it every thing which holds good indeed as Kantianism, but belongs in fact more to his scholars and successors, especially to the further elaboration of his practical philosophy, and to the combination of Kantian and Jacobian ideas.

To the characteristics of his critical undertaking belongs also the mode of exposition which he selected; it plainly points to the ultimate design, which was constantly present to him, nearer or more remotely, throughout all his philosophising. His Critick was, as he said, directed against all dogmatism in philosophy. By dogmatism is here meant every unproved assumption, as well as laying down of rules from thoughtless custom, or upon authority; in short, the direct opposite of the critically testing procedure: assertions without proof are dogmatic. In all this, however, Kant had especially in view the philosophy of his time, or the Wolfian metaphysics. The latter made no use indeed of authoritative propositions, but it placed mathematics and logic as a method and organon at the basis of cognition, without having previously inquired into the full power of these sciences, and estimated their compass or extent. Should it be found, however (as was certainly proved by the critical test), that these methods admit only of being applied to the region of the finite, or the spatio-temporal and sensuous world of phenomena, it follows, that, if extended beyond this limit, and brought to bear upon the contemplation and

comprehension of the transcendent, that the latter would be thereby rendered perceptible by the senses, and the infinite itself rendered finite; thus, either mere contradictions would originate, or no infinite and unconditioned whatever would seem to exist, because all which might be so regarded must resolve itself under that method of consideration into mere phenomena, or into sensuo-natural existence, by which means the door is opened to that destructive sensationalism of the English and French, to materialism and naturalism, while a pure theism and a pure system of morality would be rendered scientifically impossible. Now it was this ethical interest that originally moved the sage of Königsberg to bury himself anew in the secret depths of speculative thought, not in order to prop up the hollow foundations of eudæmonism, and to do homage to the mode of thinking of his age, but with a view of opposing himself to it with sharpened weapons.

In this sense, his struggle against the Wolfian and every other kind of dogmatism held good. But when he incidentally declared, after having examined the means of cognition, which we find in our reason, that matters might be constantly dealt with in the same manner, *i.e.* logically, and when again he called this very procedure a dogmatism, but one that was now permitted or justifiable, still no great stress is to be laid upon these expressions though they are certainly contradictory in character, seeing that he associated that permission expressly with the condition, that intellectual speculation is to keep strictly within the confines of the phenomenal world. The contradiction of which he was guilty consisted, at least verbally, only in this, that he had and knew of no other method of cognition than the logical; and since this was the only method applicable to the finite, in this way the infinite must be regarded as uncognisable, and nevertheless its existence ought to be for us a matter of *certainty*. Yet, with all this, it is readily conceivable from that ethical point of view, how Kant was convinced that he had conferred a greater service to humanity by having pointed out the *limits* of knowledge, than even by establishing its certainty within these limits. Is it, he thought, impossible to break through these barriers in a speculative way? Still in this very impossibility, an ultramundane sphere is acknowledged, and perhaps another path is pointed out, by which to approach it. This, then, is the double object of the Critick of Pure Reason; to annihilate scepticism within the

limits of the phenomenal world as submitted to the senses, and also to mark off exactly the line beyond which the desire of knowledge must not venture to soar.

The first problem was grappled with by Kant in the following manner. Experience shows us in the direct perception not only what is manifold, but this also combined, in a certain manner, into things or unities endowed with different properties, and many things again with one another, so as to constitute whole series of phenomena. Here then the material as well as the form, *i. e.*, the combination (synthesis) is *given*. These combinations we can resolve into their several constituent parts, and what we have accomplished in our thoughts is but an analysis of parts, which we can in like manner recompound or put together as we found them, without, in doing this, comprehending in the least degree any thing of the necessity of that previous connection. This necessity is only seen into when the thing and its attribute, or, speaking generally, the logical subject and predicate, must be thought of as identical, *e. g.* body and extension. The judgment, that all bodies are extended, is essentially different from that of all bodies being heavy, for nothing of the conception of gravity or weight lies in the conception of a body; but in the representation of corporeity is already contained that of extension, and I cannot forbear thinking of the latter while I think of the former. This is the essential nature of the analytical judgment *a priori*. Hence, in such cases, there is no difficulty and uncertainty as to combination; for it is necessary or inevitable.

Still, however, these analytical judgments are only judgments of an *explanatory* not an *amplifying* character; we learn thereby nothing new, but only illustrate what we already know. We have, however, actually to deal with the extension of our knowledge by the logical path beyond the actual, even beyond all possible experience into the region of that which is never manifested to the senses; for the ideas of freedom, immortality, and deity, will ever remain the highest subjects for reflection. Now, if we could find a means of accomplishing, and that indeed *a priori* with logical certainty, such amplifying judgments, or those wherein the predicate does not reside originally in the subject, we should then have attained what we wish, and what is really the problem of philosophy; we should, in the first place, perfectly comprehend the internal connection of things among themselves, and we might hope

to be able to throw a bridge from the region of experience to the opposite one or that of the transcendent.

In this sense, Kant summed up the problem of the Critick in the cardinal question, — “*How far synthetical judgments a priori are possible*”? We readily enough perceive that, in this question, Kant, after his fashion, asked nothing more nor less than how speculation, in a general sense, is possible? for in its essence, what has been called speculation is nothing else than a fathoming or investigation of truth by means of such amplifying judgments *a priori*. With Kant, the reply to the above question as regards the sphere of possible experience turned out of an affirmative, but for the supersensuous or transcendent sphere of a negative character. The grounds of this twofold decision are clearly set forth in the two first leading divisions of the Critick, viz., the transcendental Logic and Dialectic; and consist, to speak generally, in this, — that without an application of that *a priori* synthesis, no experience whatever, *i. e.* no coherent consciousness, would be possible; but in fact, there is such a consciousness, so that that supposition must come into full play. Nevertheless, as regards the application of this synthesis to the transcendent, the directly opposite is shown to be the result; for through its application not only is nothing gained, no connection and unity of thought attained, but rather contradictions and sins against logic are produced, so that its use must here be cast aside.

As concerns the region of experience we have hitherto, induced by Hume, spoken only of the conception of causality, *i. e.* of the connection of cause and effect, which the human understanding finds itself necessitated to think of as associated with phenomena. But this connection is not the only one which we believe that we perceive among outward things; they are related also to each other, as essence and properties (substance and accident), and thus of the modes of combination, and of the relations subsisting amongst things, there are several, which we have to regard as a subjective transfer on our part to them. It is of great importance to become acquainted with *all* these, in order that we may know what in the different representations truly belongs to ourselves, *i. e.*, to the activity of our understanding, and what as appertaining to the sensations or phenomena proceeds from the impressions made upon us by outward things. The sensations afford, says Kant, the content or material of the individual representations; the understanding gives the forms and relations in which the

former are placed in union with each other, and united to form an empirical whole.

Kant saw at once, that the most universal and highest conceptions must have an entirely different origin to the experience of the senses; that they were in themselves, it is true, but empty forms, yet universally necessary in all thinking and cognition; and by this very criterion of *universality* and *necessity*, he believed that he had recognised them to be, as above indicated, of a subjective character, and resident *a priori* in the cognitive faculty of man.

Still, however, we must not represent to ourselves the most universal ideas of relation, as those of cause and effect, substance and accident, and such like, as being ready prepared and present to the human consciousness *a priori*, previous to all reflection,—in a word, not as innate conceptions and ideas,—for, what is mentally innate, are only certain modes of procedure employed in cognising and judging. Thus, if we take cognisance of any thing, and judge of it, we must do so according to those possible ways and means; we consequently regard things, as they are related to each other, as causes and effects, substances and accidents, in quite an involuntary manner; we do this involuntarily, and even the thoughtless child does it, who has never in its life thought of the abstract notion of these relations. This point of view is merely a mode or necessary law of our vision, of which indeed, at a later period of life, when reflection has been cultivated, and attention directed to the forms of our mental activity, we become conscious to ourselves abstractedly, and which we are then enabled to indicate in language by substantive words. The understanding itself can render these ways and means, these laws of its own movement, an object of attention, and reduce them to certain abstract conceptions or notions, which are, however, by no means to be confounded with innate cognitions, or ideas, in the sense adopted by Plato and Descartes, but are rather to be viewed as direct products of the understanding, while engaged in the process of abstraction.

Would we now know perfectly, what, and how many such, modes of combination the understanding has within its power, and how many such general fundamental notions will accordingly be possible, we need only, says Kant, look to the different modes or forms of the judgment, as pointed out to us by the science of logic; for to judge, means no more than to combine one representation (as subject) with another (as predicate).

Now, logic shows that there are, upon the whole, twelve different modes or forms of judging; so that the understanding has twelve different modes of bringing together its scattered representations. Such then are the original and universal modes of action, or laws observed in its dealings, by the understanding. We can easily find them out, when we abstract, in the different judgments, all the objects upon which sentence is passed, and look only to the *relation* between the subject and predicate. I say, for example, when it thunders, then also has it lightened. This is the hypothetical form of judgment, in which, at bottom, reference is obviously made to what, expressed *in abstracto*, is called the relation of causality — cause and effect. Or, I say, the lightning is electric (categorical form of judgment); in which case, the relation of the subject, *lightning*, to the predicate, *electric*, is that of substance and accident.

In this way result, by means of abstraction from the twelve known forms of judgment, the twelve familiar fundamental notions of the understanding, viz. unity, plurality, totality; reality, negation, limitation; substantiality, causality, reciprocal action; possibility, actuality, and necessity.

Of what and in whatever way the understanding thinks, it never thinks otherwise than in these twelve forms, which we can, in the manner above specified, comprehend *in abstracto* as general relations, and designate as *Categories*, after the precedent or example of Aristotle. They all express only possible modes of the connection of thoughts (synthesis); and all the thousand combinations which, as Göthe says, “one step strikes out in the tissue of the thoughts,” admit, according to Kant, of being reduced to these twelve features of a hidden mechanism of the thinking process.

Let us here pause awhile, in order to see where we are. We have before us in the categories, not laws of nature, according to which the natural objects external to us live and move and are; we have but recognised laws of our own thinking nature, of the understanding, within and according to which laws it must act, or which, so to speak, constitute the net in which it is involved. Hence, these necessities of thought or categories can only tell us how the relations of things to each other must be *thought of*; but they do tell us this, in an absolute, universal, and valid manner, for all rational human thought in reference to things; and, this it is which, as already said, philosophy has to oppose to scepticism.

Thus the understanding, apart from these laws, which are nothing else than the only possible modes of apprehending any given material, is in itself a thoroughly empty and unproductive faculty; it merely elaborates what is given it, and given it are the intuitions of sense. (Kant designates all kinds of sensuous impressions, not merely that of vision, by the general term Intuitions.) That there are things, and what they are in fact, we cannot learn or prove by any judgment of the understanding; for, granted that it may be proved for certain that the circle must be round or the triangle three-sided; still, this only amounts to saying that such an object must be thus *thought* of, but not *that* there is any real circle or triangle. The drift of every judgment, even of the categorical kind, is only this — *if* there is x , then this x must be $= x$, or else it is not conceivable; capability of being thought of or conceived is not, however, reality.

Thus, the matter-of-fact existence of any thing can never be absolutely proved by the understanding, but can only be exhibited, or set *forth* in the experience, or *referred* to under the supposition of an otherwise inexplicable phenomenon, and thus in all cases only empirically. This experience must be added to, and must contribute to the understanding, the material which it has to elaborate; or otherwise the understanding remains for itself wholly void, and merely busies itself internally with its own activity, which hovers before it as an object. It stands in need, therefore, for its forms of an actual material derived from experience; which is only furnished us through the senses; or as Kant has named them collectively, the intuitive faculty, which is based on "*the capacity of being affected by sensuous objects.*"

Unfortunately, Kant has not carried out, from its very commencement, this investigation into the first origin of sensuous representations, into the possibility of sense-impressions upon the soul, the ordinary hypothesis of certain mental faculties, &c.; but he certainly started in this subject from the views, which were current at his time, of Locke; contented himself with having proved the existence of such intuitions in the mind negatively, namely, from the absolutely void character of the understanding *pro se*; treated the whole question as transcendent, but yet criticised and changed in the course of his investigation so much as regards the original impressions, that, at last, little or nothing more remained of them; so that, "without this ordi-

nary view," one cannot, to use the language of Jacobi*, "enter into the system of Kant, but with the same one cannot abide therein; for contrary as it may be to the spirit of the Kantian philosophy to speak of objects as making impressions upon the senses, and in this way bringing about representations, still it does not admit of being clearly seen how, without this supposition, the philosophy of Kant could justify itself, and attain to any exposition of its doctrinal system."

Without discussing the true cardinal question, as to what the consciousness may be,—a defect which *Carl Leonhard Reinhold* first of all felt and sought to better by his theory of the imaginative faculty,—Kant took up the notion of consciousness as he found it, and only investigated what might be sensuously empirical in the matter-of-fact content that was to be found in the consciousness, and what might be of a subjective *a priori* character; of the latter he pointed out the origin in the nature of the understanding; as to what remained, it should and must be derived from without, and the mind comports itself in reference to this in a "receptive" manner. Receptivity and spontaneity are inseparably combined in the perception, and work together, the first contributing the material, the latter the form to every experience.†

Would we now,—in returning to our above-mentioned question,—know what belongs to the one and what to the other factor; would we separate our subjective addition from the objective factor, in order to have the latter pure and, so to speak, in its full truth, we then encounter the peculiar difficulty, that of being unable to speak about a *pure, immediate* apprehension of the given in the consciousness, without, at the same time, in and with the apprehension investing the given with a subjective form. Now, this point being clear in reference to the so-called secondary properties of things which have been already mentioned above, such as heat, cold, colour, taste, and such like, there remain only the so-called primary qualities, *i. e.* those that are mathematically cognisable, quantity, extension, duration, and so forth.

If, however, we here, within the sphere of intuition, vindicate the same Kantian criterion of a-priority as above in that of

* In der Beilage zu dem Gespräch über Idealismus und Realismus. Sämtl. Werke, Bd. 2. p. 303.

† Kritik der reinen Vernunft, v. Anfang und in der Einleitung zur transcendentalen Logik.

the understanding, and accordingly acknowledge that here also every thing, which in the intuitive process bears on itself the character of universality and necessity, is an *a priori* or subjective addition,—it follows that we must again abstract from the objective content the general form of all sense-objects, namely, *time and space*.

Thus, all determinations of space and time, such as quantity, position, relative duration, and succession, are subjective additions, and not inherent in the things themselves. So soon as we represent any thing to ourselves intuitively, we must posit it in space and time; these are the general modes of intuition that reside in us, and without them no intuition would be possible; they are the antecedent conditions of its possibility, are consequently given *a priori*, and are no more abstracted from experience than those general categories, above cited, of the understanding; space and time are the categories of the sensitive faculty, present indeed originally in the mind, though just as little as the categories of the understanding, in the state of ready prepared notions, or as a mere dead framework, but as the mind's way of acting when in the state of intuition. Nevertheless, Kant does not call them categories, but, to distinguish them from the latter, universal schemata or forms of the sensuous intuition.

Accordingly, the whole aspect and content, the whole phenomenon or appearance of things, as they are presented to our inward eye, is in its nature subjective, and there is nothing in this which we can regard as the nature of the thing in itself. What then, it may be asked, remains of the sensations, the content as empirically presupposed? If of the true nature of things in themselves, as they occur to us only in space and time, we can learn actually nothing either through the senses or the understanding, still, before we can know such to be the case, we must learn always from experience *that* they are there and actually present. Every thing is for us only a phenomenon, but *that a phenomenon exists or is present*, and thus the *existence or nonexistence* of a phenomenon must be given us *a posteriori*. Thus, the objects to be presupposed must so far exercise their influence upon us, as to make known to us their existence; the phenomena within us (whether corresponding little or much with the objects) must be evoked by a definite external something, though even this could in no other way be accomplished than, as it were, like the finger which, touching the chords of an

instrument, awakes the slumbering tones. Let us pause awhile over an example which Kant himself has given.* "In a rainbow," says he, "we shall indeed, in accordance with the ordinary mode of representation, first of all call the coloured arch a phenomenon present merely for us and our visual sense, but shall regard the rain-drops as the actual and true thing in itself that lies at the bottom of this phenomenon. But let us now consider that these drops again are only empirical phenomena, and then their round form, nay, even the space in which they are formed, are nothing in themselves but a mere modification or principle of our sensuous intuition; with all this, however, the object itself remains to us completely unknown." Could any thing further be added to this explanation, let us imagine ourselves to be looking into a kaleidoscope. As we turn it round different kinds of figures make their appearance, though the coloured bodies remain the same. I know well that the whole of the phenomenon (the juxtaposition and combination of the bits of glass, now to form a rose, now, on the other hand, a star) is not objectively the actual one, but is only effected by the position of the reflecting glasses, and thus by the construction of my organ (here=understanding). It may, however, be retorted that, if the combinations are not real, still the elements that are combined, viz. the several corpuscles themselves, with their colour, form, and nature, are actually as I see them. By no means. As regards their colour, and secondary qualities in general, the mere appearance of these has long since been determined; and as to what might be most certain in them, namely, their size, form, number, &c., in a word, the mathematical qualities without which they could not even be thought of as existing, all this is, on that very account, the more certainly of an *a priori* and subjective character." If now, at the conclusion of this so-called Kantian æsthetics (doctrine of sensuous intuition), we renew our question as to what then, in the representations, properly proceeds from the things themselves; nothing remains for us but the answer that, it is the existence only of a definite representation at a definite time and in a definite place, or the "now" and the "here" which originates from things in themselves. As to what concerns this bare "*existence*," without any determined cognition of that, which is present, this will be shown further on.

With these certainly unsatisfactory results, we now turn

* Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1ste. Ausg., p. 45.

from the senses and the understanding, to the highest faculty of the human mind, or to the reason, in order here, if possible, to obtain better counsel.*

In doing this, it is especially necessary once again to remind the reader, that the doctrine of the rational notions or ideas is here taken purely in the sense adopted by their teacher, and that every misinterpretation is set aside, which this doctrine subsequently experienced, particularly in the pains taken by Kant's disciples to bring the signification of ideas in a practical sense into accordance with the theory of their origin and logical use.

Kant himself has used the word "reason" in a double, namely, in a wider and a more restricted sense. In the former sense, it implies as much as the whole human faculty of cognition; and hence Kant called his entire investigation of this faculty a *Critick of Pure Reason*. In the latter, or stricter sense, the reason is with Kant distinct from the understanding, and a certain limit is marked out between the two, though this limit is no longer at the present day respected, even by his followers, in the same manner. The understanding was with Kant, in the stricter sense, that very faculty, which by means of its rules brings order and connection into the sensuous intuitions. The reason, upon the other hand, is, in the stricter sense, the faculty which by its laws brings again unity and connection into the use of the understanding.

This takes place by the confirmation of the judgments of the understanding upon higher principles, *i. e.* by conclusions. Thus the reason has here the function of a faculty for forming conclusions; and this is what has been called by Kant, the *formal* use of the reason. Now, just as the understanding, as the faculty of judging, can at the same time become conscious to itself of the rules or forms of this its activity, and can reduce these to abstract notions (categories), so also can the reason, as the faculty of forming conclusions, become self-conscious of the rules or forms of this process, and in like manner comprehend and represent the same, as abstract notions of a higher kind, *i. e.* as *ideas*, which are the same for *it* as the categories are for the understanding; for the efforts of the understanding, however, these ideas of reason become as it were the terminal or goal-points, for they represent to the understanding the unconditionality and absolute completeness, which is to be attained in knowledge, and

* Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Elementarlehre ii. Th. ii. Abth. II. I. Buch.

which the understanding by itself, busied with objects of experience, can in this its empirical sphere never discover. Thus, every single judgment of the understanding, *e. g.* that gold is undecomposable, remains unproved, and hence of an unsatisfactory character for our rational desire after perfected knowledge, until we have found the proposition, which contains the ground or principle of this assertion, and have placed this principle before the judgment in the form of a syllogism; thus, the elements are undecomposable, gold is an element, consequently gold is undecomposable. Again, we may probably have to prove this major proposition, that the elements are undecomposable, and for this purpose we must seek after a still higher and more general principle, and so on, until we arrive at some one highest, and perfectly certain truth. Thus, in this logical procedure, when regarded from a general point of view, we see a general tendency upon the part of the cognitive faculty to a complete, unconditional, or absolute knowledge.*

Now, as for the understanding there were just as many categories as there are modes of combination between predicate and subject, *i. e.* forms of judgment, so also for the reason there will be just as many ideas as there are modes of combination of the judgments among one another to form conclusions,—syllogistic forms. Now, of these there are three; the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive; all three advance forwards through syllogistic series, thus all three are the kinds or modes of this onward march, and indicate or imply the tendency of the thinking process towards the summit of perfection, or to absolute cognition, this tendency being satisfied in a threefold manner, — categorically, hypothetically, and disjunctively; in a categorical manner, when the perfection of the connection is attained according to the logical relation of subject and predicate (or substance and accident); in an hypothetical manner, when the perfection is reached according to the relation of cause and effect; and disjunctively when the same is reached according to the relation of the parts and the whole. This threefold perfection, reduced to abstract notions, and designated by substantive words, is in the first case that of absolute substantiality (*Subjektivität*); in the second, that of absolute dependence or conditionality of all singulars

* Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 323. und 325. 1ste Ausgabe. Joh. Schulze, Erläuterungen über Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Königsberg, 1784, p. 91. *et seq.* Fries, Neue Kritik der Vernunft, Bd. ii. p. 32.

among one another to constitute a whole ; in the third, that of the complex or perfection of every thing that is conceivable as possible. Were we now to take this subjective tendency to perfection which here hovers as a rule before the reason and renders it the goal of the understanding, otherwise losing itself in particulars, and because this tendency imparts to the understanding some final direction, transfer it to the reality itself, and then, regarding as we may the categories of the understanding as conditions of nature in themselves, think in like manner of these categories of the reason as realised ; the latter then appear, first, as the idea of an absolute subject (which we think of chiefly as an immortal soul) ; secondly, as the idea of nature or the world (the totality of all conditions and phenomena) ; and thirdly, as the most perfect Essence, or the Deity, *ens realissimum*, which is the complex of all reality, or that which excludes all negations, all defect. These three ideas would thus furnish the principles of the three divisions of metaphysics, namely, rational psychology, cosmology, and theology ; they would constitute a durable foundation for metaphysics, if only it could be determined, that these ideas, which originally indicate only forms or laws of our subjective activity of reason, were on that very account to refer to something essential in reality, or, in other words, that, apart from the above specified *logico*-formal use of them in framing conclusions, they were to admit in theory of another, or the so-called *material* use. This use they certainly obtain in the practical philosophy, where these ideas have a causal character in reference to our actions, and appear as the ideal of virtue, justice, and such like ; the further development of which subjects, however, does not belong to this place.

If we now seek to fathom still further the relation of the reason to the understanding, we then impinge in Kant upon the definitely expressed twofold question (*Kritik*, ed. i. p. 305.), "Can we isolate the reason (*i.e.* from the understanding), and is the reason then a peculiar source of notions and judgments, which originate solely from it ; and does the reason thereby bear reference to objects of a special, and by it alone, cognisable character ?" Kant's reply is, that the reason does admit of being isolated ; it admits of being easily recognised as a special faculty distinct from the understanding in this way, that the understanding has to deal directly with the sensitive faculty, but the reason directly with the understanding. The former has reference to experience, but the latter has to deal only

with itself, with the rational process of thought, and busies itself solely with *the completion of our subjective consciousness*. This becomes still more distinct, if we compare and distinguish the objects with which the two faculties, each in its own sphere, are engaged. The understanding has its notions and judgments framed according to its categories; such, properly speaking, and in themselves, are relations of thought, which are, however, expressly and exclusively applied to *experience*, and can and ought to obtain in the *external world* their verification and content. The reason has, on the contrary, to deal with *ideas, i. e.*, with representations, of which the reason itself knows and declares that they never find their object in any sensuous experience, that they are only pure products, syntheses of the reason itself, the truth or falsity of which cannot be confirmed or discovered by any experience.* “The reason,” says Kant, “here busies itself merely with itself, and broods over its own conceptions.” All pure cognitions of the understanding are characterised by having their notions given in experience, and their principles admit of being confirmed by experience, while, on the contrary, the transcendent cognitions of reason neither, as concerns their ideas, are given in experience, nor do their propositions ever admit of being confirmed in or refuted by experience; hence the errors which have probably crept into this branch of our inquiry can be discovered by nothing else but pure reason.

Thus, according to Kant, we cannot distinguish between conception and idea so as to affirm, as has been often done, that a conception or notion originates from experience, but that an idea is an *a priori* cognition of transcendent things. For neither of them originates from experience, neither of them is given *a priori* ready prepared or innate as an abstract representation in the consciousness. The original mental activity is given only in their definite forms and modes, and from these innate modes and laws we make for ourselves, *in abstracto*, a conception or an idea.

Thus Kant believed that he had pointed out, in the most definite manner, that there is indeed a higher faculty in man, distinct from the understanding, that this has special representations differing from the conceptions of the understanding, but that these are thoroughly devoid of all application to reality, nay, that they are not even capable, like the *a priori* conceptions of the understanding, of any confirmation by experience,

* Kritik, p. 308. *et seq.* Proleg. § 56. *et seq.*

but that they are rather, to speak quite correctly, framed by the reason, with the consciousness that no object corresponds to them in reality. On this account, he considers it as his greatest merit, in regard to metaphysics, to have revealed this distinction between conceptions of the understanding and ideas of the reason; since the former must always be applied to experience, while the latter, as their application to experience is not admissible, must, as often as notwithstanding they are applied to it, bring about in metaphysics only contradictions and phantoms of the brain.

From all this we readily discern, that the reason, as Kant comprehended it, is at bottom only a purely formal, logical faculty of reflection in a higher potence or degree; that it really differs, when reduced to these limits, in no respect from the understanding; just as its ideas also, in accordance with their origin and use, are none other than the highest conceptions of abstraction or reflection of which our thinking faculty is capable. For to what purpose does the reason frame its ideas? and what use is granted them in the theory of cognition? Kant limits their application to one of a regulative (not a constitutive) character; regulative as regards the tendency of the understanding to strive constantly within, but never beyond its sphere, namely, of experience, after a more perfect state of cognition—a goal, after which the understanding must never cease to strive, although it never can attain it. “In the domain of cognition,” says Kant in the Preface to his *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, “no other faculty than the understanding can suggest constitutive principles of cognition *a priori*, and the Critick (of Theoretical Reason) leaves nothing but what the understanding prescribes *a priori*, as a law for nature, or as an abstract complex of phenomena, but banishes all other pure notions among those ideas, which, though they abound for our theoretical faculty of cognition, are not therefore useless or superfluous, but serve as regulative principles to restrain, in part, the anxious pretensions of the understanding, and partly to guide it in the consideration of nature to a principle of perfection (though it can never attain this), and by these means to promote the final object of all cognition. Thus it was truly the understanding, which having its own domain, and that indeed within the faculty of cognition, in so far as it contains constitutive principles of cognition *a priori*, was to be secured by the generally so-called Critick of Pure Reason against all competitors in sole pos-

session of this domain. In like manner, its proper domain has been assigned to the reason, which no where, save in respect to the faculty of desire or aspiration, contains constitutive principles *a priori*."

In fact, we do not know whether, in accordance with this limitation, the reason prescribes laws to the understanding, or whether the latter serves the reason; the reason gives the understanding its direction, but forbids it to arrogate to itself any independent cognition within the sphere of reality; the reason ranks upon the one hand above the understanding, and prescribes to it regulative principles, by indicating directly to it the goals after which it is to strive, but at the same time also pointing out the limit beyond which it is not to pass, a goal which it is not even to get possession of. The understanding, on the contrary, in possession of the only instrument for making objectively valid cognitions, forbids in its turn the reason from holding its ideas as any thing actual or real, and accuses it of incompetent extravagance so soon as, independently of the understanding, the reason presumes to cognise any thing of itself. Hence Jacobi, in his essay entitled, "Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen,"* says, "according to Kant's mode of reconciliation, the following contrast exists between the two faculties; the reason has to forbid to the understanding the process of negation, the understanding, on the contrary, to the reason that of affirmation; the reason has to respect the understanding, and is *positively* circumscribed by it; the understanding, on the contrary, obtains from the reason only an apparent limitation, a *negative* circumscription, and without giving up its own intelligibility, makes use of the ideas of the reason in order to expand to the utmost degree its own sphere. The reason sits in the upper, the understanding in the lower house; the *latter* representing the sensitive faculty, the real sovereignty, without whose ratification nothing can have any validity or worth."

In order, however, to show the inapplicability of ideas to actual objects, it was not enough to have pointed out their subjective origin,—for this had been also done with the categories of the understanding,—but the insufficiency of such a use of the reason must be exposed also in the results. This was done in the section which Kant calls the *Dialectik* of Reason. The reason is there proved, from its nature, to be purely for-

* Sämmtl. Werke, iii. p. 82.

mal, and useful merely for logical purposes, and most strikingly so, from the fact that contradictions and paralogisms appear, as soon as we attribute objective truth to ideas, *i. e.* so soon as we think of that which they indicate, as being actually existing objects.

We easily perceive that the first idea, or the notion of substance, in the mode in which it has been usually, and also in the school of Wolf, apprehended, would be nothing but an empty logical notion of relation, applicable merely to the form of the thinking process, the act of synthesis itself. We usually regard each thing as a definite something (substance), which has in itself different qualities (accidents); *e. g.* salt is a substance, which has a cubic form, a definite savour, a definite hardness, weight, and is of a white colour; if, however, we separate these five (or more) qualities, which we think of as dependent upon the body in question, and then ask ourselves what is left, it is found, that with all the accidents, every thing, even the substance itself, is gone, and hence we see clearly, that by the so-called substance, is only meant the abstract complex, comprehension, or synthesis of these qualities in the consciousness, but not something over and above them, which made up as it were their hidden nucleus or essence. In this case, the relation stands the same as it does with the whole; a whole disappears, when we take away all the parts whereof it consists. There is, however, a single essence, which here appears to form an exception to the above rule, and in which we seem to have detected and retained, when abstraction is made of all accidents, a pure subject, a true substance; and this is our own soul. For the accidents or determinations of the soul are representations, feelings, and such like; in short, all that takes place upon or within the soul, is but a modification, a change of its nature; and thus the soul itself, in which something must take place, must be present, and lie at the foundation. It here seems that we have encountered a true, pure subject, and that indeed, directly within ourselves, within our own consciousness, a subject that is directly self-conscious of its personality, identity, and so on. But, nevertheless, when closely considered, the reality of this subject depends, according to Kant, upon only one conclusion, and that indeed a false one or *paralogism*, although such is unavoidable — unavoidable, because we always find ourselves necessitated to presuppose in the accidents, changes, and determinations, a something which is changed; but, still, a false conclusion,

because only the modifications of this thinking, feeling subject, enter our consciousness; its modifications *only*, i. e. its changing feelings, thoughts, and consequently its accidents, enter our consciousness, but never the pure subject or substance of the soul in itself. This last remains eternally unknown to us, and never becomes an object of the internal, let alone the external experience; the adoption of its existence merely depends upon a conclusion of the reason, but one which is a paralogism or false one.* Thus it fares with this subject, as with every other; we know just as little of the interior of the soul as of the essence of material things; if we abstract all thinking, feeling, and such like, in short, all accidents from the same, there remains for us nothing but a void, the bare, logical complex, which can signify nothing but the comprehension of all those accidents in the consciousness, or, as Kant says, only the form of the *apperception*, which belongs to every experience, and accompanies it as the thought, "I think." But, if even for the functions of thinking, a common subject must be presupposed, which we call Ego, still this thing would be in itself only the *thought* of an abstract something, in its essence quite uncognisable, and all the conclusions, whereby we invest it with the attributes of immateriality, incorruptibility, personality, immortality, &c., would be paralogisms, because they transfer that which holds good of the bare thought, or the bare and certainly simple representation of the Ego, to a *real* essence lying at bottom, and so, in forming the conclusion, take the logical subject in a double sense, whence originates the well-known fallacy, which is called *sophisma figuræ dictionis*. "It is obvious," says Kant, "that the subject, which is appended by the little word *Ego* to the thought in the proposition 'I think,' contains not the least quality, nor any cognisable element. It signifies a something, whose representation must certainly be simple, because we determine nothing whatever in it, and nothing whatever can well be represented more simply than by the notion of a bare something. The simplicity, however, of the *representation* of a subject is not on that account a cognition of the simplicity of the subject itself; for abstraction is entirely made of qualities, when the subject is solely indicated by the utterly empty expression *Ego*." And just as it is with simplicity, so it is also with the conclusions framed upon the remaining pretended qualities of that subject; — in short, by the Ego, or this pretended sim-

* Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 431. *et seq.*

ple' substance, which is placed beneath thought as a thinking something, is truly implied nothing more than the "function of the synthesis," *i. e.* the activity of thought itself, without any intuition or object, and thus it holds good only as the condition of all our cognitions, as the form of intellectual unity, into which they are combined, but not of any object to be specified.

We have extracted these statements from Kant, because of their especial importance to us in the sequel, when we come to consider the reverse application made of them by Herbart and by Fichte. With Kant, this line of argumentation was first of all directed against the Wolfian school, and so far, it fully hit the point intended, seeing that this very school endeavoured in the same way to prove a reality, and substantiality of the soul or mind, which amounted in the end to nothing else but the simple "condition" above mentioned.

As to what concerns the second idea, that of the universe, or nature, which should lead to a rational cosmology, the reason lays claim to absolute perfection in the composition of the universe, of quantity, quality, causality (relation), and necessity (modality). As regards the psychological idea, nothing whatever, as has been shown, admits of being validly proved; here, however, in reference to the world, the spatio-temporal, we encounter the strange phenomenon, that at any time, the opposite of one view admits of being proved as well as the other, the thesis as well as the antithesis. Such are the remarkable contradictions of the reason with itself, or the so-called *Antinomies*.

I can, forsooth, neither represent to myself, that the world has *no* beginning in time, nor *that* it has one; neither that it has nor has not any limits in space. I can represent to myself, that any substance could be continually divided into smaller and ever smaller parts, without my ever arriving at the smallest divisions, or at any thing indivisible; but I cannot, on the other hand, represent to myself this process of division as being eternally continued, because, so soon as one thinks of the whole as compounded or put together, one presupposes at the same time along with it particles or atoms, that are regarded in themselves as single. Thirdly, if I am obliged to think to myself that whatever happens has a cause, and every cause in its turn another cause, on which it is founded, it follows that I must ultimately think to myself of a first cause, which has for itself no ulterior cause, and is consequently unconditioned, absolute, or free. And lastly, a highest, as the necessarily

presupposed cause of the world, can neither be represented as immanent, or residing in the world itself, since, then, the world must have its cause within itself, *i. e.* the world must, before it existed, have created itself; nor can I think of this world-cause as external to or above the world, and distinct from it in a temporo-spatial manner, or as extramundane, since then the very connection of the world, as an effect with its cause, being wholly suppressed, would consequently admit of no explanation; still, as a true beginning of the world, the world-cause must be thought of as connected in time and space with its product, like germ and plant, and so immanent in character.

These contradictions necessarily originate from my applying the forms of finitude to that infinite which my reason strives to attain; or in turn, this infinite to the complex of the finite, the world. In a word, what vexes me in these antinomies, is the self-contradicting and hence impossible problems, which I set before myself; namely, to think the infinite finite, or the finite infinite. For while I posit the finite infinitely, I can never come to an end, and so fall into a *progressus in infinitum*, which at the very first outset has the same fate which it will have in every attempt that is repeated into the endless; I add finite to finite, space to space, time to time, cause to cause, and such like; but as that, which I add, is in its nature only a finite, and thus the same which I had already, I never reach the end, or perfect state; the problem constantly originates anew, and it fares with me, as Haller says, of Eternity,—

Monstrous numbers heap I up,
 Millions piling mountains high,
 Time unto time I add,
 World heaped on world doth lie.
 Yet, when I from this fearful height
 Bewildered look again for thee;
 Though waxed a thousandfold in might,
 The numbers—yield no part of thee!

Thus, Kant is of opinion that we must, upon consideration, acknowledge that so soon as we speak of the universe or world, we have to deal with the thoroughly finite, and cannot, without contradiction, transfer to the latter the form of the infinite, the ideas; or, as he expresses it, apply what is only a form of the phenomenon to the being and essence (or thing in itself). For in this way, the All or the universe would, on the one hand, be resolved without foundation and nucleus into a bare manifestation; and, on the other hand, this manifestation would at the

same time be explained as the essence *per se*. Now, as we necessarily presuppose such an internal essence, and cannot regard the phenomenon as constituting this, that very essence or thing in itself remains, apart from the phenomenon, totally uncognisable by our reason. Thus, Kant would rather consider the manifested being as wholly abstracted from its phenomenal form, than the latter as identified with the former, and this from a fear of wholly losing, by such a step, the infinite, as positively existing *pro se*, and in this way of relapsing again into an absolute naturalism and sensationalism. Nevertheless, when the subsequent philosophy pursued this very path, it was inevitable that the dialectick, which Kant here represents as a sophistic game, and limits to this subject of the phenomenal world, should elevate itself to a comprehensive method, expand itself over the whole system, comprise every thing within itself, and convert philosophy itself into a philosophy of nature, and with this, render all its content, nature, and nature the absolute. Kant sought for, but did not find a formula, in which, while the infinite was retained together with the finite, the two were, nevertheless, kept or held together without their absolute identification. So much then concerning these so-called Antinomies.

LECTURE III.

KANT (*continued*). JACOBI.

KANT declared that it is as impossible to prove the actual existence of our own soul as a special self-subsistent substance, or as a real subject, as to comprehend the existence of an all-embracing world-system, and finally to demonstrate also the existence of God; for the attempts to do this do not indeed lead, in the first and third idea, to obvious contradictions, as in the second, but depend upon paralogisms or false conclusions, and are, logically speaking, devoid of all power.

This is most distinctly shown in the third idea, which we have now to regard still more closely, namely the idea of Deity, or the most perfect essence, which originates solely from the form of the disjunctive syllogism*, a form which aims at the absolute perfection of the members of a division, or the complex of all that is possible or cogitable within a certain sphere. This perfection, being hypostasized, gives the idea of an absolutely perfect essence (*ens realissimum*). Now, this idea, from its including the definition of an individual essence, a personality or personification within itself, Kant does not call an idea, but an *ideal*, and pre-eminently indeed, *the ideal of pure reason*.

But here again, the same illusion, as in the previous instance, creeps in. The whole idea is, properly speaking, nothing more than the form of the disjunctive syllogism *in abstracto*, nothing but the logical conception of the absolute integrity, of all the essential parts, which appertain unto a whole, the conception of the highest conceivable unity in the fulness of the highest perfection, and free from any gap or deficiency. Now this abstract notion, and one that cannot be represented in the concrete, which has no more real existence than the expressions, justice, goodness, beauty, truth, and others—in a word, this bare ultimatum of thought—must first be realised, hypostasized, and personified by means of the imagination, in order to render it that which we are accustomed to think of to ourselves under the term God.

* A is either b or c or d ; now A is neither c nor b , thus it is d ; for example, an angle is either a right angle, an acute, or an obtuse angle; now it is not a right angle, and so on.

Now, since we learn nothing by merely negative definitions, unless a thoroughly definite idea is already presupposed and present to the mind, *an omnitudo realitatis*, which could comprehend the whole fulness of positive qualities within itself; it follows that that conception or idea of an *ens realissimum* is, as a measure or ideal, the condition certainly of a perfect *cognition*, without which we could not sufficiently judge the individual, limited and special things, seeing that this can only be done by surveying them in all their possible bearings and relations, or, in a word, the singular in the totality. But even if this requirement of the reason to apprehend things perfectly presupposes such an idea, it still does not follow from this, that to the idea must correspond an existence, and an actual persistent essence apart from our thought. To admit this is to attempt to found what has been called an *ontological proof*, which, repeated under a variety of forms since the time of Anselm of Canterbury, was at length restricted by some disciples of Wolf to the formula, that among the predicates contained in the conception of the most absolutely perfect (God), that also of *existence* belonged, the existentia or reality being a complement of the possibility, but the most perfect, the complex only of all conceivable possibilities. Hence, Kant saw himself induced to criticise this and the remaining proofs of the existence of God. It is not his intention to represent the dialectic of this "Ideal of Reason" as one resulting in contradictions, like that of the antimonies, but only to point out the formal or logical insufficiency of the proofs adduced. There are, he says, only three kinds of proof; for we either proceed in dealing with these from a *definite* experience, namely, from the teleological constitution of the world (physico-theological proof) or from general experience (cosmological), or finally, from no experience whatever, and then abide by that conception *a priori* (ontological proof). If, therefore, in the sequel, he posited in place of these abortive proofs something else, or the moral foundation, still he would not acknowledge the latter to be a proof, but called it a *postulate* of the practical reason.

As regards the ontological proof, it is clear, in the first place, from the origin above indicated of the idea of the most perfect essence, that it is, properly speaking, only the hypostasizing of a logical law of thought, and is no essence in itself; but apart even from this consideration, it is easy to detect the illogical procedure in this hypostasizing. It amounts to the confounding, already

censured in the paralogisms, of the logical and the actual object. We have spoken at all times of the absolutely necessary essence, and sought to prove its existence, but have not taken the pains to inquire whether and how we could think to ourselves of a thing of this kind. A nominal explanation of the matter is indeed quite easy, namely, that there may be something, *whose non-being is impossible*; but in this way we do not become one jot wiser in respect to the conditions which render it impossible to regard the non-being of such a thing as absolutely inconceivable, and yet these conditions are, properly speaking, that very something which we would know and indicate by the above proof.

We quote, indeed, examples from mathematics of necessary propositions, for example, that a triangle has of necessity three angles; but all the examples we can adduce of such a necessity are, without exception, examples only of *judgments*, but not of *things* and their existence. It is necessary for a triangle to have three angles, *if*, forsooth, it exists; or, *when* once the idea of a triangle is *thought* of, it must be thought of as having three angles; *that*, however, it must be so thought of, does not follow from the relation of the logical subject and predicate in the judgment, and just as little, that if thought of, it should actually *be*, or exist. From all such examples we perceive, rather, that, in order to prove the necessity of such an existence, we must already have presupposed this existence; but whether this supposition be necessary remains thoroughly unproved. In an identical judgment, such as the above, where the three angles (the predicate) and the triangle (the subject) are one and the same, I cannot suppress the angles and leave the triangle remaining—for this would be a contradiction; but I can posit the two together, or also suppress them, without contradiction; thus, the triangle itself is not even necessary. “Now the same holds good of the idea of an absolutely necessary essence. If you suppress its existence, you thus suppress the thing itself, with all its predicates, and where then shall the contradiction originate?” *i. e.* how shall a necessity of thinking of it be admitted? Now, there remains no escape for us but to say, that if this holds good of some and of many things, there are still subjects, and especially *one*, namely, that of the most real being, which cannot be suppressed at all in thought, and so must remain, if even I suppress every other. This, however, can absolutely hold good only of thought itself, but not of any subject posited as existing out of my thought, not even of the absolute; for

either it would be identical with thought, and would then be nothing "*pro se*," or it would not be identical; and then no contradiction with the thought would originate, if I were to suppress it. "I ask you," says Kant, "is the proposition, this or that thing *exists*, an analytical (identical) or synthetical proposition? If it be the former, you add nothing through the existence of the thing to your thought of the thing; but then *either the thought that is in you must be the thing itself*, or you have *supposed* an existence, as appertaining to the possibility, and concluded as to the existence, on the pretence of the internal possibility." We see distinctly how near Kant was to expressing himself in the manner to which Hegel at a far later period found himself constrained, when on the same path of inquiry: the Absolute (God) is the mere essence which is thinking and thought of, because it is that in us which thinks; thinking is identical with what is thought ("the thought that is in you is the thing itself,") or, the Absolute is the thinking process itself, and so cannot be suppressed without the thinking process being itself suppressed. Thus, the ontological proof can only succeed upon the basis of an absolute idealism, or idealistic pantheism; this last, however, was thoroughly contrary to Kant's views; so that, from his stand-point, he could not consent to that line of argument in reference to the infinite (God), inasmuch as it is, as is self-evident, applicable to the representations of finite things. In the former, as in the latter case, the thought and the existence fall, with Kant, absolutely asunder; and the thought has God as an existent (essence in itself) just as apart from itself as any other object; for example, like a hundred thalers, which are no more actually present for myself, if I only think them, than any thing is wanting to the sum of a hundred real dollars, in case I do not think them. The actual or real contains nothing more and nothing less than that which is represented or set before the mind; "a hundred real dollars contain not a jot more or less than a hundred possible dollars," for were my representation to express, in the least degree, any thing else than what lies in the reality, this representation would then not be the directly adequate representation of *this* object. Thus, from the mere notion of a thing, its existence admits by no means of being "elicited," but, something more is requisite for this purpose, namely, a direct perception of the object; this, however, in the present instance, as with all ideas, is impossible, because their objects cannot be given in any possible experience — the experience deals with the finite, and is itself

never completed ; that, however, which corresponds to the ideas must be the infinite, absolutely unconditioned and universal.

With the ontological proof, however, the two other kinds stand and fall likewise. The cosmological, which Leibnitz termed the proof "*à contingencia mundi*," begins or sets out from experience, and that indeed from the object of all possible experience, *i.e.* the universe, and thus is not wholly of an *a priori* character. It depends, upon the one hand, upon the existence of the world, and because this is a something accidental, not bearing its cause within itself, infers, upon the other hand, the unconditioned. Kant, however, says, that if the ontological proof were correct, it would then stand in no need of this cosmological proof ; but if the former be not correct, then the latter proves nothing, for it again relies upon the ontological, namely, upon the supposition that an *ens realissimum* must necessarily be or exist. If the thing whose existence is inferred be accidental, then the cause also is as accidental as the thing is ; and as the latter can be dispensed with, so also can the former. Thus the proof does not lead at all to an essence necessary in itself, still less to one that is absolutely perfect, and which we call God. This must be already proved ontologically ; but were this presupposed being a necessary one, then the matter under consideration would be inverted and the things would be also necessary, and consequently it would require no proof. Thus the world is either to be comprehended itself as necessary, and then there is no special extramundane God ; or it is accidental, and then also a most perfect and divine being is unnecessary. Thus this so-called cosmological proof is nothing else than a surreptitious inversion of the ontological one, but is no more stringent than the latter.

Now, as neither the conception of the most perfect Being in itself, nor that of accidental existence, suffices, for basing proofs upon, it only remains for us to form our conclusions from a *definite* experience, and indeed from the association and form of things in this empirical world, which appears as one *conformable to purpose or design*, to be well and wisely disposed. The proof which is deduced from the world's conformity to purpose, is called the physico-theological. Now, true indeed it is that the present world reveals to us such an immeasurable scene of variety, teleological adaptation, order, and beauty, that we may reasonably enough fall into astonishment and wonder at its contemplation, and think of the primitive cause of this arrangement as of a mind and will perfect beyond all comparison.

“ This proof deserves, therefore, to be mentioned always with respect ; it is the oldest, clearest, and that which is most adapted to the ordinary human understanding.” Nevertheless it cannot lay claim also to apodictical certainty. For, in the first place, this process of thought, built upon the analogy of human works of art, can only lead us to a wise author of the *form* of the world, but not of its substance or matter also, and consequently to an architect only of the world, but not to a creator of it and an all-sufficient primordial being. In order to prove the latter also, we must return to the cosmological proof, and (since this, as has been shown, proves by itself alone nothing) we must ultimately have recourse to the ontological, which is and remains always the final basis of the whole argumentation. Add to this, that if experience could actually instruct us concerning teleological adaptation and wisdom pervading the events of nature, it would still become just as doubtful as in the cosmological proof, whether we ought not in that case rather to bestow upon nature an immanent blindly-working law of life, than ascribe to it a supramundane and spiritual author ; but if experience does not demonstrate to us a perfect and constantly uniform regularity—experience, as aforesaid, never indicating, in fact, absolute perfection—it follows that the argument in behalf of an absolutely wise and most perfect author falls to the ground ; for, if the manifest imperfections of things were equally to be laid to his account, the author would then appear at the most only as a *relatively* mighty, wise, and benevolent being. But, finally, there holds good of all these proofs, what we were reminded of in the beginning, that by virtue of the principle of causality, definitions are transferred to the transcendent being, which, according to the Critick, have validity only in the domain of sensuous phenomena, since the necessity of such synthetical judgments *a priori* followed only upon this, that without them no *experience* would be possible ; where, however, there is and can be no experience whatever, as here within the pale of ideas, that foundation also falls away, and with it all the apparent authenticity that has been derived therefrom.

Since then, it has been made out, as a consequence of the Critick of Pure Reason, that the proper objects of metaphysics, namely, God, universe, and mind (freedom, subjective being) are wholly inaccessible to our cognition, and lie beyond the limit of all philosophical *knowledge*,—nay, further, as it is proved, that those ideas are originally, and in good truth abstract

indications only of our human form of thought, and, as being borrowed from the latter, are thus forms, which we first abstract, then by means of the so-called real use of the reason objectify (or think of as objects) and in part personify, — it follows from all that has been said that we cannot indulge the least hope of ever learning, by the help of speculation, whether or not there are transcendent beings that correspond to these ideas; nay, if we look to the established natural origin, primary signification of these ideas, it follows in fact that every firm foundation as regards the confidence of our belief in the existence of such objects is withdrawn, and that we should be given up to the most inconsolable doubt, if no other and better foundation were possible. Far from wishing to attack those objects and charge them with the contradiction, Kant rather turns his dialectic against the method of cognising and proving them, considering that this only is scientifically worthless and futile, as tending to debase the objects themselves into notions full of contradictions.

Nevertheless, in order to aid, in another way, the highest interests of humanity, and to rebuild, what he had demolished with the one hand, more firmly and fairly with the other, Kant felt that, quitting the sphere of true philosophical knowledge, he must have recourse to another sphere, or that of *practical rational belief*. And here it was, in fact, that he acquired by his doctrine an approbation and consent among educated persons, which was just as great in itself as the revolution which he had occasioned in the school of philosophy by the theoretical part of his system. The conviction of the truth of the transcendent, which we obtain in this way, should be considered as in nowise inferior in certainty to the theoretical truth. We are not indeed able to acquire any cognitions upon the subject, but still we may acquire certainty, certainty indeed though not *knowledge* in its true sense. Kant even wrote a *Metaphysics of Ethicks*, and a *Critick of Practical Reason*, but protested most emphatically against all empirical dealing with the moral principle, which, though established by him *a priori*, was, nevertheless, not to be called a true knowledge and cognition, but only *belief*.

“Finally, and once for all,” says Kant, “a pure moral philosophy must be worked out, which is to be purified from every

empirico-anthropological ingredient.”* “For so soon as we adopt what is empirically given in the principles of such philosophy, we defile that which *ought to be*, by that which *is* but is not as it should be, elevate that which should not be to a law, and so corrupt the morals.” Now it is this point of view which properly distinguishes Kant’s ethics from every preceding science of morals, and especially from that of Wolf; for the latter, paying no regard to the source from whence the material or subject-matter proceeds, whether *a priori* from the reason, or *a posteriori* from the sensuous experience, applied itself directly in an uncritical manner to the material which the empirical psychology presented, *i. e.* to the description of that which human beings usually desire and readily perform, formed from this, by abstraction, notions more or less universal, and in this way brought about only a system of that which usually happens, in other words, a system of eudæmonism.

In searching then in a pure *a priori* manner for a principle and determinations, Kant was desirous of grappling with the innermost and highest principle of the human mind—that which, in the theoretical reason, would not admit of being apprehended as substance and *Ego*—as a *principle* of freedom, and dragging it forth into open daylight. This principle he detected, and established therewith the centre of gravity of his whole philosophy, as well as that of the later and most recent schools. With the closer determinations of this principle, however, and the further genetic deduction of the content, matters remained as of old through want of a speculative method. As in the theoretical part of the system, the transcendent and unconditioned, though every where presupposed under the name of the “thing in itself,” was not however more closely defined and cognised, so also here, in the practical part, the principle of freedom remains perfectly void, indefinite, and abstract; it appears like a germ, impulse, or well-spring, from which every thing or nothing can proceed, being devoid of any internal nature or pre-established organisation. Devoid of determination, as it is in itself, it emerges or passes out of itself into externality, and so, from this, receives for the first time a configuration or form; the content which it obtains, it obtains only from the other principle, the empirical; for this content consists of inclinations and desires; and what these human impulses may be and to what they tend can only be determined

* Einleitung zur Rechtslehre, p. 16. Grundlegung zur Metaph. der Sitten, Vorrede.

by the feeling of pleasure and disgust, consequently not *a priori*, but by or through experience. Now, in order not to come into conflict "heteronomically" with these physical determinations, but to assert its antonomy, or at least its auto-cracy, the principle of freedom must never venture so far in its dealings with this heterogeneous material as to suffer the same to hold good for its own nature; as a self-subsistent principle and as freedom it can only preserve itself in the antagonism and conflict with that material, and in this very struggle consists virtue and morality. Accordingly, the subject must posit itself alone, as its end or aim, the maintenance of its abstract freedom; and, for the sake of this aim, it must not venture to pursue any objective one, since by giving itself up to some foreign purpose, it would surrender its own self; for were the realisation of an *object* to become the aim and motive of the will, the subject would then have conceded to that object a deficiency as felt to exist within itself, would have subordinated itself to the object, degraded itself into the means for another, while this in turn would have become its lord or master. Thus the subject, in order to be free, must divest itself entirely of the natural desires, must do what is good in conformity with duty only and for the good's sake, but not from mere inclination. Since, however, it was not said in what the content of this good or virtue consists, there thus remained for the subject only the negative determination, of immunity, absolution, and freedom from every sensuous element. In this way, the Kantian moral drove the *Ego*, in a stoical fashion, back from the conflict with the natural impulses and with life, into itself, instead of letting it be positively a freely-active power of nature. Besides, this principle of human freedom is nothing of an individual or self-interested character, for it says, in merely a *general* way, will and act constantly in such wise that you never lower the *humanity* within you to a mere means, and thus as little in others as in yourself; this law, however, of the "categorical imperative," as Kant called it, remained by virtue of this very apprehension of it as "law" necessarily imprisoned in an antagonism to another external element, and on that account fundamentally and essentially within the category of justice, without attaining to the higher stage of freedom, or to morality in the stricter sense, which must nevertheless be distinguished from the sphere of justice or right.

Despite, therefore, the declaration that was made by Kant of

his wishing to erect a pure metaphysics of morality *a priori*, his ethics remained, from the above-mentioned reasons, a mixed, or half-empirical, half-philosophic science, not a pure, but a so-called applied philosophy, instead of being recognised, as it ought to be, in conformity with the original plan and tendency, as the direct conclusion and crowning summit of the whole system, even of the metaphysics or doctrine of cognition, *i. e.* of the theoretical philosophy.

We believe that we do not err, when we discern in this result an explanatory hint as to the direction which was at once taken by the stream of philosophical inquiry subsequently to the time of Kant. The ethical principle, the freedom, is the centre of gravity with Kant and the moving spring of the whole modern philosophy. With Kant, however, the point is already seen, upon which this principle impinges and finds itself retarded; it is the impenetrable empiricism, the unrecognised, uncomprehended *nature*, which still mightily and perversely opposes that principle, as a strange, gloomy object, as a something directly given, a limit of the will as well as of the cognition. Natural science must first of all aid in breaking through this barrier, and rendering translucent this gloomy objectivity. Busied apparently with other and utterly profane things, or with the *natura bruta*, the philosophy of nature stands nevertheless in the service, and works in the interests of ethics, to render smooth the pathway of freedom, and conduct this repudiated principle to its full rights. Without this interest and without this aim, though probably not distinctly known to itself, the science of nature would be but a partner of trade and a playmate of idle curiosity.

Kant himself was impelled by this mysterious presentiment; his favourite studies had always been natural science and anthropology; and upon these subjects he wrote so much, that the number of his treatises almost equals that of Aristotle, and finally, by his "*Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*," he struck out a new path of cognition in this department. But still more remarkable is it, that having divided the system of philosophy, according to ancient usage, into a theoretical and practical branch, he should himself discover traces therein of a deficiency or gap, and so intercalated between these two halves a third part under the title of a *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, which was indeed to form a connecting

link or copula between the two, but has in fact for its content a theory of the teleological notion, by means of which, if Kant had been in earnest with the subject, the subjectivity of the theoretical portion would have been completely suppressed, and the abstract character of the ethical principle successfully filled up. In fact, Kant had in that work, but without clearly recognising it, encountered the deeper point of mediation, which in the sequel proved a new and fruitful germ of thought, while his own school troubled itself for a long time in vain, to discover a common principle for the two parts of his system, — the theoretical and practical philosophy, — and felt deeply the schism that prevailed between them. In the theoretical part, for example, it is shown that what is necessarily thought is on that very account purely subjective, and declares nothing whatever of that which is in itself objectively real, and does not even correspond to it; while, on the other hand, in the practical part, it is shown, that certain representations, just because they are subjectively necessary (for otherwise no rational dealing with them would be possible), must correspond to something objectively true. At what point now are we to stop? By practice we are indeed constrained to adopt the latter position, but by theories, wherein, properly speaking, the scientific foundation of this practice had been sought for, we are left in the lurch. The practical theory of belief stood in need of an entirely new foundation, and between this and the theory of cognition there was no connection; such a connection was first contrived at a later period through essential modifications wrought in the one and the other doctrine by his followers.*

The Critick of the Faculty of Judgment seeks to mediate or bridge over this gap in the following manner. The principle of freedom or the practical reason must exert an influence upon nature; now if it is to exercise a causal agency upon the course of things, which continue their progress of necessity and according to their laws, these two kingdoms cannot be entirely separated, nor be heterogeneous. Both nature and freedom must admit of being mediated in a certain manner for our understanding. This mediating principle resides in the *feeling*, namely, of pleasure and disgust, and thus in that which was previously reckoned as the empirical content of the rational consciousness, and on which account ethics have been regarded as a mixed science. This feeling, however, is, properly speaking, a direct judgment, not logically developed, but,

* Compare Schelling, philos. Schriften, I. p. 264.

as it were, anticipating the thinking cognition, so as to pronounce upon the conformity to purpose of sensuously perceptible objects, and this partly for our faculty of cognition, and thus as an æsthetic satisfaction of an intellectual kind; but partly too upon the conformity of the sensuous appearance of the object to its own essence or conception, seeing that the judgment is passed as to how far the latter corresponds more or less with that which, from its specific nature, it can and ought to be. This internal essence (the thing in itself), which lies at the bottom of the objective phenomena, is then regarded as if it were its own creator, or artist, as it were, working full of design by means of the understanding and consciousness. Thus, to nature is attributed an artistic understanding, which, in Kant's opinion, she certainly has not, for she works blindly and of necessity, but still we can so deal with her, as if she worked with consciousness and design, in order that we may, upon such grounds, explain to ourselves her products. *We*, who ourselves possess understanding, can again detect in these products an understanding, consequently, our own familiar nature, and can in this way render nature comprehensible to ourselves, although, with her, as is self-evident, matters do not really stand thus. Now, if Kant had not by these contradictory and evasive statements retracted at once what he presupposed, the undiscernibility of the thing itself would have disappeared, the antagonistic character of nature have become perfectly transparent, related to, and associated with us to such a degree, that even in the ethics no struggle and no opposition against nature would have held good, but man would have moved in it as in that which was his own peculiar province, free and without hindrance.

We must decline the task of entering further into the practical philosophy, since it is not an exposition but only a connection of its content with metaphysical principles which has been here attempted; what has been mentioned will however suffice to indicate the knot whose disentanglement or solution is now the further problem of philosophy, and the point which it has to hold fast by, if it would move securely forward with a distinct consciousness of the object it has in view. If now the point at issue is, whether empiricism should be radically exterminated from philosophy, at least from the principle of the latter, because, as was shown by Hume, it is the root of all scepticism, and, as Kant was himself convinced, is at once the germ of all eudæmonism, why, we ask, once for all, and in

conclusion, — why did he not lay his hand to this root of all the mischief? To banish from the system of philosophy all content which is of empirical origin, and consequently improved and doubtful, is a pretension which, since the time of Descartes, and especially since that of Kant, has been repeatedly insisted upon more or less as concerns at least the beginning of the system; we must, it is said, make abstraction at the very outset of every thing which we know or believe that we know, in order that we may find a principle certain in itself, and then from or upon this establish something further. Now that which stands in such connection with a principle of intrinsic certainty that it cannot be denied without denying the principle itself, must be just as positive and incontestible as the latter. This has been always postulated and its fulfilment undertaken. But that other element, which is to be posited in connection with the principle, or, according to Kant, to be attained by synthetical judgments *a priori*, this we have been continually obliged to receive again from experience.

For how should it be otherwise? Does the man who is born blind produce *a priori* from himself the representation of colour, or the deaf and dumb man that of sounds? Must we not, if we are to know any thing of natural objects, possess our five senses in a healthy state? and are we not from the first moment of life in constant relation with the external world, which, even if we had the power to engender every thing within ourselves, does not once leave us time sufficient for making the attempt? Already this psychological observation seems to cut off all further inquiries; for at the utmost it concedes to the individual human being an independent reproduction of the impressions received, but not an *original* production of the representations. But yet more. Were we in a condition to produce all cognitions purely out of ourselves by a process of thought, or, as it is said, by natural reason, how then should we stand in need of a preparatory revelation and education by external or historical means from a higher or divine source, or how could such education be necessary and possible? The theological interests of belief here find common cause for apprehension, and for being induced to revert again in good time to empiricism. But the moral philosopher also, and the philosopher in a less restricted sense, may well pause to consider, before matters are brought to an actual attempt, how, even if they have already recognised empiricism to be the root of all evil, and heartily resolved to themselves

to root it out, how in all conscience they are to reinstate *a priori*, or in a purely genetic and creative manner, the fulness which empirical knowledge procured for them? Should matters succeed with them to some extent in the department of ethics, still a similar success would not on that account be met with in the sphere of physical science and of history; or are we to construct and invent the whole history of nature and of the world in an *a priori* manner? But granting even that we could at least discover the general laws of nature with just as much certainty *a priori* as the mathematician does those of the heavenly and earthly mechanism, — how then are matters to stand in respect to our cognition of God? Must we not, in order to cognise God *a priori* transport ourselves into the place of God, or in order to find him within ourselves, and demonstrate him from ourselves, be in ourselves God himself, or at all events divine? If, however, we human beings are the divine, what then remains of God? Is not this pantheism, or—what amounts to the same thing—naturalistic pantheism? In fact, it may be truly said that this foolhardy attempt upon the part of the human understanding, to transfer itself into God or God into itself, is but the audacity in which Mephistopheles delights, when exclaiming,

“ Ay! only trust to that old text, and take
 The counsel of my antient friend, the snake,
 And soon will come a time when you shall see
 Good cause for grief, though ‘like to God’ you be.”

Now, to invite philosophy to such an undertaking would imply nothing less than to entice her cunningly to the verge of some dizzy precipice, in order that she might more certainly topple over, break her neck, and leave once and for ever a free field open to the empirical belief upon authority, while to us is left the choice alone between this *belief from feelings of despair*, and the despair itself. It would seem, then, that all well-wishers to the cause of philosophy must cautiously endeavour to bring about a coalition between that science and empiricism, and must consequently dissuade others in every way from a purely genetic method, which could only have been contrived with the above dangerous intention. Healthy common sense, the good will, the aim of philosophy itself—all appear to unite and conspire against the attempt to construct an absolute idealism, or, what amounts to the same thing, a pure monism, which, whether partaking of a material or spiritual pantheistic or

pankosmic character, would be a self-engendering and unmixed system of Identity.

Yet, nevertheless, philosophy, since Kant has not forborne from striving after a pure genetic method, and, through this, after a pure self-excogitated system; she has bestowed more confidence on the principle laid down by Kant, that empiricism leads to a slavish serving of the senses, than to the warning against a pantheism, which must lead to precisely the same result. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel went boldly forwards on that road to arrive at the absolutely One. But meanwhile the warning, upon the other hand, was not neglected; many believed that they knew already beforehand the result of such audacity, for they had it directly before their eyes, in the writings of Spinoza. Prudence takes advice, and the next step was an unhesitating consciousness of the present stand-point in philosophy, as of *a crisis*. In Kant two principles, idealism and empiricism, were still held dualistically together; we could, while arriving through the reason at absolute unity, either acknowledge the one idealistic principle to be the genuine root of all knowledge, and abide subjectively by this alone, or we could in turn make empiricism, and consequently a multitude of objective beginnings and principles, the point of our departure, in order thus to attain from the opposite side to their unity in the consciousness, which unity had been made by the idealists their starting point. In this empirical way, Herbart dealt most definitively with the question before us. Finally, however, we can also, recognising the dualism of Kant, strive directly after a fusion of both principles into a real idealism, and in this way, without actually giving up the Kantian stand-point, endeavour to promote the objects of a fresh school. To the latter point the labours of Jacobi, Leonhard Reinhold, and especially Fries, were directed, each in his own way; of Jacobi more in the negative manner, since with him, as will be presently shown, knowledge degenerated at once into an absence of knowledge, and this again into a belief from sheer despair; of the remaining three in a positive manner, but still again in an empirical fashion, namely by psychological mediation, Reinhold* employing for this purpose the imagination,

* An estimate has been formed of his neglected merits by his son Ernst Reinhold, in the *Handb. der allgem. Geschichte der philos.* Gotha, 1830; 2ter Thl. 2te Abth. p. 140. *et seq.* See also Schelling in der *Abhandlung*; vom Ich, als *Princip der Philosophie*. Tübingen, 1795, p. 32. *et seq.*; und Herbart, *allgem. Metaphysik*, Bd. i. p. 224. *et seq.*

Fries, (approximating more closely to Jacobi,) the feelings and presentiments. It was Reinhold who first of all expressed the positive demand for *one* principle in philosophy, and entertained the fruitful thought of coming to some universal agreement upon the subject by a *theory of the consciousness**,—a thought which, though constantly re-entertained since then, has unfortunately not been carried out as yet in a satisfactory manner,—since he distinguished subject, object, and the representation that oscillates between the two, and, from the matter-of-fact existence of the representations, as well as from their nature, proved that in the subject there must necessarily be presupposed both receptivity for the objectively given material, as well as spontaneity for the form which is subjectively added to the representations. Reinhold sought, indeed, by this theory, as it is said, to support the Kantian system, but, in thereby directing attention to a most profound and single basis, he was the cause of foundations being laid upon which the Kantian edifice could no longer subsist in its integrity. Salomon Maimon† and Gottlob Ernst Schulze‡ proved besides that the Critick had not the power of eradicating scepticism, which had again emerged to the surface of philosophy, though under a new form.

No one, however, among the philosophers of that period, came forward, with, upon the one hand, so much recognition of the merits of the thinker of Königsberg, upon the other, in such decided opposition to him, as *Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi*, the philosopher of Pempelfort.

He ventured, in the name of all who were unprejudiced, to conduct the defence of the natural point of view, and did this with such striking eloquence, that his style of writing, as remote from scholastic stiffness as from the superficial character of polite literature, will ever hold good as a model; though we

* Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, Prag und Jena, 1789. Ueber das Fundament des phil. Wissens. Jena, 1791. p. 68.

† Streifereien im Gebiet der Philosophie, Berlin, 1793-8. Kritische Untersuchungen über den Menschlichen Geist oder das höhere Erkenntniss und Willensvermögen. Leipzig, 1797-8.

‡ Aenesidemus, oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, &c. Helmstädt, 1792. (anonym.)

must not forget that, as regards the exposition of his free philosophical confession of faith, his conviction based upon direct facts of the religious *feeling*, he did not require for the systematic elaboration and methodising of this position a direct *principle*, and that he only made use of the philosophical armour negatively, or, in so far, as he appeared in a polemical aspect.

Briefly to indicate his merits ; it was he who perceived that there dwelt in the human soul a deep and mysterious treasure, which had not as yet been searched for, nay, one to which allusion had been scarcely made ; and if he had not himself the power to win this treasure, he yet defended it victoriously against unbelievers, and incessantly directed the attention of contemporaries towards it. In this he expressed what every educated person felt more or less, so that there was not wanting to him in the wider circle of readers a sincere though silent participation, and thus at the present day, consciously or unconsciously, the greatest part of the educated public ranks upon his side.

As to what concerns the understanding, Jacobi agreed fully with Kant, in considering that all its activity consists in a mere arranging and fashioning of the material that is obtained elsewhere, in doing which the understanding itself takes cognizance of this its arranging function, and erects the same into rules of thought — as logic ; this logic, however, regarded in itself, is devoid of all content, so that the understanding cannot treat of the nature of the world in itself, but only of the mode in which we elaborate or work out the representations that have been obtained.

Here, however, in speaking of a content that has been brought to us by the senses, and the form bestowed upon this content, Jacobi separated in a different manner, and more strictly than Kant had done, what belongs to the sense, as an organ, and what to the understanding. *How* that which is imparted or given by the senses enters into us, and becomes a sensation, he declared to be an inscrutable mystery ; enough that it does actually enter, and with this entrance brings along with it at the same time into the consciousness the direct certainty of the given being. Now the certainty that the being is there, and that too without our co-operation, is so undeniable a fact, that we exalt it without hesitation as being above every proof, and must regard it as requiring none whatever. Before or while sensations originate in us, the understanding does not as yet perceive them ; but so soon as we feel, the affection has already taken place ; so that we can in nowise spy out or take by surprise its origin.

The understanding, as the self-observing faculty of man, always finds the representations, sensations, and feelings, ready beforehand; they are there before it can see how or whence they came; it discerns, generally speaking, nothing whatever in itself, until these representations and sensations are actually present or directly given, *i. e.*, have arrived at completion in a manner quite inaccessible to self-observation, but probably by a reciprocal action between the senses and the objects; a reciprocal action, which certainly remains for us a wonder, and on this account, because the pressure or impetus of a body upon a spiritual element, such as the soul, or a reciprocal action of two things that are different, *toto genere*, is thoroughly inexplicable. The business of the consciousness is only this, to bring first of all separation, definite character, and order into this troubled flood, this chaos of undistinguished sensations.*

Kant had indeed adopted such a reciprocal action of the senses and the things in themselves; he had adopted the opinion, that things affect us some how or other; but that which we perceive as an affection in ourselves, was, according to his view, so thoroughly blended with the peculiar additional element of the understanding (which he here called imagination), that the multiplicity of the sensuous impressions themselves could hold good as a perfectly subjective workmanship, or one no longer corresponding in any degree to the object. He had, in short, explained the whole nature upon which we gaze as a subjectively necessary phenomenon, so that Jacobi entirely missed in the sphere of the sensitive faculty the material which must be and remain there as positively given, if the understanding is to have any foundation.

Thus Jacobi appealed to the principle, that the images, the whole multiplicity of representations in us, is present there; and to this principle he appealed as to a *fact*, which is not only raised above all doubt, but which constitutes the first basis for any further reflection. In this way he rendered prominent for the first time the moment of immediateness, as one of a basis or foundation, which, even if the thought approaches it as a mediating agent, must remain in the thought itself as a basis and condition of development. It will be shown in the sequel how important this is; but for the present we will make a single remark by way of anticipation. If the nature of the sensations and representations be actually and mainly explicable, as Kant would have it, from the constitution of the understanding—does,

* Kuhn, Jacobi und die philosophie seiner Zeit., p. 283.

finally, as Fichte would have it, all the definite multiplicity of representations depend upon the activity of the understanding, — it follows that we have no longer any original element in the sensations, but only the constitution of the understanding as a principle before us; the understanding alone remains as that which is true and essential — *it, the understanding*, it alone — appearing to us in its operations; while there are no longer things, no longer an external world, and in fact nothing real, which could correspond to the ideal copy.

In order, then, to preserve the certainty of our belief in an outward world, the consciousness must, upon this stand-point of inquiry, necessarily hold fast at once by the direct matter-of-fact existence of the sensations and representations, and must not presume to wish to explain them from an internal constitution of the understanding, for with such an explanation they become at once subjective products of the understanding, and we can no longer preserve ourselves from idealism.

Now, as soon as Jacobi had, within the domain of the sensitive faculty, gained for it, as an acknowledged possession, the absolutely inexplicable matter-of-fact character, it naturally followed that he would make the same privilege hold good with a similar result in a higher sphere of the mind, namely, in the reason. This point it was that truly engaged his attention; his philosophic gaze was constantly directed to the polar star of the world beyond, unto “divine things.” With him, however, reason — *Vernunft*, as it is called in German, from *Vernehmen*, to perceive or understand — was something quite different to the logical faculty, such as Kant had represented it in his theoretical philosophy. Jacobi said, that just as our sense is a faculty for perceiving that which is directly present to us in the sphere of the concrete, so also is the reason a sense, a faculty for directly perceiving what is present to us in the transcendent sphere of the mind. We are no more able to declare how and whence occurs this real existence of ideas in us than we were previously to explain the *how* of the sensations of sense — but they are really present; this fact is true, undeniable, and needs no demonstration. Upon this point, Jacobi could argue in a striking manner against Kant. Has not Kant, he asked, adopted the matter-of-fact existence of the ideas in his practical philosophy, and regarded them as being the ultimate and most certain point? Does he not here content himself, and rightly, with letting the matter-of-fact existence of the moral law (the so-called categorical imperative) hold good as the most irre-

fragable of all? If he did this in the theory of the practice, how could he presume to do directly the reverse in the theory of knowledge? Why should that which in the former case was irrefragable, count for nothing in the latter?

In fact, Jacobi has here sounded a fundamental error of Kant, that of wishing to base what is directly certain—*that*, upon which every thing else might be built—upon another and deeper something, by which means the first became of a wavering or uncertain character.

Yet, while admitting all this, we cannot pause abruptly at what Jacobi has pointed out as the first and ultimate stage of inquiry—namely, in the sphere of the sensitive faculty, the sensations, and in that of the reason, the ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the true; for in the present instance, the question is not as to his having correctly discovered what is actually the first or primary fact in the consciousness, but only as to his having indicated the matter-of-fact quality as the essential character of that in which the true foundation of knowledge could be recognised; and as having given utterance to the simple proposition; you derive every thing which is to hold good to you as certain from higher sources, and yet you would have *every thing* demonstrated. But how then is this finally to be done with the highest principle, or with the ultimate truth? Here you must at length come to a stand-still, by admitting a matter-of-fact existence. For even when you would set up an axiom, such as two things that equal a third are equal to one another, — as the last anchor of truth, what do you express by that? You say, that such is a matter-of-fact certainty, which resides as a law of thought present in every human mind; and thus you appeal to the being, to the matter-of-fact existence of this law of thought. Now as to that which exists, which presents and forces itself directly upon us, as, for example, the present being of our laws of thought and such like, attention can only be directed to it as to a something present, or, as it were, set before the consciousness, but it can never be demonstrated, *i. e.* logically deduced, from higher and more general propositions. This error, however, was the heirloom of the scholastic philosophy, — a logical superstition, which was soon acknowledged by other contemporaries, and especially by Fries, who called it without hesitation the Kantian prejudice*, and on that very account laboured diligently by anthropological investigations, into

* Neue Kritik der Vernunft, Bd. 1. Vorrede.

what actually occurs in the mind during cognition, to avoid the same error.

By proving that the logico-synthetic method is useless for metaphysics, Jacobi exercised a beneficial influence upon the progress of philosophy, and it is this point which, from among his many other merits in *expounding* truth, we have here brought forward as being the most essential.

Endowed with penetration, he tracked the mysterious source of our presentiments of the Highest and Divine up to the point where they declare themselves to be matters of direct perception or *feeling*; he did not consent to their being nothing more than, according to Kant, obscure intimations of the logical fetter while engaged in clenching a conclusion, but he rather directed attention to them as the proper treasure and concealed riches of the human soul, which we must indeed preserve, as he thought, without indulging in any blameable curiosity, unless we would trifle them altogether away: to every one who ventures with the torch of knowledge into this sanctuary, it fares as with the youth before the veiled image at Sais.

Now with a view, not of unveiling this image, but only of pointing out its existence, Jacobi gave vent to manifold varieties and modes of expression; what he merely called at an earlier period of his writings *faith*, then *feeling*, and internal *revelation* of the Divine, he finally designated, as has been said, as *reason* in the strictest and most appropriate sense, in order to distinguish it from that which Kant had termed the formal use of the reason, and which was in fact only a function of the understanding. Jacobi never intended to lay down a system of philosophy; nay, he could not at any time have desired to do this, since during his inquiries into Spinoza, the conviction had been early forced upon him, and subsequently confirmed, that every systematic attempt, aiming at strict demonstration, must of necessity diverge into a system of Identity, whether this be one of materialism or idealism, naturalism or pantheism: every system of unity, the more it is governed by strict rules and circumscribed within itself, must be a system of necessity, and consequently of fatalism; but such a system contradicts itself, is impossible as truth, and, on that very account, faith only remains for us, as that which acknowledges incomprehensible truths. The hypothesis of an unconditioned is incomprehensible, because it does not reveal the connection of the unconditioned and conditioned, although it of necessity refers the latter to the former. No necessary transition however of the unconditioned

to the conditioned reveals itself; the universal cannot be merged directly in the particular; *that which is one in its essence* (the absolute mind) *cannot enter into that which is in essence not one* (nature); i. e. God, who in his essence is a real notion or idea, a spiritual-personal individual, cannot at the same time be comprehended as a formal complex or *ambitus* of natural things that are separated among themselves.* We shall return again later on to this point, in considering the doctrine of Schleiermacher.

If, with these philosophic assertions, which concealed in themselves a deep presentiment of the truth, but couched in the above form were of an insufficient character, Jacobi trod too closely upon the most sensitive part of the matter, still, according to his opinion, such rational belief should be by no means a blind belief upon authority, a mere plausible or passive reception and adoption of certain dogmas, but should be constantly invested with the right of critically repulsing whatever is opposed to reason. Nay more, he maintained most decidedly (against Claudius), that it was not the historical fact, for example, the appearance of the Son of God, but conscience and self-feeling which constituted the main fact in religion, and one day pronounced to his son the memorable and never to be forgotten words: "Despite every insufficiency in our philosophic reasonings, we must still continue to philosophise, must do this, or become catholic, there being no third course for our adoption." But with all this, Jacobi never succeeded in discovering for himself and others the word which solves the riddle, and in this consciousness he declared the discovery to be impossible. To express what he really wished, the word "*feeling*" is in fact more appropriate than that "*reason*" which was selected at a later period of his career. For in the feeling there is still presupposed a substantial, indifferent unity of the feeling and felt, and the feeling is the primitive commencement of this unity, resolving itself in the heart and mind. In the act of feeling, we have, he considered, the real, actual, and essential, constantly present simultaneously or along with the ideal, but this real vanishes wholly from us at a later period in the reflection of the understanding, so that the ideal only remains of a one-sided character. As in the sensuous sensation, that which is felt to be external is really present and even felt, while in the bare representation of a past sensation there is no longer such a relation of the subject to objects, but the subject is

* Von den göttlichen Dingen. Beilage C. Sämmtliche Werke, iii. p. 454.

alone in itself *per se*, so also in the higher spiritual sphere the same distinction exists between feeling and thinking. He therefore designated, as was above remarked, this feeling of communion with God by the word reason, but regarded this reason only as an *organ* for the transcendent, not as an independent faculty engendering, but only receiving ideas, as a receptivity, along with which the object, the Divine itself, might be given, and be directly present as an internal revelation, which he placed beside the external revelation through the medium of the senses. It does not engender ideas, as the understanding does conceptions or notions, which are not on that very account independent natures, but it is a quiescent contemplation which must precede the understanding before the latter can reflect upon it, and thus it corresponds in the sphere of the transcendent to the intuitive faculty in the sphere of the sensuous. They both presuppose, each in its own way, a being and real something, which can be known apart from the thinking process, for without such a real being, the presumed knowledge would be no truth, and the reason itself a nonentity.

That to the knowing must correspond an intrinsic truth, to the subject an object, which is in itself subject and personality, this is, properly speaking, the kernel which Jacobi was intent upon freeing from all the envelopes or coverings of the consciousness: he only unveiled it deficiently; but insufficient as was his delineation of it, for the strict claims of science, still his *opinion*, as opposed to the formalism of Kant and every one-sided idealism, was invested with such general and potent interest, that we cannot wonder how, despite all the outcry and scoffing at his "Glaubens- or Gefühlsphilosophie," he could not only abide by this principle unvanquished, but again live anew in the memory of the most recent times. It is true that, instead of further following out that presentiment of truth on the speculative road, he forestalled such inquiry, by placing in opposition to all speculation this undeveloped form, as one that was essential to the truth and irremovable; for, as he said, speculation *must* end in absolute idealism, which must become nothing else than nihilism and fatalism. Jacobi also believed that with this measure of *his own* consciousness, he had already measured that of the human mind collectively, and so dreamt that philosophy had come to an end, without at the same time perceiving that in this way he had defeated his own cause. For while he would hold fast by

the personality of God as well as of the human being, he placed the essence of the latter, namely, the self-consciousness, in the middle as a merely passive state, receptive both in the upward and downward direction of the divine and natural, and rendered it in this way a medium devoid of self,—not a self-illuminating fixed star, but the empty space, in which two stars shine through one another. As a deeper foundation for that which he intended, nothing could have been more welcome to him than Schelling's modified system of Identity, which, in fact laid just such a groundwork as Jacobi intended,—namely, a foundation in which ideality and reality, being and thought, are, previous to all difference, originally identical*; but Jacobi, waxing old, was already prejudiced against this bold and youthful manifestation; he saw in it only the ghost of Spinoza risen from the grave, to banish which, his own formulæ were no longer potent enough. He cleared the field for a generation which soon took no further interest about any thing in his writings, save only those propositions in which he had cast suspicions upon and condemned the first metamorphosis which philosophy under the title of *the science* had necessarily to undergo.

A certain reviewer says as aptly as beautifully of Jacobi, "Jacobi is like a solitary thinker, who at dawn of day found some ancient riddle, hewn in an eternal rock. He believes in the riddle, but in vain endeavours to solve it. He carries it about with him the whole day, coaxes out of it some important meaning, coins this into doctrines and images which delight the hearers, and animate them with noble wishes and presentiments; but the solution fails, and he lays himself down to rest at eventide in the hope that some divine dream or the morrow will give to his longing the true interpretation, in which he has so firmly believed."

We take leave of Jacobi with the grateful acknowledgment that he has at all events brought us to comprehend that there can be a content of the consciousness, or, if one will, of the mind or soul, which lies already potentially in the consciousness, before the real consciousness knows about it, and of which content the latter faculty may in some way obtain a more successful mastery than hitherto, drawing it forth from the obscure region of presentiment and feeling, into the light of knowledge. Still, however, in spite of that warning, it is

* Schelling's Denkmal der Schrift von den göttl. Dingen, &c., p. 7.

natural that, dissatisfied with that quiet or unphilosophical possession, inquiring minds should seek at all risks for further enlightenment ; for the philosopher, as well as the poet, can say of himself —

To quell the impulse I should vainly strive,
Which ceaseless in my bosom day and night
Alternates ever,—Life were life no more
Were I to cease to poetise, to dream.
Wouldst thou forbid the cunning worm to spin,
For that he spins himself still nearer death?
From his own being, he unfoldeth still
The costly texture, nor suspends his toil
Till in his shroud he hath immured himself.

LECTURE IV.

HERBART.

JACOBI persevered, as was shown, in asserting that there is an existence, an essence, which is not merely to be thought of as a pure activity, but that there resides fundamentally in things as well as in the consciousness some real, existing element, whose being is not to be derived from thought or action, but, inversely from that element is first to be derived the actual action and thought. This statement he subsequently vindicated in opposition to Fichte, but at an earlier period also against Mendelsohn, the disciple of Wolf—that things were not merely a phenomenon or appearance, nor minds a mere thinking process, but that there was in both, as it were, a nucleus, a reality, or inherent essence, which could not, however, be further cognised, *i. e.* we could discover for it no adequate act of thought or conception;—and for this very reason, that being or reality in itself always expresses something in itself quiescent, persistent, and immutable. To this, however, thinking and cognition are in themselves the direct opposite, seeing that they imply activity and motion. This proposition, which is here appended to the previous sketch of Jacobi's doctrine, may prove very important for us in the sequel, when we come to regard the opposite direction which was thereupon taken by philosophy, namely, to annihilate every quiescent, and in the proper sense of the word *existent* (non-becoming, non-acting), because this objective being, in order to be understood, must itself be converted into notions, and at the same time be elevated into something that is thought of.

I, therefore, insert, by way of anticipation, in order that the point of view to be taken in the following lectures may be better determined, the following consideration, which meanwhile can, at a later period, be further carried out and completed.

If we apprehend quite clearly the conception of the existent or substance, and do not connect or confound it with that of cause or principle, we then perceive that by the substance, when firmly retained in this abstraction, is meant only the quiescent, the immutably existent, which depends in this its existence upon nothing else, and upon which also, nothing actually depends. Thus, if we represent to ourselves that gold, as a certain substance, is devoid of sound, of a yellow colour, and of a certain form, we think of these properties as *upon*, or perhaps *within*,

the gold; we do not, however, as long as we thus regard it, gain any insight into how the substance of the gold is the cause, for example, of the yellow colour, seeing that we do not in the present instance think of any causal connection as subsisting between the substance and its properties. It will be shown later on, that the notion of substance and that of causality, or, more correctly speaking, of principle, must be in all cases united, nay, that they probably indicate but one and the same relation in the things *per se*;—but that such is the case, of this we must first be convinced, and the notion of *substance* by itself alone does not affirm this. Substance really indicates nothing more than something which is devoid of accident, inherence, and predicate,—being not a mere condition or quality in or for another, but its very self this other, the self-subsistent, persistent, absolutely independent,—in a word, the direct opposite of dependence.

If, on the contrary, we combine the notion of substance with that of principle, regarding every thing that actually *is*, as being at the same time active, effective, and involving *in itself* a causality, then every thing appears to us *alive*. But if we abide strictly by the logico-abstract notion of mere being, or, more strictly speaking, of substance, without mixing up with it any thing whatever of the notion of principle,—if, in other words, we think of the essence of things *only* as substances, then every thing stands singly for and by itself, nothing whatever is effected, and if one thing even depends upon another, it is only in an accidental or indifferent manner, neither originating from this its sustainer, nor explicable from its essence.

Now, the above considerations may serve to indicate the two-fold tendency which after Kant's time animated the systems of philosophy, and caused them to diverge from one another. Upon the one hand, the essence of things was taken in a one-sided manner, as pure principle, pure causality, no substance of an active kind being transferred to the principle. This tendency may be called the Dynamical, that which, carried out consecutively from the Kantian doctrine of nature, must necessarily take the idealistic turn. The other tendency, built upon a one-sided abstraction, suffers all things to subsist as existent substances, devoid of internal motion and life, as atoms, to which, if any thing is to *become*, the impulse must be given from without. This is the Mechanico-realistic view.*

* Herbart's Psychologie, Bd. ii. p. 506. *et seq.*

Now, while the former or dynamico-idealistic tendency found immediately after Kant's time its most zealous and subtle representatives in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, still the realistic view did not remain wholly disregarded; Jacobi already leaned towards it; but subsequently *Johann Friedrich Herbart* appeared more decidedly in its behalf, by which nothing further is implied, than a decided *preponderance* on that thinker's part of the realistic as a fundamental view over the dynamical, and not a *pure* and perfect mechanism or atomism, as will be presently more definitely pointed out. It cannot, historically speaking, be a matter of indifference which side of the subject we first proceed to trace. For Fichte and Schelling made their appearance at an earlier period than Herbart, whose "*Hauptpuncte der Metaphysik*" first came before the public in the year 1808; the latter, too, has, during his whole life, displayed the most decided opposition to both those writers, as well as Hegel, and has, in the controversy, put forth his best strength against the dynamical tendency of philosophy. Nevertheless, for the sake of gaining an easier insight into our author's views, we may set aside the polemico-critical portion of his writings, and the more so, seeing that it was chiefly directed against Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, the philosophy of Schelling in its first form, partly also against the school of Wolf, and in so far is of less interest to us at present; and since we would become acquainted only with the positive side of his system, it appears more conformable to our present purpose, to place his system at once nearer to that of Kant, with which, as regards subject-matter, it stands in the closest connection, than by entering upon that long route of inquiry, which we must traverse upon the other hand with the above-mentioned speculative dynamicists, to interrupt the close union of these three thinkers by the intercalation of a wholly heterogeneous or different mode of viewing the subject.

Since Kant, as Jacobi reproached him, had undermined, upon the one hand, the experience of the senses, and caused it to evaporate into bare appearance, while, upon the other hand, he silently rested upon it for support, appealing repeatedly to the "matter of the sensations" as the only content and material of the cognition, it followed that his method of reasoning, both *a priori* and *a posteriori*, naturally presented upon either side a separate point, which could be seized upon afresh and selected as a point of support. Now while the dynamical party above alluded to, convinced of the necessity of *one* absolute principle for the

science, found an immediate resting-point in the *a priori* principle, in the absolute *Ego*, Herbart defended the empirical stand-point in so far as he recognised in the real objective fact given in perception, *i. e.* in the natural and unprejudiced view of the external world common to all reasonable men, the necessary and abiding foundation for further philosophic inquiries, but in this objective fact he did not acknowledge a mere isolated something, but an infinite number of real principles, problems, and starting-points for philosophical inquiry. The sum and substance of our ordinary views and convictions, that state of the consciousness, which can be regarded as human in a general sense, this is the something which we directly encounter upon beginning to philosophise; and it is upon this point alone, upon this *given*, that we can philosophise, *i. e.* adjust our *representations, conceptions, and ideas* by means of *reflection*, but we can never create any thing from *one* general and empty idea, such as that of the so-called absolute, which, closely examined, is nothing more than a void abstraction of the given. Philosophy is therefore, according to Herbart, nothing else but *a scientific elaboration and adjustment of our general conceptions in behalf of the cognition of the real objective fact*; we must and will comprehend the nature that is within us and without us, and form to ourselves true notions of it corresponding to its essence; this is the object and goal of all reflection.

Provisionally, therefore, we adopt every thing just as we find it in our consciousness; for this is to be the material which we elaborate: we take this material, the infinitely numerous sensations, representations, and notions, not as if we had therein what is actually true, but as the mass, which is first to fashion itself for us into a coherent totality of truth; for were we not to regard the material in this light, then nothing whatever would remain for us, either as starting-point, mainstay, or scope of our inquiry. Granted even, that many things may be in a very different state to what they appear to us, still for this very appearance there must be some ground from which it proceeds; this ground must be discovered, and so the appearance itself necessarily leads us thither in search of the truth. Thus the appearance cannot be merely dismissed or passed over in an off-hand manner; for we cannot certainly entertain any right notion of the essence of things, unless at the same time the appearance can be explained from its conception or notion. Even the natural appearance, how much more then the true

in our empirical cognition, is the real test of the philosophically discovered opinion; and in so far the objective fact is not only the point of departure for all investigation, but finally remains as the only means whereby we may put to the test and rectify the whole calculation.

This is one of the fundamental principles, which it is incumbent upon us to hold fast provisionally. But the other is no less important; for of itself alone no empiricism can be a criterion of truth, still less, however, be or be called philosophy. For it is shown that the usual representations which we have of things and their connection with each other, and, as a consequence of this, the general notions abstracted from our observation of them, bear in themselves upon closer examination a greater or less amount of contradictions, and are not therefore adapted to take the place of established truths, and to be elaborated into a system. These contradictions, which especially appear in the highest and most universal notions, when applied to the actually existent, have been indeed disclosed by Kant, in the paralogism and the antinomies, though they were already no secret to the ancient philosophers; while Hegel has even made them to constitute the proper essence of the understanding and (as we shall see) of existence itself. But hitherto no one has known how to deal with these contradictions; for, instead of finding a means of purifying the notions themselves from all contradictions, and then transporting to them the given, these contradictions have been left standing, and then either a doubt has been raised as to the capability of our understanding to cognise any thing truly, or, upon the other hand, as to the reality of the things themselves, to which those notions, along with their contradictory elements, must be applied. Thus, from such improvident dealing with the matter, must, in the first place, originate Scepticism, and then — since the reality of all things, even to one's own thought, has been denied — Idealism.

We now turn from these preliminary considerations to Herbart's system in itself.

We have already seen that a slight reflection upon the so-called secondary properties of things must awaken a doubt in us, as to whether the things are so constituted in themselves as they appear to us. Now, if this doubt be once awakened, and we have become sensible, at least in regard to some of the so-called properties of things, that they do not belong at all to the things, but to ourselves, as subjective modifications

of our feeling and faculty of apprehension, then scepticism advances at once without a pause to the question as to whether *any thing whatever* corresponds objectively to this subjective appearance, or whether, in a word, there are things in themselves. Thus, in the first place, we would doubt only the conformity and truth of the qualities represented, and now we doubt also the being or existence of the things themselves. The former may be called the lower, the latter the higher stage of scepticism.

If, however, we have once reached this stage of thought, then scepticism has reached, as it were, its culminating point, and we then begin seriously to consider, whether, if the existence of all reality were negated and suppressed, the appearance also, nay, even the representation and thought, which would be still the directly active source of this doubting, would not at the same time be suppressed along with the thing, and be no longer present; and so we return to the thesis of Descartes — *cogito, ergo sum*; the *cogitare* itself, or this mental activity, *being* still present as a certainty. This activity, however, as being the only remaining ultimate fact, or direct certainty, becomes now a pure idealistic basis, from which proceeding, and upon which supported, we purpose to cast a bridge over into the actual world. Whether, and in what way this attempt may succeed, of this point the idealistic systems of philosophy have to render account. Herbart denies this, and does not acknowledge this standing-point to be true, but regards it as an aberrant attempt upon the part of the thinking process, in which we must at once discern error and feel ourselves driven back to the truth.

To the pure idealist nothing more is left at last (as will be shown in the case of Fichte) than his own thinking process, and thus an activity, without any thing, whether a spiritual or bodily substance, which is active. The question then arises, whether such a pure activity, living and soaring by itself alone, can be thought of, and if even thought of abstractedly, *i. e.* if even the understanding could think of the essence, which is active, and its activity as separate, whether we could then affirm of the latter that it *is*. In a certain sense indeed we can evidently affirm this, and we do so frequently, but we then miss at the same time also a *something*, which should be active, should think, &c., and yet we can only think to ourselves of the thought and action as a certain condition or determination of that very essence, to which belongs being or existence in the

proper sense. Thus the above question leads first of all to a close investigation into what is really meant by the word *Being*.

In the first place, we must draw a rigid line of distinction with more caution than is usually done between *being* or *to be* (as a verb) and the *existent*, the real, actual, or the *essence*.* As to the notion of *being*, which here especially concerns us, it signifies, first, that very relation of an object to our thinking process, by virtue of which it subsists quite independently of the thought, and does not vanish when even it ceases to be thought of by ourselves, or by any one else. For example, a mountain *is*, *i. e.* it remains and does not disappear, although I do not represent it to my mind for a long time; nor does it occur to me to believe that the mountain could not have been there as long as I did not think of it. Now, the same independence of our representative faculty, which we ascribe to the things that *are*, a thing must also possess, in reference to all other things, if we would truly say of it, it *is*. Thus, for example, we could not say of the brilliancy of the rainbow that it *is*, or is something for itself in the same sense of the word as we could say this of the drops in which the rays of the sun are mirrored; but we would say that the brilliancy exists only through the sun, and its relation to the drop, and that of the drop to our eye. In like manner, of motion, distance, and the like, of all which we ascribe to a thing as properties, so far as these, taken in a strict sense, are mere notions of relation, we cannot say of any one of them *it is*, *i. e.* it is something in itself, seeing that it does not subsist by itself alone, but only upon and in, or for and by some other. The notion of being, strictly apprehended, implies as much as *absolute* being, and excludes every notion of relativity and independence; for in so far as any thing is not in itself, but depends upon some other, it is on that very account *not itself*, and the notion of being does not belong to it. That very something of which we say, it *is*, is consequently regarded as *self-subsistent*, as independent both of our thought and also of the conditions of other things. Thus the notion of being implies (according to Herbart) a perfectly *independent position*; but, meanwhile, we must not be led by this expression to infer that the position—the being of the thing—originates for the

* Herbart's *allgemeine Metaphysik*, nebst den Anfängen der phil. Naturlehre. Königsberg, 1828—1829, 2ter. Bd. p. 73. *et seq.*

first time through *our* positing, *i. e.* by a process of thought. If we posit a thing as absolute, we do but think of it as a thing unthought, and not a mere representation; there here takes place upon our part no positing in the active and transitive sense of this verb, any more than upon the part of the thing there is a process of becoming posited by us, but the expression is of quite a neutral character, meaning only a self-existence, subsistence for itself; and it is this entire neutrality with regard to being all that is thought or effected, which corresponds to the notion of being. Thus, *being* is here understood by Herbart in a perfectly rigid sense, and means as much as *absolute being*. *Being* thus signifies merely a *kind* and *mode* of positing. Let any one take the word *being* on the present occasion purely as a verb, and as infinitive, and he will at once recal to mind that this being *is* itself naught, but merely expresses the relation of something to our thinking process and to other things, namely, the self-substantiality, the self-subsistence. Hence it may be aptly said, *being is not*. This proposition has a meaning or sense, which must serve to remind us, that whenever it is said it *is*, or *is not*, a *something* must every time be added or spoken of. Just as little as running, standing, or hovering, is any thing by itself, so also with *being*; the question turns every time upon the *what*, or that something which runs, stands, hovers, or in a general sense *is*. By this time it will be understood, when furthermore it is said, that to the being belongs at all times a *what*, or something, that exists, a *quale*; and that we cannot speak of the being, but only of *the existent*, as of something really actual. In so far as the being is attributed to a something, is the latter a *reale*, and reality belongs to it; but this logical separation of the *something* which is, and of the *being* which belongs to it, must not mislead us into supposing that the something is any thing by itself apart from its being, and that the latter is any thing without the former; in the reality that *quale* is the very existent, and the existent is the *quale*, or they are one and the same; and so, when we say of a *quale*, that it is, the notion of it gains no new ingredient, but it remains what it was before (as a something thought) in respect to its whole content, as Kant has already made evident by the well-known example of the hundred thalers.

Thus the *existent* is always a *quale*, a something, which is regarded as existent. But every *quale* cannot be regarded as (absolutely) existent; many qualities will not support the

absolute position ; philosophy at least will be obliged to deny to much, of what in ordinary parlance is said to be, the attribute of being, according as this notion, as we see, has been limited to the stricter definition of the absolute or pure and true being ; for at all events in many things, as regards their nature, contradictions to the idea of absoluteness will present themselves, and hence render the application of this idea to them impossible. To give up entirely the idea of reality, or to apply it to nothing whatever, is impossible ; the idea must find its application in nature, or else every thing would be represented as null and void, as nought ; yet notwithstanding it cannot be transferred without distinction to all things and their notions, since the latter, so soon as we think them, resist the absolute position. Thus we shall have first of all to define closely what is understood by the notion of reality or of being (applied to things) ; and secondly, the notions which we entertain of the actual, at least those most comprehensive and important ones, whose reality we may be least able to give up, must be submitted to the trial, as to whether they accord in their content with that notion of absolute position, *i. e.*, whether as soon as they are thought, they admit of being posited as actually existent or not ; in the latter case, however, they must rest content with such a remodelling or determination, as may render them capable of being posited by an act of thought as existent without entering into any contradiction with themselves.

In the first place, it is essential to the idea of the absolute position or the being, that the quality of that which is to be posited should be absolutely *positive* or *affirmative*, *i. e.*, contain no negation or limitation, which might again suppress the character of absoluteness. Every negation, namely, is either the directly contradictory opposite of position, and is consequently a suppression of the being, or it is so, as being contrary to the latter in a certain relation, hypothetically and relatively. As to any thing that cannot subsist by itself, but which, in order to be, must, as it were, cleave to something else, as for example, the shine or glitter upon a nature endowed with that property, to such only a relative being, *i. e.*, no true being in the proper sense of the word can be attributed, nor can it hold good for any thing real. No limitation of any kind whatever admits of being thought of, without a positive element, which becomes limited, having been previously posited.

Secondly, it is essential to the idea of the absolute position that the quality of that which is to be posited should be abso-

lutely *simple*, *i. e.*, should not be thought of in any way as a plurality or as internal antagonisms. For if we would think of the real as a compound of *a* and *b*, then two cases only would be possible; either *a* of itself alone, and *b* also of itself alone would be absolute and real, and then each thus regarded by itself would be a simple real, and hence the composition would be unnecessary; or neither of the two regarded by itself would be real and absolute, and then no reality could originate from the composition or reciprocal dependence. We must not in the present instance deceive ourselves by the abstract notion of the *unity*, in which we believe it possible to unite two different sorts of things; for this could only signify an inclusion in thought of two things either real already or non-real. Were we to say, that *a* is only through *b*, and *b* through *a* to attain reality, we should then have the self-contradictory idea of a *causa sui*; we should, in fact, posit something which has first to create itself, which could not thus be regarded as yet present, and consequently could produce nothing.

Thirdly, the quality of the existent is absolutely *undefinable by notions of quantity*; the existent as such can never be regarded as a *quantum*, *i. e.*, divisible, extended in space and time. Let it be well understood that we are here speaking of the real *by or in itself*. We can indeed transport the real into universal space, and in like manner into time, but in either case only as something in itself unspatial and immutable, just as we may posit also the mathematical point in space, and determine from it the distance and position (or place) of other points, but cannot say of the point itself that it is spatially extended, or includes in itself a space. It has no space *in itself*, and hence the predicate of space is perfectly foreign to its own nature. That such is the case already follows from the second position above stated; for where quantity (extension in time and space) is, parts also are conceivable; these parts are to be thought of as parts of the real, and thus again in themselves as something real; thus, there would be either a number of reals (which is not impossible), but then the singular and simple would be real, and there would be no need of the composition; or the reality would first originate through the inclusion of the details in an unity, and then the same dilemma, above alluded to, would reappear. Thus time and space are to be denied to the idea of the real in itself, but not on that account to the relations which may subsist between several reals; these relations, namely, first appear to a third party, or to the observer

from without, but do not belong to the real itself, just as in the nature of the mathematical point not the smallest change takes place, however many other points be posited in relation to it (by a geometer). The question, as to whether there is actually more than one real, cannot be decided *a priori*; for in the conception or notion of the real, according to Herbart's express declaration, there resides nothing which may exclude the thought of numerical quantity; but no multitude of parts or qualities is to be posited in one and the same real, and hence no qualities of space and time, seeing that these notions include within themselves infinite divisibility, and would consequently transfer the same also to the real. If, however, it is once forbidden us to think of the real in any way as divisible, it follows from this that we durst not represent it to ourselves as a continuum. This representation, namely, that of a constant quantity, depends upon this, that we think of successive parts in the real, but as constantly disappearing and blending into one another, only in order immediately again to suppress them; thus a procedure of thought is undertaken in respect to the single real, which, from what has been already said, is not even applicable to it, but relates only to space and time, which have been improperly imposed upon the real as a scheme of the existence. As with the constancy of parts, so is it also for the same reasons with the notion of *infinity*. This also implies only a failure upon the part of the representative process, which grows weary of including the many (as parts of the continuum), and with this its own action can never come to an end. The being (the absolute position) is a thought, once for all ready prepared; a something, with whose positing we can never arrive at completion, for what is never to be wholly posited would be no absolute; the idea of being would not admit of being applied to it any more than it can be applied to space as such — the infinite (merely represented) void, the infinite nothing — and to time as such.

Now if in this way the notion of Being itself, which is the firmly abiding and fundamental element of the whole science of Metaphysics, has been provisionally sifted and rendered clear, we may confidently pass with it to experience, *i. e.*, to that which is given us *a posteriori*, in order by means of that notion to think to ourselves correctly of the essence of things, or gaze at these, as it were, in the right light. In doing this we must not forget that our *notion* of being, or, as it has now been defined more closely, the notion of absolute reality, is not to

be confounded with the existent or the real itself; for objects are in themselves the latter, but the former is only *our way and method* of thinking of them. If now we were to regard the being, the existence, as a quality along with other qualities in the thing,—were we to make the *being a predicate* of the actual,—then we should fall into an error, which Kant has already emphatically denounced, and which would henceforth render the whole system of Herbart unintelligible. In complete contradiction to this, the most recent Identity-philosophy regards, as we shall see later on, that very being as the *something* itself, which is present, recognises in it the essence of creative nature, the life and immediate real itself. Herbart, on the contrary, distinguishes well, like Kant, the notion of being from other notions, and the posited something from other objects; but the characteristics of the *notion* as such are not those of the something, and *vice versâ*. The being, which in itself is nothing but my position, is positively not to be confounded with the qualities of the something, not to be misplaced among these, or rendered the first and essential quality of the object in itself. This confusion readily enough creeps in, when anything posited as actual is doubted of, or when I, being moved by experience or reflection, have withdrawn or negated my originally simple position, or when I may still doubt whether I regard an object as actual or only as a thing of thought, *i. e.*, whether I am to renew and confirm the first position already withdrawn, or, what amounts to the same thing, again to negate the negation.

In the following passage from Herbart's *Metaph.* vol. ii. p. 86., we find the fundamental and characteristic view of the whole system thus expressed: "The notion of being indicates, properly speaking, nothing but the avowal that we have in regard to the object raised an unnecessary question, namely, as to whether all is done when the object is posited. Instead of understanding that we are in the present case busy only at bottom with ourselves, we fall easily into imagining that we have said something of the object. The *thought of the real object* was comparable with thoughts of another kind; the former is to remain unlimited, the latter are to be held in check, so that they, the void or empty thoughts, may not hold good for more than they are worth. If now we take the first of these two opposite determinations as one not merely to be bestowed upon the *thought* of the object, but upon the object itself, why then the being is erroneously converted into a quality, and the error of the old school returns in full force. This error, how-

ever, as is well known, consisted in so regarding the being of things, as if it was indwelling or inherent in them."

Herbart would say, that the *signification* of the conception or notion is not the same as the intellectual movement of the conceptive faculty, although it is true that nothing can lie in the notion which we have not first placed there by a movement of thought; for we cannot once for all know and affirm any thing of a something, which is not known, thought, or conceived. From this condition of all speculation we can and ought not to wish to withdraw ourselves. "We are completely shut up in our own notions, and just because we are so, notions decide concerning the real nature of things."* If we really know nothing at all of a beyond, of a real nature of things, we could not even presuppose it, and could not once negatively define it. But as soon as we regard this real nature as a something for us, and as identical with our notions, we suppress its true notion. Thus, that which we mean by it, is not to be confounded with notion, and its notion is just this, that it is the opposite of every subjective idea of an actual thought-activity. Thus we have a notion of the real, the existent, but must not confound this *our* notion, *i. e.*, the way and method *in which* the supposed object presents itself to our mind, with the object itself. In the present instance, Herbart does not direct his polemics against the general principle of our only transferring to the objects that which is thought of in the notions; this principle, which is acknowledged even by the most recent Identity-philosophy, only in a different way to what it was by the Wolfian school, remains here also in full force, but the question here turns upon a special case. The notion of being is, as is well known, the most abstract and empty of all notions; on that account Herbart has good grounds for denying that in the same any sign of an existing thing, any *aliquid*, or any directly definite character can be met with; and on that very account nothing is to be predicated by or through it of the object; for we have only to think over the notion correctly and clearly to discover that in it there resides nothing, no quality, no something, but that it is rather applied to the what or *quale*.

Now whence, and in what way, it may be asked, comes such a something to be added to the being, to be imperatively required by this notion, so soon as it is to enter upon any general application. This something, according to Herbart, does not

* Einleitung in die Philos. § 114.

admit of being developed or analysed from out the empty notion of being, but it is postulated by it, comes to it from elsewhere, must, in a word, be *given* to it, and that indeed *directly*. The something is directly given in the sensation; for it is founded on fact, and to prove *a priori* that something must exist would be impossible, unless something were directly given; still less can it be determined *a priori* how much must be given, and how the many must be constituted in itself, and so on. The manifold, given in the sensation, necessitates directly and in the first place positions, which must often upon closer consideration be withdrawn. We arrived, as already mentioned, in the passage through the lower and higher stage of scepticism, at, first of all, the general result, that posite we must; and then came the question as to *how* we must posite; and hence it follows, that the something which is posited cannot be so constituted and thought of as to contradict the nature and form of the position, and thereby bring the thinking process into contradiction with itself, while wholly or in part suppressing the position. In this case, the particular quality of the existent in itself remains constantly unknown; for by virtue of its being a something posited, positive, nothing whatever (nothing definite) is known of it; we cannot even know how it is in itself; but, that many and manifold reals may be posited, is deducible from the diversity of the appearance, and follows upon the one hand from this multiplicity or diversity of the phenomena, and on the other, from the simplicity of the existing real in itself; for one kind of real could not afford a diversified appearance; but a different real will under different combinations appear different.

Let us then, first of all, follow out the phenomenon awhile in this manner, as far as is consistent with brevity. In the beginning, the unembarrassed and inexperienced subject *posites* much which it must again retract at a later period; in a word, it presupposes every thing to be real, whatever or howsoever it may appear. Upon closer consideration, however, much turns out to be *only* an appearance or semblance, and this the subject must take upon *itself* as its own representation or as subjective; that only which is not a mere appearance is, and is actually, and this only can be *given*. Thus the positing begins with that which is directly felt (Psychol. § 141.); or, in other words, red, blue, sweet, and such like, would be the positive element. The latter, however, are very soon reduced by reflection to the condition of properties or inherences, and the things in which they inhere now hold good only for that which is to be posited

and that which really is. But even here we cannot stop, for we observe that the things are aggregate states of several reals, and the *elements* are now regarded as existent. "Thus fares it with the notion of existence; it continually withdraws itself more and more behind what is given through the senses, and the distance constantly becomes wider between this given and the real on which it is founded, and whereby it is explained. The notion of existence, however, must at every formative stage of the cognition be *somewhere* recognisable, *for otherwise every thing would be represented as zero or naught.*" It is at length found that the position returns to the absolutely simple element, which lies indeed at the basis of the sensations, though it is not perceived as such, but rather as a tissue of manifold combinations and gradations, and with this element alone, that positing which had been sceptically negated, is confidently repeated.

As to the question, why we do not persist in our scepticism? the reply is, because once for all the thinking process cannot remain in a state of self-contradiction; the contradiction that here prevails depending upon this, that in the thinking process the necessary notion of existence comes into opposition with the as necessary and unavoidable abstractions from direct experience. Granted, that this reality of experience is but the reality of an appearance, still the actual appearance compels us, as soon as it is acknowledged to be a mere appearance, to posit a something real, since the appearance is that which cannot exist for itself alone, but only by and through the essential. If, on the contrary, we had in all that is given both as to matter and form (for it is not merely single sensations, but combinations of them that are given), if in this, just as it is presented to us, we had an uncontradictory and harmonious whole, our thought would then be in agreement with experience, and no refining whatever of the general empirical notions (of those sums of experience which we comprehend in the consciousness) would be necessary. It so happens, however, that these empirical notions, as they are psychologically developed, are found to be full of contradictions, so that, on the one hand, we cannot, without having recourse to the greatest of all contradictions, suppress all existence, nor, on the other, without admitting many partial contradictions, can we retain the several notions of experience as we psychologically find them; upon this opposition and the consequent elaboration of the notions, arises the necessity for Metaphysics.

Before, however, we enter upon more special details, let us take a glance at the arrangement of Herbart's system in general; for, having gained an insight into the architecture and connection of this system, which differs essentially in these respects from the earlier as well as later systems of philosophy, especially from that of Hegel, a proper light will at the same time be cast upon the method or methods of this philosophising. While with Hegel, in his logic, nature-philosophy, and philosophy of mind, we every where encounter a tripartite system, bound together by a single, formal, and real principle, and conditioned by *one* decisive method, which repeats itself in a rhythmic and symmetrical manner throughout; so also in Herbart's system we find, it is true, such a threefold division, —but one which, apart from many other considerations, differs wholly from that of Hegel's system in this, that the three cardinal divisions, or the Logic, Metaphysics, and Æsthetics, are neither bound together by a common, real, or formal principle, nor do they acknowledge, as presiding over them, any general and fundamental doctrine, which might contain and determine such a fundamental principle. This inability to deduce the three divisions of philosophical science from one another, is to be recognised as “a fact of the consciousness,” not indeed directly, yet in so far as, in the course of the investigation, the independence of the principles, as a matter of internal experience, or as something given, is critically demonstrated. What Herbart gives as an “*Introduction*” to his philosophy, and the followers of Hegel compare with his *Phænomenologie*, is no more than the latter a *part* of the system which, based on the organism of the whole, yet independent and essentially different as regards its content from that of the rest of the system, may serve as the absolute foundation of the remainder; but it has only a didactic propædæutic object, namely to prepare the mind of the student for what follows.

Of Æsthetics, under which title Herbart understands the *practical philosophy*, we shall make mention further on, as far as is consistent with our limits. With the general principles of Logic, we may presume that most persons are familiar, and will only remind them that Herbart lays particular stress upon the fact, that, as a science, it is conversant indeed with representations, but not with the *act* of forming them; thus not with their psychological origination, but only with the notions as prepared, already fixed, or completed. As little also does it trouble itself about the things or objects which may actually correspond to

these notions. What it has to deal with are solely the *relations* which the notions form among themselves, in that they partly exclude or partly include one another. Each notion can only be held once, but it can come before us in different combinations, and so in a different manner, *i. e.* as a characteristic; when blended with another notion, it can then appear itself as another; but the elements or notions of which such combinations are composed are always supposed to be present and ready made. Logic cannot on that account solve all the problems of metaphysics, and must not be regarded as a general organon for philosophy, seeing that it admits only of an *atomistic synthesis* of notions: it only shows what admits of being put together, and what not; but it shows neither an original unity nor gradation, nor has it any interest whatever in combining the many and manifold into an unity, — an interest which philosophy derives from another source. Logic only forbids what is impossible in thought, without urging the latter to the combination of the possible only; its *veto* must be respected, but it cannot itself create any thing positive; it *allows* or merely forbids, but does not lay claim to certain combinations, for these must be already given, if such claims or postulates are to have any previous foundation. An *original* genesis or positing does not lie within the domain of logic. Thus logic is so constituted, as we shall see further on in the Dialectics, that only something appears as necessary when it is the presupposition or condition of a something already posited, so that this latter could not be, nor be thought of, without the former, and therefore, as Herbart says, it has in the presupposed a necessary complementary notion; *e. g.* if an appearance be there, there must also be a manifested essence; if passivity, activity also; and such like.

In regard to the Metaphysics, which we especially keep in view, it is to be remembered that this title is taken both in a wider and stricter sense; in the wider sense it embraces, first, the *general*, and secondly, the special metaphysics; the former takes the place of the *ancient* ontology (but itself contains a section which is specially called Ontology), and prepares the fundamental notions for applied metaphysics, which last resolves itself into psychology, nature-philosophy (instead of cosmology), and doctrine of religion. On the other hand, by Metaphysics in the stricter sense is meant that general or precise form of doctrine which we have now to consider.

To gain, however, a satisfactory insight into the train of

thought, and the method adopted by this Metaphysics, we must once again recall to mind the psychological course which is involuntarily adopted by the natural consciousness. Starting from sensations or determinations empirically given, it works them up into representations, and these again into general or collective notions, or making abstraction of the special, comprehends what is common to the different phenomena. By such notions, however, are merely meant abbreviations of experience, and they have a sense and value only in so far as they are taken for signs of the given manifold, while in so doing we think of the empirically given singular, as having in those general notions been comprehended after a certain scheme or manner. All depends upon the singular being actually present and actually given in the sensation (internal and external experience); or otherwise, those general or collective notions would have nothing to which they might refer, —would be schemes only abstracted from schemes, and consequently, quite useless for the cognition of the actual. We must guard ourselves, therefore, against mixing up with them such general notions as are probably fictions only, or hypotheses of a certain philosophy in vogue, *e. g.* the so-called different faculties of the soul; moreover, such notions as refer only to the logical relations of thought, possibility, capability of being thought, &c., or lastly, such as should bear reference to the objectivity of the world, but which are so abstract that they offer no point of association with the given, *e. g.* the nothing, infinity, and even the existence, the becoming, &c. Metaphysics certainly requires *general*, and in this sense, abstract notions; for if it is to throw an explanatory light upon the infinite multiplicity of the directly given, as many problems would be presented to it as there are objects of experience, and in this way its task would be an endless one, unless it were to comprehend the given in general classes.

Now, such general rubrics or notions are these three in particular, Thing, Matter, and Ego. The thing itself must again be regarded from a double point of view, for it first appears as a unity composed of several characteristics or properties, and then as something *changeable*. Matter also would fall under the notion of thing, and in like manner the Ego, unless, in the former, the peculiar characteristic of a definite *spatial* extension, and, in the latter, the peculiar phenomenon of *self-consciousness* were to present themselves; it is this last in particular which opens up *per se* the world of direct *internal*

experience, from which again it is certainly admissible to form conclusions as to the internal behaviour of the natural objects which are plainly external to us; provided only that this be done with the greatest caution, and not without necessary foundation.

Thus far the thinking process has advanced without meeting any obstacle; but now, upon closer consideration, unexpected difficulties are at once disclosed; for in its cardinal notions, which are to be rendered applicable to every thing actual, it encounters *contradictions* in the thing, the matter, and the Ego. These are to be posited as existing, both on account of their origin from the given, and on account of their reference to it; but this position, their existence, falls at once into opposition to the multiplicity and mutability, which these notions include in themselves. These notions are *given*, for they are derived from actual phenomena, and cannot be given up, seeing that we cannot do away by negation with the reality to which they refer; on the other hand, we cannot concede one jot of the notion of the real, as it must be thought of in itself, namely, as single, purely positive, indivisible, &c., without at the same time suppressing the reality itself.

Now, how to unite the two, to remove the contradiction, to render the given conceivable, and the conceivable suitable to the given, such is the problem of Metaphysics, and that indeed of its first division, or the *Ontology*, in reference to the manifold and changing thing in itself; in the second department, or the *Synechology*, in reference to matter or the appearance of the real in space, time, and motion; and thirdly, in reference to those peculiar phenomena which occur directly within the sphere of the consciousness itself, or in the Ego, *Eidology*. If, then, as has been already pointed out, the inquiry starting from the given arrives at a recognition of the contradictions, which lie in that (or its collective notions), it follows, that it has to regard all these notions as just so many different problems given, and to obtain from this consideration the special method by which, conformably to each problem, the contradictions are to be solved. Now, in so far as the contradiction, however varied in form it may appear, has yet in itself this common feature, that a conflict of the existence (or internal unity of the real essence) and the multiplicity of the phenomenon enter into *one* apparently simple notion, in so far also the methods to be applied to it admit of being reduced to one common formula, which Herbart specially designates by the name of the "*Mc-*

thod of Relations." Thus upon this method turns the fundamental problem of all theory and speculation. 2nd. When subjected to these methods, the fundamental notions of metaphysics certainly remain no longer in their original form; an insight is opened up behind all experience and phenomenon into that relation of the real which lies at the basis of the phenomenon or (as will be shown presently) of many reals among themselves; a relation which, although it is not perceptible to the eye of sense, is yet of such a kind, that by it the empirical phenomenon may be perfectly explained. For if the inquiry has in such a manner ascended into that sphere, it must then take care that the cognitions there obtained should be used as principles, conceivable and free of contradiction, for the further explanation of the given, *i. e.*, that in them, as the principles, the possibility should be pointed out of attempting a further derivation of the general laws and relations, from which the given can be explained, and by means of which we may thus approach again the world of phenomena. Now, as in this way the whole investigation sets out from the given, and after soaring upwards into the transcendent descends back again to the given, it describes, as Herbart says, a curve, the ascending part of which requires a different method to the descending; for it started with a logical analysis of the given notions; driven further onwards by the contradiction it attained to the Method of Relations, in which analysis and synthesis go hand in hand; and lastly, through a constructive synthesis, it again sinks down towards the given, in order, in the portions of applied metaphysics, the nature-philosophy and psychology, to render valid the formal principles which it has won.

The Method of Relations, as I said beforehand, bears special reference to the fundamental problem of all metaphysics, namely, to the contradiction which resides therein, that *one* essence is to separate into manifold differences, and yet with this remain one and the same; it is the principle of the recent philosophy of Identity, and has been, as we shall see further on, spoken of as the *Identity of the identical and non-identical*. This contradiction lies, 1st, in the notion of the thing with several characteristics, — the problem of inherence, as, when we say, gold is heavy, yellow, fusible, and so on, all these different characteristics are one, *i. e.* they are the thing we call gold. None of these characteristics by itself alone is gold; thus, if one of the most essential be taken away, the rest would not constitute gold; and let them all be taken away, and

then the gold would no longer remain as such, for nothing whatever would remain; thus, the many characteristics *are*, and are together only characteristics of one, the thing; and so this last is a unity which is a plurality, — a thought this, which contradicts itself.

Still more strikingly is the same contradiction shown in the notion of the *changeable* thing (or of causality). A thing which changes holds good always after the change for the same thing which it was before the change; if it had become *completely* transformed, then it would not have changed itself in fact, but rather a wholly different thing would have supplied its place. That which is to change itself must essentially remain the same, and still not the same. This is obvious to the dullest understanding; and now then comes the question, — how are we to think of any thing thus? *i. e.* how is the contradiction to be solved?

Moreover, the notion of matter, which here comes into consideration as the space-filling solid, involves, in like manner, a contradiction in itself, since it appears of necessity to consist, as being a definite spatial *quantum*, of single particles, infinitely small, but which admit of no further division, while, on the other hand, these particles, from the very fact that collectively they are to fill space, each also by itself filling space, are consequently further divisible, and cannot be in themselves simple.

Lastly, it is the Ego, no less than the remaining problems, which succumbs to the same difficulties. That, namely, which every one understands by his Ego, is here not the whole complex of determinations partly external and personal, but is the deepest, innermost point of his self-consciousness, in so far as it knows itself to be that which is equi-persistent and identical in a multiplicity, and in the vicissitude of transient conditions. Thus, the Ego is to be the simple element in a variety of determinations, and the persistent in the midst of restless change, a contradiction, which places it at once in the same category with the first two of the above problems; with this peculiar feature, however, that this problem does not, like the former ones, fall within the sphere of the external, but solely of the internal experience, and that, while the self-consciousness seeks after a real in itself, or after its true self, as that which is to be knowing in opposition to the known, it finds no such pure subject, but in every such subject would have again rather an object, — a something known. It is the idea of the absolute subject-object, which here specially comes before us in opposi-

tion to Fichte's idealism, and which will occupy our attention repeatedly further on.

If, now, by these general remarks, we have arrived at the conviction, that contradictions are certainly to be found in the most important fundamental notions of metaphysics, and that in such contradictions the thought cannot remain at a stand-still; the next point is to look round for the expedients which the method offers for solving them, without in doing this disturbing or falsifying the notions themselves. For this must no more be done than, on the other hand, thought must be allowed to oppose itself; or the very contradiction, just as it is, be (with Hegel) made to constitute the nature of things. The contradiction which incites the thinking process to advance, and which is, properly speaking, the elastic spring of metaphysics, would, if it were retained, rather paralyse the thinking process; it is, in a word, the "logical monster" which swallows all thought; the contradiction plainly proving the *impossibility*.

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LECTURE V.

HERBART (*continued*).

By the sensuous perception, indeed, every thing that holds good for a something externally circumscribed, existing *per se*, and thus as an unity, is at the same time represented *in itself* as a multiplicity of predicates; but whether now these predicates admit of being referred again to different elements, or real and essential component parts, which form themselves into an aggregate in the *one* thing, or whether, upon the other hand, to a manifold appearance coexisting with an internal simplicity of essence, or in whatever way we may explain this relation of unity and diversity—upon this point the sensuous perception can decide no more, than the *φαντασία*, or representative power of the mind, which is subservient to it; enough, that the real beings are simultaneously represented as simple and manifold, and that it was this very fundamental contradiction which, reduced to the most concise form of expression, led to the doctrine of the Identity of the identical and non-identical—that *a* was at once *a* and also not *a*, a proposition which, as is well known, stands opposed to the first axiom of formal logic.

If we now turn with this problem to Herbart, we discover the formula, by which this contradiction is to be solved, in the already mentioned *Method of Relations*. Herbart himself gives a preliminary and popular explanation of this operation of thought at p. 302. of his *Encycl.*: “If,” says he, “you propose to yourself to posit *one* something, which you can no more posit as simple than you can reject it altogether, posit it then as manifold; but in doing this beware of disintegrating the many, for thereby the former difficulty would return; but bear in mind, that of the many, so far as it stands in reciprocal combination, something may possibly hold good, which would of the singular be absurd or out of place.” The same explanation is indicated elsewhere*, by the following formula. Let a contradictory notion (*A*) contain within itself the two mutually antagonistic members *m* and *n*. The nearest point to which given contradictions would drive us would be, without doubt, to deny, *i. e.* to separate the unit *A*, which should unite the opposites, and yet cannot do so. This separation, however,

* Hauptpuncte i. Psychol. Bd. i. p. 128. Metaph. Bd. ii. p. 50. *et seq.*

runs counter to the problem, namely, the given phenomenon, and would wholly suppress a necessary notion. Thus this unity (A) cannot be separated. We accordingly press forwards in the inquiry, and deny the unity of that which is here opposed: *one* m cannot be equivalent to the n , but instead of the one we must posit several. We should, however, miss the goal of which we are in search, if we were to regard each of these m 's as separate; for in that case, the same contradiction renews itself with each singly or by itself. We must then regard the several m 's from some other point of view than as single m 's, *i. e.* we must take them together, and assume that in the combination of the m originates the n , or what amounts to the same, each m not singly, but together with the other m is equivalent to n . Thus the unassisted eye (the sensuous perception) sees double stars, that shine in concert like single ones. The eye, properly speaking, sees nothing false; the *appearance is that of one star* (like that A in the previous instance), which cannot be denied; but that, what we see is *one* star in itself (m) can be denied; we now distinguish through the telescope (corresponding to the Method) two or more stars, and now discern that the lustre which shone upon the unassisted eye is only the result of the clustering of several stars; for if these were removed from one another (or posited as separate), then the lustre would not be one, and certainly not such as it is.

We see now in what sense analysis and synthesis here encounter or meet each other (Met. § 182.). By analysis of the contradictory notion, there is found to be a duality or plurality of the real component parts; this is retained; the unity, however, such as the empirical notion originally allowed it to appear, is now no longer an unity of the essence, but of the appearance, which is either simple or complex, *i. e.* an actual occurrence, but in itself no essence transmuting, changing, or differencing itself. From the mutual combination or gradation, in which certain simple notions are *given*, results a *condition*; a cannot be posited without b , nor inversely; so that neither of them is to be posited absolutely, but each becomes the condition of the other. Now, as regards this specially required supplementary notion, the thinking process has not to go far, or, as it were, at random in search of it, beyond the originally given notion and its parts (this latter notion, which was only apparently simple, being in fact compound), but finds it within the sphere of the same notion in those very component parts, to the recognition

of which the thinking process had been previously conducted by the analysis of the notion.

In Hegel, also, we shall meet with an analysis and synthesis in the solution of the same problem ; but with this difference,—Hegel, after the division or analysis of the momenta of the notion has been effected, brings the divided elements again together, or comprehends them in *one* substantial unity ; for after this distinction has been effected, comes the consciousness that neither of these two momenta can maintain itself *per se*, but that they can only subsist together in and through one another, or mutually hold and support one another. With Herbart too the same consciousness is indeed present, but bears reference only to the phenomenon, whose different momenta, being unseparated, are blended together. The substantial unities, however, from which this phenomenon proceeds, remain in themselves behind the phenomenon as special, self-subsistent reals (monads), which are not really conditioned, *i. e.* they are only indifferently aggregated, but hold no *necessary* relation to one another ; they stand merely in themselves in a certain *relation*, though no conditioning takes place between them, but in the contemplative subject (thus external to them), and in this subject (that is, our thinking process), the substantial unity of the (objective) essence becomes, despite all unity of the phenomenon, suppressed ; that methodical separation was this very suppression of the *essential* unity, which was dissolved by the several *m*'s having been posited, each as a substance *per se*, existing *per se* as *real*. A reunion indeed appears, but it is one only as to external form, and is no identification of essence, but merely a coexistence of several reals in or near one another according to place, but not according to substance. Thus the conjunction which ensues is no *dialectic* or necessary one, grounded in the unity of the nature of the real itself, but one which experience forces upon the philosopher. Thus the separate and analysed component parts do not require for their own sake their reunion ; for, as being real in themselves, they have no need to adapt themselves to any relation, for they are self-subsistent or independent, and from their very nature insulated ; it is only the *whole* notion which, on account of its origin from experience, demands the reconjunction of its elements.*

Now while by the advocates of the Identity-philosophy an

* Metaph. Bd. ii. p. 49, 50.

objection may be raised to this view as completely suppressing all *essential* fundamental relation in truth and reality, all substantial unity in an objective sense, its upholders might on the other hand assail their opinions somewhat after the following manner:—Your momenta do not subsist by themselves, and independent of one another, for this very reason, that you have not posited them correctly, *i. e.* as actually and objectively existing. If you would by this, your procedure of thought, think of and cognise that which truly and actually exists, you must then posit what you have thought, namely, the momenta, as existing, *i. e.* as independent altogether of your own and every other thought, and as independent among one another; or else you have posited nothing more than thoughts; you have posited thoughts *as such*, but not as symbols for the existent; you have, in a word, not even thought of the existence. Had you thought what you wished (and you wished to cognise the existing), you would then have posited the momenta also as existing, and could not, unless you would *completely* extinguish the same thought, take back again this posited into the unity of the essence, for this restoration is nothing else than a suppression of the existence. You say that you cannot, on account of its content, posit the unity as existing *per se*, and yet this very content (the kind of existence or posited existence) is only such, because you have so posited it; complete the positing truly, as you must do, if you would arrive with certainty at the real, and you will see how admirably every thing, so far from abiding by itself, can be brought into a connection, which perfectly replaces the real ground or foundation of reality that was missed by you, or, at least, suffices to demonstrate within certain limits the substantial relation of things, and that too in a manner which does not openly set at defiance the logical laws of thought; all this, instead of constantly positing what is thought as a *thought*, remaining thus immanent within the absolutely shifting sphere of action, or of absolute thought, and your realities remaining no realities by themselves, no nature, nothing but an absolute spirit in the form of spirituality, but not in that of a separate existence, or the world, in short, nothing but a pantheism, a cosmicism, or absolute idealism spun out of your own thoughts!

Now, I know not how far a disciple of Herbart might be content or not with having the above apostrophe thrust, as it were, upon him. Still less is it my opinion, that the advocates

of the Identity-philosophy will be forthwith silenced by such an objection; besides, we have not yet heard what they have to say, and can on that account pass no sweeping sentence upon them beforehand. What has just been said is intended only to serve as a means of arousing attention to the difficult and probably contradictory points at issue, and in this way promoting an understanding of, and interest in, the subject, without meanwhile wishing to sway and imprison the judgment by preoccupying it in any manner.

Having now dwelt in sufficient detail for our purpose upon the foundation of Herbart's system, we may be allowed to bring forward just so much from the content, properly so called, as is necessary to afford us some glimpse or at least a general perception, of the way in which Herbart, setting out from that basis, arrives at the explanation of the given.

At the very outset of this inquiry, we meet with a certain expedient of method, which must be of the greatest importance, considering the apparent impossibility of one and the same real, although in different combinations with other reals, yet without detriment to its simplicity and essential immutability, being able to appear as something else. Now this expedient or resource consists in so-called *Accidental views*. By this expression, it is not meant that fortuitous or lucky thoughts should be introduced into the science of philosophy, but only thus much in reference to the above problem, that one and the same notion can frequently, without undergoing the slightest change in essentials, be regarded in very different relations to other notions; thus the straight line may be thought of at one time as a tangent, at another as the radius of a circle, without ceasing on that account to be one and the same straight line. A tone can be regarded as a third, a fifth, a seventh, or an octave, from other tones, as harmonious or inharmonious, without ceasing to be one and the same tone. Tangent and radius are indeed different notions, when they are each regarded *per se*, but they coalesce into one when they are thought of as contained in the higher notion common to them both. As to this higher notion, that of the straight line, it is not essential that it should stand in this or that conjunction, in which it becomes a radius or tangent, but merely accidental; such are merely characteristics of it in *our* eyes, and may thus be aptly called accidental views. In mathematics this expedient is in general use, so that many problems could not be solved without it; and even in the metaphysical construction

of notions, an analogous application may be made of it, provided that the given problems themselves point thereunto.

If we now return to these same problems, and first to those of the Ontology, namely, to the thing with different characteristics (relation of substantiality and inherence), and to the self-changing thing (relation of causality and dependence), the question directly arises, — for what are we to take every special and *apparently* simple thing? How is it to be thought of as constituted *in itself*? As a complex or aggregate of *many* simple reals or monads, which have entered into a more or less constant conjunction among themselves, so that their grouping, by its empirical recurrence, is regarded by us as *one* thing. Thus, just as Herschel, with the artificial assistance afforded to his eye by the telescope, has lately recognised several nebulæ, which to the naked eye appeared as single stars, to be in fact double stars, or whole clusters of stars; so Herbart discovers in the one thing whole heaps of simple substances or monads.

We have here made use of the expression *substances*, because after the preceding considerations it seemed to us the most apposite for the self-existent. Herbart, however, abstains from using the word in this connection, and calls his monads only *reals*, reserving the former expression for a relation which we shall have to examine more closely hereafter. Nay more, we must take the present opportunity of acknowledging that even the word *monads* is avoided by Herbart, probably from their reminding him too much of the monads of Leibnitz, which certainly differ from his; or probably because *monads* are more frequently regarded as synonymous with *molecules*, when in fact they are something else; and least of all would it please Herbart to have his reals called atoms, or his system by the name of an atomic theory. From this latter I, in justice, refrain; but to call the system a *monadologie*, or doctrine of monads, although it differs in essential points from the scheme of Leibnitz, must be here allowed for the sake of brevity, as will be still more evident when we come to treat of the Eidology.

We should, however, justly take offence at the expression above used of *heap* or *aggregate*, to imply the complex of monads, of which an individual thing may consist, if we were to abide by the notion of a mere aggregate only. Where many things remain constantly together, where, as we have already seen and shall see yet further on, these forms also of combination must be recognised as empirical data, and consequently

as pointing also to an objectively real combination, in such case this combination can hardly be called a mere aggregate, for this word would only express a certain accidental coexistence of the several component parts, or mere external grouping devoid of an internal and essential bond of coherence. It cannot indeed be denied, that the things are in reality to be thought of as *actually conjoined* monads. Just as they appear to us to be united, so they are also in point of fact; and where they do not appear so to us, they really would not be so. But the question does not turn upon whether the monads are really united amongst themselves, but *how* they are united. That which we miss in the hitherto established notion of the thing, is not truly the assemblage of its elementary component parts, but the *dynamical* and chiefly the organic *union*, which we perceive among the parts or members of many natural products, and which we believe that we must presuppose.* A merely external or mechanical union, a kind of conglomerate association of parts, might indeed be ascribed to inorganic or earthy bodies, but not to the organic. This latter point, however, the idea of life, does not belong to this division of the subject.

In the Ontology the above problem can only be comprehended in a more general sense, by its being shown to what extent the notion of the real, when once firmly established, admits of the reciprocal influence of one real upon another; or, in a word, how far a *relation of causality* admits of being adopted and determined, or not. In the notion of the real itself, which we must retain inviolate, we found with the absolute position, nothing more than a state of absolute simplicity, immutability, and freedom from quantity, or space, and time, and this position excluded every character of relation, dependence, and limitation of the being.† It is clear, then, that of such essences it can only be said, *that* several are together; for that we see;

* The word Aggregate may be aptly enough used "in respect to the representation, but not in respect to the representative process and its mechanism." (Herbart, *Psychologie*, B. ii. p. 261.) "For the characteristics (we must never forget) are not linked together by any bond whatever, nor are they conjoined by any synthetic act, but it is solely by virtue of the unity of the soul, and the constantly contemporaneous apprehension, that all representations of these characteristics complicate themselves into a single undivided act of the representative process, into a single total force."

† *Psychol.* ii. p. 320. The category of cause is merely to be referred to the changes of relation, not to the existent in itself, but in this respect it is a necessary correlate, since change of the accidental (the accidents), such as change always is, cannot be thought of without a cause.

but not *why* they are together ; unless we were to seek for the rationale of this from beyond the given and without the pale of the science of metaphysics, either in the practical part of the philosophy or in the sphere of belief. We must in the present instance remember that Metaphysics is not called upon to devise a cosmogony, which remains once for all an unattainable something, but that its business is only to reconcile the *given*, and the forms of this with the logical forms of thought, *i. e.* to render them comprehensible, but not, by transcending the given, to enter upon a perfectly inaccessible field of inquiry. How far, notwithstanding, a further advance in this direction is possible, will be shown further on. If metaphysics is to exhibit a general rationale of this question *a priori*, it can find it nowhere else than within the notion of the real itself. In this notion, however, we should search in vain for such a means of coherence of the monads among themselves as to form definite groups. The real is the absolutely self-subsistent, that which stands in need of nothing else ; no real can admit of any real influence being exercised upon itself, for it is immutable, and for the same reason cannot undergo any internal change. Thus, instead of assuming certain forces, influences, activity, and passivity, as present in the monads, we must limit ourselves to saying, that because the real appears in certain constant groups, it must always have the same relations ; and now we may proceed to inquire, how, in the actual combinations of the reals, that very relation, which is usually apprehended under the title of relation of inherence, is to be thought of. This relation, however, must at the same time appear as dependence, *i. e.* one of the reals must be the cause which connects the others with itself. Now causes may be either immanent or transient. When a substance is thought of as immanent cause (real ground) it is then one and the same with its accidents or characteristics, the latter being only its form or phenomenon, and indeed posited by it ; thus the substance, although perfectly simple, would yet work out of its own self both its existence and the mode of that existence ; it would be a *causa sui*, or an absolute becoming—a notion this, which contradicts itself. This mode of representation has been already rejected in the investigation of the thing and its characteristics. Transient causes, on the contrary, are causes which consist in the influences wrought by one thing upon the sphere of another, and which produce changes in the latter ; thus to these causes belong at least two things, and the effect does not remain in the active

thing, but is transferred to the other. Yet even this representation is here entirely out of place ; for real influences of one real upon another contradict the notion of the absolute reality. No more can we think of such influences as produced by powers which, as it were, stretch invisible arms from out one real, and beyond it, into the very being or powers of the other. For, apart from the fact that such powers without a real support are inconceivable, it also follows, upon some reflection, that the word power indicates nothing but the effect presupposed and thought of as possible. An effect held in a state of suspense, or still expected, is a possible effect, *i. e.* not an actual, but only a conceivable one ; we assign to it a cause, which, however, still remains at rest, that is to say, is nothing else than what we think or posit it in thought, consequently as possible, and such a cause we call power or capacity ; a cause, however, which does not act, is a contradiction, cause and effect being correlative ideas or notions.

Now, if nothing is gained by all this, the question then arises, how in the group of monads, which, taken together, constitute a thing, *one* monad can be thought of as the cause of the union ; for one among the many monads must play the part of substance and principle, *in order that the form of the unity of the thing may be explained.* This is the point upon which, properly speaking, the whole question turns, and which must be explained, for this *unity is a given phenomenon.* It may indeed be said, that not only is the juxtaposition and persistence to be explained, but, above all things, the original encounter or coming together of the monads ; for by this latter only is the former rendered perfectly clear. As regards, however, the *coming* together, we must, to explain this, presuppose, first, that the monads had not been together ; secondly, space and time ; thirdly, motion ; all these being notions with which as yet we have had nothing to do. Thus the question is at present merely to be confined to the causes of the *real given* unity of the thing. Now this phenomenon is produced by one out of the many reals which are grouped together into one thing, taking the place of the middle point of union. This real, however, is, as was said, by no means the immanent cause of the different characteristics that appear in it, and these characteristics are not mere modifications of the one substantial real, seeing that such would contradict the notion of the real ; but on that very account *many* reals must be assumed as present together, because the real essence, which we call substance, cannot be answerable for (in

the notion, which we have gained empirically) plurality and unity contradicting one another. Thus the many reals, which lie at the basis of the characteristics, are so many causes, each by itself, of a phenomenon which is just as manifold. Now, however, no real appears in the given connection by itself alone (for a purely simple real could, *per se*, never appear as a phenomenon); but as such, and as they appear, they appear only in the aforesaid connection, none being alone, but one with the other. This complicated appearance of each one points at once to another, this again probably to another, and so on; and if we now assume that one of these many monads asserts such a position among the rest, that they all in their turn point at length to this one, unite themselves all like radii of the collective phenomenon in this one, as the middle point, why then this last will afford the point of union of the manifold appearance, and thereby effect its unity, consequently supply the place of the substance sought for, while all the rest furnish the causes of the manifested characteristics and are themselves in turn, through their position, the causes of that one appearing as the substance. In this sense, namely, as having reference only to the *relations* in which several reals stand to each other, does the notion of causality connect itself with that of substantiality, though not, however, in the sense adopted by the advocates of the Identity-philosophy, with whom the notion of causality is considered to represent with greater truth that of substantiality, and the very causal itself is posited in the place of the substantial and real. Thus much in brief, in order to suggest how far removed is that very something, which might be explained as the substance of a thing, from being the one collective cause of all its characteristics and appearances, and at the same time by way of indicating more closely what meaning Herbart attaches to the word substance when taken in a more restricted sense than is usually done.

With the notion, however, of cause and effect, is intimately connected that of *change*, and we have accordingly still left for our solution the second problem of Ontology, the *thing with changing characteristics*. The notion of change must, in the first place, be cleared from the contradictions that infest it, just as was done with the notion of the thing with *several* characteristics. In the latter case the thing was to be regarded as identical with the different characteristics that belong to it; in the present instance the thing must be identical with its

changing and successive characteristics: it must change, and still remain entitled both in and after the change to be called the same thing. If we imagine that the thing is composed of several characteristics, that it is to be regarded as their complex, and that some of them change, while others remain, or entirely new ones are added to them, then the thing can in nowise be regarded as the complex of the *same* characteristics before and after the change, and thus can in nowise be called the same thing; for each characteristic here lays an equal claim to essentiality, seeing that at the outset they all of them together constituted or made up the thing.

According to Herbart, we can (as already mentioned) think of the change as taking place in a threefold manner; either as proceeding from external causes, or by self-determination, or finally, as absolute origination or becoming. It is, however, only the first kind of change which is admissible; and now we may readily guess what the solution of the problem will be, and, from thence, what view of the self-changing thing will follow. The thing is, as already shown, not *one* real, but a complex of several real monads; some of these monads remain, *i. e.* are still present in the thing changed, the same after it has undergone that process as they were before, namely, those which are the cause of the so-called essential, *i. e.* persistent characteristics of the thing; meanwhile, other monads have taken the place of the rest. Thus, while we find the causes of all changes to be coincident with the shifting to and fro of as many real component parts of the thing, the opinion, that a single substance lying at the basis of all phenomena could produce all these different effects from out of and from within itself — consequently, by self-mutation — must be rejected as thoroughly inadmissible. In *this sense*, there is no internal process of change, no self-determination, no becoming and life, no living essence; the monads are and remain in themselves immutable; they do not *become* in themselves different as to their quality, but they *are* originally distinct from one another, and maintain each of them its quality without undergoing any change. The changes of the thing, to which the given appearance points, are merely caused by the different kinds of outward approximation or divergence from each other of the monads, — by their shifting *to* and *fro*; but of this, the first motive or determining influence can be no more explained in metaphysics, than the coexistence or non-coexistence of the monad. It is only when a series of changes in nature has been

already observed empirically, that any thing admits of being determined in physics touching its further course. Metaphysics says merely, if such and such monads are so and so together, such and such phenomena must ensue; or if such and such phenomena are given, such and such monads must have accordingly come together; and with this step, metaphysics has done what is its business, namely, perfected the explanation of the *given*.

Meanwhile, however, Metaphysics has not by this statement fully satisfied experience; for the latter, so it seems, does not merely point out changes in the external relations, but also in the interior of the substances. Our own Ego is a witness of this. Now, what may hold good of *one* simple substance, and this our own soul, would hold good also in respect to all other reals. If the approximation of different qualia produces different phenomena, and these in every case accommodated to the qualities, we cannot think otherwise than that each monad must become the cause of a different appearance in other monads, and that these others exercise in turn the same influence upon the former, so that, with the approximation, the internal condition also of each monad must, in conformity with the qualities of the others, be in a certain way determined and changed.

An actual change in the interior of each monad would, however, be a change of its essence, which, from all that has been already stated, is quite impossible; such a change could merely take place *apparently*, but not actually. Thus the question originates, what *actually does occur in each monad* along with this change? for that something does occur, the given phenomenon teaches us, and this phenomenon must be explained.

Now, of that which takes place in the monad when it encounters other monads of an opposite quality, we may, by means of the Accidental Views, form such an idea as, upon the one hand, denotes an actual occurrence*, yet, upon the other, imputes no actual change to that monad's original quality. The absolutely existent, the substance, is that which subsists by and maintains itself: this is what lies involved in the very notion of it. Thus every thing which can occur in it reduces itself to a kind, or, rather, a mere analogue of activity, namely, to an act of *self-preservation*. Since, then, the monads are in themselves qualitatively distinct from each other, they bear a different relation to each other; and since one and the same

* Wirkliches Geschehen.



monad *a* holds a different relation to *b* than to *c*, and to this again than to *d*, and so on, it follows that this different relation, determined by its approximation to other monads, allows of different views being entertained of its quality, although the said quality remains immutable in itself. The self-preservation would in no case cease, even if a monad were by itself alone; but the kind of self-preservation, or its behaviour, will differ according to the relation in which its own quality stands to the quality of some other monad. Under different qualities, namely, the most diversified relations admit of being thought of. They may, for example, be directly or indirectly opposed to each other; they may be disparate (*i. e.* having no relation to each other, as cold and colour, sweetness and sound); they may be similar, or even equivalent to each other. Now, in proportion to the difference of their qualities, must be the diversity which takes place in respect to the degree of strength which is necessary to the self-preservation, and that indeed not merely against one, but, at the same time, several monads of different or like qualities, which, in turn, may be among themselves in a state of manifold antagonism. Against like or even wholly disparate qualities, no special self-preservation whatever would be necessary, because these qualities could occasion no disturbance in the essence of the monad; but opposite qualities seem impelled of necessity to mutually suppress and annihilate one another (which here certainly cannot ensue); on that account the self-preservation of each monad will appear, in this case, to be increased and modified according to the nature or condition of the antagonism. The opposite states of the reals in their aggregation, admit, therefore, of being regarded as resisting forces, to which conatus or effort there corresponds upon the other hand an *arresting* process, and both may, without any injury being done to the simplicity of the real, be regarded as the sufficient rationale of all actual phenomena. It is indeed quite correct, that in no case does a disturbance and change of the existing essence as such actually ensue; but we think that this does not ensue just because the *monad preserves itself*; thus we presuppose in thought a possible disturbance, and this possibility, in its turn, causes the self-preservation which is opposed to it to appear as a specially evoked or stimulated activity, and as a tension of monads defending, as it were, themselves, though, regarded in itself, nothing more occurs in the monad than what always does, namely, its completely neutral persistence. Let us bear in mind, if we stand in need of comparisons, the different

relation of one and the same tone to another, its harmony or dissonance, or of one and the same colour, *e. g.* grey, which, when placed near black, will appear as white, near white, on the contrary, as black. Thus, the self-preservation, this single act, if we may so call it, remaining eternally the same in itself, will admit of just as many views, or will seem just as often to be a changing state of the monad itself, as manifold qualities concur with it. The only thing then which can be said to be not a mere apparent, but an actual occurrence in the essence of the monads, is this *self-preservation*, to which, as to the last single spark of activity, change, and vital manifestation, all which can ever occur in the single, non-quantitative, and in itself immutable real, must ultimately be reduced. So much as regards the Ontology.

The second part of the Metaphysics, the Synechology (from *συνέχης*, coherent, constant), has for its leading object the problem of corporeal matter, with which the inquiry, which in the Ontology lost itself chiefly in the intellectual sphere behind the phenomena, seeks again to approach the directly given and sensuous phenomenon. It must, from all that has been already said, excite in us a feeling of wonder, how from monads, which themselves fill no space, but, like mathematical points, are devoid of all extension, nevertheless, when brought together, an essence at least apparently extended, such as matter is, may be formed. And even if we were to imagine the most closely aggregated points as constituting a space-filling mass, still one characteristic of matter, especially that of stability, which is usually ascribed to it, would be wanting. For while we say that matter, even its smallest part, constantly occupies a space, we do but think to ourselves of parts, which contain in themselves no further discreet parts, but which are, by virtue of their own extension, constant quantities in themselves. Now, in this lies at the same time the contradiction, that we must, upon the one hand, think of such parts as being no further divisible; while still, upon the other, at least in thought, the division may continue to all eternity without ever coming to an indivisible point.* Thus the notion of stability, which at the same time occasions a contradiction, as soon as we would apply it to the real, and think of real, constant *quanta*, *i. e.* matter — this notion it is, which must be chiefly tested, before any thing admits of being established concerning the possibility of matter.

* For further information see Herbart's Metaph. § 240. *et seq.*

Matter, however, was only thought of as a constant quantity, *i. e.* as in itself or from its nature extended without distinction, because we are always obliged to think of it as extended in space, and because, from experience, we find it in this form. Thus the contradictory element, which enters into the notion of a material real, depends upon the space (and, as we shall see, the time also) which we have mixed up with the essence of the real. But if we separate this element, then nothing is left remaining but the above monads devoid of quantity, and with these it is impossible to discern how we may construct such a *continuum* as matter represents, and must, in fact, be.

Kant had regarded time and space as subjective forms of intuition, and had consequently denied their objectivity. We, however, who do not adopt this doctrine of innate categories, must nevertheless point out in the objective world some ground of explanation for the existence of space and time, even if these forms were for us a mere appearance. Every appearance, and especially one so universal and inevitable as the spatiality of things, points to a relation in the objective world. That objective relations must lie at the root of the appearance, follows from our having no power whatever of determining the several, individually determined, space-and-time relations of things, as they appear to us, but from our finding them at once determined in experience. We ourselves have not the least power to increase or diminish the quantity or duration of a phenomenon; we find the phenomenon, or thing, within certain fixed limits, and the whole—with the material of the sensation being in every instance associated, its spatio-temporal form also—is *given* us, the one as well as the other. It is true, that space and time are not given *immediately* in the sensation, yet still mediately; or else we could not determine the forms and existence of things by observation. Now, granted even that space and time are transferred by us to the phenomena, it does not follow that we, while observing this, must again withdraw what has been transferred. We must rather, necessitated by the *thought itself*, ascribe to space and time objective truth; for just as these categories proved themselves to be relations, that must of necessity be thought of, so do they retain upon speculative grounds their right also in reality. “Thus much, indeed,” says Herbart*, “is found upon closer investigation to be true, that we need not associate in thought the determinations of space, and what resembles them, with the original

* Encycl. p. 308.

reality of every single real among things in themselves; for our thought of the singular leads to nothing. The *things* in themselves must be taken together, if we would comprehend experience. And now it is found, upon further inquiry, that the comprehensive thinking process, independently of any sensuous element, unavoidably adopts anew the same spatial form, and must, according to determined rules, bestow this upon the aggregate of things, with a full consciousness of its own kind and mode of procedure; hence in the *Metaphysics*, the doctrine of *Intelligible Space*."

All this undoubtedly points to objective relations; and now comes the question, how we are to think of these relations without contradiction and as sufficiently explanatory of the given; but we must not, therefore, declare with Kant, that the whole relation is merely subjective, that is to say, that space and time are an illusion. Thus, in order to determine this important point fundamentally, it was necessary to construct an entirely new theory of these so-called forms of intuition, and this theory was presented by Herbart under the title of a construction of *Intelligible Space*. Into the details of this theory* we cannot here enter, on account of its peculiar difficulty, extent, and mathematical treatment; but we must rest content with the general observation that Herbart, without mixing up with it any intuition and empirical representation, such as we have already of space, first elicits this notion through a process of abstract mathematical construction, since starting from the mathematical point, and taking this alone (thus something perfectly devoid of space), he nevertheless, by an atomistic stringing together of such points, originates the line; thus the first dimension, and so on with the others; whereas in geometry and in other metaphysical systems, the line is *drawn* by a continuous movement of the point in space, and consequently in space already presupposed. "Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, only two essences, we have then also two places. These are quite separate, but without any distance. They are *together*. Let us now retain the *together*, but put, since the place is accidental to the essence, one in the place of the other, and there then originates for the second essence a *third* point (the simple place of the simple essence). The second point now lies *directly* between the first and the third, because for the latter there is no other transition or passage whatever than *through* the second.

* Herbart's *Metaphysik*, Bd. ii. p. 199. *et seq.* Desselben, *Psychologie*, Bd. ii. p. 120. *et seq.*, pp. 68. 473., Bd. i. p. 378.

The same process, continued upon the same principle, has for its result an infinite *fixed* straight line."*

I forbear from entering further into this construction. Enough, if the aforesaid suffices to render intelligible what follows. The object in view is attained if by these means the above-mentioned difficulty is obviated, namely, as to how an extended something can be thought of as originating from the unspatial, and if we see that there is no necessity whatever of transferring the space into the monads themselves, although the monads in their connection appear to us as *continua*. Space is and remains absolutely excluded from the interior of the monads, and nevertheless it is possible to think of them in spatial relations. At the same time the Kantian antinomy of the divisibility of matter is solved and explained: divisibility merely applies to empty space, as a *continuum*; but this is empty, *i. e.*, it is nothing in itself; it is or expresses merely the relation in which the reals appear to stand to one another. That such is the case is evident from the simplest thought-experiment. If I set before myself a simple monad by itself, I cannot determine any place whatever as being that, where or in which it is; it is in no place whatever; it is, one might say, every where, wherever we may please to transfer it, and is still nowhere in a definite spot. It first attains a place, or comes as it were first to a fixed position, by my thinking to myself of a second point, from which it must be at a definite distance. Thus I transport both points into a common representation of space, and think of them to myself as connected by a space.

Now this leads us at the same time further on to the representations of rest and motion. Neither the one nor the other can be perceived at *one* single point, nor even thought of at *one* given point, and consequently they do not fall within the notion of the real in itself; but both conditions belong merely to the *relations* in which several reals are thought of as standing to one another. *Motion* especially must, as we imagine, be something which belongs to the real in itself, or must be a property of its essence. It is sufficiently evident, however, from what has been said, that from the *a priori* notion of the real, nothing whatever of that kind can be inferred. The possibility of the monads being in motion requires no proof; for motion, as well as rest, must be *given*, if one or the other is to be predicated of the monads. Metaphysics can neither prove that the monads have been originally quiescent, nor that they have been in motion;

* Hauptpunkte, d. Met. p. 228., in Herbart's kl. Schriften, Bd. i.

by their nature they are neither this nor that ; both conditions are equally possible ; so that no question whatever can be raised about the *absolute* cause of the motion—for the motion has none whatever ; but only when, in a movement or in a rest already given, a change or transition were to take place from one monad to the other, should we inquire about the special cause of this, and then only could an answer to the question be afforded by experience and the sciences which minister unto it. “ Besides, among a number of mutually independent bodies, motion is always to be expected as their original relation in space ; rest, on the contrary, being infinitely improbable, because this latter, among the numberless possibilities of greater or less velocity, is only a single case, namely, that in which the velocity would $= 0$. (Metaph. i. p. 430.)* A thing appears to *us*, the observers, to be in motion when, in contemplating or representing it, we are unable to connect it with another thing, seeing that it incessantly escapes from this connection with another, thought of as a stationary point. Added to this, in order to represent a thing in motion, we require some other thing or point to be firmly established in thought ; but this point cannot, as we saw, be firmly established without a third, this third point without a fourth, and so on, and thus the whole points to a web, a network of relations spun out in our thoughts, for the which there is nowhere to be found in the whole universe of space an absolute first fixed or moveable point of connection ; a proof that the whole representation merely implies a relative relation, and that indeed relative to the spectator. No stream can be regarded as flowing, unless fixed banks are given ; while travelling in a carriage, we believe at times that we are standing still, and that we see the trees in motion.†

Now, what holds good of motion, holds good also of the elements out of which this notion is composed ; or of space, and in like manner also of *time*, for this is only the measure of velocity, and the greater or lesser velocity indicates nothing more than the way in which we fail to comprehend and establish one point along with the other—the continual escaping of the one from the space in which we would place it along with the other. Thus time holds good for us merely as a notion of re-

* Thus the Rest is here subsumed or taken in, as a kind of motion, under the generic idea of motion, while it is obviously the pure negation of motion.

† Compare the very lucid exposition of Herbart's ideas by Hartenstein, *Probleme und Grundlehren der allg. Metaphysik*. Leipzig, 1836.

lation, and like duration tells us nothing of the thoroughly timeless nature of the real in itself.

The result of Herbart's doctrine of Intelligible Space might accordingly be summed up as follows:—Space is not, as Kant affirmed, a merely subjective form of our sensuous representation, but it is, as well as time, a general abstraction from the objective relations of the several monads or things among themselves, but this only in reference to a spectator: it is thus an appearance, but one that is objective, given, not merely passing over or transferred from us to the relations of the things, but in like manner from them to us. In accordance then with what we are taught by this investigation of intelligible space, the latter wholly coincides in the results,—but not in the grounds of cognition, with sensuous space. It has, like this, three dimensions; it has reference in like manner to the relations and positions of the monads themselves, just as the sensuous space (represented and psychological) bears reference to the represented things; in short, there is no actual difference between the two, they both coincide or relapse together into one and the same notion. The union and separation of the reals in the space, in which we have to think of the reals in themselves, corresponds completely with the shifting to and fro in that sensuous space in which we behold the essences.

Space and time having been thus, as it were, liberated from the Kantian interdict, and reclaimed from Metaphysics, we return to the leading object of Synecchology, namely, Matter. Matter was, as you will remember, regarded as an aggregation of mathematically punctual monads. And it was the plurality of these monads which produced the appearance of an extended *continuum*. If a definite number of reals be present *together* according to all dimensions of space, they will produce for the spectator the appearance of extension, or all will seem to flow together into *one* extended essence. This representation does not suffice in order to explain all the phenomena of the material world. We miss in particular the key to those phenomena which we ascribe in nature to the *attractive* and *repulsive forces*, forces which, according to Herbart's system, cannot be adopted. Nature, however, shows incontestably, that many bodies are no accidental aggregate of real parts, but that their form, the position and number of their parts, their density, internal and external structure, &c., seem to depend upon an internal process of life and activity in the bodies themselves, especially when we bear in mind organic structures. We com-

monly attribute this to certain forces, and reduce these, according to the direction of their operations, to attraction and repulsion. Now, however, as was said, since nothing is explained by the word "force," we must in its place suppose some other principle, some other causality of cohesion and form. Here then is shown, in the first place (what is admitted also by recent Chemistry), that the predicate of impenetrability does *not* belong to matter, though it was once regarded as an essential property. Just as a mathematical point admits of being thought of as exactly coincident with others in the same spot, so also may the monads, like the points in this respect, be represented as one in the other, in the same space. Thus here also Herbart differs from the earlier supporters of the Atomic theory.

Attraction and repulsion are, however, notions which, properly speaking, bear reference only to impenetrable elementary component parts, and presuppose such; if the latter are deficient, then there is no longer any ground for taking refuge in those hypothetical representations, and it is merely left for us to explain the appearance of such operations. Let us bear in mind that nothing more is required for our construction of spatial relations than the two notions of *association* and *non-association*, and that from these proceeds of itself the mid-notion of *imperfect* association, which will now be thought of as a partial *penetration*, just as the perfect association must be represented as a total one. (Whoever might object to a partial penetration of mathematical points being even thought of, need only be reminded of many kinds of geometrical problems, in which the geometer in like manner avails himself of this fiction.) The question now comes, as to what will actually happen in two reals that occupy such a position. The actual occurrence consisted, as is known, in the *self-preservation*. If then the external grouping of things admits of being derived from an internal activity of the essences (such was the above postulate), it can be effected by nothing else than by this self-preservation. Thus, if an attraction is to ensue, we must assume the attracting monad *a* to be internally in such a state that it strives in itself to penetrate the other, *b*; of this state the self-preservation in *a* must be the cause; the self-preservation must in a certain way have been already excited; the monad *b* must thus have penetrated into *a*, but not perfectly, or else that effort could no longer take place; thus that very relation must have intervened which we previously called the *imperfect association*. By such a penetration, although it is only

partial, we must further admit that the whole monad is placed in the state of self-preservation, because no parts admit of being thought of in its simple essence (parts can only be thought of in the space through which the monads press upon one another); thus in the monad *a* originates an internal state which is not in conformity with its external relation, and to which only the perfect association of both could correspond. Now the suppression of this state can be effected by either a perfect interpenetration or perfect separation of the monads; thus either the one or the other will ensue, according as the monad can fulfil the requisite grade of self-preservation or not; if it cannot, for example, do this at the same time towards several monads of opposite quality, it must then — for in every case, it must maintain itself as a real — recede, or (what amounts to the same thing) seem to repel the penetrating monads, but in the opposite case must seem to attract them.

Now here we may return once again to the question with which we introduced the Synechology, namely, as to how from monads, which are quite immaterial and spaceless, yet, *when they are aggregated*, a being at least apparently extended, such as matter is, may originate; and how from what is quite invisible, or what for the sensuous representation were as naught, a visible, firm, and solid body may proceed. Thus, suppose that a number of monads were present in a given space. So long as they are represented as separate, nothing will follow as a result, nothing will be perceivable. As little too would the conditions that are necessary for the formation of matter be afforded if these monads were all to be of a like nature; they must rather be of an opposite nature, for otherwise the cause of the actual occurrence would be wanting, and, moreover, these different monads must be thought of in an imperfect state of association. Now, then, self-preservation, and with that attraction also, would come into play, and the latter will, if it encounters no obstacle, advance to a perfect state of reciprocal penetration. In such a case, however, the monads would again collapse into a single mathematical point, and consequently no matter would originate. At this point, comes in repulsion. In order at the same time to produce the latter, not merely two, but several, at least three, monads must be presupposed in an imperfect state of association. Thus we suppose that two monads, that are like each other, together penetrate a third, which is opposed to them. This would happen if the self-preservation of this third were great

enough to suffice for the two others ; if it is not sufficient, then repulsion ensues, or it will drive out or expel the two others to as great a distance from itself as its internal state requires ; and these two or several monads would now occupy a space and be represented as molecules, which again cluster together in the same manner, and finally represent a visible mass, which can be of the most different degrees of density, according as the internal qualitative antagonisms and the attraction that follows thereon is weak or strong.

In the present case, where the external position of the monads, the configuration, cohesion, rigidity, and so on of matter, is regarded as a result of the *internal* state (not inversely), an incongruence of the two states is presupposed, but an incongruence which cannot remain as such. It is true, that these states must in a certain way correspond to, but also at the same time *contradict*, each other. Upon the one hand, the greater or less degree of self-preservation which is called forth in the imperfect association of the monads, so far depends upon this external position as it accommodates itself to the greater or less degree of coincidence ; it will be the weaker the less the external position has encroached upon the self-preservation. In so far the internal is certainly conditioned by the external. But with this partial penetration the actual occurrence is distributed in equal proportions among all parts of the monads, even of those that are not penetrated (at least we must so consider the matter to ourselves in accordance with the fiction or assumption) ; thus, the *actual occurrence*, namely, that this state is the total state of the monads, and what follows from this, the attraction and repulsion, is, in its commencement, not a consequence of the association (this is a mere condition), but follows rather from the simple nature and quality of the monads. Thus, that incongruence of states cannot, as already said, subsist, nor be permanently maintained ; it is in our thoughts, as in phenomena, only the transition or resolving of the contradiction into the congruence ; and this it is which the above statement implies : the external position adapts itself to the internal state.

The above theory of attraction and repulsion, which, according to Herbart's own examples (Met. ii. p. 271.), can be represented by several balls interpenetrating each other, denotes nothing more than this, that, since there are no transient forces encroaching from one real through the empty space

upon another, a direct causality only and mutual action, and by means of this alone, an operation at a distance, *i. e.* upon distant monads, can be thought of, which operation either results in the mutual penetration (chemical penetration) of the monads or not; a mutual action which solely depends upon the self-preservation that is reciprocally excited, and whose result is dependent upon the quality and number of the monads that encounter each other in space. From the very fact that a *mutual action* is spoken of, which depends as much upon the reciprocal self-preservation as upon the reciprocal determinations of the monads, we cannot charge this theory with teaching a purely mechanical doctrine.

Still, however, a doubt must be raised as to the logical precision upon which Herbert every where lays so much stress, when we find that, along with the fundamental notion of the simplicity and absolute immutability of the real, a certain internal capability of formation upon its part is, at the same time, asserted. To produce, namely, those internal shifting states, which were introduced under the name of self-preservations, among monads, the monad can only be constrained by given external causes, by the association with other monads of opposite qualities. Now, how these states may continue after the association of the monad has been annulled, nay, even remain to such a degree under its control, that it has the power to renew them as if by memory, and how this is all to be reconciled with the original simple quality of the monads, are points which we certainly do not understand. Experience, it is true, necessitates such an assumption; and Herbart, therefore, believes that he has done enough in his way, if he has pointed out a route by which this empirical demand may be satisfied, without one's being obliged on that account to adopt the idea of preformed germs, and a free organic self-development, in the sense of the Dynamic philosophers—to whose theory he has a perfect horror. The monad is and remains simple, every thing which can here be called development into an organism being an attraction and repulsion of other monads by means of the above described preliminaries of the actual occurrence. It will be sufficient for our purpose if, in conclusion, we bring this matter more closely into view by an example borrowed, as nearly as possible in his own words, from Herbart's *Philosophy of Nature*, concerning the nutritive process which occurs in the cellular tissue of animals and plants. (*Met.* p. 426.)

We must first of all transport ourselves to the lowest point of organisation, that in which animal is scarcely to be distinguished from vegetable life. If pure water evaporates, nothing else can ever be left behind but pure water. But if the water contains any heterogeneous elements, the latter will, during its evaporation, in case they remain behind, approximate gradually to one another. If they are heterogeneous, they come at the moment of contact — by which is here meant their entering into *imperfect* association — *completely* together, and combine in a chemical manner; *i. e.* according to the above theory of the actual occurrence, this imperfect association, or presupposed external position of the monads, cannot subsist, unless the internal state correspond to it; in the imperfect association, however, the internal state was a self-preservation aroused in all parts, and thus it was necessary for the monads completely to interpenetrate each other, *i. e.* chemically. So, *e. g.* with the lime which water in a boiling state precipitates. If the parts are homogeneous, and devoid of all determination of internal state, nothing whatever ensues; if, however, on the contrary, they are homogeneous in their quality, but have at the same time also, by virtue of the supposed internal power which they possess of adapting themselves, passed out of previous combinations into any heterogeneous states of self-preservation, they then come, it is true, in contact, but their incipient penetration is at the same time also associated with a reciprocal arrest of their internal states; an arrest (the perfect explanation of which the reader will find further on in the Psychology), but which here depends upon this, that the internal states or self-preservations stand in an antagonism which renders impossible or retards their perfect blending, and as a consequence, also, the perfect penetration of the monads. A relatively deeper penetration will nevertheless take place in an extremely imperfect association, for in such a position each monad begins to evoke in the other the same self-preservation, and thence ensues the condition, already familiar to us, of attraction. This, however, merely refers to the presupposed heterogeneous *states*: the quality of the monads themselves must be homogeneous; this homogeneous quality, in which no attraction finds place, now retards, with uncontrollable necessity, the penetration, which would occur in perfectly heterogeneous elements; time is thus lost, and between this arrest and that attractive self-preservation, oscillations en-

sue, which will, according to given circumstances, be quicker or slower.

If now, in the surrounding water, we imagine not merely two such elements, but many of them, to be present, and these sufficiently near one another, there then follows an approach by mediate attraction, and a communication of the oscillation from the first two (or more) elements, which have fallen into this relation with each other. Now, since the arrest increases, the deeper the elements enter into one another, while the attraction, on the contrary, will, under the same relation, be stronger and quicker the more imperfect the association of the elements, it follows, that the more remote elements, which are subsequently and only indirectly implicated in the same process, will become more attracted, and will strive from the periphery towards the middle point, as being those elements from which the movement, in the first place, set out; between these, on the contrary, so soon as, in the progress of the process of the elements, too many are attracted and accumulated together, some repulsion will straightway ensue. Accordingly, at that point in the water, where what has been just described takes place, there is constant movement. How far now will this movement gain ground? Is there not a limit at which it stops? Some definite form, which proceeds from it?

"Let us suppose that, round about certain elements, there were to be every where present, as is natural, such elements as resemble them, it follows upon such conditions that, in a spherical space, the latter will be first attracted at that spot where the former begun the process, but that then, also, just like these, they will be gradually moved outwards in radii from the same spot; this latter movement, however, not displacing the elements so entirely that one of them can disengage itself from the rest. In the first place, there are no grounds for any considerable velocity, but the oscillations adapt themselves to the gradual arrests of the internal states in every element; moreover, there always remains a ground of connection, because each element, in conformity with the other, represents something opposed to the first supposition. Now, while in the midst of the spherical space there is still a lively oscillation, the periphery becomes more at rest. Those very elements which have already passed from within outwards, are more in the equilibrium of their older and newer internal state; accordingly they do not merely attract each other, but the result of this, a definite mutual position, is less disturbed by oscillation; it approximates to

fixity, and with the greater security, the more the water continues to evaporate. Besides, the elements which were present in the midst are gradually displaced from direct communication with the rest of the water, because they are surrounded by those other elements. If, however, the surroundings are not closed in a perfectly uniform manner, (and how should they be so, unless the originally given position of the elements was possessed of a geometrical uniformity?) then the communication with the external water remains open, and consequently, in that direction, the above process of attracting new elements still continues to set out from the middle; hence, the repulsion also renews itself in all directions; and because a limit is already set to this by a kind of fixed periphery, the envelope or case must be constantly becoming denser and more defined, while the whole expands from within, so long as it draws in nourishment through the openings from without."

"We may now proceed to consider," continues Herbart, "whether this description is good enough for a so-called Infusory animal. That it is an animal, we cannot be assured; but that those microscopic objects which usher in the green matter of decomposing water, better deserve the name of animals, no one will undertake to prove to us. Thus much is clear, that the least stimulus afforded by any thing external, by light, by heat, or else by extraneous elements which may be found in the same water, can and must change both the movement as well as the form."

After these, in our opinion, characteristic experiments, which now, considering the manifold return of Chemistry to the molecular theory, as well as the progressive microscopic discoveries of Ehrenberg, Cagnard de la Tour, and others, are invested with a peculiar interest; we must leave it to natural philosophers, and still more to physiologists, to determine in how far they may favour these views, and how far, with them alone, without assuming an immanent purpose or *nisus formativus* in the organisms, they may advance, or rather return to the deepest grounds, in their explanation of natural structures; and let us here content ourselves with observing that many obscure points which yet prevail, especially in the doctrine of the actual occurrence, will receive a more satisfactory explanation in the last part of the Metaphysics, namely, the Eidology and Psychology, to which we now proceed.

CONTINUATION AND CONCLUSION OF HERBART'S PHILOSOPHY.

MATTER, or the intrinsic nature of the corporeal world and its spatio-temporal relations, having been determined, it only remains for us to consider more closely the doctrine of the mind, or, what in other metaphysical treatises would be called, perhaps, pneumatology or rational psychology. This doctrine follows as a postulate from what has gone before; for there is still wanting a point of coincidence, in which all appearance as a totality of manifold elements may meet to form an unity, and this unity can be found nowhere else than in the *Ego*. With Herbart, in whose philosophy every thing rests upon the given, this investigation likewise can only proceed from an empirical basis, and that indeed specially from the human mind, as being that to which, as the support of the *subjective* phenomena, every thing else is manifested, and hence this doctrine is called Eidology, from Gr. εἶδωλον, an image.

And here let me observe, that the ὕστερον πρότερον, which I commit in treating of Herbart's system before that of Fichte, would involve us undeniably in great inconveniences, if it were our intention to set before the reader the whole strength of Herbart's polemics, and, together with the positive, the critical portion of his labours also. As, however, the whole matter here depends upon our seeing fairly and simply set before us the peculiar positive doctrine of this thinker, divested of all its surrounding and often tedious weight of controversy, that historical anticipation which is here entered upon cannot essentially injure the present exposition, and still less distort its subject-matter.

The Ego, of which every one speaks as of himself, is first of all his own person; and by this is meant every thing which is a positive constituent both of his mind and body. But in the present instance, we are not speaking of the *personal* Ego, which, to characterise satisfactorily, would require a long series of predicates, a self-description, and autobiography. But the question turns upon the so-called *pure* or absolute Ego, to which we ultimately come when we separate in thought all which is only a *state* or condition of our mind. This Ego, for so it calls itself, rests in the very depths of our self-consciousness; it does not speak of its body only, but also of its sensations, representations, and desires, in short, of all its activity as of something which it possesses, which is in it, and proceeds from

it, as from the one innermost and unchangeable centre of the essence, the axis or pivot of all thinking and doing. Now, this Ego not only represents to itself the outward world, but also its own self; and if it asks itself what this is, the answer is given by itself,—I am the being which represents the world and myself to myself. The Ego represents itself; it has or makes itself an image of itself; thus, the essential characteristic of the Ego is the self-consciousness: beyond this, it finds in itself no other characteristic; it cognises itself or knows of itself only as of a self-consciousness.

But now, then, comes the question, is the Ego actually an *essence*, or is it *merely* self-consciousness? A knowledge — no matter whether of itself or of another — is only a certain state, an activity; and we cannot think of this without an essence which is in this state, or which is the source of this activity. Thus much appears to be clear; the Ego must also be something real in itself. Besides, no one will regard himself merely as an activity, namely, belonging to something else; but if any thing is directly certain for us, if any thing is established in and together with us, it is undoubtedly this, that at the bottom of our personality resides a *single* self-subsistent essence, which remains under all circumstances the same in itself. And so setting out from this given fact, we must acknowledge the Ego to be something real.

The Ego is thus a real, but a real with many properties, changing states, powers, capacities, activities, and sufferings. Here we have again the contradictory notion of *the thing with many and changing characteristics*, with which we are already familiar. But, in the present instance, we shall find a special contradiction in the notion of the pure Ego, as it has been usually, and especially since Fichte's time, understood. The Ego must be that which knows itself, thus the subject before which its own image floats as object. This image, the object, must be wholly the same as the subject is, or must wholly express, give back, or truly reflect, as from a mirror, the subject; on which account, Fichte called the Ego the absolute subject-object, or the identity of subject and object. But can that real essence, which by its activity produces this reflection, ever contemplate itself immediately in its own image? What then does it behold therein? A reflected Ego, an Ego as object; object, however, it must not be, but the reverse; an Ego beheld would be an object, and thus certainly not the Ego itself, but the non-Ego. The act of seeing cannot see itself; the eye cannot behold

itself; so also with the Ego; it beholds only its image, as an image which represents a spectator, as a representation which represents itself as representing, and so on, so that it would be extended to an infinite series of self-representing representations, or would resemble a row of persons each of whom gazes at his fellow. Thus subject and object can never be set forth as one and the same, without involving a contradiction, nay more, with Herbart, this last is the greatest and most inconceivable of all contradictions.

Now, however, the Ego, just as it is, is given without doubt. Thus it can, as little as other given phenomena, be dismissed in an off-hand manner, but its notion must be purified from the contradiction, the phenomenon of the Ego must be explained in the internal experience. Here again the Method of Relations stands us in good stead. It rested, as we have seen, upon this point, that the contradictory notion (which is here the subject-object) was separated into its component parts or elements, and something was predicated of these which would not have held good of each of them individually. Now, here it is not the representing subject, but rather the object only, which can be multiplied; the method indeed does not decide thereupon, but the problem itself suggests the application of the method, for it is self-evident that the object (the represented Ego) will be the momentum to be multiplied; I, the knowing, gaze upon myself in the thousandfold states of feeling, thinking, willing, &c., and all these representations of myself are called my Ego. Thus, the object must be multiplied, and of the association of these numerous Ego-objects, that must hold good which cannot of any single definite representation of the Ego, namely, their equivalence to the Ego-subjects. "At present thus much is clear, that the quality of the self or Ego (*Ichheit*) rests upon a manifold objective basis, each part whereof is accidental to it, in so far as the remaining parts would still serve the Ego for its support, in case that part were taken away. I suppose myself to be this or that (represent myself now in one way, now in another), but I am bound to neither, so long as I can change." (Psychol. 1. p. 104.)

The above, however, is not yet the complete solution of the riddle; it is only the first necessary step towards it. "In the first place, if several objects are represented, something in them belongs to the representing agent, namely, their comprehension in *one* act of representation, and what further originates from this. Thence also must proceed the desired modification, by

means of which something may be observed in the different objects, which would belong to none of them taken singly, and which, upon that very account, may probably appertain to *us*. Thus, the representation of myself remains indeed dependent upon the representation of the objects, bears reference to it but nevertheless does not coincide therewith."

Now, however, it is obvious that the numerous objects, as a *mere sum* of represented states or determinations, do not suffice to exhaust the proper notion of the Ego's quality, or of the self-consciousness. A subject, entirely imprisoned by turns in different feelings and intuitions, has still no clear self-consciousness; it must be able to oppose itself to these its states as the persistent, identical element *in* all of them, and so distinguish itself from them. Guided by the objects, these single states, we must, through them, come to a knowledge of ourselves; but meanwhile, in order that the quality of the Ego may form that antagonism to all these inherent determinations (by virtue of which it is in the midst of its connection with, to be still distinguished, from them), we must rise above the objectivity, instead of becoming firmly imbedded or imprisoned therein. The investigation must not take the reverse course, and voluntarily presuppose an absolute Ego, which may by absolute spontaneity evoke all determinations in itself; such an Ego does not actually exist, but is only a philosophical abstraction. What is irrefragably given and true, in the case before us, is, as may be learnt by any one from his own observation, this; that we certainly live in the objectivity, and are wholly taken up by it, before we gradually arrive at self-consciousness; and so we obviously come, in the first place, to a knowledge of ourselves from out the representation of the extraneous and objective. Now, as the consciousness of the pure Ego, or self, is not present prior to the objects, but the latter rather prior to the former, which last is only a supposition to which we are gradually driven, "it follows that in this objective alone can lie the cause of our being lifted out of its representation, the represented itself in its multiplicity being so constituted as to loosen the fetters in which a subject would be imprisoned, which could merely learn to know objects, but never *itself*." (Loc. cit. p. 108.)

Thus, the single definite representations must in some way transport us from out their representative process; this, however, is done not by the single representations *per se*, as such, but they must in their association be so related, that one

lessens the other, *i. e.* arrests, but does not extinguish it, seeing that in the relation of arrest the passively arresting representation must be present as well as the actively arresting one, whereby may be explained the preservation of the *memory* during the state of obfuscation. Manifold representations must thus condition one another, if a self-consciousness is to be possible. Thus, for example, the representation of one colour displaces that of another, one sensation of taste or feeling the other, and of this fact we are soon convinced when, for instance, in the *Logic* it is said, that we may think even of disparate characteristics together, *i. e.* of such as belong to wholly different spheres or series (of sensation), such as red, fragrant, round, but not of such as belong to a common category (red, yellow, white), and may unite the former into one notion (*e. g.* into that of the rose). "Through this contradiction, arrest or disturbance, comes movement into the mind, and not merely movement, but also formative power."

By this theory of reciprocal arrest, in which ultimately the origin of the most perfect self-consciousness and of pure thought, as well as all progressive kinds and degrees of distinctness of the consciousness find their explanation, Herbart has rendered completely superfluous the older theories of different mental faculties and powers for the different functions of the mind, *e. g.* a faculty of sensation, feeling, recollection, and representation, and so on, as being a method of explanation which is both unmeaning and thoughtless, and has been one of the first strenuously to oppose this psychological view.

We have already, in treating of the problems of inherence and causality, spoken of the self-preservedness of *two or more* reals in relation to one another, and because there the discourse was merely concerning an antagonism of *real* essences, we could only think to ourselves of the self-preservedness as directed against disturbances which *would ensue* if it were possible for a real essence to be actually disturbed or destroyed, thus against disturbances which do not in the process actually take place. Here, however, in the Psychology, where we are speaking also of disturbances or arrests, the relation is one of a wholly different kind; for here these arrests do actually or in very fact ensue; for in this sphere, which is that of the consciousness, the arrests do not take place between several real essences, but between mere representations, to which the absolute position is not even transferred, *i. e.* the representations, having their

existence only in the self-preservation of the soul, must not be regarded as simple essences existent *per se*, but as being manifoldly compounded in themselves, susceptible of disturbance, and thus of a wholly different nature to the simple self-pervations of the reals themselves. The *individual definite kind* of self-preservation of the soul, *i. e.* some definite representation, is to the soul and its general simple self-preservation, accidental in the proper sense of the word; the self-preservation, as such, continues just as it is determined in itself, and by some other acting upon it from without; the qualitative element of the soul is not affected by it, but the modifications only (states) of the general self-preservation reciprocally modify one another. Now, *how* or in what way these states must become modified, if self-consciousness is to be the result, we shall see further on, but they must become reciprocally modified, because they all occur within *one* sphere, namely, within the *one* self-preservation of the *one* soul-monad, and have within this sphere their common, their substantial element; wherefore, on the other hand, just because they participate in this element, they may reappear in a certain *relation* of independence to each other, and may behave as potencies, though certainly changeable ones, towards one another. Thus, in a certain way, they will admit of being viewed and dealt with as similar to the self-pervations within their own sphere of the reals, as being, like the latter, opposed to each other, homogeneous, but also unequal in strength and weakness, so that they arrest or accelerate each other and condition each other in the most manifold, nay, the most infinitely diversified manner, and so constitute in their association a system partly blended, partly discrete, as will presently be more clearly shown.

If now we have consented to admit, that the pure self-consciousness presupposes a multiplicity of determinate Ego-representations as its basis, and that this so-called idea is abstracted as the general element from these numerous determinations of the Ego,—it follows that the Ego-subject, of which we are speaking, is by no means to be confounded in itself with the real soul-monad, but that related to these its determinations (the numerous Ego-objects), blended with, and at the same time distinct from them, it is not the *real* Ego, the soul, but only the actual knowing, the self-consciousness, and, as such, cannot and need not sustain the absolute position which in the outset it was necessary to apply to the contradictory notion of the subject-object. Now, however, Herbart does not con-

tent himself with regarding this pure activity, the self-consciousness itself, as something substantial and absolute, as Fichte does; but for the very reason, that the absolute position does not admit of being transferred to this manifold One, he transfers this position back to a fundamental soul-monad, in whose sphere, *i. e.* in whose self-preservation, all this doing or action finds its substantial basis. This again is one of the points in which the presupposed view of existence, already confirmed in the Ontology, comes prominently before us. Without, however, dwelling upon this point afresh, we proceed to consider more closely that "mechanism" which takes place in the mind among the single representations themselves, and which is to have as a general result the formation of the consciousness.

We can, properly speaking, call the single representations forces, which oppose but do not annihilate one another. During this resistance, they do not indeed remain wholly unchanged, but still they are not qualitatively altered; their something, or that which is represented, remains the same object, whether represented or not. But what is changed is the *degree of strength* upon which their vivacity, distinctness, or obfuscation depends. "All depends upon the sum of arrestation (or of the resistance), and the relation of arrest. The former is, as it were, the burden to be distributed, which originates from the antagonisms of the representation. If we knew how to deal with this burden, and were familiar with the relation in which the different representations stand to it, we should then find out by an easy calculation of proportions the statical or *constant* point of each representation, *i. e.* the ground of its obfuscation in the equilibrium." (Lehrb. zur Psychol. p. 14.) We might now imagine that, because we stand constantly in relation to innumerable other reals, innumerable representations also must be constantly present with us at the same time. This, however, is not the case, for one representation only is specially present, and usually in conflict, as it were, with another. The whole matter amounts to this. The relations to the objects, and consequently those representations which correspond to them, are not all of equal strength; hence, one of them enfeebles or arrests the other, by distinguishing itself above all the rest. Still, of two representations only, neither of them can, as may be readily understood, *completely* suppress the other, and for this very reason, because they are engaged in mutual conflict; but among three or more representations, one may indeed be wholly displaced, and, despite its

constant endeavour to emerge again, may be rendered as ineffective as if it were thoroughly absent. The suppressed representations do not on that account entirely disappear, but only linger as it were at the verge of the consciousness, awaiting the favourable moment when they may emerge from their obscurity, when the dominant representation is either enfeebled, or some new one has stepped in, which appropriates, by virtue of a certain relation of quality, that previously displaced representation, and so with united powers presses forwards at the same time with it. Now, just as the equilibrium of representations present in the consciousness can be calculated by the rules of statics, so can this pressure of representations which have sunk down below the static level, and are again striving to reinstate themselves, be calculated according to mechanical rules, or rather, this mathematical theory can be aptly called a statics and mechanics of the mind, although in the present instance we are not really *discoursing* about laws of inertia, parallelogram of forces, leverage, or antagonism of moving power and thing moved.

Those repressed representations, that linger on the verge of the consciousness, and of which it may be said, that they *endeavour* to reappear, while in so doing, although unobserved by ourselves, they still act continually upon the representations present in the consciousness — of these unconscious and but dimly working representations, we may say, we feel them, without being able to characterize them more closely; in other words, they are the feelings, and as such are to be well distinguished from the sensations. They manifest themselves, according to the greater or less success of their impulsive effort, as desires, and the desire becomes the will when it unites itself with the representation or hope of success, with the hope of being able to reappear as a dominant, present sensation. This state becomes an end or object, and all allied representations converge for its attainment.*

Hitherto we have been speaking only of representations as of *simple* potencies; but it lies in the very nature of the case,

* "If a representation is continually urged against an obstruction, so that, in place of yielding to the latter, it makes its way, it is then called a *desire*. For what would the desire have but satisfaction? and what is satisfaction but the perfected representation of that which was desired? Is there a single enjoyment or delight that is not an *act* of the consciousness? A lively fantasy creates to itself enjoyment, at least so long as it succeeds, despite the obstruction, in perfecting the representation, and nothing else but this success constitutes the vivacity of the fantasy. Is it still a question how understanding and will may be one?" Hauptpuncte, § 13.

that this will be by no means their usual relation ; for as a rule all our representations are entangled and blended together in the most manifold manner. These combinations are, however, all essentially of two kinds ; they are, namely, either *complications* or *gradations*. The so-called disparate representations, appertaining to different series and originating from different senses, *e. g.* blue and red, sweet, yellow and soft, and so on, will complicate each other ; but the opposite ones, or those that belong to one and the same series, will blend together, as *e. g.* two colours, such as red and blue, when they go to form violet. Thus each thing, with several characteristics, is a complication ; to the gradations belong especially the æsthetic, harmonising or disharmonising relations. Now, such an entire complication or gradation yields, in respect to the arrest and endeavour, a total force, the action of which, however, and its calculation will naturally become more complicated than that of the single representations ; nay, more, it soon becomes impossible to follow out by the calculation these intricate complexions ; and hence the latter is restricted only to the determination of simple and general laws.

We refrain from venturing deeper into this labyrinth, in which mathematics alone can furnish the clue of Ariadne, and must content ourselves with tracing out more closely the origin of what are usually called abstract notions, to which class the Ego belongs, and in doing this we must, on account of the difficulty of the subject, rest satisfied with gleaning only some general ideas. It is evident, from what has been already said, and is besides a well known fact, that in the first place there are single representations, which proceed from single isolated sensations, as red, round, sweet, and such like ; then come compound representations and notions, such as a thing with several characteristics is ; but, finally, there are abstract notions also, to which direct sensuous intuitions do not, as with the two former, correspond. The genesis of these abstractions and ideas, and the answer which is at the same time involved in the question as to how the thinking subject arrives at them, or makes its own representation the object of the representation ; — this it is which must especially interest us as being one of the most remarkable, but also the most difficult, problems in the doctrine of the human mind.

Now, as there are no special powers and faculties of the mind, so also there is no special faculty of abstraction. The development of the mind, when psychologically regarded, pursues

rather, in general, the following course. We need not here inquire into how the combination or synthesis of the individual representations is formed, for the former is originally given with the representations themselves, and the division or analysis takes place quite gradually. "For a child of the tenderest age," says Herbart, "there are no single things whatever, but entire aggregates, which only separate themselves in space in a successive process of representation."* In the first chaos of the representations it is chiefly the *movement* of individual things, by which the aggregate is dismembered, and by which a plurality of things originates for the representative process. "At first, the table appears one with the ground upon which it stands, as well as the table-top one with its legs; but the table is moved from the spot where it stood, while the top is not separated from the feet. What is not disjoined or separated, preserves in the representation its original unity." "Now, as the aggregates are gradually resolved into individual things, so the things again into their characteristics, and such like." If, now, the single things have assumed a separate position, there are then formed from them certain "*collective impressions*," *i. e.* complexions, or what are called also "general notions," generic ideas, such as tree, man, in which what is similar among the partial representations gains an equilibrium or balance over the heterogeneous or diverse, seeing that by repeated apprehensions of similar objects, the similar constantly becomes elevated in rank, while the diverse, arrested at a point of persistent obscurity, and pressed down beneath the verge of the consciousness, no longer attains to the evolution of the whole series of remaining characteristics united with it. It is true that *nothing* can be actually severed and lost from complexions that are once formed; some partial representations (characteristics) may be merely checked or obscured; but even the obscured ones always form with those, of which we are conscious, a collective force, as we saw above, and all appear again in the series, if they are able to develop themselves freely in some other way. Such series or results of united representations, in which one and the same object has been seen, *e. g.* a man, now working in his garden, now reading a book, then on horseback, complicate and intersect indeed, in the most manifold manner, other series, in which

* Lehrb. d. Psychologie, p. 194. *et seq.*, Psychol. als Wissensch., § 117., *et seq.*, § 132. *et seq.*

the same proximate representation, garden, book, horse, occurs, and therefore become checked in the most manifold manner, while the representation of the man constitutes the common nucleus or point in which those series in their turn meet each other. If now a representation is freed from its original connection, so that it can oscillate, as it were, isolated and undetermined between several other representations, as a subject in union with predicates, yet as subject also can at the same time be distinguished from them, it follows that several such series are necessary, in which the same subject occurs, but also just as many arrests of the remaining partial representations, which were originally in direct connection with it as predicates.

It is true that the above are not yet abstractions in the highest sense, nor are they logical and metaphysical notions; but the formation of the collective impressions hitherto regarded, in which also language plays a prominent part, still depends for the most part upon the accidentally successive apprehension of empirical events, and can on that account lay no claim in philosophy to universality, but may well strengthen the position, that not merely the stuff or material of the sensation, as Kant would have it, but also the *form* of the combinations, is at the same time *given*. Matters stand quite differently with the logical and metaphysical abstractions or notions. These indeed are general notions also, but pure and completely severed from the complications, in which they occur, and in which the series, which they recall, is no longer developed in memory, or in which the representative process no longer reaches to the fulness of their extent; they are artificial products of thought, to which no reality corresponds, and only serve the thought itself as goal-points, as "*logical ideals*" in the sense probably in which Kant regarded the ideas of the reason, as regulative for the formal use of the understanding. In such a case, we can only ask, how it comes to pass that we think of and approach nearer and nearer to such ideals. The question is already answered in part by what has gone before, provided we have arrived at any clear perception of where the *judgment* has its seat, or at least its premises.

Abstract notions, like the above, have been to such a degree divested of all their relations, that they have in fact lost all their content also; for as with the notion of the substance of a thing nothing whatever was left after we had stripped the thing of all its properties, so also with the Ego; here also it was but the

bare or naked notion of the collective relation which remained as a medium or point of reference for the manifold Ego-objects, thus a mere *empty spot*, to which the manifold relations all point as to their goal-point or formal unity. Now, how and why, upon ontological grounds, a real, the soul, must be placed under this point (which soul, on that very account, appears only in the Psychology as a substratum of activities), has been already pointed out.*

We will here say a few words concerning this very soul in its connection with the body, and concerning *life*. Herbart limits this latter notion to a far narrower sphere of natural phenomena than is usually done in the "philosophies of nature." We have already, in speaking of the construction of matter, given, by way of example, the genesis or production of a natural object, of which it was doubtful as yet whether it was to hold good as an animal, a plant, or a crystallisation. And now, by advancing a step further, we may again connect the present inquiry with what has gone before. One chief requisite explanation of life is this, that we must hazard the hypothesis, that self-perservations, which have been, in the first place, reciprocally aroused in the association of several reals, may, in the next place, continue when these reals have again stepped out of connection with each other. If it is ever possible to carry out this assertion (a point which we here leave quite undecided), it can only be done with some show of proof in the Eidology, where we have come to assume in one and the same essence a whole system of determinations that reciprocally check, hold, blend with, and presuppose one another, — in short, a microcosm, or little world-totality *per se*. Now, if we persist in viewing the soul-monad as that which is capable in regard to its self-preservation of a permanent formation in its interior, and of so being a supporter in itself of states, which states may again be the cause under favourable relations with other monads of a definite external form and movement, we have then won, in the present instance, a direct principle of assimilation and organisation, which may be employed forthwith as an explanation of vital phenomena. "That the internal formation of the elements," says Herbart, "still continues after their complete separation, is shown in the remarkable capacity they have of becoming assimilated, whereby the organic materials serve as salutary food for other yet living organisms. The existence of the higher plants and animals depends, as is well known, upon

* Compare Hartenstein's *Metaph.* p. 471.

the fact, that nourishment has been prepared for them through the lower organisms." (Psychol. ii p. 450. *et seq.*)

If, now, we first of all take into consideration the union and mutual action of body and soul, we do not encounter, according to our theory, that incomprehensible feature which is most frequently looked out for, and for this very reason, that soul and body are not *toto genere*, like spiritual and material, opposed to one another, but consist of one and the same internal or fundamental essence, the real; while the soul is but a single monad, and that very one which in the whole system of the person supplies the place of the substance-monad. As concerns in the first place, the actions which proceed from this monad to the periphery, or to the different members of the body, in other words, the voluntary movements; we have above all things to bear in mind that there is no special faculty of volition, but merely definite individual movements within the sphere of the soul's self-preservation, namely, movements of such representations or self-preservation (states) as strive to come forth and again emancipate themselves from the condition of arrest in which they are. We have seen, moreover, that to every sort of change of the internal state of a monad, changes will also correspond in the position of those very monads, with which the former finds itself in imperfect association, and that these changes in the monads immediately surrounding it, have as a result other changes in the more remote monads united only mediately or indirectly with the substance-monad. "Now we know that the soul is associated with the nerves at one end, a fact which constitutes, in the present instance, the general condition of all causality; furthermore, that the nerve, which is presented to us as a coherent thread, must be a chain of simple but imperfectly connected essences; finally, that in such a chain we must invariably expect the slightest change in the internal state of one essence to have some influence upon the disturbances, and consequently upon the self-preservation of all essences in the chain. Thus this influence, running along the nervous fibres, can propagate itself through space (only not through a void space), without being in the slightest degree of a spatial kind." In like manner the nerve is upon its side connected with the muscles and modifies their internal states; from this originates at the same time a change in the position of the muscular molecules, an approximation of the latter among themselves, contraction, or, in the directly opposite case, relaxation.

From all that has been said, it can scarcely require any

special exposition to show how, upon the other hand, external disturbances are propagated inwards to the soul and there become representations, *i. e.*, corresponding modifications of the self-preservation. If once we could explain the so-called voluntary movement, which characterises in the strict sense of the word, all that is called living, we might then explain also the power of locomotion and every thing else, which is peculiar to the bodily phenomena of the vital principle. As concerns the much-talked-of *seat of the soul*, Herbart says, "it is probable that the soul has *no* permanent spot, else some distinct middle point or centre in the brain would have struck the attention of physiologists as being that to which all converges. But the whole middle region, in which the *sensorium commune* has been long since sought for, may furnish a residence for the soul. Thus, the soul may move itself to and fro upon or rather within the *pons Varolii*, provided that we do not search after a canal for this movement, for there is no need of any; no more than light requires the pores of the transparent body, which it permeates in the truest sense of the word in every possible direction. Besides, it is self-evident, that, when the soul moves, this is not done by virtue of its willing so to do (for it knows nothing of it), but because in their turn, as previously, its internal states, united with those of the brain, must be first the cause and then the result of its change of place, and this by virtue of the necessity, everywhere present, that the external and internal state should properly correspond to each other."

As to the movements which the soul produces in the nerves and muscles, the real mechanism of these is completely unknown. Of course! for this mechanism depends upon self-pervations in other reals, which bear no direct relation to the soul. There hovers before the soul, when it wills any thing determinate, not as before a machinist that part of the machine which must be touched in order to produce the intended effect, but only the representation of this effect. What then is the mediating link between this representation of a purpose and the muscular movement which is to realise it? In *actions* properly so called, which are to be carried out with full consciousness, this mediating moment must in some way or other enter the consciousness. It must consist of a definite *feeling*, "which is combined with each flexion and control of the members, whether intentional or accidental — this feeling being complicated with volition, or, more strictly speaking, with

those very representations which are the active element in the exercise of the will; and herein lies the middle term or member of the above-mentioned connection." Through this conscious feeling we bring our own movements, which at first, as in the child and in the inexperienced artist, are wholly or only partially involuntary, gradually under our control. Every movement in the joints excites a definite feeling, and at the same instant the movement also, and its further result is externally perceived; if now at a later period the representation of this result, when once observed, is raised to the rank of a desire, then by the same complication is reawakened also that feeling which accompanies it, and which is in itself that self-preservation of the soul, to which correspond the definite nervous and muscular states which are here required.

We conclude our account of Herbart's Psychology with a figurative illustration of what the author himself has selected as the "most luminous application" of the principles pursued by him in that work. (Psych. ii. p. 4.). This is the *State*. "The state, viewed as a society, which may be protected by a power residing within itself," is, says Herbart, "as perfect a contradiction as the notion of the Ego, or any one of what are commonly regarded by metaphysicians as universal ideas; for the power can just as well destroy as protect, and a society which is to maintain itself by its own power, must necessarily turn this power against itself, and so give rise to internal faction, but not to a fixed or stable constitution. The notion involves a contradiction; yet nevertheless there are states: thus, that notion is no correct expression of the reality; it must covertly refer to the characteristics, which were not thought of in it, but which nevertheless belong to it and suppress what is contradictory therein. These points of relation are powers of a *psychological* nature, inasmuch as the state becomes realised to the extent in which these powers are, and work within it, namely, as *custom* and the *course of business* together with the recognition of and insight into the necessity of the latter. This necessity, however, is partly internal, partly external; the external is the conflict with other states or peoples, which corresponds to the self-preservation of the real against another real, and especially concerns the wars which a state has to carry on for its own existence. In this lies, as for single soul-monads, so also historically for many states, the chief cause of their improvement; "and we shall find that most states, if they were to stand alone, or were given up entirely to themselves,

would really know nothing of their capabilities; as in like manner a single human being knows nothing of what he would be, when apart from all society. The *internal* necessity, however, corresponds exactly to the psychological relations, with which we have already been made acquainted under the names, statics and mechanics, of the representations. "The active working powers in society are unquestionably in their origin of a psychological nature; they meet together or encounter each other, in so far as they are represented by speech and by our dealings in the common world of the senses. In the latter they arrest or check each other; and such is the general drama of conflicting interests and social anxieties." If now we adopt the idea of an imperfect association, a kind of patriarchal state, or something similar, as being the primeval condition of humanity that directly precedes true civilisation, it follows, that we find men already united in different groups of greater or lesser extent — these corresponding, as it were, to the collective impressions or representations of things. Many very unequal forces will soon, however, come into collision with each other. "What first strikes us are the well-known *confines of the consciousness*, which are here converted into confines of *the social influence*. It is quite clear, that a *few powerful* individuals, or those who are supported by trusty followers, can and must in any strong conflict of all the powers against one another (according to the above developed calculations), render completely inefficient a number, however great, of weaker isolated individuals. But then there remains between the more powerful individuals a pressure and counter-pressure, as though those feeble individuals were not even present. By the activity of each a part is knit together; no one remains wholly exempt from the process of arrest." Those who in the historical formation of states could from the very beginning take no part whatever in their consolidation, owing to their being depressed below those confines, would remain the depressed class, yet one constantly ready under all relations to strive again, like the obscured representations, for the ascendancy, and so constituting a potency silently but always at work. Those individuals who fall beneath the confines "must, to allay their wants, become beggars, or else submit themselves to be used as servants, and so will attach themselves to certain persons who pay for their services. Now so long as the community (or those who have been blended together by the process of arrest) adopts them, they belong to it as to their lords

and masters; they will be regarded by the latter as an useful property or possession, and will have no other means of escaping from this bondage than by attempting to flee without knowing whither." Above the confines or verge even of the social influence the equilibrium varies among individuals; many sink down, many rise, while a few separate themselves as *persons of rank* from the herd or common people to whom no regard or attention is paid. Now one is the most illustrious of all, namely, the prince; with him the consciousness or individual feeling of those that rank next to him blends imperceptibly; all look to him, follow him in his movements, and depend upon him; while he in turn, finding them tractable, makes use of this as an advantage to himself. Such is the connection of events in the oldest monarchies. Yet this tractability also has its limits; for the prince dreads most, as regards his authority, those who rank nearest to him, the nobility; he has recourse to the common people, not so much in order to elevate them, but to blend them among themselves into a collective force; he gives them a constitution — in a word, makes them burghers or free citizens. Enough now of this comparison of the state with the psychological processes of the individual human consciousness. We see at once how closely these doctrines are connected, and how in each system they will evolve themselves consistently together.

In fact, when we say that Herbart's system is characterised, in opposition to that of Hegel, by a preponderance of the mechanical view, we do but make use of his own words. "Had I not," says Herbart, "been previously convinced by the practical philosophy, the psychological mechanism had easily filled me with the same terror that leads many to shut their eyes in its presence, who can no more bear to look into the interior of the human mind, than they can regard the inside of the body without horror or disgust." (Psychol. i. p. 79.)

Hence, upon one who undertakes to report Herbart's opinions the obligation is imposed of saying at least as much of those practical principles as is sufficient to rescue the connection, or rather non-connection, of the theories which have been just adduced from a doubtful obscurity which may well seduce the ignorant into cherishing prejudices against the moral purity and worth of Herbart's practical philosophy, though the presence of these elements is acknowledged even by the opponents of his system. Since, however, this wide field of inquiry lies beyond the prescribed limits of these discourses, we must here

rest content with only some brief remarks. Herbart will not have, as might be imagined from what has gone before, any innate special privileges, for all *innate* psychological forms, all original facts of the consciousness or special faculties, are with him a nonentity, and such rights would, as a consequence of his doctrine of law, lead not to justice, but to injustice and contention. In like manner Herbart lays down no original law-giving moral feeling: he rejects the categorical imperative of Kant, "not merely because innate forms would amount to this, but because the moral feeling, together with the disposition towards moral obedience that springs from it, is to be derived as a collective result from the different practical ideas, which are in their turn engendered by as many different judgments of an æsthetic kind," as will be presently seen more clearly. Kant's categorical imperative was merely a formal precept or command; Herbart's principle, on the contrary, does not lack the content, the *something*, which should be done; but this principle lies in those *involuntary judgments* of an æsthetic kind, which, being thoroughly freed from the caprices of our will, have fallen beyond the relations of the latter into the consciousness. There is with him, as we have seen, no special will-faculty, and the will is no special power, least of all the substantial one, or truly real element; but it is grounded psychologically in the aspiring representations. As little, also, with him, is there a transcendental freedom in the rigid sense in which we shall encounter it in Fichte, or in that sense in which it would directly coincide with the essence and substantial willing, as the root of all being *per se*. Herbart, however, does not deny the moral and judicial freedom; he only seeks to rescue the notion of it from being resolved into a wholly abstract, indefinite, and empty independence, and finds it in the well-marked and perfect independence of a definite character. "Man should know and feel that he acts in conformity with insight or judgment, for in this consists the very essence of his inward or spiritual freedom;" or freedom is "the *combined* faculty of judging and arriving at a perfectly accordant resolution." It is thus a capacity or power of doing, and involves just as much a correct mode of judging as the consequent resolution and power of action. But in the ordinary theories upon this subject, the two component parts or elements which lie therein are not properly distinguished,—namely, upon the one hand, the arbitrary character of the power to do, and, upon the other, the necessity and incorruptible precision of the judgment. The will, when

realised in an individual case, is to the moral æsthetic judgment of the conscience just as accidental a matter as a deed or action is to a law-book. On that account Herbart especially insists upon a decided separation of the principles of the theoretical and practical philosophy, considering that they should not approximate in their points of starting, but for the first time only in their results. The principles of Ethics reside in that *involuntary* judgment of an æsthetic kind which acts with logical severity according to the moral ideal, with which a given act of the will has been compared. The theoretical philosophy has, however, only to deal with the actual, and thus in the Psychology with the will-movements, or with that which is actually willed. That which is a real object of cognition, and that, which apart from that æsthetical act of judging, cannot be understood, are to be separated; but not, as in the systems of Identity, to be resolved under the name of freedom into an unity of a law of the reason that wills and fulfils itself. Moreover, as for the theoretical act of judging, no “good” or “evil” is present, so also does the practical not trouble itself about the question, whether any thing has been, nay, can or cannot be accomplished.*

When in the mind several representations would simultaneously rise up and enter into conflict with each other, there then comes into play the practical deliberation, which ultimately reduces the selection that is made of them to one single purpose or end in view. Thus the general volition, the power of coming to a decision, the character of a man, will especially depend upon the fact of his having rendered in his consciousness a certain body of representations, a definite kind of mental images, persistent, prominent, and thereby of such power that the other representations become enfeebled by constant subjection, or are early prevented from gaining any entrance whatever into the consciousness. In the sway of this governing body of representations, which the longer it is established the more indisputable it becomes, consists the habit and main object of volition.

Since man, by virtue of his self-consciousness, can contemplate his own states, and judge according to the idea of the good and beautiful, there follows from this the *conscience*; for there is not only a conscience in a moral point of view, but a conscience also of the truth, with which rules of art, nay even rules of worldly prudence or wisdom, may be carried out. Now to these ideas of the beautiful and good, says Herbart, there is added an

* Herbart über philos. Studium. Kleine phil. Schriften, Bd. i. p. 151.

original testimony or evidence in the human consciousness: it is not necessary to subject them to the same elaboration and rectification as metaphysical notions; but they are directly applicable to the passing of valid judgments, namely, of approval and displeasure. They cannot even be first logically corrected; they must appear only in their purity and clearness; for indeed in many individuals they are frequently obscured and defaced by the mass of subordinate representations. The fundamental idea of them all is that of *Beauty* (the *καλόν*, which comprehends the morally good within itself). And now let the beautiful be but freed from impeding and perplexing representations of a subordinate kind, depicted in its original state of purity and distinctness, while especially protected against being confounded with the merely agreeable and useful, and every one recognises and knows that, as something persistent, universal, and abiding, it is well to be distinguished from the satisfaction of shifting desires. This unveiling and portraying of the beautiful constitutes the main business of the *Practical philosophy*, which hence is *Æsthetics* in a wider sense, as we see, than what is usually bestowed upon the word. *Æsthetics* is a practical science, *i. e.* it takes the idea that is given it of beauty, and with that sets to work at the given. Thus, it consists of a series of artistic rules, which instruct the artist how he is to deal with the object upon which he is engaged, in order that it may correspond to that idea, and so, instead of displeasing, may prove a source of pleasure to himself or others. From the remainder of the beautiful, however, the moral element detaches itself, as being that very something, which is not merely possessed as a thing of worth, but which itself determines the unconditioned worth of individual persons.

As regards the Beautiful in the *stricter sense*, it is a matter of indifference as to whether we would be practical artists and represent it. It is merely a rule and law for the practical artist, and the æsthetic conscience enforces obedience to it on whoever has once selected it as his study and occupation. But there are also technical rules*, says Herbart, whose prescripts carry in themselves the character of a necessary law for *all men*, just because all men must, by virtue of their whole existence, elaborate this definite object of nature—namely, themselves; the technical rules that are here indicated being the *doctrine of virtue*. This doctrine rests upon the so-called *practical ideas*,

* Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 3te. Ausg. Königsberg, 1804, p. 26.

of which there are several, and of which five are especially to be taken into account: 1st, the idea of internal or moral freedom; 2nd, the idea of perfection (*e. g.* of culture); 3rd, of benevolence or of goodness; 4th, of justice; and 5th, of moderation. The chief relation that is to be regarded in the doctrine of virtue, as having to deal principally with the honourable and dishonourable, is the conformity of the will and judgment as acts in one and the same rational being. Either the individual affirms in his will what in his judgment he scorns, or he neglects in the former what in the latter he prescribes to himself, or, lastly, his will and judgment are in conformity with one another. This harmony it is which directly pleases us in a moral sense, as being the morally beautiful, the virtue thought of as an ideal, the declaration also of moral freedom. Justice in particular springs from the voluntary establishment of harmony between the wills of different human beings, and is thought of as a rule which should obviate contention. Its validity and sanctity depend upon the disapproval of contention, and cannot, without a dangerous confusion of ideas, be built up upon any other basis.*

Lastly, as regards the settlement of the religious question, Herbart believes that what is especially required of him is, not to regard, with Kant, the idea of conformity to purpose as a purely subjective idea of the reason, which man only bestows upon the course of nature, but rather to deduce the idea, together with all empirical intuitions and notions, from nature itself, or to demonstrate it in the same, *i. e.* in our empirical representations.† If the world actually exists as a whole disposed according to design, it follows that we must inquire also for the author of this arrangement, and shall find him in an essence that is above us, but not merely within *our* vision, which would only transfer the reason of man to nature. This belief in a Spirit of Order, little as it is grounded on demonstration, yet depends directly upon the same conclusions, and has the same certainty as the belief by which every man is convinced of the existence of other rational spirits; for of my fellow-men, I see only forms and teleological acts, and that these proceed from rational thought is only a belief, but one so worthy of confidence, that

* Herbart's practical philosophy has been further carried out by Hartenstein in his "Grundbegriffe der ethischen Wissenschaften," 1844. For a concise survey and general idea of this work see the *Jenaische Liter. Anzeiger*, 1845. No. 16, *et seq.*

† *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 3te. Ausg. Königsberg, 1804. p. 243, *et seq.*

it stands in certainty above all knowledge. To carry out in scientific detail a Cosmogony is indeed impossible, but, as to what belongs to the domain of real concrete existences, the position is indisputable, that they are in substance created. To the substance belong accidents; these, however, may be regarded as raised above the infinitely manifold possibility of the accidental views by preparatory disturbances and movements. "Besides, all metaphysics, so long as it does not, like mathematics, enjoy general consent, and is only comprised or thought of as investigation, can neither encroach upon experience nor upon the feelings of those who live only in belief."*

It is evident at a glance that Herbart has so far kept to the Kantian stage of philosophy as to admit of no true cognition and knowing of the qualities of the existent and of things, but, like Kant, only of a cognition of phenomena. Since, however, the varying sensations, as well as their connection or form, are still directly and undeniably *given*, while these, although an appearance only in themselves, yet presuppose a phenomenal or real element external to or without the soul, it follows that the presence or existence of a real world, apart from the Ego, is proved; and that the soul also stands in connection with this. The origin of the sensations is no longer a riddle, so soon as we regard them as self-preservations; but it does not follow from this self-preservation that the sensations truly correspond to the qualities of the reals, but rather that they are purely subjective, and in so far an appearance. Each monad lives shut up within itself together with its own sensations; in my soul-monad, no other monad can ever convert itself directly into my knowing or sensation. This is the subjective aspect or feature of the system, which we must not, however, by any means, confound with subjective idealism; nay more, it stands in direct opposition to the latter, inasmuch as with Herbart the diversity of the sensations, *i. e.* of the relations of the self-preservation, point in general of necessity

* Hauptpuncte, § 14. We meet only in Herbart with some scattered aphorisms of a Philosophy of Religion. As regards, however, what may be achieved in this respect by his theory, which is essentially based upon a pure moral, the reader may consult the Religions-philosophie of Drobisch. Leipzig, 1840.

to actual real objects, to a diversity of the real, and this again to a corresponding multiplicity of reciprocal relations, while the subjective idealism, such as we shall encounter presently in Fichte, explains the things to be pure spontaneous products of the Ego. Herbart, on the contrary, says of his real world; it is only the relations, not that which stands in these relations, which we cognise; all our metaphysical knowledge bears reference to the form, not to the quality, the material of the real in itself. This intrinsic nature (*Ansich*) of the real, says he, does not concern the human being; it concerns him only to learn what the things are for *him*; and this he is taught by a long and faithful observation of experience. We cognise no substance whatever, and as each substance is merely conceivable as a *quale*, no quality whatever in itself. "In our circle of experience, we picture only to ourselves the concurrence or disintegration of such unities as determine among each other the groups of unities, by virtue of which they are to appear to us. Experience merely consists in a tissue or web of relations. The given contains only that objective appearance which is valid for all spectators, but can furnish no predicates of the things themselves. Yet how much, *e. g.*, have the astronomers made out of such an appearance, by united skill and power! The ordinary human being draws thence his usual worldly prudence, the satisfaction of his desires, and the remedies for his pains. For all this, the knowledge of the true qualities, and of what actually takes place in the substances, is neither necessary nor useful, nor possessed of any influence whatever. We live once and for all in relations, and need nothing further. It is the metaphysician alone who perceives how remote the true real and the actual occurrence are from our usual sphere of thought."*

The true objective cognition of qualities, and of what actually takes place in the substances, is not necessary for the ordinary purposes of life; enough, if we only know how any thing is *for or in relation to us*. If, however, we would concede this point for the sake of getting agreeably through life, still it would be impossible thereby to explain in a satisfactory manner, either that higher object and impulse, which is in itself a valuable acquisition, namely, the intellectual object of cognising truth for the sake of the cognition, or those ethical and religious objects of the human mind which are inseparably united with this. The modest judgment, apparently so befitting us,

* Allgem. Metaphys. Bd. ii. p. 414.

concerning human reason as limited, the refuge in belief, whenever and because we cannot directly *know* nor comprehend the highest verities, — this it is which every where leaves behind a thorn in the mind and a pang of doubt that is not to be silenced. It is not the mere pride of knowledge, but an ill-concealed contradiction that stings us, a contradiction in which a definite philosophising has first entangled us, and then left us without advice, because it no longer knows how to help itself, and would like, accordingly, to shift the burden upon the shoulders of human reason. But here also we encounter the same error. Herbart strives to remove in detail the contradictions from the special notions, and then lets the contradiction stand upon the whole. A general defect which pervades the whole of his *Metaphysics* is, that the objective truth is wholly devoid of any unity or substantial bond of connection, of which, although subjectively — yet *only* subjectively — we might be conscious, and which, if our knowing is to hold any fundamental and essentially adequate relation to being, might be set as a postulate to the objectivity. The relations of the real, which should supply this deficiency, the repulsion, and especially the attraction, resolve themselves into a mere subjective appearance. We find, indeed, how this appearance can originate in us, the observing subjects, and, granted the premises, how it must originate, but by so much the less do we experience the objective truth, the actual occurrence or that which really takes place. It is but too frequently the case that we render the phenomena conceivable by certain fictions, *e. g.*, when we would represent the spaceless monads as globules that wholly or partially penetrate each other; but that which would render the fact conceivable, is the fictitious element therein, and this must again be negated: thus, of these views of Herbart, which directly concern the cardinal point of his whole system, we may say, as Jacobi did of Kant's system, "one cannot get into it without them, and with them one cannot remain therein."

The whole system formed itself in Herbart's mind in opposition to and in conflict with the Idealism of Fichte, with which he was dissatisfied; and, in direct opposition to this idealism, Herbart is in the right, so far as he insists upon an objective, real existence; for such right he will maintain against every system of idealistic monism. A second fundamental defect of this form of idealism was its utter inability to prove and conceive of the emergence of an infinitely manifold content from out the abstract principle of the Ego, which was no ground or

substratum for such a production. In opposition to this, Herbart persisted in declaring that from a *single* abstract factor no multiplicity of phenomena could be explained. Thereby he renders valid an all-important fundamental canon, one which has been violated both by ancient metaphysicians, and by the professors of the subsequent Identity-systems,—namely, that of the sufficient reason, by virtue of which the higher and more concrete cannot spring out of nor be derived from the lower and more abstract, nor be evaded by the assumption of a “potency,” which is neither acknowledged to be real, nor mental; but, as will be shown further on, is commonly placed as an indifference at the bottom of both forms of existence.

Now, while on this point, no less than on others which have preceded it, we would not hesitate to do full justice to our author; we cannot, for all that, forbear from placing Herbart as the counterpart of Fichte upon the *same* line with the latter, though at its opposite extremity, so that the two must form a mutual complement to one another, provided only that they are apprehended from a higher point of view. We must say that Fichte is the same monadologue, but from the subjective, that Herbart is from the objective, point of view. The latter regards all from without, and, accordingly, every thing appears to him as an existing object, the special determinations of thought even appearing after the fashion of things: the former transports himself directly into the place of the thinking subject, is himself the monadic Ego, and every thing converts itself with him into pure thought-determinations, and the objects emerge from him only as thoughts of the subject. Both, however, have an equally abstract void being, as their principle and essence, for while Fichte admits the fulness of thought as being *directly* present and given in the Ego, but not produced by it; Herbart must presuppose the fundamental elements of things to be objectively devoid of production. Hence, with Herbart, a “Cosmogony” is not merely non-deducible, but is, in fact, a contradiction, being not merely inconceivable, but also impossible, and, as a direct consequence of this, a free creation also. Herbart, indeed, lays the chief stress upon this point; that, for a world of monads originally represented as chaotic, no necessary ground could be afforded for an orderly and teleological development, but that, should this world have assumed any form, to regard such as a matter of accident, would be untenable; that, consequently, from the actual conformity to purpose which is perceived in

the world, we must conclude that there is an author conscious to himself of an object; but as this author must himself be thought of as monad, and, as of the monads or reals, it universally holds good that they only, in and through their association with others, by virtue of the "self-preservation," spiritually determine themselves and perfect their states, it follows, that a series of assumptions and suppositions is forced upon us, which, if, as the system justifies us by its notion of substance, we were to transfer by analogy from finite things to God, we must either have as a result a very inadequate notion of God and his activity, or we must not at all apply it to the highest essence, so that we here find ourselves given up to ignorance and incomprehensibility.

Herbart cannot relax one jot of the strictness with which he regards the notion of being; for from this only arise the contradictions, which entail, as a direct consequence, their method of solution, *i. e.* his whole Metaphysics, if the notion of existence admitted of being in any way easily dealt with. But, this not being the case, we are prevented from taking the internal states of the real essences as any thing more than an appearance, which only originates for the spectator, who gazes upon them in their manifold groupings; an appearance which, being then subjective as it is in the Ego of the spectator, is again mirrored over into the interior of the reals, where it must in like manner be an internal state as in the subject; and again, because these states have been previously comprehended only as external relations of the reals among themselves, it follows that the psychological states in the subject also are external relations only of the representations among themselves. Nevertheless, here in the subject, the Ego is the common substance of the representations, which are mere inferences of it, although to each other they hold the relation of real essences. If, however, the actual occurrence, or the movement and combination of the real essences, is to find objectively its ultimate ground of explanation in their internal states, it is necessary to transfer the collective image, which holds good of the interior of the subject, to the association of the objective group, to the complexion or the thing itself: but then the form of the complexion or the association inevitably becomes something as substantially single as the Ego itself. Thus, there is either no single self and self-consciousness, or the form of unity of the things is just as substantial as the subjective self; both which cases, how-

ever, run counter to the hypothesis. With all this hangs in closest connection what has been already noticed above concerning the plastic nature of the essences as regards their internal states, resembling, as it were, a re-collection of the latter; when either the essences appear isolated as a many-sided condition of states, which is no longer consistent with the strict notion of a simple *quale* as such, or, to evoke multiplicity and change in them, an actual association of monads is required.

All this and much more, which might be pointed out as involving difficulties unsolved, will ultimately find its source in the principle and method of the whole system, to which in conclusion we will once again revert. We do not, however, meet with a single principle, as a starting point, but with an infinite number of beginnings, and the unity which is craved by the science of philosophy must first be produced in the end, *i. e.* in the result. The whole system is the direct reverse of a genetic one, such as Idealism when perfected would be; it is not from the point of unity of the eye that the cone of light, which might depict a plurality of objects, streams forth, but from many objective points the rays converge together to a focus in the eye, *i. e.* in the subject. In this way the unity is only subjective, not objective; it is only in the knowing, not in the being or existence. Thus, if a substantial unity was *known*, *i. e.* not merely thought of, but presupposed also as existing in itself, as *truth*, something false would then be known or rather only thought of; thus in the thinking process or consciousness, a something, a form, must be posited, which must not hold good of the objects, namely, the unity or thoroughly substantial bond of connection. It follows, therefore, as a direct consequence of this, that Herbart says, what holds good of the *notion* as notion, does not hold good of the existent, or of what is posited by this notion; for a notion is a representation, a mere inherence and modification of the state of the subject, and is thus the direct reverse or negation of the true objective being *per se*; to confound the one with the other would infallibly lead to idealism, and would leave no real being whatever external to or without the subject. By the same right, however, the relation admits also of being reversed. If all and every thing that *is*, be real and self-subsistent, then there is no more in the knowing than in the being an all-embracing unity; each monad is together with its representations — or whatever else we please to call its modifications — absolutely shut up within itself, isolated, an idealism in itself *per se*, and of a real world-unity

without itself, it can know nothing whatever, because none such exists; even the present appearance can prove nothing, for it is only the peculiar appearance of the monad in itself, as being the ground and consequently productive source of that appearance; but this again would be wholly at variance with the hypothesis.

Herbart himself acknowledges that there is only something for us, so far as it is known; within the subjectivity itself and by virtue of *logical* necessity is the certainty alone to be attained of an objectivity perhaps utterly distinct from us, or devoid of any influence. He requires, however, that such an objectivity should be actually present; for to insist upon the strictness of the notion of being is to negate, and with that to dismiss every solution of objective truth into the region only of subjective thought. This, as already said, is the one side of the system that stands in full and unshakeable strength against every system of Idealism and Identity. A system has no truth, and is therefore false in itself, so soon as refusing to acknowledge being to be a free, true, and independent being *per se*, it absolutely and directly identifies the thinking process with the being. Now then is this truth to be logically or empirically confirmed, *i. e.*, raised to a state of certainty? If scientifically, then without doubt this must be done in a logical manner, *i. e.* by pointing out the contradiction which might lie in an opposite assertion. The knowing must know the existent, or else it is no knowledge, no truth. Nevertheless we find, so soon as we press forwards to this at least formally universal principle, the idea of the knowing or of truth, that Herbart is not distinctly conscious of it. He occasionally rejects even this principle as unfruitful, and instead of attempting, if only in the simplest analytical way, to find out whether any thing admits of being deduced from it, or whether (to use his own words) this notion points to definite complementary notions, he affirms, that we can do nothing with it, without either falling back again upon the favourite doctrine of psychological faculties or else hypostasizing the *activity* of thought, *i. e.* rendering it a constituent of the thinking subject.*

Upon the other hand, Herbart raises the question: if all speculation and scientific interest turns upon unity and depends upon the instinct for it, is this unity to be merely a subjective unity in the sphere of the thoughts, or an objective unity also

* Über philos. Studium. Kleine Schriften, Bd. i. p. 161.

of the things? is it, in short, to be both a principle of philosophy, as also the expression of nature in the aggregate? * The answer is, "so far as the thinker *thinks* the real, he stands in need of the unity; for in his contemplations of nature a general connection must prevail; in so far, however, as to the question, what he thinks, the reply is — the real; *that want or requirement falls away entirely*, and on this very account, that it lies in every instance not in the what or something, but only in the thinking process." Thus we have, in fact, a want or necessity of the thought, which consists in cognising the truth, and thus thinking of it as it is; and nevertheless we cannot cognise and think of it as it is, without thinking it otherwise than it is. If by this Herbart would only say, with Kant, that the thought, I think, must accompany all my representations, in order to elevate the thinking process to the self-consciousness, and that this thought may serve as a corrective against falling into the error, which is close at hand, of confounding subjectivity and objectivity, ideality and reality—it follows that this reminiscence of the formal distinction of thought from that which is posited by it, is, as has been said, a point which it is of especial importance should be rendered again valid in our own time. But meanwhile this distinction must not be rendered a material one of the content, and extended so as to imply that, although, subjectively, unity may be present, yet that, objectively, it has no meaning and truth.

It must surprise us to find how, on the one hand, it is admitted that the absolute position, the hastily granted being, must in numberless cases be withdrawn, because the *something* to which it has been attributed does not sustain it; while, upon the other, an equally *a priori* mention is made of *qualities*, and without any closer determination single *qualia* are posited as real essences, which, upon closer consideration, just because they are mere qualities, resolve themselves into relative states and relapse into dialectics, so that in the end no essence whatever is left as truly existing and self-subsistent *per se*, except those which are themselves Egoes or thinking subjects. It is, however, a striking fact, that Herbart, as well as any one of the more recent philosophers, acknowledges the insufficiency of the ordinary formal or analytical logic to solve the highest metaphysical problems, and has shown that the reason for this essentially depends upon our taking the notions and their momenta or characteristics as ready-made or given; and so dealing with

* Über philos. Studium, p. 131. *et seq.*

them, that only compositions and decompositions, but no essential unity, is either produced or presupposed. It hence discloses no substantial copula or bond, no proper ground either of unity or multiplicity: it lacks this ground, and with this the deepest point into which philosophy has to inquire. In place of this comes in, with Herbart, where the problems demand it, the Method of Relations, which sets out indeed from an objective unity (the m in the A), but by rendering this m by subdivision into several m 's, equivalent to the n , suppresses objectively and in truth the substantial unity, and leaves the latter to subsist only subjectively in A , *i. e.* in the appearance or phenomenon for us. Thus, this method is, in fact, a reduction and adjustment of the problems in question to or for the old logical method of regarding them, which has been already declared to be insufficient.

Much of what might here find a place will be more readily understood, when we come to treat of the other side of philosophy as represented by the Idealists and Monists. We must not, however, upon the above grounds, find fault with the unprejudiced student of philosophy, if he turns with only excited, but unsatisfied, curiosity to other masters, who, at least, promise him full satisfaction.

LECTURE VI.

FICHTE.

THE result of the former discourses, and with this the present one is now in its turn to be more closely connected, may be briefly expressed as follows.

Kant, in striving to put an end to every false and unproved supposition, or to all dogmatising in philosophy, found that we mirror over into the objective world the kind and mode of our vision, or the subjective arrangement of our perceptive and thinking faculty; that this world never comes directly with us into view, but only by means of the categories of our sense and understanding; and that consequently all experience, everything which comes before us as a world and an event of that world, is only the reflex in our consciousness of a perfectly unknown external, and thus is only the *phenomenon*, as it must fashion itself within us according to *internal* laws of the mind, — a phenomenon, in which we may very well detect our mental organisation, or, so to speak, the optical arrangement of our mental eye, but not the nature of the objects, or how they may happen to be in themselves.

Nevertheless, objects, which are reflected, must be present external to or without us, since otherwise our sense and understanding would be absolutely devoid of content; for the understanding, as the activity which first impresses upon that content within us a definite form, fashions and arranges it, and in like manner the theoretical reason, which in its turn brings order and systematic unity into this formed or moulded content of the understanding, are both in themselves absolutely empty, being mere formative activities for a material to be obtained through the senses; but they have at the same time the capability of reflecting upon these their functions and operations, in a word, upon their own action, and then by becoming purely conscious *in abstracto* of these, apart from all material, of erecting their proceedings into rules, or what is commonly called Logic; but in doing this they but *too* readily forget that they have no content in themselves, no other object than themselves, in short, only their own empty mode of activity set before them, and so they regard also these subjective forms of activity, when comprised under certain notions, or categories and

ideas, as something real, or as laws, to which in actual nature similar arrangements must correspond, because they *so* subjectively think them. Thus the notions that correspond to the categories of the senses, such as space and time, those of the understanding, as substantiality, causality, and such like; and those of the reason, absolute subjective being, or mind (soul), the totality of phenomena or world-unity, and the idea of the fundamental and primary essence, the complex of all reality or God—all these notions and ideas only originate from our objectifying, hypostasizing, and even personifying the kind and mode of our thinking activity, to do which, however, the imaginative faculty is not competent.

Such was the result of the Kantian Critick of Pure Reason. Jacobi had, upon the other hand, appealed to the *matter-of-fact* existence, both of the sensuous intuitions as well as of the ideas in the reason, and had rejected every genetic explanation of them as inadmissible; he had suggested, that just as every influence of sensuo-corporeal impressions upon a mental consciousness was inexplicable, but still actually present, so also was the reason not a higher logical understanding, but a faculty designed for perception, a higher sense, and that the ideas were actually, *i. e.* in an inexplicable manner, given in and together with it. He had—and that was the chief result of his labours—directed attention to a richer content of the human mind, which could be perceived and gradually disclosed by the reason. Thus, the reason held good with Jacobi for a sense, or for that faculty of perception which is given us that we may become conscious, and that indeed directly, of the mysteries of our own spiritual essence, or of the nature and fulness of that which within us is called mind.

In this way was distinctly mapped out by Kant and Jacobi the twofold tendency or direction which philosophy was to assume: it either took the images and ideas as a matter-of-fact basis; appealed to the undeniable fact, we have them, they are there, and to the equally undeniable fact, that they originate for us, we know not how; and continued to build upon this empirical foundation by making a constant appeal to a ready prepared *existence*—such was the Realistic view, which has for its fundamental notion that of different substances, real, immutable, and directly present; a doctrine, this, first distinctly declared by Herbart, who has hitherto pursued this tendency in the most consistent manner;—or philosophy sought, in the next place, as Kant has done with the general notions of

the understanding and the ideas, to explain their origin genetically, by proving the speculative and thinking mind of man to be itself the creative author of these notions, and then representing these notions as products of the reason. Such was that tendency, which would ultimately explain all from the vital principle, and has hence been denominated the *Dynamico-idealistic* view. Now it is this view which we must proceed to characterise in its progressive development through the writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

While for a long time the greater number of philosophical writers persisted in the endeavour to combine Kant's Critick and Jacobi's rational belief, and work them out together into a tenable system, a point to which an impetus was especially given by *Carl Leonhard Reinhold* (first of all in Jena, and then in Kiel), it happened that *Johann Gottlob Fichte* (born at Rammenau in the Oberlausitz May 18th, 1762, and at that time acting as private teacher in Switzerland) became, by his own confession, fully convinced * (just as Kant had formerly been by Hume) through the sceptical writings of Salomon Maimon and Jacob Ernst Schulze, that as yet philosophy had by no means risen to the rank or dignity of an evident science.

Now, in order that we may not lose our way throughout the whole of Fichte's undertaking by an error at starting, it is positively necessary to think distinctly to oneself of the *object* and *goal*, which was incessantly pursued by this acute and thoroughly scientific thinker.

We have already seen, at the very outset of our inquiries, that philosophy aspires after *knowledge*, where otherwise faith and opinion alone prevail. But that knowledge can only be attained through the consecutive steps of a system, which has been built up on an intrinsically certain foundation, and that indeed in such a way that one position sustains the other, so that all of them may be finally reduced to one fundamental position or principle, as being that which is directly certain. If now such a system has been built up with a strict regard to truth and to definite rules, philosophy, or the love of knowing, has attained her goal, being now no longer philosophy, but actual knowledge, episteme, or absolute science. Now this was the point which Fichte yearned to attain (as every one does, who

* Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, Weimar, 1794. Preface, p. 3.

has once distinctly thought out the idea of philosophy). Impelled no less than Kant, in the depths of his own nature, by the strongest ethical consciousness, he would make an end to philosophy, if possible, and restore the science or knowledge in its place. On that account he called his system "*Wissenschaftslehre*," or *Theory of Knowledge*; in short, it was to be nothing more nor less than a method of instruction as to the mode by which a thorough and strictly scientific knowledge could be accomplished or brought about. In doing this he believed and was *firmly convinced* that the material for this purpose, or the stuff, as it were, for this edifice, had been perfectly supplied by Kant, and that nothing else was wanting than its arrangement, in order to let the science obtained by that philosopher come forth triumphantly and overwhelmingly in its full character of sterling and immoveable strength.

The main point in this was of course to find out the principle, which, though nowhere distinctly expressed by Kant, was yet that upon which Kant's own view of the matter depended. Kant had reduced all to the internal *a priori* arrangement of our thinking faculty, which was with him based upon a number of contiguous peculiarities and special laws, *i. e.* the categories. These were in part involved in contradictions with one another, and above all there was no means of arriving at any unity of consciousness, no absolutely first and last principle to be found, so long as two different sources of our knowledge were adopted, whereof the one was to lie in the depths of our own mental nature the other external to us in the influences of unknown things. Fichte, however, was firmly convinced that that master-mind had been misunderstood when it was saddled with contradictions, or when it was believed that Kant, in his deepest reasonings, rested, by turns, first on the sensuous phenomenon, in order to confirm the judgments of the understanding, and then on the *a priori* nature of the mind, in order to confirm the phenomenon. Such a twofold procedure as this, betraying as it does an utter want of *one* common and deepest point of support, should not, he believed, be attributed to the master of philosophy, and hence he regarded all this as a misunderstanding.

He was actually not aware, that, while seeking to expound the true sense of the Kantian Criticism, another and a new system was silently evolving itself; and was not convinced of this fact until Kant himself, in the *Intelligenzblatte*, No. 109. der allgemeinen Literaturzeitung, 1799, and at the same time in the *Hamburger Correspondent*, protested in a formal and

most decisive manner against the exposition made by Fichte of his doctrine.

Fichte—that I may express my opinion at the very outset—has not only during his lifetime been upon all sides misunderstood, but is *still* partly so in the sense to which an almost general credence has been given, namely, that nothing is to be gained from his idealism, and that it is not worth one's trouble to study it. One usually passes him by in studying the philosophy of the present age, and yet *in his system alone lies the key to the comprehension of all the more recent systems.*

In the first place, if not a thoroughly false, it is still a distorted view, and an impeding prejudice, when one goes upon the judgment drawn from hearsay, which says, that Fichte was convinced that he himself, or his own Ego, made up or projected in a dazzling light the world before itself, that no world could exist, and that, properly speaking, Fichte alone could be present with his magic-lantern in universal space. "Such," says Fichte himself, "is that unmeaning, irrational, and bottomless Idealism and Egoism, which only offended courtiers and captious philosophers have palmed upon me." To deny the existence of the world was not even Fichte's intention; nay, what is more, it continues to subsist for him unassailed in its reality, but upon other grounds than those which are usually adopted; and he even busied himself in the practical part of his philosophy with exhibiting and justifying this reality in the light of a higher necessity. But in venturing thus far, he was much too consistent or logical to let any thing hold good in the theoretical part of his system that did not admit of being strictly proved from his principle; he would not deny the objective world, but he repudiated every explanation of our knowledge that depended upon the common assumption of an external influence, as being one which would at the same time invest our freedom and self-activity with external limits. What he desired, was to furnish a *Theory of Knowledge*, and to establish it of one piece, in the strictest connection and in perfect unity; and this he could not do otherwise than by keeping himself strictly to the stand-point of the subjective principle. Every thing, which may possibly be and occur external to us, takes place, it is clear, external to us and to our consciousness; that it occurs and how it occurs, we positively learn only from within, or within our subjective sphere of thought. Thus, is the image that is reflected in me a reflex from without; I can only know this through being necessitated by my own inward

nature and reason to adopt and presuppose such influencing objects. I see that these phenomena are present in me; and whence are they? Whether I have engendered them myself, or another than my Ego has evoked and occasioned them in this my Ego; still in either case my Ego has been actively engaged in the matter. I can absolutely know nothing beyond what is present within me, or in my consciousness, as a something *known*; does my reason find itself necessitated, *i. e.* by its own rational laws of thought, to assume something external to me, still it is this very reason, *i. e.* my own Ego, which thinks, presupposes these things to be without me, or, as Fichte expresses himself, posites them. Such, then, is that calumniated idealism upon which so much crude and cheap wit has been expended, yet which still to every one who thinks over the matter in any degree must obviously appear to be the only consistent road for philosophy to tread.

Thus, that which the things external to me are to be, the reason or the understanding has obviously thought in them; for in first presupposing them, we presuppose them also with certain qualities—in short, all that we ascribe to things, or regard as being derived from them, is first bestowed definitely by us upon them; the true and original drift of all this, being, that the consciousness has representations in itself, and that our own understanding presupposes things, in order that it may explain the origin of these representations. Thus we have before us a thoroughly internal action and essence: first of all, images and representations; secondly, the representation of things without us; and then, as being likewise thought by the understanding, the relation and reciprocal action of these things and those copies among themselves: thus we have nothing whatever beyond images and thoughts, for the things also, in so far as we think them, are still only something thought. It must accordingly be possible to discover, in this thoroughly subjective sphere of life and movement, a thoroughly immanent and subjective theory, and upon this to build up a thoroughly consistent system.

Such is Fichte's fundamental view. We see from this that he had, as already said, no intention whatever of denying the presence of things external to us;—that he did not think even of this—but simply declared that all that we could know of things without us, even their bare existence, is still *within* us, and, in so far as all this arrives at the consciousness, is only a thought, a something thought of, and that indeed by

us, being thought of in each man by his own Ego — and each one of us is only justified in speaking of his Ego — and so also in philosophy of the Ego, in a general sense.

Now, whether Fichte, either in the course or at the outset of his investigation, had reflected sufficiently so as to perceive that his stand-point, as *subject*, necessarily presupposes of itself an *objectivity*, or external world, which limits the subject and influences it by acting upon it, is a question to be determined later on. Thus much, however, is certain, that even after the discovery of such an influence to be presupposed, still the effect of this, as it is manifested in the consciousness (and only in so far can we speak of it), can only be regarded as a subjective process, as a something felt and thought; and that we shall never and nowhere find a means of *thus* thinking of reality external to us, as it is, unless we first discover and directly perceive in our own consciousness some real or essential element; for thus alone can we suppose what is internally perceived to exist externally in like quality; or in so far only as we may discover a reality in our own soul, can we have an acquaintance with realities in the same sense external to us, namely, by a kind of analogy or multiplication of our own real essence. On that very account Fichte was as intent upon discovering a *single* principle for the theoretical philosophy, as in maintaining the same absolutely *free* for the practical. So soon as, with Reinhold, we place at the foundation of our reasoning an Ego *determined* by real facts of the consciousness, the question at once arises for consideration as to the *condition* of this passively conditioned state; thus the conditioning (the object) becomes forthwith elevated above the Ego, becomes itself a principle, and the Ego ceases to act absolutely and freely. To these preliminary observations, I will only add the following. It will at the outset facilitate the understanding of Fichte's, and in the next place of Schelling's views also, if we assume that there are *unconscious representations*, *i. e.* determinations, modifications of the mind, *internal* states of the soul, or states, *in which* the mental nature is, before the consciousness perceives itself therein. It is throughout presupposed by Fichte, that the consciousness is but an inward perception of this already present state; the consciousness then suddenly perceives these states, determinations, *i. e.* feelings and representations, in itself, finds *itself* already in them, or *them* in *itself*, and as it is not conscious of having evoked these freely by its own activity, or as, properly

speaking, having had any share in them, it feels them to be *passive* states, *i. e.* determinations not caused by itself, but by something else, although in fact they have been self-positing, but not as yet adapted as such for the self-consciousness.

Hence to the natural and unprejudiced man, the question does not occur, as to whether he has in any way evoked these intuitions of himself; no, he sees the *things* and believes that he sees them; he does not even distinguish his representations from the things; he does not even think, so as to perceive that he can only have in himself images of the things; but he believes that he looks out of himself and sees the things themselves. That, however, it may be merely *images* of things present which we have, is a thought which is first awakened in us by philosophical reflection.

The next step that he makes is to compare his representation with the thing, to ascertain if the former be correct. How then does he begin to do this? He shuts, as it were, or averts his eyes, retains the image internally and then again looks forth at the thing, as he believes. But, thirdly, he must reflect still more closely in order to discern that this procedure is none other than a comparison of the representations with the intuitions, and that the image in the intuition is just as much a subjective image as the image of the representation. Thus, he compares images with images, and all that he really does consists, in good truth, only in investigating whether in the original image, which was present in him as an intuition, any thing may have been peradventure altered by him in his representation. The thought of wishing to compare our representations with the things in themselves, in order to see whether they accord, depends altogether upon the inconsiderate supposition that we can arrive in any way at a *direct* knowledge of the thing in itself. How indeed could we attain to this in any other way than by representations of it? The jugglery that deceives us vanishes instantly when we hold fast by this one position, which is easily understood, namely, that to wish to represent things as they are in themselves implies nothing more than to desire to be able to represent things without representing them, or to wish to have a representation of things without any representation of them.

Even the original intuition, in which, so long as I behold it, I can alter nothing, which is there, in fact, without my having contributed any thing to it by means of the consciousness, is and remains only a modification of my soul, in a word, a some-

thing subjective. The only characteristic, by which we distinguish the intuition given us from the free representation, resides only in my subjective consciousness, namely, in being conscious to myself of not having acted freely in its production.

Now, the whole question turns upon this point: whence comes this consciousness or feeling of non-freedom in me, with which the present intuition, in contradistinction to the free representation, is accompanied?

With this question, we have at once entered the sphere of subjectivity, and from out this we cannot with the self-consciousness escape, so that the following answer only admits of being given; the consciousness perceives in itself a want, a negation of its own self-activity in the intuitions, and hence that very consciousness presupposes, seeing that every thing must have a cause, other essences, by which those intuitions are to be determined or caused. The consciousness, or, as Fichte says, the Ego, presupposes *something*, something which it is not itself, out of or apart from itself; it posites a *non-Ego*, says Fichte, and ascribes to this other essence the activity, the causality, which it is not conscious of exercising itself. Thus the supposition or representation of things or Egoes out of us is only a thought of the Ego, a supposition, which the Ego itself makes, but one to which it is only impelled by its own subjective laws of thought, namely, by the logical law of the sufficient reason, which resides in the Ego, and nowhere else.

Thus, the true procedure in the consciousness is not, as is usually believed, that there are things, and that our representations originate from them; but the truth of the matter stands thus: there are representations, images in us, to which we attain in an unconscious manner; in order now to explain their origin, I first *think to myself* of things without me. Thus, man first creates for himself the things in his thinking process, he represents them to himself, thinks of them, and only in so far are they present to him. He even thinks and so disposes of them each time, that they correspond to the intuitions, or that the intuitions correspond to them; thus he endows them each time according to the actual intuitions with all corresponding properties, thinks of the thing every time exactly as its intuition is — or, to speak more definitely, he objectifies this his really subjective intuition; or posites — what is really within him — as out of himself before himself. Thus what is first and immediate was the image in us; this image *we* have objectified, *i. e.* set it as an object before us. Do we now ask, whence

came this first image, or the intuition itself? we can no longer answer, from the objects; for the representation, "object," is itself a representation, and that indeed not the primary, but the second representation, which has been posited by us for the sake of the subjective image. If I have once posited the object with deliberation, I cannot truly say that towards this object, posited by myself, I hold a passive relation, nor that I, just as I am, am an effect of this object, since this object is rather an effect of me. Such is the well-known circle, out of which philosophy when it has taken the above stand-point cannot escape, and of which it must become fully conscious to itself as of a paralogism or false conclusion, incidental always to the return of what has been called healthy common-sense.

The sensation, the image, is *present* in my consciousness; *thus* only, and nothing further can I say, for I know not how it has originated in me or how it has entered me. It is there and complete, and this indeed has been effected *without a free conscious* activity of my Ego; yet still in any case by an activity of the Ego, for the Ego must be active in the representation, and even in the sensation, or else it would be dead, insensible, non-representing, in a word, neither life nor spirit. Thus the representation or the sensation has, such as it is, originated through an unfree and unconscious activity of the Ego. Thus there is a sphere in the thinking process, or in the mental activity which has its seat below the consciousness — a sphere that lies at the basis of the latter, and wherein something is accomplished, or the mind has adjusted itself to a certain determination, before the time has arrived for reflecting upon this its state, and thus it finds itself already imprisoned therein at the very moment that it becomes aware of it, or when opposing this its state to itself, or rather itself in this state to itself, it renders itself the object of its own contemplation, or rather, setting itself in this state over against itself, renders itself the object of its own intuition. For to reflect, or to meditate upon itself, to become conscious of itself, is none other than to behold itself internally, to render itself an object, so that the contemplating subject has opposed itself to itself, as the very object which is — a self-intuition this, in which, as the etymology of the word *Sich-selbstanschauen* teaches us, one represents oneself to *oneself* (*se sibi*) i. e. sets oneself internally before oneself.

We spoke of this lower and unconscious sphere of our sub-

jectivity, in which the thinking and cognising mind—or, to speak with Fichte, the Ego—at length perceives itself to be imprisoned in certain determinations, *i. e.* sensations or representations. To derive these determinations from the influences of external things did not succeed, because, to explain these states, we first posit the things themselves, and would consequently form our conclusions in a circle; thus nothing more is left to us, than to say with Fichte, — we here stand upon the limits of our knowledge; this is at once the nature, the law, or rather the *incomprehensible limit of the Ego*. In all this thus much is certain, that all sensations, feelings, or representations, —even if they may depend upon some exciting cause from without,—yet as they are, and as they enter our consciousness, are in this their form and essence nothing more than determinations of the Ego within its own thoroughly subjective sphere, and, although originally framed in a sphere that underlies the consciousness, are yet in constant accordance with the laws and nature of the Ego. Hence, the important position, that in the very first sensuous intuitions and images the form of the understanding is already present, and the former are not pure copies of things. If, for example, we imagine the soul to resemble a stringed instrument, which, to give forth a sound, awaits the contact of the musician's finger, while still it is only upon this contact that the string develops the sound that already resided in it, and the whole instrument the harmony of tones that dwelt potentially therein, —tones that slumber as it were *a priori* in the strings; and if to these the contact of the finger imparts nothing of its own nature, but rather from the sound we infer the inner quality or nature of the string itself;—how much more must this be the case with a thoroughly living and independent essence, such as is the human Ego!

In this way, and without detriment to those limits, we shall be always enabled to cognise from the present intuitions and thoughts the true nature of the Ego; and all these self-determinations will be but a revelation of its essence, *i. e.* that I see any thing definite, and *how* I see it, or the phenomenon, which holds good to me as an object, will be at one and the same time the reflex of my internal laws of intuition and also their product. Just as the little green, red, or gold clouds which the eye, when blinded for any length of time by the sun, sees flitting before it, reveal only a certain internal disposition of the organ of sight; so also do the qualities, in which the things,

may, the whole world, mirrors itself before us, reveal the internal natural constitution of our mental faculty of seeing, of our intelligence. Thus, these determinations, the whole multiplicity of our internal world, which we supposed that we derived from without, must originate, and that too in all their definite character, from within, seeing that they are self-determinations of the living consciousness. It is the laws of life, residing in the consciousness, constituting its very essence, or, in a word, the *nature of the consciousness*, which appear as hindrances and determinations of the free activity of the representative power. So that, in order to arrive at the consciousness, we must arrive at the *determined* consciousness, at definite representations; for the boundless activity would lose itself in the Infinite, would represent nothing whatever, unless it could and were in the most diversified manner, to impede, arrest, hold fast, and modify itself in its formative process, so as to constitute definite images. Every determination is a negation of the infinite power of thought. Thus upon general grounds we perceive *that*, and why the consciousness must *altogether* have such a constitution, such vital laws or immanent limits of its essence, that it may arrive at a representation, that, virtually present, it may realise itself actually also or in fact; that an intelligence, a consciousness may actually be brought about, without which and without its product, namely, the whole world of phenomena, man could not even attain to his proper destination, practical and moral, upon which point the whole matter ultimately turns. Thus, that limits are necessary is *a priori* understood; but why they are so constituted, that, as a consequence of them, now this, now that sensuous object, is straightway manifested in the individual, is just as inexplicable as it is necessary that for the universal and highest aim of philosophy it should be known; enough, that man at every instant sees material and opportunity before him for action, and in action for fulfilling his moral destination; for thereby alone does the singular obtain its true meaning or worth, and the whole its final and fundamental explanation. Such then are what were so called by Fichte himself, "the inexplicable, absolute limits" of the theoretical philosophy or science; for here the latter directly impinges upon the boundary of practical cognition, and this last was constantly present to this earnest thinker as the main point even in his purely theoretical investigations. These absolute limits of the intelligence or Ego supplied with him the

place of every external impetus or of the thing in itself as presupposed by Kant, and differ only from this by not being without, but within, the Ego, and thus to be sought for as immanent in the peculiar nature of the subject, which in this view remained perfectly free and independent of any thing else, while at the same time these limits are the covert principle which has as a result the illusion of things in themselves, — an illusion, which, as Fichte says, he must thoroughly exterminate from philosophy.

After giving this general characteristick of Fichte's system, it is necessary, in the next place, to report what is needful concerning the systematic application of it at least in its fundamental outlines. And in doing this, we must first of all set aside the usual error, which regards Fichte as having left behind him his system in a form completely worked out, fixed and satisfactory to himself. Of this form the first outline of his philosophy which he has given in his "*Grundlegung der Wissenschaftslehre*," Weimar, 1794, is usually taken as an example. But this essay was, properly speaking, a merely preliminary step to the more mature elaboration of the system, and was destined to serve as a kind of guide to his auditors, but satisfied him so little subsequently, that he even altered throughout the language there used, and in his later writings, no longer made use of the fundamental word in the whole system, the far-famed or notorious "*Ego and Non-Ego*." He was in the main convinced, that his doctrine admitted of being represented in very different forms (upon this point his letters to Reinhold are particularly instructive), and he has himself left behind him no less than five veritable modifications of his doctrine, as may be found at present in the posthumous essays published by his son.

Meanwhile, seeing that that first outline of his system made an epoch in philosophy, and that repeated reference will be made to it in what follows; we must here follow out in it what is necessary for the purposes of instruction.

The principle of all philosophy, that which is at once the most certain and primary starting-point for us, must, as a consequence of what has been said, be necessarily sought for *within* us, within the domain of subjective thought, not, without or external to us. We can, however, with Kant, know just as little of the spiritual *substance* of our essence in itself, as of the substance of the world; nay, it may perhaps be proved, that the supposition of such a substance, as being something in

itself unknown, is equally ungrounded. We need consequently (and this is a fundamental position) make no use whatever of such a spiritual substance, or soul as it may otherwise be called, as a starting-point, or point of support for the whole system. Such was Fichte's decided opinion, at least in the early period of his philosophical career. *That very something* which is given us *directly* to cognise, is no being whatever, no substance, but an activity; it is the *act of representing, of forming internal images, the consciousness*. Thus, with him, substance, when he uses this word, is only thought of as implying in a general sense *absolute* change; accident being a something determined, that changes with another changing something.* Our consciousness is at every instant busied with some definite representation; these individual representations we must separate from the idea of the consciousness, if we would comprehend it purely in itself, as a faculty for thinking all that is possible. Even in the change or alternation of different representations that move in succession before our inward eye, we remark that such an inward eye, which apprehends all in succession, is present, and does not pass by with those images. Thus the consciousness is the central point, in which all representations unite; it is the faculty or power which sees; being by no means a substratum, but the activity, the *seeing* process itself. Now this consciousness, intelligence, or the Ego, is or becomes that actually which it is potentially, by knowing itself, by representing itself to itself (*se sibi*); thus in a certain manner it creates itself, the knowledge rendering itself self-consciousness; and this is *the first fact* which is directly certain, and which stands in no need of being ascertained by inference, or which, in a word, admits of no demonstration.

Thus, this self-consciousness is brought about by the Ego representing itself; and in this process we can distinguish, first of all, the Ego, as a representing subject, from the Ego as object, or the represented Ego — the representing from its representation; but at the same time we see that both in their content are one and the same. The Ego is here *intuition* both in the active and passive sense of this word, *i. e.* the contemplating and also the contemplated. Still, however, this self-consciousness is quite empty, *i. e.* the Ego is cognisant of itself as an intuitive process, but more than this it does not know about itself; it represents itself directly as an act of vision,

* Wissenschaftslehre, Neue. Aufz. p. 73. Sämmtliche Werke, Bd. i. p. 72.

but in this act there is nothing which it could see, but only the activity, the bare contemplation itself.

Thus the first principle of the "Wissenschaftslehre," or Theory of Science, is this; a consciousness of itself takes place, or, the Ego represents itself to itself, — the subject Ego holds its own image as object before itself, makes itself the object of its mental intuition; or, as Fichte expresses it, *the Ego posites itself*. This is the primitive act of all knowledge. Upon closer attention being paid to the matter, we at once observe, that to such an intuition which merely contemplates itself, but nothing else, the name "*Ego*," or at least that of *subject*, cannot as yet be applied. If, however, this name and this idea is notwithstanding used (and Fichte used it), why then with this *direct supposition* another something is certainly posited at the same time, the non-Ego. — Upon this supposition Fichte proceeds as follows.

The second act of the consciousness, directly united and inseparable from the first, is this, that the consciousness opposes itself to every other, distinguishes itself as a definite representation from every other, which is not this representation, and by this very antagonism first perceives itself. *The Ego posites the non-Ego*, but of this it knows or as yet thinks no more than that this non-Ego is its own simple antagonism, and thus is not itself.

Through these two first principles, opposite ideas are given; but these are to be united in one and the same consciousness; the way in which this happens is a special and third fundamental law of the thinking process, namely, that of the mutual limitation of these two representations; the Ego is that which the non-Ego is *not*, and the *non-Ego* is that which the *Ego* is not. Both are to be opposed in the consciousness, without the unity of the latter being thereby suppressed; the formula now stands thus: the *Ego posites itself as determined* (limited) *by the non-Ego*, i. e. that faculty of knowing which was heretofore thought of as pure or empty consciousness, as yet wholly void of determination, has taken to itself a determination, namely, the representation of a non-Ego (an *alterum*, a world), yet nevertheless, as in so doing to remain at the same time conscious of this its thought; it has determined itself to a representation, with the consciousness that this representation or internal self-determination is only its own representation, only a modification of itself. The more now that the consciousness is, as it were, absorbed in and occupied with this its representation,

by so much the less does it succeed in becoming conscious of its own activity of itself; and the more, on the other hand, that it reflects upon itself as activity, by so much the less does it bury itself in the definite representation or object which it sets before itself.

All this is, properly speaking, only the scientific form invented by Fichte for the above popular statement, that the consciousness, the representative or internal formative and contemplating process, is a pure productivity from itself. Now, this consciousness is found, when strictly regarded, to have an objective external world involved in an occult manner in its principle, this principle being the Ego, namely, the individual, definite or finite Ego; on which account, for the sake of this its own nature, and thus from itself, it necessarily opposes itself to some other, and some other to itself. Thus, this other or non-Ego is manifested in accordance with the second principle, as a product of the Ego, — as an opposition necessary and involuntary indeed, but still as an opposition, which is designed or framed by the Ego according to its own indwelling laws of thought; so that the subject or Ego will be also the mediating author of all the reactions resulting from that original opposition, and will have as an ultimate resource to derive the same from its own capacity and activity. That the Ego represents to itself objects or non-Egoes, is but a proof of its own activity, though this activity may not hold good as a voluntary one; voluntary it certainly is not, but necessary only from its own internal laws of thought, its nature being derived from its own original determination and peculiar quality, so that the Ego always remains absolutely free, *i. e.* independent of every other, or of all external and foreign influence.

Let us now add to the above that very passage from his writings, in which Fichte has expressed himself most distinctly in reference to his idealism, for it is one which is especially worthy of note, inasmuch as it renders clear at the same time the sense in which Fichte regarded the idea of *being*, the substantial, in opposition to the active and thinking process, and also how that idea gradually resolved itself with him into the latter agent.* “Idealism,” says he, “explains the determinations of the consciousness from the *actions* of the intelligence. It regards the latter or the intelligence as *only active* and absolute, but not passive; and not passive, because as a consequence of its postulate it is the first and highest, and to this

* Fichte's and Niethammer's Phil. Journal 5., Bd. i. Hft. p. 34. *et seq.* Sämmtliche Werke, Bd. i. p. 440.

nothing is antecedent, from which a passive state would admit of being explained. Upon the same grounds, no true *being* or state of persistence belongs to it, because this is the result of a mutual action; and nothing is present, or assumed to be so, with which the intelligence could be placed in co-operation. The intelligence is to the idealist an *action*, and absolutely nothing more; for it is not even to be called *active*, seeing that by this adjective mode of expression, a something *persistent* is indicated, in which the activity is inherent. *Idealism, however, has no grounds for adopting any such something*, since it does not lie in its *principle*, and every thing is first to be deduced from this. Now, from the dealings of the intelligence, certain *definite* representations are to be derived, such as those which familiarly occur in the consciousness, as of a world, namely, a world present without our aid, material, existing in *space*, and such like. But from an essence in itself wholly undetermined, nothing definite admits of being deduced, it being impossible to here apply the formula of all deduction, the *thesis cognoscendi*; consequently, that action which is laid at the basis of the intelligence must be of a determinate kind, and truly so, since the intelligence is itself the highest ground of explanation, as being an action determined by itself and its own essence, but not by any thing external to it. The hypothesis of idealism will accordingly stand as follows: the intelligence acts, but it can act only by virtue of its own essence in a certain way; if we now think of this necessary mode of action apart from its agent, we may very appropriately call it the laws of the agent or activity. And thus there are necessary laws of the intelligence. In this way, the feeling of necessity, which accompanies the definite representations, is rendered comprehensible; for the intelligence does not then feel any impression from without, but it feels in that action (the thinking process) the limits of its own nature. In so far then as idealism institutes this only rational, definite, and actually explanatory hypothesis of *necessary laws* of the intelligence, is it called the critical or transcendental. A transcendent, or wholly bottomless idealism would be a system that attempted to derive the definite representations from the *free* and perfectly *lawless* action of the intelligence,—a perfectly contradictory supposition, since, as we have been already reminded, the *thesis cognoscendi* is not applicable to such an action."

"It is the direct problem of the 'Wissenschaftslehre,'" says Fichte in another place, "to point out how the *involuntary* representations, such as seeing, hearing, and such like, proceed

altogether from *one's own* activity, and thus how to construct *a priori* the representations according to laws of thought. To this science there stands opposed no ready prepared being, for it admits of no ready prepared or absolutely given, in short, of nothing which appears to us absolutely as thing and being. It rather exhibits the *origination*, and draws that forth into the light of the consciousness, just as we ourselves have brought about its representation. Thus it resolves and renders fluid all being; all being as a persistent, quiescent something, vanishes before it; it looks only to its own rendering or constructive process, and so recognises all objects as special products of the consciousness and thought. *This* and *this* only (says Fichte further on) is the sign that we are philosophising upon the right track, when, forsooth, we have no longer any eye for ready prepared objective existence, but only for origination—when to us all that is, is first constructed before our inward eye; for thus only is an insight gained into the origination and essence, the inward and true life of the mind. If once we comprehend the thinking and representative process as a perfect activity, shut up the consciousness absolutely within itself, abide by the position that nothing can enter the latter save as something known, represented, self-imagined—in a word, as *ideal*,—and then regard this definitely as a product of the consciousness itself,—why then it only remains for us to pronounce all representations as well as intuitions to be without exception our own creations, and to seek in the next place in the Ego for the ground of our ascribing objective reality to the one and not to the other. The being—the objective reality—can be for us merely a being that is *thought*, a *thought* reality, thought by *us*, and consequently in this sense self-produced. Have we once recognised the law, according to which this construction and projection takes place? we must then also acknowledge with perfect conviction that the objectivity and reality, the being itself, is but a subjective representation. We know the optical laws according to which this appearance is produced; but before the higher consciousness all objective existence, as actual, wholly vanishes; nothing remains as truly actual, than the very working within us, or that merely from which we set out, namely the subjective activity; in a word, there is only a thinking, representing, imagining process, an activity united to certain laws indwelling in itself; these laws are none other than the invariable kind and mode of that activity, and this activity is itself the absolute and only actual or real.

LECTURE VII.

CONTINUATION OF FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHY.

AFTER the summary sketch which has been attempted, in the last discourse, of the substance of the older "Wissenschaftslehre," it remains for us now to take the requisite glance at the practical part of that system, and, above all, to consider the remaining question, how from that theory of cognition we may arrive yet further at the transcendent world and a religious belief or knowledge.

Upon this point Fichte, in accordance with his own theory, could not express himself otherwise than he did in the memorable essay which was condemned and had for its result his retirement from Jena.* From the contemplation of the world, as it lies before our senses, we can derive no proof of the existence of the Deity, nor even form any conclusion as to his attributes, for this very world has ceased, when confronted by the transcendental idealist, to exist as an independent essence, "being nothing more than the view of our own activity rendered perceptible to the senses according to conceivable laws of reason, or that of mere intelligence acting within certain incomprehensible limits, in the which we are enclosed." While the common sense of humanity regards the world as external to and completely independent of itself, thus as self-subsistent, the idealist recognises in it only the reflex of his own mental activity: thus to him it is no longer a self-subsistent something; it has, with all the so-called things in themselves, changed into a product of his Ego, and that product one of an involuntary character, for the Ego finds itself compelled by its nature to posit a non-Ego, or the whole image of the world as opposed to itself. It finds itself necessitated to do this by a determination that incomprehensibly dwells within itself, by the inward impulse of its own nature, by its natural determination or *limit*, as Fichte calls it. On that account the world which is mirrored forth from the Ego is to be regarded as nothing else than the revelation, or effect of this internal natural determination of the Ego, this being the very source from

* In the eighth volume of the Journal, edited by Fichte and Niethammer. See Journal, 1798. Sämmtl. Werke, Bd. 5.

which it proceeds. It is clear then that, from the quality of this world-image, which is indeed but a transcript or copy of the Ego, we cannot form conclusions as to a supramundane creator, such as those do who regard the world as a real objective reality. The idealist sees in the world-image only his own product; thus, if he asks for the creator, he discovers only himself, his representative faculty, and the laws of this which dwell within him. Thus, in this way man never gets above or beyond himself, or never attains that which he seeks—a Deity. With him the only real or primitive foundation from which all proceeds is the subjective activity of the Ego, and that which apparently hovers before him is still, from being a something known, only a modification of this activity; while if, on the other hand, it be said, that the fetters or limits imposed by nature upon the Ego, as its natural determination, must still depend upon a power that hovers external to and above it, the objection may at once be repelled by observing that these very limits, in so far as we become conscious of them, as a something perceived, felt, or known, are and remain *subjective perceptions*, and thus products of the Ego, while, in so far as they are not perceived, they are not indeed present.

Thus, the only immediate reality* is the real power of the Ego as a working, active element, or rather the Ego is itself this working activity, this life; it is a creation of all activities out of itself, both of the so-called voluntary as well as representative acts: what this power effects, that also it knows, or it can at least bring it before the consciousness; and what it knows, that also it has worked out, for of that which we do not ourselves effect there can be no consciousness. The power is one and the same, though it is at one time apprehended in the consciousness with regard to its mere activity as a process of action, at another as reflection upon itself or as knowledge, and is, consequently, now represented as a real power which works as such without knowing it, and then as knowledge only. This separation of what is one in itself and indistinguishable into subject and object, constitutes the very process of becoming conscious; thus, knowing and being are not fundamentally separated, but become so for the first time in the consciousness; that which becomes separated, or the primitive power which is in itself unseparated, is the Absolute,—in other words, the human activity is itself the Absolute, being that operation which

* Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre von J. G. Fichte. Jena und Leipzig, 1798. Vorrede, p. 7., *et seq.*

mirrors itself in each of its acts. Now while to the ordinary consciousness the action by which something definite is represented appears to precede the consciousness of this something, or, in other words, because I cannot become conscious to myself of a representation until I have represented or created it in myself, and then set this representation, as it were, permanently before myself; it follows, that the activity appears, as it were, to require two different powers, or, if we may so speak, two spiritual hands. By the one the activity is grasped and held forth, by the other it is touched and investigated. If, now, it is forgotten that this activity is one and the same power, we then distinguish two powers, and the object held forth (which is really nothing else but activity itself suspended in a certain act) seems then to be the principle which determines my intuition, knowledge, or intelligence, and so the subjective becomes dependent upon the objective; for, by the proximate ground of its material determination residing in that something which hovers before it, or what, in the truest sense of the word, it *imagines*, the subjective appears to be merely passively recipient, or perceptive, but by no means an active process of production.

Thus the Ego, or absolute activity, is seen to be in good truth the principle and author of all its own modifications, and we can say nothing more of it, than that it is spontaneity, being in its essence self-subsistent, independent, and free from all foreign impressions and determinations; that all determinations and limitations which occur in the consciousness, instead of being derived from without, are or exist only within its very self, so that it is completely independent, thus at least negatively free, and — because every thing, which appears to determine it, is only a something produced by itself — positively free also.

But this free action, continues Fichte, is not, therefore, arbitrary; it has and sets before itself its own purpose or object, not, however, obtaining this purpose from without, but positing it of or by itself. I myself and my necessary rational object are or constitute the transcendent and sublime. Thus Fichte here assumes a subjective object, the proper object of the Ego, beyond which he does not venture to speculate any further. He thinks of it to himself as the direct rational nature, the reason in the concrete, the true and special essence of the human spirit, the one realistic point which is to be met with in his system; and to ask further, why and whence this end or

object? is as much as to ask why the true is true, why the inconcievable is not at the same time capable of being thought. In short, this self-object is the innermost and deepest truth of our own nature, the most special something which we possess, what, in a word, we ourselves are, what we desire, and what we need. What in conformity to this we strive after, we try to obtain for the sake of ourselves; nor could we do otherwise, even if we would: thus, there is no object forced or imposed upon the Ego, but one only that is posited by the Ego itself; and while in this way expression is given to what the Ego should or ought to be, the Ego declares only in reality what it desires; the categorical imperative, is not, however, derived from without, but from the innermost depths of the Ego's own essence; being, so to speak, the extension and yearning of its nature after development; and on that very account no question can be raised as to any principle that lies higher: the absolute principle being found in the quality of the Ego itself. Thus the Ego, to use a Leibnizian form of expression, is ever more *virtuellement* than it is *effectivement* (*réellement*); it develops every thing out of itself, because it carries originally, or potentially, in an unconscious state every thing in itself, of the which it first becomes conscious, when it has arrived at a real objective phase of development; and thus the "Wissenschaftslehre" depicts the kind and method of this self-development of the consciousness, as it gradually recalls to mind or recollects its content — a view this of the immanent or egoistic conformity to purpose, which, subjective in character as it is, we shall find in the subsequent systems to be forthwith expanded into the notion of the Absolute. Now in so far as that content of self is not present in a state of perfect development, but only potentially, it is called its own object, and thus every thing depends upon the Ego truly seizing upon that object which is posited to it by its own essence, and as it is itself all action, all spontaneity, realising this object by real action also. If the Ego were not to comprehend or form a conception of this its own proper object, but were to deny it, it would then deny itself; for this very object being its internal nature or essence, it must thus *eo ipso* assume the practicability of its action as possible, for to set before itself any thing as an object, is only, in other words, to presuppose or set something in the future as actual, and thus as possible also. Hence the proposition, what I should, that also I can, do. If now I cannot entertain any doubts whatever as to the practicability of what my true, *i. e.*, my moral nature demands, *then by*

this at the same time the whole phenomenal world of sensuous things (which hitherto appeared only as a perfectly purposeless, incomprehensible, transitory, and on that account deceptive juggle) *obtains for the first time, on the practical stand-point, its purpose, signification, and that sanction also of necessity* which theory had no power to impart to it. It is true that from this moral point of view, the whole previously abrogated opinion concerning actuality as a reality of the objective world, determining the subjects and rendering them dependent upon itself (a view this upheld by realism and common sense), cannot be reinstated as by the stroke of an enchanter's wand; — for this would amount to withdrawing the whole preceding theory as something superfluous and false, and annihilating upon the practical stand-point what, upon the theoretical, has been diligently built up; but here a purpose only is discerned or the reason seen why, conformably to our nature, a world must appear to us in this phenomenon, being the only means, *i. e.*, condition for attaining our own object; for without such a phenomenon there would be no arriving at any *definite* action, which still is our absolute destination. Activity in general, and so also activity of the Ego, cannot even be thought of without the antagonism of the internal and external or subject and object, of something from out which it must proceed, and something to which it must return. Thus, all which is contained in this phenomenon, from the object that is absolutely posited by myself at the one end, to the raw material of the world at the other; all this, like my own body, for example, is but the mediating members of the phenomenon, and consequently itself phenomena. The only positively true and actual is and remains my independence and freedom, whose indwelling limits are but the form of the human consciousness, the form of the intelligent side of our activity. “These limits are and remain, it is true, incomprehensible in their origin. But what matters it to you? exclaims the practical philosopher; their signification is the clearest and most certain point that there is; they are, or constitute, your definite post in the *moral order* of things. What you perceive by means of them has reality, the only reality which concerns you and which exists for you; in them you have the abiding exponent of the law of duty, the living expression of that *which* you should do since there is something that ought to be done. Our world is the material of our duty; this is the proper real element in things, the true element of all phenomena.” “Thus, it is not without reason and purpose, that the

world constantly obtrudes itself upon us as a reality. With the same irrefragability and truth with which our own nature proclaims itself in the law of duty as conscience, so also does the reality of the world proclaim itself as such, since only in and by means of it can that highest purpose of existence prove or substantiate itself." Thus the reality of the world depends, as we see, not upon a knowledge, but upon a belief which on its part is rooted again in the necessity of realising the law of duty, which without such a world does not admit of being realised. Thus the whole world, born from out the original disposition of our nature, remains indeed the reflected image of our hidden nature, and is its revelation; the whole, however, is a thoroughly moral arrangement and serves moral objects. "Such then is the true belief, for the moral order which we adopt, is the Divine."

"This, then, is the sum and substance of our belief. The living and active moral order is God; we need no other God, and can comprehend no other." In other words, we are unable to perceive any thing as Divine, but this very order which resides within and works in and through us. Were we to infer that, where order shows itself, an original disposer must be presupposed, still we are by no means justified in this conclusion*; for it is made by the understanding, and solely within the sphere of sensuous experience, in order to knit the fugitive or transitory phenomenon to a persistent substratum, which is always material. But here we must pause at the transient, or at the pure action; for this itself is the immediate and only valid scheme; and whoever makes the above conclusion seeks and obtains inevitably a persistent corporeal substratum for the pure action of the Deity." If we call God a spirit, we then attribute to him extension (persistence) in time, in order that we may attach to his unity the manifold action; but spirit or soul has merely a negative sense, meaning neither more nor less than the negation of body. This expression is a make-shift of our thinking process, which having first dispensed in thought with every thing sensuously persistent, material, places something in the place of the subject, which should not *really be*, and yet must be; though as a positive expression to serve for a definition of the Divine nature, it is wholly useless.

The order, however, the prevailing law, can and must be thought of as absolute, nor does it require any higher ground of

* Der Herausgeber des philosoph. Journals gerichtliche Verantwortungs-schriften gegen die Anklage des Atheismus. Herausgegeben von J. G. Fichte. Jena, 1799. p. 43. *et seq.* Sämmtl. Werke, Bd. v. p. 263.

explanation. If it is believed that we must, in addition to the above order, think of a personal being, by whom this law was given, this order administered, still in this personal essence we must again presuppose that order, as willing, mode of action, holy power, or under any other abstract notion, and so this last would remain always the First and Highest, the Absolute, as sought and presupposed. Besides, the supposition of a personal God, such as is usually made, is nothing but an anthropomorphism or transference of human limits and imperfections to God, and is involved in contradictions. Thus Fichte shows that the ideas of a Divine consciousness, a personality and extramundane existence, are nothing but unseemly limitations, by which the highest essence would only be rendered finite, and reduced to our own level, since these notions would necessarily include the idea of a spatially and temporally extended substance, which, once for all, is inappropriate to the Deity. Our thinking process is altogether schematic, *i. e.* constructive, representative; of the transcendent we become conscious only under the scheme of action, of activity; of the sensuous, under the scheme of extension, of materiality. Now, God is to be thought of by the first scheme as "*an order of events*," but by no means as a form of extension*; it cannot be said of him that he is substance or any thing; for this would amount, according to our system, to affirming that he is an extended matter, and admits of being seen, heard," &c. "He is not a being or existence, but a pure action, *i. e.* the life and soul of a transcendent world-order, just as I also, a finite intelligence, am no being, but a pure action, an action in conformity with duty, as member of that transcendent world-order." "All our thinking process," continues Fichte, "is one of limitation, and in this very respect is called *conception*, *i. e.* a grasping together from out a mass of the definable, so that something constantly remains beyond the described limit, which is not included in, and thus does not belong to, the conception or notion. All reality which we apprehend is only finite, and is so because it is we who apprehend it. Every thing, which is any thing for us, is such only in so far as it is not something else; all position is only possible by or through negation, so that the word to determine means in itself nothing else than to limit or circumscribe." With these

* See the work last referred to, pp. 37, 40. Compare, J. G. Fichte's *Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel*, herausgegeben von seinem Sohne, J. H. Fichte. Sulzbach, 1830, part i. p. 346. u.; part ii. p. 306.

propositions Fichte evidently approaches very close to the conclusions which at present, well nigh half a century since he wrote, have been confidently deduced from them; though, with less confidence, he himself declared at that time, that God ceases to be infinite, as soon as he is made the object of a notion, or as soon as he is to become definitely represented or conceived of. "For," he says, "if we would call God a consciousness, it follows that we apply to him the limit of the human consciousness; if we get rid of this limit, by thought, then there remains to us a knowledge which is quite incomprehensible; and this might well be ascribed to God, who, so to speak, is in this sense pure consciousness, intelligence, spiritual life and activity, save only that we could form no notion of such attributes, and on that account would rather abstain from this approximative definition, and that, too, out of strict regard to philosophical accuracy; for every *conception* of the Deity would be an idol." On that very account, there can be no proper proofs of the existence of a God, because proofs are only mediated cognitions. Belief, however, in a transcendent or supersensuous world is an *immediate* truth. The postulate of a transcendent world-order is the first and only abstraction which is given to man, is the one and only true absolute.

In endeavouring now to form to ourselves some general estimate of Fichte's system, it appears to us that it is an Idealism which originally commenced with the explanation of objective reality—as at bottom, indeed, all philosophy has hitherto done; but which, in the present instance, was associated with the distinct perception that nothing objective as such—no direct influence from any thing objective—could ever penetrate the consciousness; but that all knowledge of the presence of something else, each intuition, representation, and transcript of an object, could only be a knowledge thereof, but not the object itself. The clearness of this view rendered a strict idealism inevitable; and, as a consequence of this, the starting-point and main-stay of all special knowledge and conviction can and must of necessity be sought for subjectively, or in the consciousness alone. This consciousness, this spiritual activity, is that alone which directly perceives itself in itself; and all that it perceives is already present in it, as represented, being nothing more than a modification, determination, and change of that activity; the consciousness, or the Ego, is its own object, and has no other immediate object than itself; thus it is subject-object, or self-object, being quite alone with and

by itself. It must so regard itself, or else it would readmit the idea, which has been constantly rejected, of an immediate influence entering from without into the consciousness. To repel this influence, and with it, at the same time, as a matter of course, to banish irrevocably all duplicity and dualism, was Fichte's first rule and problem; since, by this incomprehensibility and duality, when posited in the principle, all unity of exposition, and consequently the whole of systematic philosophy, is rendered impossible. Finally, to explain all from one principle, to reduce the whole as such to the unity of the consciousness, is the very postulate and drift of all demonstration, as well as of all insight into the problems of philosophical research.

Thus the Ego must set out with regarding all modifications of the consciousness, not merely as determinations absolutely present within or with it, like accidents in the substance; but simultaneously, or rather exclusively, as effects of the consciousness, as products and self-determinations of the absolute self-activity: all representations must not be conceived of as a something present in the mind, but as an activity, or as products that have issued from the mind's own creative power; they must be explained as a result of pure activity, this being their only foundation. The Ego must abide by this point, that it is the first and only immediate real, that in it every totality of conditions is to be met with, that it is the complex of all, the absolutely independent and free, *i. e.*, absolute creator *per se* and complex of all that occurs within itself.

But here we come at once to a stand-still. If this absolute Ego be, in the manner above specified, the true subject-object, because, as a consequence of the two first principles of the system, it posites itself in opposition to the non-Ego, *i. e.*, becomes for the first time conscious of itself only by and in this antagonism, while apart from the latter, no self-consciousness whatever originates, — it follows, that both parts of the antagonism, the Ego and non-Ego, must be posited with equal necessity; that, in other words, if we were to suppress the Ego, the non-Ego would, at the same time, vanish; and inversely, that, with the suppression of the opposite non-Ego, the Ego would, at the same time, be no longer distinct in the consciousness, *i. e.*, no longer present there as such. The two can only be simultaneously retained together, *i. e.*, with the express consciousness in the consciousness of the antagonism; and there is no ground whatever for subsequently explaining the non-Ego as being less absolute and necessary than the Ego.

As regards, however, the fact of every definite being dialectically thought of and known merely through its antagonism being simultaneously retained in the consciousness, this very general law was, indeed, incidentally alluded to by Fichte, but was not recognised and applied by him in its full sense, as was done, at a later period, by Hegel. Thus, if the *principle* of Fichte included a germ, also, of the Absolute Identity, or, as we might here say, of Realism as well as Idealism, it follows that, by virtue of the hypothesis and method, either the objective-realistic moment would be in the course of the system subjected to the ideal, or this to the former, *i. e.*, it would abide by a dialectick, which would have, in the principle, an unvanquished dualism, and would lead only to an alternation, or at least reciprocity, of the two sides, but not to the monism that is aimed at; not even if, as subsequently occurred, this Ego was declared together with its method to be absolute; for this statement would change only the name, but not the essence or fact itself.

There thus remained a one-sided, subjective idealism of the finite Ego; and with this comes the question—has the human consciousness, as a pure and directly self-knowing subjective activity, as the all-embracing activity and creator of its universe, the power to regard and contemplate all that which hovers before it, and which it requires? or does it directly perceive, in and through itself, that it is not this totality? It does perceive this according to Fichte's own confession; for it impinges upon incomprehensible, absolute limits of its omnipotence; and it is in vain that it says to itself, these limits or determinations reside in thee, they constitute thy own nature, they are not without thee in a foreign something, which might limit and circumscribe thee. This all amounts to one and the same thing: "the Ego remains," to use the words of Hegel*, "still imprisoned, whether it lies in the bonds of its own, or in those of an external nature. For that these bonds are inexplicable to the Ego, depends upon their being foreign to it, and not resulting from the notion which the free Ego has of itself. The Ego, *i. e.* the thoroughly free activity, must evidently be the first, or absolute, which posites every thing else, without, however, presupposing any other higher something, from which to account for its existence and conditions; this Ego, which can only gaze upon itself to see how it determines itself with absolute self-determination,—this Ego, which frames or devises every thing alone and of

* Hegel's Werke, vol. i. p. 128.

itself, still finds itself in empirical fetters, or perceives itself to be determined by something which it has not itself devised; these fetters then must belong to its essence, — its essence, however, should be absolute, thoroughly free. Thus it appertains to the conception and essence of the absolutely free and self-subsistent not to be free and independent—an assertion this, “which amounts to the most stubborn of contradictions.”* To break, however, through these barriers, to comprehend this incomprehensible law of its essence imposed upon the Ego, is at once the highest object and desideratum of philosophy.

As regards, however, such a purely subjective knowledge, which engenders, according to indwelling laws of its activity, both itself and its determinations absolutely from itself, which instinctively or inevitably projecting before itself the whole empirical world-image, contemplates this image in no other way than by suffering it to hover before itself as a reflex of the internal constitution of the Ego; from such knowledge we should naturally expect both the power and ability of deducing all the laws of nature as reflections of its own laws of representation in the most perfect manner, in a word, of erecting a perfect system of speculative Physics. Matters, however, do not come to this point, just because those laws remain incomprehensible to the Ego; the Ego sees only what it must mirror forth in consequence of such laws, but their internal connection and mechanism it does not comprehend. It cannot therefore attain to a successive genesis of the *content* of nature, this content being given or present to it, from the beginning; the laws of the thinking process are only formal categories of the understanding, all being, as with Kant, only of subjective import and devoid in themselves of any true organic connection; consequently their reflexes can, in that which is contemplated, the supposed nature, establish no productivity. “The product of this idealism, a sphere of empiricism without content and of purely accidental multiplicity, stands opposed to an empty thinking process. If the empty thinking process be as an active and real force opposed to a null and void world of images, as is done in the practical part of Fichte’s doctrine, why then this is illogical; for with the positing of a real power the relation to another real is posited, and this it is which Fichte would deny.” Such is Hegel’s judgment. We find that the contradiction is not solved because Fichte, together with his Ego, presupposed only a finite Ego, hence posited; or rather assumed and presupposed without

* Hegel, op. cit. p. 127.

further investigation a something standing at the very outset in opposition to another, while in all this nothing else lay involved but a psychological empiricism, a remnant of Locke's teachings. Thus posited, the Ego can be thought of as engaged in nothing else but a reciprocal action with other objects as real as itself. Nevertheless this finite Ego is to be regarded as truly infinite, and on that account we are not to speak of several real Egoes acting upon or influencing one another, because, as shown above, the non-Ego does not actually proceed from the Ego, but only remains as its representation; in this non-Ego, however, the whole world is enclosed. Now had Fichte actually arrived at the conviction, that apart from the Ego there was nothing real, and that the non-Ego, the world, was in itself utterly null and void, only an empty appearance, he would then have been constrained to acknowledge, as Hegel declares *, "that the Ego is just as null and void also; for as finite Ego it can only exist in as much as it is conditioned by the non-Ego." Thus ended Fichte's idealism, to use Jacobi's expression, in nihilism. If at the very outset the same dignity or grade of rank had been logically assigned to this non-Ego as to its true antagonism, the Ego, then, the intrinsic development of the system, would have been from the very beginning at an end, and the system would have been recognised as of a compound nature or a real idealism. Thus, the fundamental deficiency of the system — judged from Fichte's own stand-point — was the *incompleteness* of the idealism, because the thinking process in the very beginning as *subject*, and yet without an object, was posited as an *individually* determined subject or Ego. What right, we may ask, had Fichte to call the thinking process, which was in reality there, — to call this process decidedly or completely *his own*? What if it were in reality the absolute and sole thinking process, for which it was to pass?

* Hegel's *Kritick of Fichte's System*, 1802, in 2nd vol. of *Critical Journal* by Hegel and Schelling, reprinted in Hegel's works, vol. i. p. 158. *et seq.* For Jacobi's *Sendschreiben an Fichte*, see Jacobi's works.

LECTURE VIII.

FICHTE'S LATER VIEWS.—SCHLEIERMACHER.

SUCH, in essentials, was Fichte's system in its earlier form, in which form it is really to be viewed as the connecting link and progressive step from Kant to the more recent systems; nay, more, as the true introduction and key to the philosophy of the present century. As concerns the general course of philosophical inquiry, this earlier system of Fichte may be truly regarded as containing the problem, which he set before himself, and which he has solved, so that at this point the thread to be unravelled fell into the hands of his younger contemporary and scholar, Schelling, and caused the general attention of the philosophic public to be directed towards the latter. Yet, meanwhile, it seems but due to the claims of historical justice, that we briefly characterise the progress which Fichte himself made in his later dissertations beyond the limits of the first "*Wissenschaftslehre*," and still more the close connection in which the philosophical views of Schleiermacher stand to the later doctrine of Fichte, as being that with which the opinions of several younger philosophers have been recently associated. This second form of Fichte's doctrine, which is usually called his realistic or practical period, is contained in his writings of 1800—12; namely, in the essay "*Upon the Destination of Man*," and in the "*Posthumous Works*" edited by his son, in three volumes. (Bonn, 1834.)

Now, in these writings, we find not only, a completely new terminology and exposition of what had gone before, but also, as a point which here especially concerns us, a reappearance in essentials of his earlier doctrine, so that this, although exceeded, is nevertheless not annihilated or withdrawn, but is at the same time included and preserved in his later doctrine.

If we were to call this later change in his opinions his *realistic* period, and contrast this with his earlier doctrines of idealism, such a distinction would, in a double point of view, be incorrect; for, on the one hand, Fichte was never that subjective idealist in the sense in which he has been long regarded and misunderstood; while, on the other, this second period is not a perfect realism,

renouncing the idealism, but is rather to be called an objective or absolute idealism. If already, in the first period, the existence of the outward world was by no means denied, as though Fichte's individual Ego was the only existing and certain something, but a system of Egoes and non-Egoes was recognised with, at the same time, a definite multiplicity of them, and a law elevated above all caprice, as ruling over all that is known, still Fichte seemed to be only busy, at first, with explaining this knowledge, and establishing the truth of the known. At the bottom, however, of this theoretical purpose, lay a deeper ultimate object; it was not only a gnostically contemplative interest in knowledge as such, that moved him, but the deeper ethical desire of preserving the absolute independence and spontaneous activity, the freedom or antonomy of the human Ego: while, upon this ground, no reality and causality whatever was to be conceded to things in the sense adopted by the sensationalists, of their filling up the void Ego with representations from an external and foreign source, and so determining and circumscribing it in every way; for even theoretically, we can only know with certainty and fathom what we ourselves produce from the depths of our subjectivity, while, of an absolutely transcendent, nothing whatever can be known or said. Fichte had in his thoughts, at the very beginning, the pure causality and promethean nature of the thinking Ego, but he did not regard these merely as a final aim of development in time, but posited them from the very beginning, so that the Ego must regard the things in a primordially productive manner.* Empiricism reverses the whole matter; but the truth is, that the ideal principle in the subject is the productive one, "that the external senses, together with all their objects, are grounded only in the universal thinking process, and that a sensuous perception is present only in the latter, as a something thought of, as a determination of the universal consciousness, but is by no means separated from the consciousness or possible in itself." Thus Fichte everywhere preserves the bond of connection with his earlier principles, and resting upon them as a basis proceeds to carry out and elevate the realistic moment, which lies unmistakeably in the Ego and its general nature. Fichte searches altogether for the real, not *without* the Egoes in the things, like Locke and other sensationalists, but constantly only *in* the Ego and its deepest principle. Here, in the self-

* Sämmtliche Werke, vii. p. 304, *et seq.*, 375, *et seq.*, viii. 386, *et seq.*, v. 434, *et seq.*

consciousness of the individual finite Egoes, a *universal* self-consciousness is gradually unfolded to him, an Ego in itself or an absolute Ego, in whose broad foundation all individual Egoes are, as it were, rooted, and into whose unity they all, while maintaining their own essence, return. To him the universal unity of the Absolute among and in all particulars discloses itself more or less after the fashion of Spinoza. But while thus assuming a reality, and that, indeed, an absolute and single one, he resolutely persisted in affirming that this reality lies only *in* the Egoes, and *is* that creative moral will, which, by means of the infinitely endowed Egoes, projects the world and all its phenomena from out this point. This fundamental moment of the Ego, which opposes to itself the non-Egoes,—the same doctrine this as was previously taught by Fichte—is the fundamental source of all being, the only primordial real. Now, however, we must distinguish the particular individual, or finite Ego, and the infinite Ego, or absolute. “We, as intelligent essences, are, in respect to what we are in ourselves, by no means that absolute Being; but we are connected with it by the innermost root of our existence, since apart from it we could not be or exist.”*

Meanwhile Fichte does not regard this universal or fundamental essence as being by any means a quiescent substance or dead thing in itself, but, in this point also, he remains true to his earlier positions, that, “every notion of being, as such, must be expunged from our thoughts, and be in all instances comprehended as only a thinking activity, action, and life.” Even the absolute Ego, which he calls “Pure Knowledge,” “Absolute Consciousness,” is to be taken in the same sense as the human Ego, namely, as pure activity; it is the all-governing, self-existent (objectively universal) reason, not indeed a knowledge of one object, but the transcendental ground of all objective knowledge, the actively moral and omnipotent world-order, the living, absolute law, which, on account of the incessant activity, which it is in itself, is called the absolute (real) *will*. The “*Wissenschaftslehre*” has not, however, to deal with this being in itself, but with its manifestation, for it is everywhere and throughout a formative activity, an absolute formative process, or “formative essence;” an image, however, is not the being itself, although the image points at once to a being of which it is the image. Thus the “*Wissenschaftslehre*” is a theory of phenomena, and in this sense it is that of the most real expe

* Zum seligen Leben. Werke, V. p. 448.

rience, being the theory of what we ourselves experience and do; there is no other existence, "for existence implies only "being" in the understanding, for both are thoroughly identical; the understanding, however, is not an understanding of nothing, but of the phenomenon; and this again is not the phenomenon of nothing, but of the Absolute, and thus through the middle term of the understanding existence is based upon being, is related to it, and also understands this relation.* Now, however, do the human Egoes belong to the absolute being, or are they to be ranged upon the side of the phenomenon? They are the very act of the understanding of the distinction of both sides in the Absolute itself.†

The Absolute taken abstractedly or in itself would be the boundless and indefinitely infinite One, the same in all Egoes; but it is at the same time a *ground*, a primitive ground or foundation of all and in all; the individual Egoes, as being the manifold revelations of what is grounded in it, do but avail themselves of it; their being consists in the function of allowing that universal to appear in the antagonistic quality of the understanding, *i.e.* in the reflection which is peculiar to the Ego, and consequently in the actual consciousness; hence in them, the being is first distinguished from the thinking process, and they are themselves this *primitively* judging activity of the understanding, which is at the same time an infinite specification of the manifold content. Thus the Egoes, taken together as specialities, constitute the totality of the modes of revelation of the Absolute, and every Ego manifests from its immanent "genius" that, which in its place in the total connection is necessary, and ought not to be otherwise, or that which is imperative and conformable to duty.

This Absolute is God, and "God is intrinsically One; being in himself one and the same without change or shadow of turning." In so far now as we ourselves are this divine existence itself, no separation, distinction, nor division, can take place. Now, however, that manifold of being is found in the *reality*; hence comes the question, whence and from what principle is this manifold reality? The manifold, as such, is only an appearance; it is indeed there, but we cannot bestow upon it, as being the diverse and mutable, the predicate of *being*, for this properly belongs only to the One and the Same.‡ "Thus no division can occur directly in that act of the divine existence,

* Nachgelassene Werke, i. 360, *et seq.*

† Op. cit. p. 571.

‡ Anweisung zum seligen Leben. Werke, V. p. 450.

but must occur *without* or beyond it; nevertheless in such a way, that this 'outer' is obviously connected directly with that living act, and is necessarily consequent upon it, so that at this point no chasm between us and the Deity and our irretrievable repulsion can by any means be established." Into the self-exclusive points of the freedom (of the Egoes) the divine essence does not enter whole and undivided, but it enters into them only in a one-sided manner; beyond these points, however, it enters divested of all obscurity, just as it is in itself, continually forming itself *in infinitum*, in the form of that continuously flowing life which is inseparable from the idea of its own simple undivided life. Now this eternal efflux of the divine life is the true innermost and deepest root of the existence." "It is the persistent, eternal, and unchangeable *will* of the absolute reality to develop itself continually, as of necessity it must."

Thus Fichte endeavours, in a variety of ways, to find an adequate expression for the relation of the finite free Egoes to the absolute One. He believes that he has established their distinction by limiting the human consciousness (when taken in a stricter sense) to the antagonisms and distinctions of the sensuous phenomena, within the pale of which the human understanding moves; of these the understanding has the most searching knowledge, just because it produces them itself; but upon retracing its steps back, to the very root of its own nature, it then comprehends that which is devoid of all difference, the principle or source in which to it all definite thoughts originate, and from which, in like manner, all definite thoughts proceed, so that, as Fichte well said in agreement with Schleiermacher and Jacobi, here only a direct *feeling*, but no conceivable discrimination in thought is possible. Thus, the divine, from its being the primitive source of all rationally moral world-order, is abstract reason, but we cannot clothe and confine it in any definite form.* Nevertheless Fichte ascribes to the Absolute, regarded abstractedly, no more consciousness, than he did in the first period of his writings; and the rationale of this we find to consist in the Absolute being, with him, that very fundamental moment which is present in the Egoes themselves; that part of the Ego—if I may so express myself—which appeared indeed to be a source of activity, but, when regarded *per se* or by itself alone, and apart from the other moment of the non-Egoes, to be indeterminate and indifferent. Here then the Egoes,

* Briefe an Reinhold im Leben. und Briefwechsel, Bd. ii. p. 305.

in thinking conformably to the understanding, take upon themselves the place of the discriminating reflective activity; and thus pass with their activity to a certain degree beyond that absolute indifference-point, although the act of discrimination proceeds from this, and cannot be posited without it; or, in other words, since Fichte viewed the finite Ego, as positing from an indifference-point all the multiplicity of representations (although the latter must be ever present simultaneously with the former and inversely), and then explained this point as the universal reality of the Divine Being, it follows inevitably that the Deity could in itself be nothing else than a moment in the Ego; though it can, no more than the latter, be posited without its second moment, or without an actual world of Egoes, — cannot be thought of as Creator *antecedent* or prior to a world, but is only the immanent point of unity and relation for a world that is to be presupposed as co-eternal with it. With all this, however, the idea of absolute causality is infringed, and the same contradiction steps in as in the case of the finite Ego, which is to be absolute ground of all its determinations, but is yet dependent dialectically, with its own existence, upon the already existing determinations.

If now, as Fichte himself discerned, nothing is to be derived from so abstract a fundamental moment, when taken by itself alone, since the Ego finds itself always enclosed in “incomprehensible limits,” it follows that it must break through these with an incessant self-activity, so as to arrive at self-freedom. Fichte points out, both psychologically and historically, a systematic progress in this restless process of elevation, and becomes in this way the author of a noble *Philosophy of the History* of humanity.* In this three leading stand-points or periods must be distinguished. First of all, the Ego stands upon the sensuous stand-point of happiness; for since each Ego, as a one-sided and partial existence of the divine universal being, represents some special function of the divine will; so also it first comprehends itself in this its particularity, and regards itself as a whole, by opposing itself to other in like manner particular wills, and in this way asserting an exclusive being. Its will is not, therefore, one with the universal divine will, but is rather in antagonism to this, and in a state of disunion. In this way the Ego comes, secondly, to the point where it makes a *choice* between two wills, and has to form a resolution, whether it will determine itself in conformity to its own individual or to

* Anweisung z. sel. Leben, Bd. v. p. 510, *et seq.*

the eternal will. This position, upon the part of the Ego and the choice (*liberum arbitrium*), associated with the consciousness of being able to form some different and positive resolution, is the *stand-point of the law*. But, thirdly, this state of antagonism must also be suppressed, in order, finally, that the state of pure and free morality, and with this that of *blessedness*, may supervene. Here the idea of a possible independence of the individual will vanishes entirely in presence of the absolute will; "the Ego as it was now relapses into the pure divine existence, and we cannot, strictly speaking, say that the divine will becomes that of the Ego; seeing that there are no longer two beings, but only one, no longer two wills, but only one and the same will which is all in all. So long as man ever yearns to be any thing of himself, God does not come to him, for no man can become God. So soon, however, as he purely and radically annihilates himself, God alone remains, and is all in all. Man cannot engender God, but he can annihilate himself as the true negation, and then he sinks or relapses into God." Thus that general harmony of the blessed life is realised, to which the system of absolute morality aspires; and it is not an absolute progress *in infinitum*, but a definite object and goal of general glorification, which is kept in view, this being not unjustly compared with that to which the Alexandrian gnostics, Proclus for instance, turned their gaze as to the end of all things. "Finally,—for what must needs be the end? says Fichte; all must arrive at the sure haven of eternal rest and blessedness; at length the divine kingdom must appear in all its might, majesty, and dominion."

Who, however, does not see, upon comparing this end with the beginning of the system, that Fichte here, in opposition to the former theory of the Ego, and of the moral doctrine, lets the Ego thoroughly dissolve and vanish into the Absolute? This radical self-annihilation, this "love" that gives itself up without any restraint, is here called *religion*; but how different it is from his earlier moral doctrine "of joyful well-doing"! If, during this present life, an all-governing will perfects itself through the whole current of events by means of the Egoes, and their representations, which are bound together by necessary laws, how then is the determinism which lurks in the background to be averted or to be combined with human freedom? Of the human being who has become enlightened as to the true reality, it is said "nothing surprises him, whatever occurs around him, whether he comprehends it or not: he knows of a

certainly, that it is in the world of God, and that nothing can be in this, which does not tend to good as its end. He has no fear for the future, for the absolutely Blessed guides him eternally towards it; he has no repentance over the past, for in so far as he was not in God, he was nothing, and the past is now past, and for the first time since his reception into the Deity is he born unto life; in so far, however, as he was in God, is that right and good which he has done." How, however, the human Ego could maintain any independence and freedom in the presence of the Absolute, remained an obscure and uncertain point, because, what is preeminently the fundamental defect of the system was never satisfactorily explained, namely, as to how the finite Ego, simple in itself and indifferently devoid of determination, and in like manner the just as abstract infinite Ego, can be the determining cause of a multiplicity that is to proceed from it or depend upon it. As to the former the things or their images, so to the latter the whole world must be primordially *given*, and neither in the one nor the other can the possibility of a free creation be comprehended.

If the weak side of Fichte's system was, as has just been said, undoubtedly this, that from the abstract ground of the Ego the multiplicity of the representations which should proceed from it as non-Egoes cannot be derived,—and was Fichte himself constantly obliged by his reflective nature to distinguish the Ego from the non-Ego and inversely, and to refer both sides to each other, but nevertheless offered in this way not the slightest explanation of how the content of this Ego, the infinite fulness of the things or images, sprung originally from within it; it followed that, in this state of matters, the next and most natural step was to return to the assumption of a *real* world of things, and a real nature both around and without us.

This was done by *Friedrich Schleiermacher*, born at Breslau 1768, died 1834, in Berlin. Although, as a theologian belonging to the Reformed church, he never wholly denied the influence of his earliest education within the bosom of the Moravian brethren; "piety," he himself says, "was the maternal body, within whose holy sanctuary my young life was nurtured and prepared for entering upon that world which was as yet a sealed book; in this body my spirit breathed, ere it had found for itself its peculiar sphere in science and the experience of life." Meanwhile, as it lies quite beyond the limits of this work

to describe in detail the epoch which was made by Schleiermacher in the domain of Theology, we must be content with inserting in this place a sketch of the characteristic features of his philosophy, in the which he neither wished to found a new system nor a new school, so that it is partly to be regarded as a *resumé* of what had hitherto been done by Fichte, and partly as forming unquestionably a transitional step to the following standing-points.

While, as regards the reality of the non-Egoes, *i. e.* of natural things and real experience, Schleiermacher freed himself from the unsatisfactory idealism of Fichte, by adopting a real reciprocal action of thinking and being, and returned to *Kant's* view of the world, in which there still lay a sensational element derived from Locke, he yet agreed with Fichte, in adopting, like that author did in the earlier portion of his career, an independent, individual Ego; but at the same time also, as was done at a later period by Fichte, he adopted a real connection of this Ego with a single absolute primeval cause, and still more strongly did he insist upon this connection, as being manifested in direct *feeling*. That he adopted an empirical element in our knowledge, does not, however, place him simply upon *Kant's* stand-point, and still less behind this upon the post taken up by the sensationalist school, for he differs from the latter class of philosophers by vindicating the idealistic moment in opposition to the material one, and from *Kant*, by assuming that the *noumenon*, or intrinsic nature of things, may be cognised by us, seeing that he wished to establish an adequate knowledge, together with objective validity, in place of the bare possibility of cognising the phenomenon only, and to found this real knowledge upon a general fundamental substance, common to the Egoes and the things, in and by which a real influence of the things upon the mind, or inversely, and thus a mediation of the *knowledge* in us by means of things, and an objective activity of the *will* upon the things, becomes comprehensible.

This homogeneous fundamental essence, which we first take into consideration, by the assumption of which Schleiermacher entered into such close relationship, not only with Fichte's later doctrine, but with Spinoza and Schelling also — this essence or substance, in which the dualism of thinking and being is reduced at bottom to a unity, is to be posited as the indifference of both, of reality and ideality, *i. e.* as an essence, in which these differences having been extinguished, are no longer present, so that the dualistic antagonism is no radical one, or a dualism

that divides into two principles, but is only to be met with in the world of finite essences. Hence Schleiermacher called this his philosophical stand-point, that of the unity of idealism and realism, and with this, probably, quite independently of Fichte and Schelling, and having perhaps had his attention directed to it by Jacobi, he associated at once the doctrine of the "holy and repudiated Spinoza," in which he believed that he had found the solid and substantial basis, which lifted him not only above the one-sidednesses of idealism, but also of materialism; he availed himself, however, the more readily of the point of support afforded by Spinoza's doctrine of the All-one, since therein he could contemplate, as a necessary hypothesis for his religious principle, the "*absolute feeling of dependence*."

Although in his later years, when he had studied more closely the original works of Spinoza, his predilection for that renowned thinker was withdrawn more in favour of a platonising view of the subject, still it may be justly said of his earlier opinions, that his mode of apprehending the doctrine of substance differed always essentially from that of Spinoza. With Schleiermacher this doctrine is, in a philosophical point of view, a means only for blending or fusing together Fichte's monistic idealism, and Kant's dualism; for with him, indeed, we never encounter that decided pantheism of Spinoza, which regards the absolutely and singly existing substance as the essence of all things, but the things as mere abstract forms, devoid of essence, and transitory, in which that substance, as the only eternal and divine, exists; so that a world, as distinguishable from God, does not even exist, and hence the pantheism is of a completely acosmic character. In opposition to this Spinozism, but certainly not without involving himself in a contradiction, and at the cost too of some logical consistency, Schleiermacher distinguished very definitely the existence of the world from the existence of the absolute substance, which with Spinoza he called "God." The absolute substance or the Absolute is with Schleiermacher, in the strictest sense of the word, an unity and self-homogeneity, which excludes from itself all differences, determinations, and actions, and in the which, when we endeavour to think of it, the power of framing conceptions attains its extreme point, since we can only think of the definite, the formed, or of that the limits of which are mapped out in distinction to something else. This substance, which is not to be comprised in any definite thought, which is to be uttered only negatively, or as to what it is not, is not-

withstanding, a necessary hypothesis of all definite thinking, being, and knowledge, as also of all action of things upon one another, and of the intelligence upon material things, and is thus an altogether necessary postulate for all knowledge, and all active volition. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher does not, like Spinoza, regard this divine substance as entering into all finite things, and directly constituting the existence of all of them in the aggregate; but with him, all finite things taken together are, and remain, the complex only of *finite* natures, and this complex is the universe or *world*. Thus the world is opposed to the Infinite One, just as the many are to the one, and is in nowise identical with God. From the infinite in itself, Schleiermacher considers that every quality of distinction, both the material one of things among themselves, as also the main distinction of thinking and being, or intelligence and nature, is in the strictest manner excluded. It would be but a rendering of the infinite finite, consequently a contradiction (*in adjecto*), if we were to regard the Deity as being identical with things, or things in their aggregate as being God. In this way the world obtains upon its side, in spite of its being necessarily dependent on God, and upon God's existence, a certain relative independence as the totality of every thing definite, finite, and changeable.

Despite, therefore, the actual negative dependence and the absolute feeling of dependence, the individual Egoes are, and remain, insolubly self-subsistent in this general substantial medium. For since the substance determines nothing, but only supports and unites the determined in itself, it follows, that the individual minds are principles that determine themselves and something else, save only that their definite and individual nature must be accommodated to the universal whole, of which the minds are integrant members. As in that universal whole, the infinite multiplicity is exhausted, while this multiplicity of individual essences is determined by their mutual relation to each other, and also by the whole; it follows, that each individual Ego has its definite mode of existence and action portioned out to it, of necessity, by a kind of pre-established harmony; each Ego having its specific calling, function, "*talent*," or endowment. In this respect, Schleiermacher is, upon the one hand, a complete determinist; while, upon the other hand, he believed that he had, — by this specific individuality, whereby each Ego becomes the representative of a moment in the whole, and one that of necessity belongs to the absolute totality, — suc-

ceeded in strengthening the individuality, personality, and independence of the latter. To the objection that may be raised against this view, as giving rise rather to a thoroughly dependent *particularity* and deficiency, than to a totality of each individual *per se*, he replies, that each, as well as all, has a share in the Absolute, the one and the homogeneous ; and hence, in the universal reason, whose universality is demanded and presupposed by that very multiplicity. Each individual has, also, in his self-consciousness and conscience, an incontestable knowledge of this, his participation and dependence upon the Absolute. Now, to speak critically, if this substantial unity were to be in itself not merely the abstract unity, but were to serve for more than a collective complex, in which the differences would not merely be contained and supported, as upon a basis, it follows, that the general element which corresponds to it in the subjective reason, or self-consciousness, would be more than a formal complex of everything special and particular ; the individuals would become true personalities, as Schleiermacher would, without doubt, have them ; for, according to his view of the matter, we seem to encounter in the world more of the spontaneous activity of the finite individual essences, than of the energetic activity of God ; and it is not so much to be feared that the Absolute should effect every thing by suppressing only human freedom, as that, on the contrary, God should be lowered to the condition of the passive substance : nevertheless, this would, according to Schleiermacher's view, be directly the case, if the Divinity were ever to engage himself actively in the world ; for then the latter would, in the conflict of finite things, hold a passive relation, — a disadvantageous state this, which could only be evaded by our plainly withholding both attributes, activity as well as passivity, from the Absolute.

If, then, the whole argument is to turn out satisfactorily, the main point is obviously to determine the relation in which the infinite stands to the finite Ego. Upon this question we find laid down, as a general basis, only what follows. As the Absolute is in itself perfectly undefinable, so, also, is it to be posited in reference to its relation to the world ; and as there the determinate thinking and knowing comes to an end, *i. e.*, the Absolute itself cannot, properly speaking, be *known*, it follows that neither can its relation to the world be known, nor cognised by definite thought, and then expressed. But this inability to cognise the Absolute is not to be charged as a weakness upon the part of our own limited reason ; but it follows

from the notion of the Absolute itself being perfectly undefinable, incognisable, and inconceivable. It is not, however, with this want of knowledge, or ignorance, as with the other ; for while of the totality of natural objects we can have no adequate, no wholly perfect knowledge, but only such as may be obtained from the subjective foundation of our individual and limited sphere of thought ; yet, by an unlimited mind, this totality would be comprehensible ; and we even approximate to it continually in the progress of our education, although we never actually attain to it ; but, in the former case, the ground of the impossibility of arriving at any knowledge lies objectively in the nature of the Absolute itself. Thus, there can be no true knowledge and comprehension of the Absolute ; but still there is an inward or spiritual perception of the Absolute Being, which is the minimum of knowledge vanishing into the indifference of the indiscriminate state, and of the consciousness emerging from the indifference, and passing over to the difference,—an inward perception which, in this very act, is, at the same time, affected by the indifference ; whereby we may, in some measure, render account to ourselves of that relation. This inward, spiritual perception is *Feeling*. Here, again Schleiermacher agrees with Jacobi, although upon different grounds ; for with the latter, the feeling was only an imperfect but immediate apprehension of the activity of God ; and for God he did not presuppose an indefinite substance, but a *personal* spirit. With Schleiermacher, the feeling, from its not being the sensuous organic sensation, but the religious, absolute feeling of dependence, is a mode of mediation which is adequate to its object, because it is its very self the suppression of all definite distinctions in the object felt, and of the antagonism of subjectivity and objectivity. In the feeling, no object stands opposed to us, but we are directly one with it ; here, also, in particular, is the antagonism between willing and knowing suppressed, or the knowing passes, on the one hand, through the indifference-point of the feeling, into willing upon the other, and this again into the former by the same route ; for if knowledge proceeds from an influence of the objects, while inversely the will acts by an operation from within us upon the objects, it follows that an indifference-point must here lie between them both in the subject, in which these antagonisms again relapse into the absolute indifference. If there were no point of union, no common bond of connection between willing and thinking, they would both fall utterly asunder, an interval = 0 would intervene between

all our acts of thinking and willing, and thus the unity of our consciousness would be utterly disintegrated. Thus, the indifference of feeling is seen at once to be the continued potency which leads not only to a constant renewal of will-determinations, but also to determinate series of thoughts. Thus, to the objection raised, that if in feeling the character of difference and antagonism is suppressed, every trace of consciousness must also vanish, and thus the feeling itself sink down to zero, Schleiermacher replies, that the subject upon this very retrogression of itself into utter indifference, or in its progress from this into the different, comprehends itself in the moment of distinguishing them both, so that in this moment a minimum of the one extreme is always apprehended simultaneously together with the other, before it wholly disappears. Nay, the evanescence of this moment from the memory is by no means connected with the appearance of the knowing and willing upon the world of antagonisms; on the contrary, this feeling must of necessity accompany the mind, during its actual life in the world, as a permanent substratum for all definite acts of thinking and willing. The absolute feeling of dependence, which is the sum and substance of all religion, is distinct from every other physical feeling of *relative* dependence upon external things as determining us; for over against this, there constantly remains, at the same time, a relative feeling of freedom, in the which we are conscious of *being able* to act upon the things, and of letting them act or not, as we please, upon ourselves. Of this feeling, however, over against the Absolute, there remains to us not the smallest trace; for in regard to this, we cannot will, *i. e.*, be spontaneously active; it is impossible, and self-contradictory, to seek to define or determine, in any way, the absolute Being, since this itself is plainly the indefinite pure Being; thus the Absolute can be no more willed, than it can be known. Here we do but encounter our own absolute dependence, and that of things also; and the feeling of this dependence is religion, as regards the fundamental nature of which all men resemble each other, but hold a different relation among themselves, according to the degree in which God's consciousness is active in them. As regards the ideas, or *representations*, which men spontaneously frame to themselves of the Absolute, and their relation to it, there may be very different religious doctrines and theologies; but in all these forms, the true religious element is that feeling, a reality which is something essentially different from every kind of

theory or speculation in which the essence of religion does not even consist; for religion is not a mere process of thinking or knowing.

If we now turn from the consideration of the real objective condition of the matter in itself, to that of human knowledge and science in the true sense of the word, we find Schleiermacher entertaining the lofty notion of *Philosophy*, as being the central science, which, as with Plato and Aristotle, soars above all the special ones. It does not engender, *a priori* the content of these sciences, but it determines their form, since it harmonises all the given content into a whole, produces the positive connection of all special notions, determines these critically by the sum of their total connections, and in this way produces the systematic consciousness, in the formal conclusive character of which it consists. With all this, however, we must at the same time bear in mind the limited sense, which by Schleiermacher, as well as Kant, is attached to the word "knowledge." Knowledge bears a double character, first, in its being the general method, alike unto all men, of representing and forming to themselves notions of things; and, secondly, in its bearing reference to the *being* of things, and including in itself, not merely a thinking process, but a positive knowledge of objects corresponding to the notion of their being. The former character is conditioned by the latter; and this *objective* validity of knowledge includes that general character of the representative process, so that Schleiermacher lays most stress upon the latter, for in the objective *truth* of what is thought the correct thoughts of all men concur. Thus, instead of rendering prominent the first criterion, in which case his philosophy would have gained a more subjectively idealistic character than in Kant; it was by the predominance of the latter criterion invested with an objectively cognitive theoretical character. Hence knowledge and all science have their free play only in the sphere of the *world*, thus within the finite antagonisms of thinking and being and of the thinking finite essences (Egoes) with one another and with the nature of things. Thus philosophy is, in the truest sense of the word, world-wisdom; but inasmuch as this or the experience upon which it rests, is never completed, philosophy also is never completed, but strives continually towards this goal, and finds itself constantly in a state of infinite approximation thereunto.

All true knowledge has indeed a double factor—empiricism, which, as with Kant, furnishes the content of our notions, and

the intelligence, which imparts the form to this content, which, without it would be chaotic; while, to the thinking activity, on the other hand, a formal function only belongs. Over against the theoretical activity of cognition, stands the practical activity of the *will*, *i. e.* the activity of the Ego, by virtue of which it transfers its notional forms to the external world, and therein embodies them, so that these conceptions or notions here become active principles, or *notions having an end or object in view*. As for the content of philosophy, the special real sciences must elaborate and prepare this; this content is originally given only as empirical material, and the reason is not originally self-conscious of this material, until it has elaborated it; the reason only manifests itself actively, when by the active human being it is on account of the "organising activity" imagined to be in nature, nature being animated with reason, so that this rational form is now manifested to the human being in an objectively comprehensible manner, and the organised reality becomes the symbol for the symbolising, *i. e.* the cognitive activity of the reason. Without the content, which is to be adopted by us only through the medium of objectivity, philosophy would only have to deal with abstract logical formulæ. It has, therefore, in order to become a science, upon the one hand, to reduce by a process of abstraction the given manifold content of cognition to general notions, *i. e.* to deal with it *inductively*, and upon the other by an exercise of the judgment to *deduce* with dialectic precision, through the medium of opposites, that content from out the notional unity. The formulæ discovered by induction, and the "schemata" determined by deduction, coalesce into the intellectual *intuition* as being now full of meaning and critically justified. Had philosophy the power of producing originally all content from out of the reason, or even of reproducing that content perfectly with only the assistance of the given, it would in the latter case be a perfect, in the former an absolute science; but for the present at least philosophy is unable to do this, being only one side of the truth, namely the formal, while from its penetration into the given content originates for the first time the highest form of knowledge, or that which Schleiermacher, to use his own expression, regards as a "technical" (intellectual) *intuition*. So far as philosophy busies itself with the forms of thought as such, it is logic; so far as it penetrates in thought the content that is given us, thus cognises the being and elevates it to knowledge, it is metaphysics, which is the fundamental science

of philosophy. Schleiermacher, however, includes the two parts of it, the metaphysical division of the general doctrine of cognition and the special logical, together under the name of *Dialectick*. Under this general division comes in due order every thing that is conceivable, consisting, upon the one hand, of nature, upon the other, of the sphere of conscious action, consequently of physics and ethics, so that on the whole the ancient division of philosophy into dialectick, physics, and ethics is reestablished.

If we now take a concluding glance at the theology and ethics of Schleiermacher (for with speculative physics he has not specially concerned himself) it might at the first glance seem difficult to discern how Schleiermacher, as a theologian, could have associated with his metaphysics, as above characterised, a Christian theology and Christology, seeing that the Deity is so firmly enclosed within itself, and is so bare and devoid of all definitions. In fact, Schleiermacher does not connect his special doctrine of religion and belief with this objective principle, in order to deduce something more from it scientifically; but setting aside all speculation, he passes over to the human subject, in order to take his stand-point here in the absolute feeling of dependence. This feeling is, indeed, essentially one of a general and abstract character, but on that very account it stands the more in need of being determined from some other source, or by the channel of history. Now Schleiermacher transplants us at once into that definite state of religious feeling which is characteristic of the Christian frame of mind, and with him this state serves, not only as the criterium of what is to be rejected as contradictory, but also as the positive principle of what must be presupposed as a necessary condition, and thus, of all that without which that very feeling could not be present and alive within us. The position which he assumes is thus of a psychological, historical, and the method of a critically postulating, character.

The true Christian feeling and consciousness of religion, is not, however, limited to the abstract and general feeling of dependence upon higher powers, but, when defined more closely, its sphere of action is seen to include the antagonism between the consciousness of guilt or sin, and the certainty of atonement, or grace. The former state consists, not so much in the consciousness of definite acts of injustice, as in the deeper self-consciousness of *weakness*, and a feeling of dependence as regards the individual sensuous will, so that one's piety is not only too feeble to pervade all the moments of life's conduct, but one's

whole view of the world besides ; this state of weakness on our part, as regards our consciousness of God, is the sin for which we are answerable. The state of grace, on the contrary, hovers before the Christian as the *power* of the divine consciousness within him, to govern all states of his mind and conduct in life, and in this consciousness he becomes reconciled to being freed from the dominion of sin. This state, however, cannot be regarded as one which is any way attained or even attainable by the human being, in so far as he is placed by his nature in the antagonisms of finitude : in order to subdue the finitude both in the singular and the whole, *i.e.* the world, he necessarily stands in need of an infinite principle lying beyond this finitude, and this principle must be imparted to him. The Christian, however, knows that this communication is only granted him through the mediation of an historical Redeemer. If even we were to assume that this communication came to us through the world in the ordinary course of civilisation, still it could only be by the Christian church in the world ; for the world itself, as the complex of the finite, is utterly sinful, and has neither power to elevate another, nor itself, above this state. The redemption must proceed from a principle, elevated above all sinfulness, which was and is the personality of Jesus, to which our traditional knowledge points as to a definite historical phenomenon. He alone imparts to us the strength of his divine consciousness, as in him alone was this divine consciousness attained ; not merely by a gradual process, or by degrees, but absolutely so as to perfectly pervade his whole personality, and govern his whole life ; and thus he can work continually, in the Christian community, as a pure archetypal form of instruction,—sacrificing himself for us in the fulness of his love.

Now while Christian dogmatism possesses, in this precise feeling of devotion, which betrays a real state within us, an infallible criterion of Christian belief and knowledge ; from the same principle, also, springs Christian ethics—in so far, namely, as this feeling of confidence in God, conditioned by communion with the Redeemer, is the motive of a practical or truly Christian conduct of life. Hence, Christian ethics are as distinct from general or philosophical ethics, as the Christian doctrine of belief is from metaphysics.

Philosophical Ethics originate from the general self-consciousness of the will, and is a science that may be represented in a speculative form. Upon the one hand, it presupposes

physics ; for the human being finds itself, from the beginning, already organised by nature as or for a rational being ; save only that reason and nature are here, in a directly unconscious manner, one. Now the problem of the science consists in rendering itself, by the action of the reason, more and more conscious, and by the conscious (subjective) reason gaining a greater mastery over nature, *i. e.*, it consists in the universal effort of the reason to penetrate what in nature is isolated—to render it its own organ, and animate it, until the whole nature of our earth's surface has entered into the service of the reason, and the latter become the dominant or governing soul of that universal body of nature ; a goal this, which must, indeed, constantly hover before the science of ethics, but which it never attains ; for, with the actual suppression of that antagonism, the science which essentially consists in the process and struggle of this suppression, would be itself suppressed, and its place supplied by a thoroughly rationalised nature, *i. e.*, general state of blessedness.*

We are forbidden, by the general plan of these discourses, from entering further into the moral doctrine ; and will only add, that Schleiermacher was the first who denounced the one-sided character which ethics present when they are handled, either from the point of view of the highest good, or of virtue, or of duty. What he wished for was, a knowledge of these three points of view, as united, though it was the doctrine of goodness especially which he made to rank, as the principal one, above the others. To this step he was especially moved by the deficiencies of the earlier outlines of ethical science given by Kant and Fichte, who had formularized the moral doctrine throughout into a doctrine of duty, though in this was involved the character of a dualistic antagonism of the subjective will and objective law, which can never be wholly reduced to the level of perfect freedom, unless both are essentially one and the same in the natural will. If in this we seem to run the risk of eudæmonism, still, upon the other hand, the possibility must not be denied in the outset of our being ultimately able to rise above the legal sphere of justice up to the state of perfect freedom in love ; and this goal Schleiermacher has, in his religious moral doctrine, especially kept in view. Indeed,

* The comprehension of Schleiermacher's philosophy has been recently facilitated by Julius Schaller in his Lectures (*Vorlesungen*) upon Schleiermacher, Halle, 1844, and by Weissenborn's Lectures upon Schleiermacher's *Dialectick and Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1847.

the general tendency of this more recent philosophy is, as has been frequently observed, to confirm the freedom of the individual. Kant, indeed, with his dualism, could not effect this otherwise than by making the Ego sacrifice the desires which confounded it with nature, and then take stoical refuge back into itself. Fichte, more energetic in character, preferred annihilating or reducing the reality of objective nature to a mere, although necessary, mode of representation upon the part of the Ego, rather than give up any thing of the infinite principle of freedom; but, in this way, he lapsed into the path of absolute idealism, which, with his successors, veered round into a deification of the Ego. Lastly, Schleiermacher left the reality of nature to subsist, but identified, to such an extent, the reason that is immanent therein with the self-conscious reason of the subject, that ethics threatened to become physics, and inversely.

As regards Schleiermacher's philosophy in general, the reason why it arrives at no satisfactory result is, without doubt, to be sought for in its deficient notion of God. It has been already observed, that what was to be feared was not so much that, in his system, the absolute substance, by entering the world, should be made its solitary and energetic soul, and all freedom of man be suppressed; as rather inversely, that it must seem as though the finite Egoes would get the mastery over this formless substance, and, by dint of their significant intelligence, deal with it as with a passive substratum. Since, however, Schleiermacher has declared this substance to be the whole absolute, and this absolute to be God, it follows, that he cannot admit any kind of entrance of this substantial and original essence into the forms and conflicts of finitude. In this way, the existence of the world is only *negatively* conditioned by that essence, *i. e.*, the absolute is only that *without which* higher, more concrete principles could not exist and work, which they require to do in order to realise themselves and become spontaneously active; though, in fact, such a condition, by being only negative as regards other positively determining principles, is nothing more than what is called, in the wider sense, matter or substratum. Now, since from it alone no world can proceed, such a world must, if it exists, be presupposed in and along with it from eternity, thus devoid of free creation; and, since Schleiermacher repeatedly gives utterance to the expression "without God no world, and without world no Deity," the absolute appears, upon the one hand, to be dialectically conditioned and dependent upon the finite, as inversely

the latter upon the former. Accordingly, despite every caution being taken against the Absolute entering into the sphere of the finite, and the Deity becoming again degraded to the condition of a powerless and passive substratum, it appeared, nevertheless, to be inversely at the cost of the self-subsistency of all finite creatures, that the same Deity was elevated to the rank of an omnipotent causality, to the potency of all "becoming," and to the single formal principle of all. The idea of the true Absolute appears only to be saved, and the last trace of the dualism of the material and formal principle to be extinguished, when the Absolute is regarded, not only as the abstract indifference, but as such, at the same time, the living principle of all difference; when universally immanent in all things, it enters not so much energetically into a present world of opposites, as rather evolves these in the very beginning from itself, or, by distinguishing and determining itself in itself, unfolds itself into the totality of the world's reality. This total subversion of the hitherto current view of the world, appeared with justice to be the next and necessary point that must be taken into consideration; and it was the youthful Schelling who ventured upon this bold and daring step.

LECTURE IX.

SCHELLING.

WE left the science of philosophy upon the earlier standing-point assumed by Fichte, with the following result: all our knowledge is a subjective activity; no one can know and learn more than what resides or occurs within the sphere of his own Ego, *i. e.* his self-consciousness, and all which there occurs is a *spontaneous activity* of the consciousness. Whatever there may be external to or without this sphere, — and that there is something, we are constrained upon the practical stand-point at least to *presuppose*, although never directly sensible of it — whatever may occur external to the Ego, at all events admits only of being perceived internally, and can be regarded as an object upon subjective grounds alone. These grounds or principles, however, may be reduced, when regarded from our subjective sphere, to the fact of our free activity some how or other feeling itself arrested or retarded; — retarded, but whether through limits and fetters that reside in the Ego itself, or in another Ego external to it, such was still the question. Fichte said; even if we assume that our free activity is retarded and determined by another Ego, still this very assumption is only a thought proceeding from us, and holds good in theoretical philosophy for nothing else than a subjective law of thought, according to which we, in thinking, ascribe as much activity to the non-Ego, as we find our own activity retarded, and attribute to the Ego as much free activity as we deny to the non-Ego. Thus, the non-Ego is, as our representation, in so far effected by ourselves as we are mentally active, and, on the other hand, the non-Ego acts in so far upon us, as we acknowledge ourselves to be passive, *i. e.* deny activity in ourselves, and ascribe it to the non-Ego. — Now, in order to assert the absolute unity of the Ego, as principle of the science, and, — what to him was of the greatest importance — its absolute freedom, Fichte transferred those limits to the nature of the subject, without perceiving, that by these very means he directly suppressed the absolute character of the Ego, and rendered it unfit to be the only absolute principle of philosophy. Besides, there remained with him, as with former philosophers,

a circumstance that was as good as disregarded, but which is of the most decided importance, namely, the content or intrinsic worth of the non-Ego, the nature, in other words, of the posited objects themselves, these being, as is self-evident, of the greatest variety, so that, if not for all objects indiscriminately, yet, for the sake of this specific content, something may be declared concerning its being or non-being.

Schelling at once observed the one-sided subjectivity of this so-called knowledge. In fact, we can, according to Fichte, merely know of our own ideal activity; or, with him there was merely a consciousness of consciousness, a thinking of thought. To know, however, implies to be certain of the reality of that which one perceives or represents to oneself; thus, in knowledge, an actual something that becomes known, is constantly presupposed; a knowledge devoid of any thing which becomes known, or which is real or actual in itself, apart from the knowledge, contradicts itself, and would be a knowledge of nothing, an empty dream. In fact, with Fichte (in the older "Wissenschaftslehre"), there existed only knowledge for itself alone and nothing else; the only thing that actually existed being consciousness, *i. e.* thought. Moreover, this consciousness was not to be thought of as present in a soul or mind, but as an activity *per se*, a pure actual process of thought; and beyond this there was nothing, not even a thinking element—an essence, namely, wherein the thinking process might occur.

Let us now learn what further additions were made by Schelling to this question, and that indeed in the very first period of his philosophical career. He asserted that if a knowledge is to take place, there must be also something which is known, or, in other words, so soon as a knowledge occurs, a being also must be admitted. This, however, refers only to the antagonism of the finite Ego to the external world, not to an universal antagonism of thought and being, or of subjectivity and objectivity in the Absolute. Schelling, in the present instance and at a far later period, declared the absolute to be the universal reason.* Now, it had certainly been rendered clear by Fichte, that we can in a general sense, or at least *proximately* and *immediately*, know only of our own being; and consequently this being, in so far as it is mirrored in the consciousness, or self-consciousness, was at all events to be taken or rather retained as the starting-point. It was discovered further, that all knowing and thinking consists in an internal ob-

* See *Jahrbücher der Medicin*, 1. 1.

jectifying, representing, setting before itself, or internal severance of what is thought from that which thinks, in an internal antagonism, and that this is the fundamental form of all mental activity. Through this internal process of separation or distinction, there originates to us a thinking principle, a middle point absolutely active from itself, and an action or tension proceeding from this, or, as it were, a sphere, that expands in rays from that point; in a word, there originates what, on the one hand, is designated subject, and on the other, object. Both constitute in themselves one and the same essence, a Subject-Object, but we have in this to distinguish the point as the absolutely active and producing, from the sphere or the product. That point, which in itself and apart from its sphere, can only be regarded as a pure abstract Ego, *i. e.* as absolutely subject, but never as object in itself, is the absolute source and starting-point of all activity; from it every thing proceeds, every thing emerges, and having reached the circumference, sets itself, as it were *vis-à-vis*, as an object before it, becomes a point of resistance for the Ego. Thus, all objects are such only as being thought, or exist only in so far as they have been thought; the Ego exists, however, in so far as it thinks. In the Ego must reside the absolute ground of all that issues from it; but this resides originally in it, only in a *possible* manner, or potentially, being not as yet worked out, *i. e.* not as yet real or *in actu*. The Ego is altogether life, it is an energy that evokes from itself into existence what does not yet exist; and just as we are not self-conscious of the thought until we think it, so also does the Ego not become conscious of that which resides in a possible manner within it as the subject, until it objectifies the former, *i. e.* transplants it from the centre into the circumference, or fashions it from out itself.

Now, if Schelling had with all this proceeded to establish the notion of a thoroughly real and effectively active Ego or absolute subject, he would then have reencountered the antagonism which became lost with Fichte in an empty and one-sided knowledge. But with Schelling there was something present, that was known. This something, however, did not with him reside without the Ego, as an *external* Ego or object, but constantly within this sphere, so that the object was indeed immanent, yet from the activity of the subject itself being regarded as a real operation, it had, while opposed to, really emerged from out the subject. This object was none other than the essence emerged from the *centrum*, the unfolded nature of the Ego

itself; in a word, it was that very something expanded in time and space, which had previously lain contracted and undistinguishable in the central point of the Ego.

All that lies potentially, so to speak, and originally in a state of undistinguishable contraction in the Ego, becomes evolved by the very spontaneity of this Ego; it now exists *in actu*, as it had previously existed only *potentiâ*; i. e. it now really exists, or is present for the first time; for of the potential being, we can only say with impropriety that it is, or at all events not in the same sense as in speaking of the *actual* existence of the manifested essence. Thus, that antagonism which was previously felt to be wanting, is here found between the absolute producent Ego, or the subject upon the one hand, and the product, the representation or object, upon the other. Now, however, that Ego (and this is not to be overlooked) is, in accordance with the earlier investigations of Fichte, not to be thought of as a material nucleus or rigid being, — for the absolute subject would then be represented as object, which from its very nature it never can be, — but the true notion of the being which belongs to the subject is this, that we represent to ourselves this Ego as perfect activity, productivity, will or volition, and finally as strenuous or energetic freedom.*

The same result is to be obtained also by another path of inquiry. If the act of knowing, as we saw, in order to be true knowledge, must be no empty thinking or idle visionary dreaming, but must have a something known, or object of which to know; so, upon the other hand, this knowledge cannot be in any way separated from this its known object or content, or regarded as any thing wholly severed from the latter. If knowing is not to differ from the true being and essence of that which it knows, if it is, as it were, to wholly pervade and internally comprehend this essence, then knowledge upon the one hand, and its object upon the other, or the knowing and the known, must be of a similar kind and nature; nay, more, a true knowing can only be a knowledge of itself in an undivided unity of knowing and known, of subject and object; it can in the strictest sense of the word be only a knowledge of itself, a *self-consciousness*. Thus, the consciousness must not regard within itself the substance of the soul (if one may so speak), as a something different

* Consult especially the Treatises that serve as an introduction to the Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre. In Schelling's philosoph. Schriften, Bd. i. p. 259.

from itself, and objectively impenetrable, or, as it were, stand before it, contemplate it *ab extra*, or hover over it, but knowing and being must essentially in themselves be of one and the same kind. The thinking process *is*,—is absolutely and immediately; that such a process takes place, no one can doubt who thinks (*cogitare est*). This is what has been called by Schelling, the self-affirmation of thinking or being, in so far, namely, as all being is in itself an actual or real thinking, both being identical. Kant had already, in his metaphysical “Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,” resolved matter into a play of active forces; Fichte had wholly suppressed being, in the sense in which it is thought of as a something persistent, quiescent, substantially existing, or merely objectively present; and had shown that being is to be regarded as a perfect activity and life; he had pointed this out in the subjective Ego, and consequently exhibited this Ego as absolute activity, with, at the same time, the antithetical rhythm or method of this activity. What we have now to bear in mind is this: that what Fichte had declared to be a merely ideal activity, — a partly conscious and partly unconscious thinking process,—Schelling represented as being, in essence, both an actual and real activity; or in other words, to use his own expression, the Ideal and Real are radically identical.

This root, however, or the Absolute (the fundamental Ego), Schelling recognised at once (as has been observed), in the practical moment of Fichte’s doctrine, in the practical Ego or absolute volition and action, with which at the same time he admirably associated the theory of immanent self-purpose, which had been advanced by Kant in the “Kritik der Urtheilskraft.” Now if we earnestly regard this immanent teleological effort or volition, so to speak, as the first *punctum saliens*, from which every thing is worked out, it follows, that the real formation precedes the ideal one; this volition or effort is at once a life, or that which, regarded by us as a bodily side, emerges altogether by activity into reality. Schelling accordingly appears to have been the first who, by reducing these premises given in the philosophy of his time to a conclusion, expressed what had hitherto been the instinctive tendency of the modern consciousness. He broke through at one stroke all the limits and fetters of the subjective principle, boldly expanded this, as the circumscribed Ego of Fichte, into the general sphere of the world, and thus stood with one step at once in the Absolute and Real.

From this point, however, it must be possible to work out a definite theory. If we have once acknowledged the absolute reason to be an absolute activity, the question next arises, — what is the law or form of this activity? or in what rhythm does it move itself? As such a form we recognise by means of reflection the movement in time and space. Time and space are the fundamental forms of our activity, and especially of the first or original mental activity, which is met with in the consciousness, the *intuition*. Temporo-spatial representation is = intuition. Time and space were, according to Kant, the forms in which sensational intuition occurs. But, taken in a strict sense, they are not forms residing ready prepared in the mind, or, as it were, mounted by nature before the latter, like spectacle glasses, but they are (like the categories) only the way or method in which the Ego contemplates itself, and thus they constitute the peculiar law of its intuition; nay more, they are really the intuitive process itself which takes place *in this way* and in no other. Regarded from a strict point of view, space is nothing else than the self-expanding, extending activity, the looking out into the distant, the Infinite. Now this extension (or space) would have neither goal nor boundary, would be a sphere devoid of periphery, unless *time* were to be added, as a limitation of the intuitive activity. “The original measure of all space is the *time* which is required by an uniformly moved body (a movement) to traverse it; and inversely, the original measure of time is the space which such a body (as the sun) traverses.” “Time and space are therefore necessary conditions of all intuition.” Without time the subject would be formless, the intuition would pass into the Infinite, without pause and cessation; but without space, without extension, no object whatever could arrive at completion. Thus time, as the measure and limitation of spatial motion, is something negative; while, on the contrary, the space measured through and included within these limits, *i. e.* the extension itself, as the sphere, is something positive. Thus intuition is rendered possible by two absolutely antagonistic activities; one of these being of a positive kind, the other of a negative, for the one extends, the other limits, negates. In this way, then, the representation, the object, consists in a common product of these two activities; the so-called content it obtains from the expanding, the form from the contracting, activity. The whole product is nothing but a product of the original and absolute self-activity.

Now, if we have acknowledged space and time to be the original form of an activity, namely, of the sensational intuition, and to be of an ideal character, it will become still more evident to us, that the same form is that also of all real activity or motion. For an (originally internal) activity, which successively (arrested, as it were, by time in every point) extends itself in a space, appears, when regarded externally, as motion; motion is a common product of space and time, being that which corresponds externally to the succession of representations. Thus expansion and contraction will be also the form of the so-called material nature, as regarded by us externally, or of natural life.

Thus Schelling retained, indeed, the theory of the Ego, which Fichte had made the principle of knowledge, as a principle also, but amplified it at the same time into a general scheme of the universe. He even declared that he had always held this view as constituting the true opinion of Fichte, and had from the very beginning regarded Fichte's system in no other light. In Schelling's early writings there are certainly to be found the most unmistakeable traces of this view. The absolute Ego is a general complex of all reality. The Absolute, when regarded truly as Absolute, cannot, indeed, be otherwise thought of than as *one* and omnicomprehensive, or, in other words, two or more absolutes cannot be posited together; the rational idea of *totality* and *unity*, the highest of all ideas, imperatively demands this. Fichte's Ego was that very conception which every man has of his own Ego; Schelling's Ego is the truly absolute and universal Ego, which every one finds within and out of himself, the nature. The all or universe, which Spinoza had thought of as a single absolute substance, presents itself to Schelling in the form of the only infinite Subject-Object, the world — or universal Ego.

Now, if, instead of thinking of our own psychical nature, in which ideal activities occur in the form already indicated, we think to ourselves of the universe, as the grand unity or world-Ego, being active in itself after a similar manner, we shall then readily comprehend how, by such a temporo-spatial movement, by such an activity of the universal Ego in itself, all objects, in a word, every thing that is, arrives at completion—how all or every thing, like sonorous figures in a moved medium, assumes a form or shape. We have already seen that our individual finite Ego, which is only a part of the great whole, is, by virtue of its own nature, so full of power and life in itself,

that in the sport or play of those two activities, there is internally born or evolved a true creation out of nothing, an infinity of manifold intuitions in us. This multiplicity of determinations is not evoked in us by the influence of manifold external objects or things in themselves, but it is the birth or product of the potential fulness of our nature. It is, really and truly, the universal world-nature which here acts in me, as in one of her innumerable points, as well as every where else; and on that account we have an immediate knowledge of this nature; or, more correctly speaking, it is the universal nature, that here within us knows something of or perceives itself, the nature, which has organised itself into human souls, into humanity, and by means of these its organs cognises itself. We human beings are, as it were, but the innumerable individual eyes through which the infinite world-spirit regards itself. We are *real* or *actual* as regards our internal essence; namely, we are all, taken collectively, world-spirit, but we are not *actual* as regards the form of our self-subsistence, or in so far as we imagine ourselves to be something individual, independent, special, and, in a word, other than that universal nature-spirit. That which is imaginary and unsubstantial in us, is the absolute personality with which the individual flatters himself; for what is *his*, can in the full sense of the word be only the universal vital force and power of nature, in the pulses and successive formations of which this my earthly organisation is but a fleeting moment, or one that passes by.

Before, however, we can enter further into this part of the Schellingian doctrine, the Philosophy of Nature, it is necessary to test the theory of the consciousness still more closely, and become acquainted with the method upon which all that follows, and especially that which in the more restricted and modern sense of the word is called Speculation, depends.

The unreflected, unconscious action, as we may call it, of the vital or psychical power stands, so long as it is only this and knows nothing of itself, upon the very same stage with the action of the so-called blind and outward forces of nature, and nothing constitutes the distinction between the conscious and unconscious activities, but that want of reflection upon itself, *i. e.*, as will be shown more distinctly further on, the want of freedom in those natural essences which cannot repeat or represent to themselves their own activity *as* one of a spontaneous character. That blind activity is met with just as much in the lower regions of human life, as it is perceived to be

generally distributed among the objects of nature. The whole distinction between them is just this,—that this natural activity cannot contemplate itself, nor even perceive what it is and does, that the objects of nature cannot become objects to themselves, but are always viewed in their activity by other objects that stand external to them, and thus are merely *objects for others*. Man alone is, in the state of creation with which he is acquainted, subject and also object for himself; he is the only active, and in this activity, self-conscious essence, the only absolute Subject-Object or self-object.

If, however, the knowledge of his own activity were not originally and simultaneously in itself this activity, — were the actually self-stirring, moving, and creative vital activity in us, not the same as that which only in a higher potency or degree is manifested as sensation, intuition, and knowledge,—and, inversely, were these which in the stricter sense are called spiritual functions, not originally and in themselves those same actually working forces of nature, — then indeed no true self-consciousness would, in the strictest sense of the word, be possible, *i. e.* no knowledge of *self*; nay more, upon closer consideration, it is that very identity of knowing and being, which healthy common sense or the instinctive logic of language has expressed by the compound word *Bewusstseyn*, consciousness, *i. e.* *being conscious*.

In order to have a *perfect* self-consciousness, we must presume that the self or being which is to be known coalesces with the knowledge, or is in itself one and the same therewith; or otherwise there would still be for the knowledge an object, a dark nucleus in the inmost of the phenomena, which it would not have the power to penetrate; but so soon as the knowledge has gained an insight into the fact, that that which I term being or essence is internally, as regards its true nucleus, *i. e.* its true hidden content, none other than the very same play of activities which the knowledge is, then for the first time the knowing and known, or the ideal and real, perfectly correspond to each other, knowledge being then of a true character, and as such really deserving its name; so that of this knowledge, the well-known saying, “that no created spirit dives into the interior of nature,” no longer holds good. On the contrary, the spirit does dive into and wholly penetrate the latter; for it finds again in all nature only itself. The statement above made, that thought must have a real object, a being, in order that it may be *knowledge* and truth, is not suppressed by this identity, inasmuch as

the thought itself is assumed to be real, *i. e.* being or reality; it was only suppressed by Fichte, when he opposed the thinking process as non-reality or non-being, to being. If meanwhile, despite of all this, some wavering and unsatisfactory element still appears to dwell in these views of Schelling, this is but incidental to his standing-point at that period, and to that of the so-called Identity-philosophy in general, and will be brought to light further on.

Let us now contrast with these views, first of all, the usual mode in which one commonly thinks to oneself of the origin of knowledge and the relation which it bears to objective being, in order that by disclosing the true sense and ground of the recent Speculative Philosophy, we may clear away the impediments which still prevent so many persons from gaining an insight into its leading features. I should indeed hesitate after so long a digression, in again laying claim to a trial of patience upon the part of my hearers, did not every thing which I shall have to say in the sequel depend directly upon this point.

Let us once again recall to mind the usual theory of cognition, as it was prematurely taught us in old works upon logic. The thousands of different objects in the world make impressions upon our senses, and bring about intuitions or pictures of themselves in our perceptive faculty. For as many different things as I behold, so many different figurative copies have I in my sense and memory. But by what species of magic they have really entered my consciousness, it concerns me not to inquire; enough, they are there. In order now to bring this confused host of objects into order and connection, I compare the individual objects with each other, co-arrange them according to their similarity, and devise for myself general class-schemes or generic conceptions, that guide me in making my arrangements. Upon seeing then in future some new object, I am often indeed at a loss to know, at first, under what kind or genus it may happen to fall; I find, however, upon closer consideration, the corresponding generic conception, and so soon as I have found it and applied it to the intuition of this definite individual, or have by a process of judgment brought the individual under that generic conception, I then recover my thoughts instantly, cognise and comprehend the fact. I find, for example, in my walks, a certain something; I regard it closely, turn it round upon all sides, have, it is true, a distinct perception of it, but do not know what it is. Now, if any one recalls to my memory the common word or conception under which it comes, and says, for example,

it is a shell; then, from that very moment a light breaks in upon me, there arises an understanding, comprehension, and consciousness of the previously enigmatical object, and I say, I now know what it is.

Such is the logical judgment which is passed in recognising or cognising facts, and so far the psychological process is in the main accurately described; nor can the above statement be in any way denied; but we cannot pause or rest content in our inquiry at this point, as is commonly done.

For, upon the other hand, say the recent speculative philosophers, with all this you have not yet explained to us what we would properly have explained; nay, you appear not once to have understood our question, namely, as to how that *first* perception, seeing or cognition of the individual object itself, takes place. We readily concede to you that logical arrangement of single intuitions under notions, when one has already single intuitions as well as general notions in the consciousness; but how, in the first place, does one get at these? That is the question. The true riddle to be solved is not as to how order and connection are brought to bear upon the whole multiplicity of images already known, and treasured up in the memory; but this,—as to how any single image first enters the consciousness, or, if you will, how an impression, a motion or determination of the psychical organ, can convert itself into a something known.

The very first image that is given or imparted to us by an object obviously supplies us at once with the place of a common notion; so that later on, whenever we see a similar object, we are reminded of the first image, compare them together, and refer the later seen object to the first, seeing that we recognise it as the same,—as being identical with the first, or at least recognise in essentials the sameness of character that pervades them both. If, however, the object first given becomes the type and conception for all similar objects, how then has that first object been cognised and perceived? How have we, in a word, perceived this object, and become conscious to ourselves of its presence?

Now in this case we have to deal with something very different to the logical judgment; for we are now speaking of a mental function, which must precede every act of judging, or not merely of representations and notions that are found ready prepared in the consciousness, and of its demeanour with them, but first of all of the *preparation* (*Fertig-werden*), or process of origination of the so-called perceptions, and thus of that fundamental

question, which you upon your stand-point ordinarily express thus: how do impressions from material objects enter my immaterial soul? or how comes it that the impressions mechanically excited in the psychical organ are on a sudden converted into consciousness? As regards this question, logic is of no use whatever, because it only brings into order the representations as they have been found ready prepared. The above process, however, of "preparation" was at the utmost but superficially treated of in the scanty psychological introductions to logical compendia; or when expounded more fully in works of a special character, every true explanation of it was at once rendered impossible, by the writers resting content, in their endeavour to explain that mental phenomenon, with presupposing "a mental faculty," and for all the different kinds of mental phenomena, "different mental faculties or powers." It was not perceived that, in having recourse to these make-shifts, words only were coined, as in every case where one says, such or such a phenomenon is to be explained by the very power that produces the phenomenon.

Such is the ground upon which the speculative philosophers resist not only the earlier or logical, but also the psychological mode of explanation. They might just as well call their own explanation a logical or psychological one, only this must be done in a very different sense to that in which these expressions are usually taken.

We return now from the above digression to inquire what is the purport of Schelling's exposition of the same matter. It is to be found already traced in outline by Fichte, who, acting upon the impulse given by Kant, may properly be styled the first inventor of the speculative method. Schelling, however, was the first to bring the method prominently forward, and to give it an objective signification; Hegel to complete it. Of the internal mental process, as described by these philosophers, it may be incidentally observed, that it cannot be *proved* or demonstrated to any one in the ordinary sense of the word, but is to be regarded as a general psychological fact, as an internal experience, and immediate necessity. Every one must put it to his own test, whether he perceives and finds to be ratified within himself or not, that which those writers declare; who-soever does not find it, to him — they say — we can never prove it; every thing depends, upon each one of us possessing as much activity of mind and acuteness of self-observation, as is necessary to the inquiry, for there is no other thinking process than that of *self-reflection*.

We can, as already said, have an *immediate* perception, understanding, and pervading consciousness of nothing else than what we ourselves mentally are, and perform. Now, the intuitions of sense are, as has been shown, *within* us, and, even if were they to originate from certain exciting causes from without us, still as being *known* intuitions or perceptions they are at all events only products of our own mental activity. (I do not say, of absolute freedom, but only of activity, in contradistinction to a mere receptive passivity.) Thus, the sensuous perceptions are in themselves direct products of our activity, though still in its lower or instinctive sphere; for we saw that they took place through a mental expansion or contraction, or through a spatio-temporal process of representation. They are first of all and *in themselves* unconscious and involuntary products of the mind; they first become *for us* or for ourselves, *i. e.*, our own possession, when the intuitions have been recognised as our own activities by means of reflection, or, in other words, when in the act of producing them we take heed at the same time to this our act, not merely in reference to them as the product, but to ourselves, the producent. Such representations, which, apart from a reflection of the above kind, are still present within us, are called intuitions or images, and as such always abide with us as determinations of our consciousness, although not understood, nor reflected upon; they are there, and we act conformably to them, without knowing or reflecting that they are there, and *how* we have arrived at them; upon which very account we inevitably regard them not as our own free product and fabrication, but as a something existent, in a word, as objects. When, however, by a free act of repetition the very same image presents itself as a special act of our activity, we then call the intuition, in the stricter sense, our own representation, and become conscious to ourselves, in and by that repetition, of our representative self-activity, seeing that we can evoke or bring this activity into play at our own pleasure, or again let it subside. This original intuition, or now actual representation, serves us henceforth as a model or scheme for similar intuitions, and expands itself, in a manner well known, by abstraction being made of unessential accessories, to the more and more general conception or notion. Such is its relation to other intuitions. It remains, however, for us to deal with its relation to ourselves, as the intuitive agent; *i. e.*, we would know how, speaking individually, I get

possession of or master the intuition so as to call it *mine*, or how I come to see that I have it, *i. e.* become conscious to myself of its determination, which was in the beginning blindly present within me. We would, if I may so express myself, behold the wonderful transubstantiation of the *real* psychical determination into a *thought*.

Intuition is thus an act, but an unreflected act of the mind, an act, of which the mind does not even know that it is *its own* act. This act, however, is freely repeated by its own power and activity, and on this account with the self-consciousness, that this object, this my representation, is only my own activity, only my own consciousness, *i. e.* that I myself am it. I now acknowledge the image for the first time to be my own activity, to be myself, to be perfectly translucent, and that which previously appeared to me as an impending foreign object and existence, is to me now a subjective object only, a determination of myself, whereof I see at the same time also that it is a *self*-determination of myself, that — let the cause or occasion of its presence in the soul be what it may — yet that the whole image formed is nothing else than a formative process of my representative activity, a moment of this activity retained in the act of fashioning or representing.

Now, that the represented image, as being only a product of my representative act, is, as it were, extruded or thrust forth from the centrum of my Ego into the sphere of the latter, is an observation which I can only make, by distinguishing the represented image, as product from the act of representation, the productive process. Each time, however, that I repeat the *act* of representation, the *product* also re-originate of necessity at the same time, so that I cannot keep the two apart. If I bury or lose myself again in the product, I then experience nothing of my action, and I am again in the unreflected condition of the intuition, out of which I would emerge, above which I would raise myself, and which I would make the direct object of my observation. Nevertheless, that the mind becomes conscious *in abstracto* of this its action, is a matter of fact. Thus, the *human* mind possesses the energy, the disposition to free itself from its blind intuitions; and hence the success of this operation depends solely upon the *freedom* or automatic power which has been originally granted it, this freedom being the deepest groundwork or substratum of the self-consciousness. This self-deliverance or emancipation, however, proceeds in a gradual manner. I first of all succeed in

distinguishing the free representation from the immediate intuition; between the two there must be a difference, in order that they may be distinguished, and that, when I represent, I may not believe that I am also gazing at some outward object. That first definite empirical intuition served me, as we saw above, so soon as I can once repeat it freely from memory as a representation, as the pattern or rule of my activity which was again to be thus disposed. The schema or conception becomes the rule, or indicates the general method by which my activity modifies itself; the conception being the representation of the activity, by means of which I bring about the object, the intuition. Thus, in the conception, I have really indicated the activity as such *in abstracto*, apart from the intuition that is produced by it—and this was what I would have; I would become conscious of my activity, without again, in doing this, immersing myself in the state of the intuitive process. Now the conception constantly differs from the intuition, in being general, indefinite, and devoid of all the accessories of unessential determinations, yet notwithstanding it would again coalesce, in the act of cognising, with the intuition into one consciousness, if we did not know how to keep the two asunder in the mind, while yet we unite them in the cognition (of an object). This keeping of them asunder in the act of uniting them, takes place in the judgment; and this is the completion of the consciousness. Animals also have conceptions or notions, *i. e.* they have common images or schemata; but they cannot judge, *i. e.* they cannot keep the schema and intuition apart from each other in the act of cognition, and on that very account they have no self-consciousness. For, in passing a judgment, as, for example, when I say that “this here is a tree,” the present intuition of *this* here (the object) and the conception (tree) are to me identical—conception and intuition coinciding; *i. e.* the modification which occurs in my mind, while it modifies itself to that definite image, and the *conception*, which is, as already said, its reflection in so doing upon this its self-activity—both—the product and the producing act, are at one with each other; but nevertheless, in the mind they are at the same time separated, *i. e.* the self-consciousness, that *I* cognise the tree, accompanies that act, and is never wholly extinguished. In or by the act of intuition there originates to me the (mental) product; I am myself my product, my whole mental activity has merged itself in this product, and, in this condition, there is wanting to me a resting-point in my-

self, so as to distinguish myself from my product. This distinction (and with this, of course, the abiding self-consciousness) is merely possible, when I distinguish myself during the act of intuition from the product of intuition, or when, in other words, by distinguishing *myself*, my Ego, therefrom as the producent or true productive activity (with both Fichte and Schelling the Ego is in itself a thorough activity) — I thus distinguish my activity from the product. Now, this side-glance, so to speak, at my activity, is the conception; thus the unconscious cognition or understanding of any object (an intuition) is only accomplished by the act of judging, *i. e.* as much by an union as by a distinction of the thought and what is thought of in the act of cognition.

All these momenta, however, of intuition, distinction, cognition, and judgment, are simultaneously present in the consciousness; it is only in the contemplation and description of them that they appear separated, seeing that one cannot regard and describe them otherwise than successively. In the actual psychical process all occurs, so to speak, at one stroke; all these momenta do not follow consecutively upon each other, but mutually presuppose one another, and one must even in theory reunite what has at first been unnaturally separated by the mental anatomy of abstraction. The possibility of abstracting and judging, from which proceeds the self-consciousness, does not admit of being ultimately reduced to more than a self-determination or freedom of the mind. This self-determination is called will; the pure form of the will is freedom; it is the principle both of the consciousness as well as of free moral action, and in this way is shown to be the common principle both of theoretical and practical philosophy.*

If that, which has here been called a conception or notion, is as regards its origin a free activity of the Ego, but was as regards its content but the intuition repeated with self-consciousness, it follows from this, that even in the intuition nothing else whatever can reside, than what *may* be afterwards elevated to the consciousness, *i. e.* brought by free reproduction to the state of a conception. In so far as we are not in this mental state, the intuition remains blind in regard to us, *i. e.* an unconscious state. Out of this state, however, we elevate ourselves gradually, according as we may convert it more or less into distinct

* Compare the treatise already cited in the philos. Schriften, Bd. i. pp. 255—260., and the System of Transcendental Idealism, Tübingen, 1800, p. 288.

conceptions, through the middle states of sensation, feeling, and such like, up to the clearest self-understanding or intelligence. Without any relation to or reflection upon myself, *i. e.* without any separation of the Ego from its state or condition, no perception whatever (*Innewerden*) is possible, which could deserve the name of a consciousness. How could I imagine any thing in the original intuition, if I could not do this with consciousness, *i. e.* by reflection upon my Ego, *i. e.* upon my own activity? Hence it follows that in the intuition there always resides just as much, or that we in exercising the process of intuition constantly observe only as much, as we are conscious of to ourselves, or as consequently resides in the conception that we have of the intuition. Were any thing more to reside therein, we could still learn it only by conceptions; and hence the conception is, in the sphere of the consciousness, that alone by which we have to abide; by it, *i. e.* in it we recognise for the first time what resides in the intuition, or, as we commonly say, in the objects.

This is the signification of the conception or notion as being the re-objectified image or copy of single definite intuitions. Thus, upon this stand-point of the consciousness, the notions are always more or less definite, individualised images, which occur as general representations in the consciousness, and then as such, are submitted to the faculty of abstraction, and consequently, to the known logical judgments. Such conceptive images or schemata are indeed derived, to a certain extent, from empirical sources; but beyond this point we only get possession of them, at first, as abstractions from the individual definite images of the real consciousness, the intuitions.—With all this, however, no concession is made in behalf of their being derived originally from without, by means of the intuitions; nay more, it is not even incumbent upon us to consider that the intuitions from which they may be abstracted were merely obtained from that source. The intuitions themselves are merely images present within, or modifications of, the soul, which, although dependent upon external stimulus, and at first unconscious, still has always produced them by its own activity. The conceptions only originate empirically for us in so far as they are repetitions or copies of the intuitions that are actually present in the consciousness, though concerning their external or internal origin nothing has as yet been ascertained. We can only admit as a certainty that the conceptions, as they appear in the ordinary consciousness, are abstracted from

intuitions; that they are, when in this imperfect stage of the self-consciousness, only accompanied by an obscure feeling of that self-activity of the mind, in which they really consist; for that they are altogether this, is first clearly perceived, when we have discovered that every conception indicates but the activity with which I first produced the intuition.

This, however, can only be perceived by the disciplined philosophical consciousness. Simultaneously with the first sensuous perception, comes the determining activity of the mind, which brings the images to their definite state, reducing them, as it were, to their outlines; or, in other words, it is the understanding, which brings into definite images within the sphere of the intuitive consciousness, the positive activity of the Ego, which in itself launches forth wholly into the remote and indeterminate. Such is the circumscribing, defining, separating, and discriminating activity, of which mention has been already made, and which we here re-encounter under the more definite title of the understanding. This understanding, however, is first perceived by reflection subsequently to the intuition, and the image is present to us, as already said, before that reflection appears. To any one who would now become conscious to himself of the mode of action observed during the first intuition, the object or intuition naturally appears to be the prius or antitype by which, upon the reproduction of the same representation, the activity must be regulated; it appears as that from which the conception must be abstracted, and from which, in the usual empirical consciousness, such an abstraction is actually made, although the true process stands in a relation the reverse of this; the object having in fact been first produced by the conception, and, on this very account, because the conception is the mode of action, by which the object of the intuition is in the first place engendered or produced.

We thus perceive that in thinking from the image that has been effected within us, we gradually re-elicite in so doing, by abstraction, the conception of our self-activity from the product or intuition, this conception being that by means of which we had first unconsciously devised the image itself. We resemble in the exercise of abstract and reflective thought, a painter who stands before his own work, which by virtue of his artistic instinct, he has happily achieved he knows not how; but now he proceeds to analyse it by means of the understanding, in order that in this, his own product, he may again cognise the method of his activity, the artistic treatment, and the rules by

which, without his knowing it, he had first created the work. In us all representations and intuitions are small and involuntarily created art-products, the which, however, from the very fact of their being involuntarily created, had better be called natural products, or products of our own nature; for it is this internal creative nature which is continually putting forth, objectifying, from the middle point or centre of our essence, that which potentially resides therein; and thus by this theory of the consciousness, we find ourselves brought back to the point from which we started.

From the above statements we shall see clearly upon what grounds and to what extent the (usually so called) Aristotelian logic is, by the Speculative philosophers, despised. They only reject the latter in so far as it does not serve to explain the fundamental problem, but, by always presupposing ready prepared notions, deals with these externally by a combining and decomposing process, instead of diving into their genesis or origin. They therefore circumscribe the logic within narrower limits, assigning to it a definite but subordinate post in the system. As an organon or means for solving the fundamental problem they substitute, in the place of psychology or logic, the so-called speculative method, which first assumed a definite form with Hegel, but which we find to be already present as a constructive method with both Fichte and Schelling, and which essentially depends upon the so frequently and warmly contested doctrine of "*Intellectual Intuition*." Now this intuition or perception consists in that very activity of the inward sense, by virtue of which both a definite intuition is produced, and at the same time an intuitive perception is attained of the method of this productive process. In this way we, as it were, lie in wait for the producing nature within us, and surprise her, so to speak, in her most secret laboratory; thus, speculation, when regarded in the strictest sense, will be the power of creative construction that resides in thought itself, whereby the human mind at once perceives its own laws, but with these laws, at the same time also, the products that are produced in conformity with them. As, however, the mind finds itself in the middle point or centre of the universal consciousness of nature, or the human consciousness is itself the point to which the general activity of nature converges, it thus cognises simultaneously together with its own essence every essence and law also, as well as all the definite content of the universal nature or world-spirit; for all that is real is throughout life, all life is

an intuitive process, and the intellectual intuition cognises in the intuition, and thus directly in itself, the actual or real. All this will be rendered more distinct further on; but meanwhile thus much is already evident, that the so-called "intellectual intuition" is and can imply only the general basis or condition that is to be presupposed of speculation. By itself alone it resembles the direct process of artistic production;—hence this stand-point and conception of art held good for a long time as the highest—but just as the latter is susceptible and stands in need of a theory, so also does the intellectual intuition require a definite methodising, unless it is to degenerate into an unscientific game of the imagination.

Thus, speculation, regarded *primâ facie*, is certainly of an idealistic character, seeing that it depends upon subjectively idealistic observations and principles; for a *direct*, full, and penetrating consciousness we can only have of ourselves, or of our own process of thought and action, that only which we suffer to originate in our thoughts being to us perfectly clear and comprehensible, both in its essence as well as origin, but not that which is only present for us in the intuition as object, or which as a foreign essence is to be regarded as external. Now it follows from the exposition already given of the problem in question, that in the act of intuition the activity of the understanding already prevails; that *we* in the intuition or contemplation of the objects, form the objects themselves, at first only unconsciously and involuntarily; that these objects are nothing more than our own subjective nature projected, developed, and objectified by us, the subject. We can thus get possession of the whole internal nature of the objects, of all natural objects, or rather of our intuitions of them, down to the deepest root of their existence; rendering to ourselves all objective existence transparent in its most internal essence, by bringing only to the consciousness what the understanding has first, in a state of unconscious intuition, deposited in it; for according to what has been already said, more than this will not be therein met with. Thus, then, as already said, the human mind does by means of the intellectual intuition, penetrate to the innermost of nature; it penetrates her wholly, for nature is the all-one, and of her the individual human being is but an integrant part, all other parts being to him the very same that he is himself. His own essence, although individual, is not merely an analogous copy or likeness of the universal essence, but it is one with this; and the essence of nature is mind, although

indeed upon many inferior stages of self-development this is still a slumbering, dreaming mind. All activities of nature are, however, in themselves none other than activities regarded objectively by us as movements, which activities we bring subjectively as mental activity within us to the state of self-consciousness.

Thus, have we cognised in ourselves, what reality, essence or being is, in a general sense: the being is the life, which unconsciously perceives itself; self-conscious life is thinking, and thinking is self-conscious being; being is the thought that directly affirms its existence, and directly apprehends itself as vitally existing (absolute self-affirmation). The being, the reality, or the life, is that universal nature which is incessantly working out itself, the *natura naturans*, which, unfolding itself, assumes a form, and in all its forms reveals only its own manifested essence and life.

This life, confined within itself, *i. e.*, self-confining and evolving itself into forms, which from its nature is always striving after self-evolution, and which bears within itself the tendency or infinite longing to objectify itself, — this life, we will regard as the truly real; and because as such it is a real effect of power, it is indeed to be called a being, *aye*, pre-eminently such; but it must by no means be thought of on that account as a being in itself quiescent or dead, or bearing in itself a quiescent and immutable substratum, a dead, substantial nucleus; that which it bears within itself, or rather is itself, in its innermost and deepest point, is the absolute quality of self (*Ichheit*) above indicated, the volition or will; the innermost nucleus is the living ground of subjectivity, which puts forth every thing by absolute self-development from out itself, which, as potency and power continually converts the possible into the actual, the subjectively implied or involved into the objectively unfolded or evolved. This eternal evolution is nature, but this evolution is gradual; the eternal life potentialises itself in time from the less perfect to the more perfect. *Potentially*, indeed, *i. e.* possibly, or fundamentally, that which was first of all present, was certainly the most perfect, the most perfect power or might; but it was present at first merely *as* a power and possibility, *i. e.*, *potentia*, while actually (*actualiter*) it first *became* gradually more perfect, from the state that was in act (*actu*) imperfect. Had the most perfect been present from the very commencement in its entire evolved actuality, as a world full of objects, how, it may be asked,

could that most perfect have reconverted itself later on into a less perfect? Thus, the evolution of the universal essence of nature must from the beginning gradually advance from lower to higher; hence we encounter in nature a certain kind of self-perfectibility, an eternal progress or process, a higher elevation or lifting up of itself from potency to potency; and so nature has a history of itself, a progressive course of life, which it is the special province of the Philosophy of Nature to disclose. The highest goal and terminal point of this evolution is that, where this, in the beginning blindly working life, attains in its fullest development to the consciousness of itself. The law, however, or, so to speak, the rhythmic movement, whereby nature elevates herself from one stage to another, is the same at all stages, only at every later stage it enters upon a higher potency than at the earlier one; it is everywhere, upon the lowest as well as the highest stage, the selfsame mode of activity, namely, an objectifying of self to self; first of all, a putting forth of what resides in the subject, and then again a retrograde reflection from this objectively created content, of the subject upon itself, a distinguishing of itself from its object, while with this it remains continually united and is at bottom the same essence—in a word, a polarisation between subjectivity and objectivity, a pulsating process of expansion and contraction, a proceeding from itself outwards and a retrogression to itself. Such is the philosophical method that completely corresponds to the nature of the matter, — a method that with Schelling moves in quantitative antagonisms of a *plus* or *minus* of reality and ideality; and this very rhythm is also the general form of the single, undivided life of nature, in which form it acts unconsciously upon the lower (materially real) stages, but in which, upon the highest stage (when it has entered upon the potency of man), it comprehends and cognises itself. In so far, now, as this original essence, having become intelligible to itself in man, still recognises in the rest of nature also, or as it were in all its members, its own life and essence, — in a word, here contemplates as objective, what it perceives in a directly subjective manner in the human being — it follows that all knowledge has, so to speak, two poles, subject and object, knowing and known; and thus also there are, actually, but two fundamental sciences, or rather but two modes of viewing one and the same life from two different points of view: first, the Philosophy of Mind, the self-consciousness of the subject — Transcendental Idealism; and secondly, the Philo-

sophy of Nature, the being or life, objectively regarded from its real side and its development, *i. e.* as natural life.

Both sciences must mutually complete and presuppose each other, just as one pole does the other, and it is impossible to set out from the one without being impelled towards the other. "This," says Schelling, "and nothing else, lies at the bottom of our endeavours to bring theory to bear upon the phenomena of nature. The highest perfection of the natural sciences would be the perfect spiritualisation of nature's laws into laws of intuition and of thought. The phenomena (the material) must, as regards ourselves, completely disappear, and the laws only, or the formal, be left remaining. Hence it comes to pass, that the more the regular or normal in nature comes into view, by so much the more does the veil or covering vanish, the phenomena themselves becoming more spiritual, and at length ceasing altogether. Optical phenomena are nothing else but a geometry, whose lines are drawn by the light, and this very light itself is but of a doubtfully material nature. In the phenomena of magnetism all trace of matter disappears, and of the phenomena of gravitation, which even natural philosophers would have us believe that they can only comprehend as directly spiritual influences, nothing remains behind but the law, the carrying out of which upon a grand scale is or constitutes the mechanism of the heavenly motions. The perfected theory of nature would be that by virtue of which the whole of nature might resolve itself into intelligence. The dead and unconscious products of nature are only abortive or unsuccessful attempts upon the part of nature to reflect herself; the so-called dead nature being, altogether, but an unripe intelligence; so that in and through her phenomena the character of intelligence is still, though unconsciously, revealed. The highest goal, that of becoming wholly an object to herself, is first attained by nature through the highest and final stage, that of reflection, which is none other than man, or, to speak more generally, is that which we call *reason*, through which nature first completely returns into herself, and whereby the fact becomes obvious, that nature is originally identical with that which in us is cognised as intelligent and conscious."*

Such was the judgment pronounced by Schelling, at least in the earlier portion of his philosophical career, which is usually distinguished, as you know, from his later views by the name of the Identity or Nature-philosophy. We might, if we were

* System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 5.

to trace the series of his writings with strict historical accuracy, point out in succession no less than three, four, nay, probably five, irregular modifications of his doctrine. Upon the whole, however, there is but *one* essential difference that presents itself as paramount to our notice, namely, that existing between the earlier Nature-pantheistic and the later Theosophical view with its leaning towards theism, so that it seems at least to be perfectly sufficient for our purpose, if we abide by this one point of distinction. Besides, Schelling himself has repeatedly declared, that the exposition of his system of philosophy given in the first volume of the "Neue Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik," 1802, was the one which, in his own estimation, "had thriven to maturity," but that it contains only the first part of his system, namely, the objective part, which deals with nature; as to the philosophy of mind, which presupposes, but does not retract the former branch of inquiry, this he has not yet disclosed in its whole compass or extent, but has always kept it firmly in view. A deeper principle may indeed have been involved in the objective portion of his system; but from its having been undeveloped and so misunderstood, one has, by dwelling too closely upon its natural side, produced a one-sided system of necessity, and such like. As regards the state of our own opinion on this matter, we will endeavour later on to set this before the reader, and meanwhile we will return at once to the stand-point of the "Nature-philosophy" above alluded to.

LECTURE X.

SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.

SEVERAL of my audience have expressed a wish to find themselves, at the commencement of each new discourse, placed, by a repetition of the results of the preceding one, in a condition of mind that should enable them to follow out the continuation of the subject in a more perfect and coherent manner. Now, though the present course of lectures is already rich enough in repetitions, I am the better pleased to adapt it still further to the above wish, since in this way, as I hope, we may the more distinctly and profoundly master the subject of philosophy under its present change of form.

We shall never succeed in contemplating nature with the eyes of Schelling, unless we first of all get rid of that usual mode of representation which perceives in all individual things but so many self-subsistent and in themselves dead bodies or substances, which, endowed however with powers or forces, act upon other substances and upon ourselves. Every single object works indeed upon some other object; and the whole of nature is such a mutual operation of its individual parts with each other and upon themselves; but the interior of the things, their matter or substance, as we call it, *is* no such substance at all, and *has* no such powers as are commonly imagined. What then is such a substance to be in or by itself? How is it to be thought of, how is it to be explained? That is the main question. It is by no means to be regarded as a nucleus dead in itself and devoid of motion, unto which—and who knows how?—living powers may only have been annexed; but it consists intrinsically or in itself of such powers, or more correctly speaking, activities, which meeting each other in the space that the body occupies, mutually support one another, enter into a state of tension, and so produce the solid something which appears to us as body or matter. Matter is impenetrable, it is said, *i. e.* it offers resistance to external pressure; but this very resistance which it offers in the direction outwards is an activity, a tension in the matter, by means of which it fills up and asserts to itself a certain space, and prevents other bodies from entering therein. Thus, we must first of all

accustom ourselves to discern, even in the rigid and dead, a constant *conatus* and tension (though bound and fettered) of the vital activity. If we now admit yet further that this materiality is only the lowest stage of the universal life of nature, which develops itself upon the higher stages and upon those of the organic essence, with a constantly increasing energy, internal self-mobility and freedom, and if we presuppose that this development follows one and the same constant law from the lowest and most rigid existence of the stone or mineral up to the play of thoughts in the human brain, consisting, in short, of a self-movement continuously entering upon higher and higher potencies or powers, it follows, that in this general self-movement and activity of nature, the law of the world, which, when perceived and cognised by itself upon the highest stage, is called *reason*, will become cognisable and representable upon the lowest stages as an unconscious and obscure instinct of nature; and if in all this we never forget the main point, namely, that apart from this living impulse, movement, and activity, there is nothing material or real whereupon or wherein these indications of power occur, but that the very real and material itself consists intrinsically of the play of these mutually determining activities, we may then be enabled to grasp at once intelligibly and intuitively the principle of the whole system; that all is in its essence one and the same. This essence is in itself life. It is called nature (*natura naturans*), in the sense of its being thought of at first only as a potency, a possibility of *becoming* (*werden*) all and every thing, but not as yet *being* (*seiend*) every thing; and it is called world or universe (*natura naturata*) in so far as it is continually originating, becoming, or has become what, in accordance with that nature it is destined to become. Both, namely, the nature as principle (*grund*) and the nature as a phenomenon or manifestation of itself, are together the same, single, total, absolute. The explicated or unfolded nature, *i. e.* all individual natural essences, repose in that nature as in their ground and essence; for they are all only forms or figures of this essence, which has in these forms objectified and manifested itself. Regarded by themselves they would be nothing but bare forms, *i. e.* forms void in themselves, having neither content nor subsistence; in so far however as that essence has itself entered into all these forms and constituted their inward nature, do they represent the very absolute itself; and thus the absolute, infinite essence or being is not separated from nature, above or external to her (the former being, as it

were, in heaven, and the latter upon earth), but they, these natural things and we ourselves,—all that is within and around us is the omnipresent eternal being and essence in its process of evolution or development. On this account also, in the unfolding of each single thing, the essence and law of the absolute may, so to speak, be contemplated within a small compass, the singular being at one and the same time a likeness or a repetition of the whole.

In each single germ, whether of animal or plant, the vital power appears in the beginning imprisoned in a state of non-development, or in a subjectivity as yet confined within itself. Now, this elastic principle of life compressed, as it were, to a point, must free itself from this imprisoned state, and must from the mathematical point, as its indifferent centre, expand itself by virtue of its activity, and thus, in its development or its product, which is the self-representation of its own essence, become the object unto itself; the power thus liberated or set free must emerge by its own active operation into the circumference; in a word, what originally lay virtually or potentially in that *punctum saliens*, first makes its appearance through this self-objectifying of its own included content.

Thus, the observing naturalist has the germ of the chick in the egg as an *object* before him, while still in itself it is a subject, and the process of development becomes clear to him by an objective perception of the invariable regularity of the transformation, which proceeds solely from the interior, the complex of this vital point;—for the heat that is conveyed to the ovum from without contributes nothing else to its development than a solution of the rigidity of those bonds within which lay the living germ. Still less does the naturalist add any thing to the matter before us; this internal something elaborates or works out its own self, in order to *become* really and in act (*actu*) what in possibility and power, or by its *nature*, it already is. It fulfils itself with a blind impulse, and without itself knowing how, as an organising life; just as if an idea, a type, or a pattern hovered before it, to which it must conform;—this idea or this conception does not, however, reside external to it, but, as its original nature, *within* it—it frees itself from the bare form of the germ, extends and divides itself, until finally, it has *accomplished* or objectified in the very fact or reality what in itself it had the determination, possibility, and power of becoming,—of *becoming* only what it should and would be, but which in itself it is not.

That germ of the embryo chick in the egg strives, I said, to unfold itself into a certain perfect structure, just as if it had a type or pattern before it by which to mould itself. This pattern, however, the chick does not actually *confront* or have *before* itself, but it was the peculiar internal nature which prescribed these movements and formations; in short, the peculiar nature, as *natura naturans*, which is here present in a single and definite natural object, known by the distinctive name of "fowl." Thus, the real fundamental and vital principle which reflects itself in the idea, is the real itself, though still in the undeveloped condition of the essence; it is that which imparts to the activity the definite direction, or rather vital disposition and determination, though this is still only *implicitly* present or undeveloped, in the original contraction of the essence. We thus recognise the idea as the internal natural determination of each object that develops itself in a vital manner. Were the chick during its development to know any thing of itself, or could the observer from without transport himself into the subjectivity or point of view of the self-developing object, or, in other words, enter with his *conscious* activity into the place of the *unconsciously* self-developing germ of life, he would then have the idea of the developing life, the form, to which it has yet to come, present to him, as an antitype, an idea or exemplar, and would endeavour to realise it in a freely active manner; but he must at the same time bear in mind, that this antitype is in good truth only his own internal natural impulse, that that conception or idea is only his own internal determination that comes before him as a thing of thought, and that the obligation which he feels imposed upon him as a *duty* of thus originating or *becoming*, is that special living nature announcing itself in the feeling as an impulse or motive. It is clear how closely this is connected with the theory of knowledge above given, and in how far the teleological theory of Kant is here dealt earnestly with, *i. e.* how it is rendered an objective truth.

Thus, in the singular as well as in the general, a law is here exhibited, a blindly-working internal necessity, which appears, however, only as necessity, from the fact of our regarding it from without as an objective phenomenon. The germ must elaborate or work itself out unto that which dwelt unconsciously and blindly in it; for it cannot do otherwise. If we now transport ourselves into the place of the germ, and there commence its elaboration as *our* own process, in a manner strictly

conformable to our own nature, and hence with the consciousness that we ourselves are acting (and no other things upon us), it follows, that the above process of the germ, regarded from the subjective stand-point, appears to us to be perfectly free, in so far as we are enabled without hindrance to develop our own nature, in other words, our own volition, the most characteristic feature which we possess, or what fundamentally in our essence we ourselves are. A law, I said, is shown to be present; but this law is not one that is imposed; it is the special yearning of the germ after development, the elasticity of its own special nature; the operation of this law is a successive self-liberation, self-satisfaction, and consequent declaration of freedom; and thus it is already seen provisionally, how far freedom and necessity may signify in themselves one and the same thing.

While, however, to the higher stages of self-consciousness and of freedom, the universal essence or nature develops itself, as we saw, only historically, *i. e.* successively in time, from one stage or degree to the other; and although no time can be thought of, wherein the Absolute could ever have existed alone as a merely abstract principle of nature, without the actual nature, or the world, — for to such a principle alone and by itself, that which we term existence could not belong, — although the world and its principle, or that primordial Absolute, must thus be thought of as eternal, still, by all this the idea of a successive perfectibility in the mode of the world's existence, or that of a *natura naturata*, will not be excluded, but, on the contrary, imperatively demanded, for the reasons already stated; and not once only, but at all times, the idea of a progressive process of origination or becoming must be taken for granted.

Now, since the world-principle never was inactive, and since this working activity is the very existence of essences or of nature itself, we must, in the attempt to construct the world, first of all completely divest ourselves of any thoughts about a definite creation in time. So also, on the present occasion, where we are entering upon the domain of the Philosophy of Nature, we must dismiss at once from our minds any thoughts about the Deity, and think of the All-one, or the Absolute, with which we have here to deal, as associated only with *nature*, and reserve that expression of the *highest* essence or Deity until a later point of our inquiry. It is true that within nature every where, and not merely in man alone, more or less of mind and consciousness is declared; but we would observe at

the very outset in due order, that consciousness and thought, which, in the stricter sense we call mind, can only manifest themselves in or upon some real existence, or combined only with real essences, but that they are never by themselves alone *in abstracto*, or, as it were, hovering as a pure thinking process in the void. Setting aside all these anticipatory ideas, of God, Creator, and Spirit, we have, as has been said, in the first place to deal only with *nature* in its most imperfect, first, and, so to speak, rudest formation.

As now in every individual germ, so also does nature act in the great whole. As in the germ of the egg we assumed a blindly working power or impulse, which, as if acquainted with its destination, organised itself into the reality, so also in the whole there is a nature antecedent or prior to the nature, *i. e.* an impulse or tendency previous to the formation, a law before its execution or fulfilment, a possibility before the reality, and thus a *natura naturans* prior to the *natura naturata*, or rather residing fundamentally *within* the latter everywhere, as a substance full of power.

We can, however, to such a principle, regarded as merely a pure potency or possibility, attribute, before it has begun to work, no *being* whatever. It can, indeed, be *thought of* abstractedly, but, apart from its action, it cannot *be*; for the merely possible is not yet actual. An *actual* principle is an operative or *working* principle, and thus is no longer the pure idea of the bare potency by itself alone, but of the potency *in actu*. But just as little as the pure potency *is* by itself alone, or *per se*, so also with the operation; an operation devoid of a working principle, and a principle devoid of operation — both *are* not: there *is*, or exists, merely an operation, which has the ground of its movement in itself; there exists merely a principle which is comprehended in operation. Thus, that which truly exists — the existence or being — is an operation that has its principle within itself, *i. e.* an absolute operation. Thus, nature, regarded in that first light, was that which is not yet existent = pure potency; but nature from this second point of view indicates the actual world spread out visibly before us, or the universal being, to which we ourselves also belong; and this actual nature is now no longer that mere primary potency *in abstracto*, but it is potency and operation together and inseparable — in a word, it is the first identity. These principles, which Schelling, even in his most recent expositions upon the subject, does not deny, but only endeavours to determine yet

further, are already found as distinct principles in his earlier writings.

Thus, this being, which we regard at present as wholly universal in character and void of distinction, consists in an infinite existence, *i. e.* in a continual *ex-sistere*, in an emergence and manifestation of the principle in the action; it is intrinsically an activity, and that indeed a self-activity; for it has its principle not external to or without itself, but *within* itself, being of itself both principle and action. Thus, the principle of the world does not lie without nor *before* it, but within it. We cannot adopt the idea of a Creator having preceded the existence of the world, for by such an assumption we should only be misled into the paralogism or false conclusion that the principle must be *present* prior to or before the action. A principle which is *already by itself*, before it works, is called a *cause*. If however the question is concerning the principle of the universe, *i. e.* of *being altogether*, then of this another already existent cannot be the principle, but only a non-existent, *i. e.* that primary potency, which taken, however, *per se*, or as (*qua*) potency, was not even present until it worked, or entered first by means of its working into existence, differing not from this its active existence, nor capable of being retained *per se*, or by itself. Hence it follows that the world and its principle are both co-eternal; for in so far as they are, they are the same.

Thus, being is the absolute, primordial, and in itself infinite working = nature. Now in so far as the potency in nature has attained reality, it is called subjectivity; and in so far as the being or existence is thought of as being effected by that subjectivity, it is called objectivity: the being, in so far as it is its own principle, is subjectivity; the being, in so far as it is sustained or effected, as it were, by this internal principle, is called objectivity; — both being in reality not distinct from each other, but the same: the being is and remains the Identity of subjectivity and objectivity: $a = b$.

Now, however, let us think to ourselves of this being, hitherto regarded as infinite and void of distinction, as being in itself organised and destined to the greatest possible multiplicity. Each part, then, regarded by itself, and contrasted with other individual parts, will appear, one more pre-eminently than the other, to belong to the subjective or the objective side of the infinite essence. We shall, indeed, in no part of the universe encounter either absolutely pure subjectivity or absolutely pure objectivity; for pure absolute subjectivity would be = to the

bare primary potency (which as such is not), and pure, absolute objectivity would be = to a being devoid of all potency in itself, and thus to an impossible being. What is, is or consists of both together, though the one or the other element may *preponderate*, when compared with other parts, and thus only in the singular and finite, where comparison is admissible; but not in the universal and the whole, where an absolute equilibrium — an absolute identity, prevails.

Attention must now be paid to that *preponderating* element as to a quantitative difference, in order that we may indicate the method by virtue of which the potentialisation is to be rendered comprehensible, or the process by which the lower may develop itself into the higher; in short, the simple into the multiplicity, such as is represented by the numberless and diversified objects of the world. All difference in the being can only depend upon a relative preponderance of the subjective or objective element. Now if we think of being in a general sense as a line thus:—

$$\underline{a \qquad C \qquad b}$$

then the side $a—C$ will represent the preponderating subjectivity, the side $C—b$ the preponderating objectivity of the collective identity indicated by the entire line C , so that by these letters is displayed at one and the same time the indifference-point, or equilibrium of the two sides. Now, however, the whole being is neither pure subjectivity at the point a , nor pure objectivity at the point b ; because to these two notions, as we saw, no being whatever belongs, but the subjective and objective element are everywhere distributed. Let now the

line $\frac{C}{a \ b}$ be thought of as divided into an infinite number of parts; in all the parts which lie between $a—C$, more subjectivity would, relatively speaking, prevail, than in those between $C—b$; but in each single fragment of the line there would simultaneously ensue one pole with relative subjectivity a , and an opposite one with relative objectivity b , and an indifference-point also between the two, which at the same time is or expresses a totality—in the first case an absolute, but here in the singular a relative totality. Thus, the possibility, *i. e.* the power of conceiving the limitation or finiting of the infinite, is exhibited, this process consisting, however, only in a distinguishing of itself from itself, and thus in an activity of the infinite

being in itself, whereby it always remains one and the same essence in and by itself.

Thus, being is self-activity; and as for ourselves, we have no other direct knowledge of self-activity than the self-activity of our own thought. And thus, if we would comprehend the self-activity of the absolute subject-object, or of nature, we think to ourselves of this self-activity as a thinking process, a representation of the absolute subject; we transport ourselves accordingly into the internal or middle point of the universe, and just as the creations or images of our own thoughts are merely transitory objects, so also the thought-images or products of the universal spirit of nature are forms, which have in like manner *as such*, no essentiality in themselves; but as they are in truth only the spirit that has moulded itself to or assumed a shape, the spirit having entered them, and in them declared itself as existing,—it follows, that they are real and actual—just as our own mental images are something, namely, the fashioned or moulded mind which, internally within us, while we think them, pours itself forth in these forms. Accordingly, to the mere human thought belongs a being as well as to the real things without us; for us, the thinkers, our own thought certainly appears to have no reality, because it is we who think it, and know that it would have, without and apart from our thinking process, no self-subsistence; in a word, because we see through the subjectivity of our thought-objects. Thus, the infinite essence looks through the subjectivity of all its creatures, *i. e.* their identity with itself, and knows (if it has consciousness in a general sense) that these forms, which we call natural things and gaze upon as without us, are only its own thoughts unseparated from itself.

Thus, every real is a subjective or objective activity, according as it gazes upon itself or not; an activity that views itself, *i. e.* is conscious of itself, is to itself subjective, *i. e.* is that which it altogether is, also for itself. An activity, on the contrary, which does not gaze upon itself is only *in* itself; it is, what it is, not for itself, has not as yet come to itself, and can neither see itself as a subjective or objective activity. In itself, however, it is the same activity, which it is, even when it gazes upon itself. An activity which views itself appears to itself as self-activity; but an activity which is beheld only by the eyes of another, appears as objective *motion*. Now in all things—in the whole of nature,—as we saw, there is indeed a subjective element; for nature is in itself absolute self-motion, but not every in-

dividual part or each organ of this nature can, as a singleness or individuality, perceive itself in this self-motion: there are individual essences, in whom that self-motion has not yet been developed into self-intuition, and which are thus in a state of preponderating objectivity, when compared with others that are, what they are, by or for themselves, *i. e.* are essences, in which the self-activity of nature regards itself.

Nature, however, before it arrives at self-consciousness, is already self-activity; the form or mode of movement of this activity is, as we have seen, a continual objectifying of that which lies implicitly in its subjective element; this objectifying actually takes place, is a real objectifying of itself, but is not a free mental process, *i. e.* the activity occurs and can become an object to itself, *i. e.* can contemplate itself internally after a certain fashion, but it cannot arrive at consciousness, because it is here in a state of preponderating objectivity, *i. e.* is not independent and free, as in the human mind; for it is, as we have already seen, the real, actual freedom or spirituality, which constitutes the groundwork of self-consciousness. Any thing which is more worked upon than self-working, cannot be what it is, *pro se*, or for itself.

Thus, the same takes place in the sphere of objectivity as in that of subjectivity, but in an unconscious manner; the activities of nature run parallel with and are the same as those of the mind or thinking process, except that they occur without any thing like knowledge or thought. By the theory of the consciousness we were taught that mental activity consists in the first place of an intuition, and that this intuition consisted in the subject becoming an object: in the intuition the mind evolves itself wholly into a definite form; and for the first time when it perceives itself in this its efflux or action, when it again contemplates its intuition or renders itself the object, beholds and becomes conscious of itself, does it arrive at the conception or notion of what it is. Now, the same relation, which in us is ideal and subjective, is found also in nature, but in this as real and objective.

The original being, which, regarded from a subjective point of view, is creative self-activity, can be only objectively regarded as motion, and this indeed of a twofold character, consisting of two movements that are opposed to each other. To the objectifying activity, by which, upon the ideal side, the first process of intuition is effected, corresponds upon the objective side the expansive movement; while to the com-

prehensive activity, which there recoils upon the subject, here corresponds the contracting movement; expansion and contraction being the two factors of the material being, or matter. Matter is "being" in its first form, the *primum existens*,—the root of all things; but much as it may seem to be but a rigid and dead something only, it is still only to be thought of intrinsically as the unity or polar tension of those powers or factors acting in opposite directions. That these active powers, as expansion and contraction in the material world, are the same in themselves as intuition and conception upon the ideal stage, results from what follows. The expanding force must be regarded as the first positive factor, for it engenders the idea of spatiality and extension, or rather it is itself a *self-extension*, like unto intuition. This intuitive process would, if regarded from a real and objective point of view, lose itself in the infinite; for the direction of this activity is to what is of infinite magnitude. In like manner the intuitive gaze of the mind, its vision or contemplation, would go forth into the infinite, unless it were to arrive at some hindrance, determination, and form: such an unbounded mental contemplation or thought engenders only what is void of distinction and empty, the *space*. Space is nothing more than the mere activity of contemplation, objectively posited—the act of extension posited as extension. Now, opposite to this positive activity stands the negative, that process which circumscribes, limits, arrests, and by these very means determines and forms. To this activity corresponds *time*. Time is the continual negation of space, the retarding element in the movement, the succession in the activity; it gives measure and scope, leads the tendency of the thinking or intuitive process back into itself, and moulds it into definite outlines and notions; as in like manner it posites the real notion in the material world; *i. e.*, just as the former positive and space-producing activity is directed to the infinitely great, so is the negative directed to the infinitely small: as the former is objectifying, the latter is subjectifying, or directed back to the subjectivity. If the former is the explication or unfolding of the hidden principle, the latter is that which intrinsically includes and brings, or unites, into a definite compass every thing, not only in the sphere of the ideal, but also of the real.

This negative activity, it may be also said, is the general connecting bond or copula which pervades the universe; through it subsist all outlines, forms, and boundaries in nature, just as in the thought all outlines of images and notions; it is that

which intrinsically includes, grasps, and unites, not only in the great whole, but also in the singular. Through it the universe obtains an unity, the singular a fixed limitation, the universe an eternity, the singular a relative duration; but were this negative force to prevail alone, all space would vanish, the universe would shrivel up to a point in itself, and the many points into *one* mathematical point; and were that positive force alone to prevail, then the universe would resolve itself into an infinite void; and in both cases *nothing* would be. Thus, neither of these activities *exists* at any time or anywhere purely for itself alone, but each only in and by the other, preponderating only in a *relative* manner.

As a relatively preponderating force in objective nature, it is called *gravity*, and appears as matter. If we indicate the positive factor by *a*, the negative by *b*, then the gravity or the matter can be indicated by $a = b$. Thus this predominant negative principle is the mother (*materies*) of every formation in the singular, of every limitation or finiting of the positive and indiscriminate being; it is, as being the conjunctive, the creative element also, and consequently is that which, strictly speaking, is the only *real* or realising; for the real is not that which is bound (the content), but is the conjunctive or binding; the conjunctive activity—the real notion—being the true and only creative force, in which all things subsist. Now, although it may sound rather contradictory to point in the present instance to the negative as being the real, yet this contradiction vanishes at once, if we bear in mind that the negative here indicates the actual activity that is engaged in determining and forming. United with this, governed by it, but in inward antagonism to it, stands the positive factor *a*, as the ideal one. This activity, although in itself directed to the infinite, can, where it has entered into the kingdom of finitude (or gravity), only partially declare itself, in so far as it does this in a general sense, *i. e.* enters into opposition with the products of gravity. It stands in the relation of a subjective and ideal activity—as intuition—to that objective real activity, and is called in nature, *light*. Light is the thought of nature, or rather its self-intuition. For us human beings, who stand upon a higher stage, light appears as a movement, which we see taking place objectively; but this movement is for nature, thus in the objective sense, what thought is for us, a contemplation of ourselves. Light is the soul, the spiritual (although unconscious) activity of the world, a thought, which, while filling a space, is yet a spatial act of

self-intuition. Thus, just as in the ideal sphere, or in the consciousness, the sensuous representation was at once a common product of positive outward contemplation (*Hinschauen*), and of the negatively limiting understanding; while the real process of becoming conscious arrived at completion by the fact of our again contemplating this our intuitive process, or, in other words, the activity of the latter rendered itself again the object for itself, and thus elevated itself above itself; — so also does the same process hold good in the material sphere. The positive activity, combined with the negative, contributed to form the product, and was, as it were, by being absorbed in the latter (the matter), no longer in this condition an object unto itself; but it elevates itself above itself, and renders itself in this state the object for itself, or contemplates itself, — light being that which illumines and renders manifest itself and also another.

By light, indeed, we must not understand the phenomenon only which is manifested to us as fire or solar ray; for by light is rather implied the sound (the internal vibration of matter), the heat and true light, in the most perfect sense; this activity, however, is manifested for the most part in nature, where a self-separation and liberation takes place of the positive from the negative factor, as in combustion, chemical actions, and such like. Everywhere is that positively active essence manifested, which by the ancients was called ether, and regarded as the universally distributed and positive primordial element. “The darkness of gravity and the splendour of the light-essence first produce together the fair form of life, and perfect the thing into a truly real object, as we call it.”* Thus, in existing nature, the light holds the relation of *subject*; the matter, as the more gloomy essence imprisoned within itself, the relation of *object* for the light, or, more correctly speaking, nature itself, the universal essence, is here in the state of light and gravity, and, as light, is the intuition or perception of herself. The light first unfolds or loosens the bond of gravity, sets rest into motion, and is in nature the inner life,—or, to speak with Plato, the kingly soul of the whole, the universal soul of the universe. From the mutual struggle of light and gravity the whole system of nature, as we now behold it, has emerged. On that account nature has a true history (Schelling says), and

* Schelling's Abhandlung über das Verhältniss des Realen und Idealen in der Natur., p. xxxvi., prefixed to the Essay entitled “Von der Weltseele,” Ed. 3rd. Hamburg, 1809.

this history of nature is the beginning of the world's history, because in it an eternal progress is taking place; an eternal progress, however, presupposes that formerly there was actually a more imperfect state than the present one; without progress there is no rational life, no life without conflict or struggle.

The process upon which light and matter had first of all to enter, in order to form themselves into the world, and to establish matter in its different forms, is the magneto-electrico-chemical process. The chemical process is but the organic process deferred, and is consequently the antecedent stage of the third and highest potency which nature can attain, that, namely, of organic self-subsistent life.

Upon the stage of materiality, to which we have traced the development of nature's essence, or on the stage of finitude, the light appeared as a subjective element of the second potency, as an internal but still blind and improperly so-called intuitive process. Nature upon this stage is to be regarded as an essence, whose soul or moving principle is the light; the light again subdues and governs matter, in so far as gravity allows this; and in this conflict it develops matter, and itself in the same, to the entire multiplicity of distinctions, which, regarded in the singular, are finite, inorganic masses or inanimate things, but in the whole are to be viewed as the animated members of the infinite body of nature or the whole material world.

In so far now as gravity, as the uniting principle, prevails among these finite things, and stretches like an universal and synthetic bond of connection around and through them all (as a band around what is bound), do the single parts exhibit the *conatus* or endeavour to enter into mutual connection and dependence upon each other. Thus, gravity appears as a force of cohesion between single bodies, or, what amounts to the same, is manifested as *magnetism*, *i. e.* as the expression of the original totality and unity of the essence at every point of its existence. The universal copula or bond seeks to comprise or gather together every singular in its grasp, and so to represent matter as a continuity, a whole. Thus, the totality of material being may be represented by the plan of an infinite magnet, *i. e.* of a line, the poles of which portray the existence, *i. e.* the manifestation in their activity of the expansive and contractile forces.

Matter, however, is only in a state of actual, space-filling existence, because it has in itself, simultaneously with the ne-

gative factor, the positive or space-giving factor also; and because in each point of the universal magnet, which it represents, matter, *i. e.* magnet, is repeated, or because each part of the matter, when present only in a potential or possible state, can constitute itself into the actual positive and negative pole, with a point of indifference, and consequently, each part, from being itself matter, will, like the matter in the whole, endeavour to render itself *per se* a magnet, as is shown very distinctly in the effort of a mass to crystallise. Thus, all special matters or bodies of the universe will exhibit the endeavour to form themselves *per se* into perfect magnets, *i. e.* to be, as material bodies, self-subsistent. In so far magnetism is the principle which renders matter a whole, but in this whole re-establishes partial wholes; so that it is the principle of formation, of union within itself, in the whole as well as in the singular.

Now all single matters, or what appear to us as such, consist, as we remember, only in the relative *plus* or *minus* of positivity and negativity, whereby they are distinguished as single objects from others, and maintain themselves in the antagonism. If now, each singular is to constitute itself the magnet, *i. e.* the totality, the one that is relatively more positive will abstract as much negativity from that which is relatively more negative—and inversely—until it has set itself, as it were, in a state of internal equilibrium, and established itself as a whole. Thus, different bodies will strive to unite, to attract each other; indifferent ones, on the contrary, that is, such as are neither of them either predominantly negative or positive, will repel each other, and thus the same law which there declared itself as magnetism, here appears in the conflict of the singular with the singular as *electricity*. Electricity is the eternal and universal bond, which in the singulars manifests the imperfection of each of them as such, and consequently the totality only of two opposites; while magnetism, as the temporal bond, seeks to comprise the totality in the singulars or details. In electrical phenomena the antagonism, which is to be united, of positive and negative, is distributed over two different individuals, and upon contact one loses at the other what it has specially for itself, and through which it was a particular and distinct *aliquid per se*. Two different bodies, of which one is positive, the other magnetic, are in a state of mutual relation like the two poles of *one* magnet; but in their separation from each other they are electrically related, just as in their union they

would be magnetically related. If we unite them, there then originates in the contact a common indifference-point, and they again represent a *single* magnet—a totality. In the entire line which was previously adduced as the symbol of matter, and thus of the universal magnet, each single part takes its place either nearer to the positive or nearer to the negative pole; each part is in itself again a small magnet; but every such partial magnet, regarded by itself as a whole, is again related to other such magnets as relative positivity or negativity, according as it has its place in the entire magnet nearer to this or to that pole. There are, so to speak, magnets, which are relatively more positive and more negative, which, if they were to come into contact, would together only make up the two poles of *one* magnet, and this phenomenon is electricity. This electricity is the expression or representation of the twofold character of what is one in itself; magnetism is the expression of the *unity* of two opposites, it is that in *one*, which electricity is in *two* bodies.

The increase of cohesion in the parts of a body is at the same time its more perfect magnetisation; for the bodies become more perfect magnets in themselves the more firmly they are united into a whole (*i. e.* into the magnet); and this binding together is the effect of the force of gravity in matter. Diminution of cohesion, on the contrary, or the loosening of what is bound, will be the effect of the positive principle, the luminar or light-essence. The light-essence, as being the loosening and expanding principle, is opposed to the binding magnetism; it loosens its ties, where it can; where, on the contrary, the force of cohesion becomes powerful, the light-essence is dispelled, and is presented to us in a free state as heat or coloric; hence comes the heat or even development of light in every electrical process.

Now, since magnetism in the whole and singulars exists only under the form of identity, but electricity only under the form of duplicity, it follows, that the real law of nature, to be an unity in the antagonism, and antagonism in the unity, is manifested perfectly neither in magnetism alone, nor in electricity alone, but that the totality of the dynamic process (the Identity of the indifference and difference) is first presented to us in that occurrence which combines both phenomena, namely, in galvanism, or in the chemism or chemical action which depends upon it.

There thus originates in the chemical process a third element;

namely, a higher bond between those two activities; and in this third they both unite or equalise each other, since by this they are both governed; they bear a similar relation to this higher element, that the parts do to the totality, or as the accidents to the substance (substance not being different from the accidents), not existing apart from them, but being their real complex or bond of connection. Thus, magnetism and electricity constitute the chemical process, in the which, nevertheless, no absolute creation, but only a conversion, takes place; each part of the matter loses as such in this process its independence, and becomes the object, the sport, as it were, of a higher activity which has become free, or of an increased self-mobility on the part of nature. All chemical separation into a duplicity that is held asunder consists, with Schelling, in a potentialisation of matter into oxygen and hydrogen; all chemical composition, on the contrary, in a depotentialisation of matter to the indifference of water. "In the domain of gravity, water is as being the expression of this third bond, this true identity, or that in which the archetype of matter is represented in the purest manner, that thing pre-eminently from which all productivity proceeds, and into which it returns. From gravity, as the principle of limitation, water derives its fluid state; while from the light-essence is derived the fact, that in it the part is like unto the whole."*

"In the sphere of gravity, the type or manifestation of it as such, *i. e.* as the potency that prevails previous to light, is what is properly called matter, *i. e.* the *fixed* or immoveable; the type of the light-essence as such, *i. e.* everywhere, where it relatively predominates in the sphere of materiality, is the *air*; in this last the whole is exhibited as developed in the singular, since each part is absolutely of the nature of the whole, while the existence of the immoveable depends upon this, that the parts are relatively different from, or polarically opposed to, each other." Thus, the indifference of the two, the true medium of material nature, is the water.

So far we have been dealing with the being of nature as elementary, *i. e.* inorganic; if this is seen to be no chaos, so neither is there any lack of individuation in the several parts, *i. e.* of organic elaboration; for upon individuation nature proceeds throughout. Her progress in the aggregate was a distinguishing of what is primordially undistinguished, an evolution of the undeveloped and of that which was accumulated in the

* Ueber das Verhältniss des Realen und Idealen, p. xlii.

subjective sphere, consequently, an individualising into distinct parts, and of these parts again in themselves, in such a way, however, that the positive essence remains in all and each eternally one, just as nature herself, as an invisible eternal band, encircles all and each, and unites them into the whole. Thus, nature organises herself in her existence into the world, *i. e.* to the totality (of parts), in the unity (of the great whole); her existence is, as being this living self-organisation, her own universal and special object. Thus, if we regard nature in general, as *one* infinite organism, it follows, that each part in her is only serviceable to the whole, has no existence and no object *per se*, but the object of its existence is only to fulfil a definite function in behalf of the whole; each has its object out of itself, being neither its own object, nor an organism *per se*. Since, however, nature, by virtue of her final object, which is constantly to evolve or unfold her own essence more perfectly, and in this evolution to render it the object to herself, is constantly tending towards the higher individuation of single objects, so also does she endeavour in like manner to represent relative totalities in the singular, as, upon the other hand, to again embrace these totalities as partial wholes into the one great organism. Thus, the universal bond declares its presence also in a certain degree in the singular, and in this represents the form of the totality. "Where, however, the same higher *copula* or bond declares its presence in the singular, there then exists a microcosm, organism, or perfected representation of the universal life of the substance in a special life. The same unity which includes and foresees all, which adapts the movements of universal nature, the still and static as well as the mighty and universal changes, to the idea of the whole, and constantly brings back every thing into the eternal circle, the same divine unity it is, which, craving endlessly after positive affirmation, moulds itself into plant and animal, when, with irresistible power, the moment being fixed for their manifestation, it seeks to convert earth, air, and water into living beings or images of its universal life."*

Thus, nature or the universal essence does not pause, with having potentialised itself to the luminar or light-essence, but craves also to become in this its new duplicity and activity an object again unto itself; it yearns to have light and matter, as they stand in conflict with each other, brought before it in this struggle, lowered to the state of objects, and then to lift

* Verhältniss des Realen und Idealen, p. xlv.

itself as a fresh subject above this conflict and govern it. Now, this happens, when nature potentialises herself into *life*. As vital principle, vital or formative impulse (call it what you will), she now sports more freely with light and matter than she did before, when, being still light, she prevailed over matter. Thus she now becomes = *a*, the third potency.

It must now be seen how the development of nature arrives at this third stage. We left her above in her activity as a chemical process. This might already be regarded as an organising process, but still one that is, as it were, continually abortive, and for this reason, because nature is here, in the continual motion and transmutation of herself, completely involved and imprisoned in a state of oscillation, like the sea in its general ebb and flow, and can at no point, as it were, comprehend and sustain herself, because the vacillation of each individual or single part obeys a law which lies for each external to it. Thus, nature here attains in none of her products to what she really is, or intends to represent, appearing nowhere as self-subsistent life in herself. This point is first attained in those cases where she reveals herself in the *singular* as self-dependence, *i. e.* organism.

Thus, the question is, how does the chemical become the organic process? It is clear at the outset, that something must enter the chemical process, which had not been hitherto present therein; it is likewise clear, that this something can come from no other source than out of the depths of the infinite nature herself, *i. e.* must be already present there in a potential state. Something must in the first place accede to the chemical process, because this, if left to itself, would soon come to a state of rest, since the two principles striving after equilibrium, and in whose action the chemical process consists, would soon find their equilibrium, and neutralise themselves into a common product. That something must accordingly bring itself to bear as a continually external influence, in order that the chemical process in the organism (whether plant or animal) may be maintained by a constantly renewed disturbance of the equilibrium, and in this way duration be bestowed upon the process. Thus, to the organic life belong again two factors; the one (in itself already a duplicity of factors or forces) in the individually determined matter, the other external to this in the universal, all-embracing, or circumambient ether, or appertaining altogether to the general positive essence of nature. The things are related as the negative element to

this positive factor ; in them prevails the principle which is derived from gravity, and which forms and originally determines the relation of combination ; in short, the material notion of the thing as a living rule of formation, or as *maternal* principle. The other principle, however, lies external to the individual things ; it is that which continually incites and maintains the process, developing it to actual existence in space, and is thus the *paternal generative* principle, and corresponds to the ether or light-essence. Thus, the light is, as positive factor, the father ; the gravity, as negative, the mother of all things. The latter lies as ground and formative notion enclosed in the essence of the individual things, and constitutes the individual essence ; it is a part of that infinite potency, which declares or affirms itself in the finite.

Now, however, the main point to be regarded, is not the ready-prepared dead products, the things as formed or circumscribed matter, but the moving and forming process itself ; it is not the product, but the productive process, which is the life of nature, *i. e.* the true nature itself ; so soon as the process has arrived at the ready prepared (neutralised) product, the *caput mortuum* is also ready, and life is at an end. The whole of material nature, in so far as it consists of immoveable products, is only the spirit that has already died in its products ; the formed material in its rigid state is everywhere but a monument of the past. The process itself is the main fact, for it is the life, and the life is the continual existence ; beyond this there is no existence for the singular than this origination or becoming in time ; the form of this origination, or the law of this movement, is the living self-exposition and comprehension of nature.

Thus, the life and existence of organic essences depends upon this, that the chemical process, as it ceases in them, is constantly being renewed, that in them an antagonistic process is continually opposed to the former processes, and thus that the organic life is a process of processes, which in their sequence mutually and constantly evoke each other anew. The organisations, known to us, are divisible into animals and plants. The plant represents the organic process upon a lower stage than the animal. The chemical process, in which the so-called vegetable life (vegetation) consists, is a continual resolution into hydrogen and oxygen. The former of these elements, as the combustible, remains behind in the plant (as carbon), the oxygen is expired, and the organs of the plant, its leaves, are

nothing more than a structure, which has, as it were, become hardened by this function of expiration (just as a crystal might be said to be nothing else than the movement of the crystallising process, in a state, as it were, of concretion.) Thus, the plant constantly advances to a state of greater deoxydation, and the product is finally that which leaves behind the body of the plant as a completely deoxydised combustible. Thus, the life of the plant can only be sustained for any length of time by new oxygen being constantly conveyed to it, which oxygen it must, according to its nature, give out or expire, and this is effected by means of light. The light always develops in the plant new oxygen, and thereby evokes the familiar phenomenon of colour, which disappears so soon as the plant is withdrawn from the light.

In the animal process, on the contrary, the reverse takes place. The animal nutrition consists in a continual reception and retention within itself of oxygen. The atmospheric air (oxygen gas) which the plant breathes out is decomposed in the animal's lung, *i. e.* taken up into the blood, distributed with the blood through the arteries into the different organs of the body, and reabsorbed, so that the blood streams back again deoxydised through the veins, in order to obtain fresh oxygen from the air, and so begin again the circulation. Thus, in the organs a certain attractive force and capacity for the oxygen that is to be absorbed from the blood must be maintained, in order that the process may not come to a stand-still. This continual restoration of the power or capacity of the organs consists in the *irritability* which is bestowed upon them, and which is manifested as mobility.

Thus, the organising nature has opposed to the animal process in the animal itself, the irritability, and by these means prevented the former from standing still or exhausting itself with a few respirations. She has accordingly united in the animal what appears only in a separate state in other products, having bestowed upon the chemical process an antagonism within itself, which prevents its coming to a stand-still in one and the same subject. In this way the self-mobility, by which the animal is distinguished from the plant, becomes for the first time comprehensible. The system of its movements is a mechanism circumscribed within itself, and from the very fact of its being circumscribed in an individual, it can attain a free, *i. e.* *spontaneous movement*. It *can* attain to this, but that it actually does so, depends upon a third capacity of the animal nature, which

is opposed to irritability, just as this is to the chemical process (reproduction), namely, upon the *sensibility* which is first awakened in animals. For the first time in this triplicity of functions (a part of Schelling's system, which Eschenmeyer has especially worked out), does life present itself as an organic whole circumscribed within itself. The irritability can be represented or thought of as an impulse to movement, and as such it represents the positive, spatially intuitive, and expanding moment. This impulse or tendency is, however, in itself, devoid of all determinations, and, as it were, perfectly formless: it first obtains form and special determination through the negative moment, which is here portrayed by the sensibility. This sensibility is, as regards itself, wholly determined by the inward individual nature of the subject; it depends, indeed, only upon this nature, what peculiar feature every action from without upon the subject will assume: thus, for example, the vibration of the air is only sound for an ear that hears, the sweet is only sweet for the tongue, the light only light for the eye, and so on; and thus all movements are what they appear, only within and for the organic essence, by whom they are perceived or apprehended. It is only by the determinate kind of reaction, which an essence, from its own nature, opposes to the impression, that this impression becomes what it is for the same essence—only by a determinate kind of reaction—thus, by an activity in conflict with passivity or by an internal specific movement, and that indeed of a voluntary character; this last, however, depends upon irritability, and so irritability and sensibility mutually determine each other; since the former, so to speak, affords the material, the positive; the latter, the form, the negative; both together first producing the conformation, which may be regarded as the peculiar life of organic essences. "If, lastly," says Schelling*, "we comprehend irritability and sensibility in one notion together, then originates the notion of *instinct* (for the impulse to motion determined by sensibility is instinct); and thus we have, by a gradual separation and reunion of the opposite properties in the animal, arrived at the highest synthesis, in which what is voluntary and involuntary, accidental and necessary in the animal functions, is completely united.

* Weltseele, p. 292.

LECTURE XI.

SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, ETC. — (*continued*).

WE had, my friends, arrived, at the conclusion of the last discourse, at a comprehension of the internal processes of the animal organic nature, as the unity of reproduction, irritability, and sensibility. The animal nature is irritable, in so far as it manifests spontaneous movement upon the reception of any stimulus or excitement; the animal here appears by virtue of the exclusive character (*abgeschlossenheit*) of its organisation to be a perfect automaton, for it is no longer (like inorganic bodies) moved merely mechanically from without, but it moves itself dynamically from itself; and even if this spontaneous movement were to result only from the application of an external stimulus, still, despite of this, it would always continue to be a living, *i. e.* organically spontaneous or self-originated motion. Now to this irritability, sensibility was added and internally opposed. By the latter, however, we cannot at present form any idea of what in the human being is called the sensitive faculty; for with this there is commonly blended the notion of the consciousness, which has not as yet been deduced. By sensibility is here meant, in the objective sphere, only certain kinds of movement which are opposed to those of irritability, so that, if we regard the latter as the positively expansive movements (those that augment the capacity of the organs), we must look upon the actions of sensibility as the negatively limiting and determining ones. Thus, sensibility is the regulating (*normirende*) and determining activity of the individual; it imposes upon all the movements that result from irritability the law or form, imparts to them that very quality which they must possess in order to correspond to the real idea of the whole, or to represent this idea in a temporo-spatial manner; and thus brings into the sphere of irritability, and through this into the whole reproductive sphere, the specific character of the race, and stamps the idea of this upon the being of the individual.

Hence sensibility and irritability taken together furnish the

notion of instinct, *i. e.* of a natural impulse, which is determined by sensation; — by sensation, not as implying that, in the present instance, this determination is effected by a more or less distinct consciousness, but as simply expressing the material element of the sensation, or that with which we have already become acquainted, as the movements occurring and the determinations present in the bodily organ. You will remember, my friends, that we set out in the theory of the consciousness with the following statements; namely, that the unreflected, unconscious action of the psychical powers stands upon the same level with the action of the so-called blind forces of nature, and that nothing else constitutes the distinction between unconscious and conscious activities, than the want of self-reflection, which can occur for the first time only in a subject which is actually in itself an individual subject, *i. e.* an organic whole, and not a mere part of something else. It is only in a subject, such as we have already raised and constructed in the Nature-philosophy, step by step, one that constitutes for itself a living whole, and which is endowed with voluntary motion, that the activity of nature has become individual self-activity, and has attained a grade of self-mobility and freedom, in which for the first time it is possible to accomplish the last and highest stage of reflection, and in this way to elicit from the natural being the first gleam of the consciousness, *i. e.* the consciousness of *self*.

Irritability and sensibility, so far as we have become acquainted with them, still belong entirely to the sphere of that blind activity which prevails even in the lower or animal regions of human life: they are in themselves unconscious. The act, however, of becoming conscious consisted, as we saw, in this,—that the activity which had first of all coalesced with or been absorbed, as it were, in its product, liberates itself from the latter, repeats itself *freely* for itself, contemplates itself as activity, and in this very way becomes the object unto itself, just as previously it was an object only for some looker-on from without. Thus, should the activity, which occurs in a blindly instinctive manner, assume a new phase, and render itself in this way by an internal process its own object, it follows, that from the unconscious state of pure reactionary movement, or of mere outward sensation, *perception*, *i. e.* the first degree of consciousness, would originate. So long as the activity of the living subject coalesces entirely with its product, there is no real internal antagonisation of ideal and real, subject and

object, and, consequently, no consciousness. The animal feels, but as in a dream; it does not perceive or feel that it feels, it does not see that it sees.

The new stage, upon which the natural being first enters fully, when it has arrived at Man, will, in its turn, depend on the same process, or upon that internal division and opposition (with retention at the same time of unity); during which process every thing, without reserve, which hitherto as objective — as the whole kingdom of unconsciously working nature, or finally, as subject-object — had been in a state of undistinguishable combination, enters definitively upon the other side, upon that of the objectivity, and leaves behind on the present one only the pure subjectivity. The subject, which during this process, may be regarded as synonymous with life, A³, may now upon the stage of the consciousness be called intelligence, A⁴: this subject now stands as a thinking knowledge or idealistic moment opposed to the whole former or real and objective sphere, for it exists *only as knowledge*, and has all besides as an existing world, confronting, as it were, or opposite to, itself. With this stage we have entered into another region, that of intelligence, whereof more will be said further on. At present, however, it is clear, from what has been said, that every thing which now appears to us as objective, holds good on that very account as real; while every thing that remains behind as subjective will be regarded as ideal, or as a mere process of thinking and knowing. Even that which has become objective, we now know to be in itself nothing but a thorough activity or motion; that which is usually present to the understanding as objective being, as substance, matter, and kernel of the phenomena, is nothing but the spontaneous activity of nature, which continues to repeat itself for itself, until this its activity in its *pure form*, or finally, nothing but this pure form, as the law of the activity that constitutes and determines every thing, hovers before itself; until it thus cognises and discerns that every thing that exists is only a determination of activity, a form only of itself, and that itself, the creative nature, is one and the same with its form, and in this form alone works, *i. e.* is *actual* or *real*. And now, at the conclusion of this general sketch, I trust it has been seen with sufficient clearness, that the ideal and real, which are usually set before the understanding as two irreconcilable opposites, or the knowing (thinking) and being, hold in fact the relation only of two poles of one and the same intrinsic indifference, or that the real and ideal

are identical in the Absolute.* With this result, however, we have but been led back in the course of the investigation to the point from which we set out, and I need not indulge in any further repetition of what will readily enough find its own place in connection with this my last discourse but one upon the philosophy of Schelling.

If the result of natural science consist in this, that all forces of the universe ultimately return into representative forces; if all origination and life, and thus the eternally self-producing nature, be in itself indeed a blind system of dynamics (for of mechanics we must not speak), but still a dynamical or organic system, which, while personating in its reality the unconscious thought, is that same spiritual and active being which in us human beings occurs at first unconsciously and involuntarily, before it appears in its own reflex and become conscious, — it follows, that, for the sake of this identity, all the activity of nature will not only appear to us to be in conformity with a purpose or design, but must be so in itself, although in itself it is blind, and has no representation of the objects, which it involuntarily pursues and attains. Nature works throughout in conformity to purpose, but not with a feeling of intention (*absichtsvoll*), so that all her products will have a purpose, though they are not evoked by her with the consciousness of such, *i. e.* with intent. Hence it may even be said, that nature acts rationally without consciousness; or, that the whole system displayed in the living operations of nature, is the existing reason; a position this, which Hegel at a later period expanded over the whole, even the historical department of knowledge, affirming, “that all that is real is rational.”

In the human consciousness, where knowing and being have already separated, the thought and intention precedes or goes before the act, while the act realises the thought; the product becoming previously prepared as an idea, then in the next place as object. In nature, matters stand otherwise; for here the product originates or becomes, without a distinct representation thereof having preceded it; it originates or is created—we say—in a thoughtless and instinctive manner, *i. e.* according to laws, which are laws of the thinking process, but which are not reflected upon and cognised as such. Thus, in the whole of nature is indeed displayed to us a conformity to purpose and wisdom, but merely on this account, because the unconscious

* Consult, among others, Schelling's Lectures upon the Methods of Academical Study, Tübingen, 1803, p. 11. *et seq.*

activity of nature — the dream-life of the nature-spirit in its unconsciousness — harmonises of necessity with the conscious activity; or, strictly speaking, because the former activity is the same in itself, which the latter has become *per se*.

Such is the distinction of the immanent conformity to purpose from that external kind which is usually adopted by theological writers. In consequence of that newer view we must not regard nature as the blind instrument or dead matter, with which a self-conscious architect of the universe realises definite and distinctly foreseen designs, which, foreign in themselves to the matter, are impressed, as it were, from without upon it. In such a view of the question, the God who would act thus would, upon the one hand, be, it is true, of an extramundane character, but at the same time only an universal architect, a demiurge or world-maker, but not a true world-author of substance as well as form; and, upon the other hand, the bulk of the world would remain a dead substratum or chaos, and would be, as it usually appears to the imprisoned senses, a lifeless, powerless, plastic material, which awaited only the hand of an artificer, but of which it would be impossible to comprehend how and by what sort of power it could thus have come for itself alone into existence and then have continued to subsist. Thus, nature is robbed of all that charm which she can only have for us, when we regard her as an homogeneous, self-subsistent, or living essence, and in her feel by prescience that there is, though lying in a deep slumber, a breathing and mysteriously working spirit, which, like the soul of the suckling infant, that is intertwined with its own body, is alive and like unto ours in every respect, save only that all of what with us has already revealed itself in immeasurable abundance, lies there concealed in the inner fulness of the system,—the idea. Hence the sympathy of the sensuous observer with the slumbering child; hence the charm that nature has for the sympathising spirit of man, and which no poets have expressed more beautifully than the German, and none more genially than Ludwig Tieck, especially in several parts of his “Phantasmus,” “Zerbino,” and other works. All the threads of this dawning sympathy and accordant thought are torn asunder, so soon as unconscious nature is made the mere mechanism of an extramundane intelligence; so soon as another poet says, “Soulless a ball of fire revolves, where once life’s fulness flowed through all creation.”

“Through the endeavour,” says Schelling*, “to explain

* System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 446. *et seq.*

nature as a teleological production, *i. e.* as designed, the character of nature and that very something which renders her nature, is suppressed. For the peculiar character of nature depends upon this ; that it is in its mechanism, and although itself nothing but blind mechanism, yet conformable to purpose. Thus, if I suppress the mechanism, I suppress the nature itself. The whole charm with which, for example, organic nature is invested, depends upon the contradiction, that this nature, although a product of blind natural forces, is still thoroughly and *intrinsically* conformable to purpose. If nature presents itself to us as nothing more than an aggregate of dead objects, which chance has thrown together, or, what here amounts to the same, a power that is foreign to it has disposed, for the purposes of our food and maintenance, why then she is veiled to the philosophic as well as artistic gaze. To the inspired inquirer alone is nature the holy, ever-creating, and primordial force of the world, that engenders and actively produces all things from itself.*

The immanent life of nature is that unreflected mode of intuition, which unconsciously, yet like consciousness, and as blind instinct, works the more surely in conformity with purpose, since object and tendency have not yet become free, but are still united, as it were, with the power itself. If, however, we are to gain a distinct notion of this unconscious working of nature within and without us, and to speak intelligibly of it, all depends upon this, that we solve the difficulty of forming to ourselves from out an unconscious state or operation a conscious, or, at all events, analogous idea. Thus, in order that we may perfectly comprehend nature, there must be present in our intelligence some psychical phenomenon, or kind of intuition, in which the Ego has worked by itself in a both conscious and unconscious manner ;—unconsciously, in order that it may stand upon the same plane with nature ; but consciously, at the same time also, in order that it may simultaneously observe this action of nature within itself. With such an activity the whole problem of Transcendental philosophy would be solved, and we should have fully unveiled the mystery as to what nature and we ourselves are.

This contradiction becomes, however, really solved by the existence within us of the productive power of imagination, —the poetic or artistic activity. This embraces in itself, what in

* Abhand. über das Verhältniss der bildenden Künste zur Natur. Phil. Schriften, Bd. i. p. 346.

nature and in thought appear only to be separated, namely, the identity of the conscious and unconscious action of the Ego, together with the express self-consciousness of this identity. Reflection and intuition, or the free, self-observing process of thought, and, on the other hand, that dream-like resignation to the phantasy which seems to sport with our mental powers — these two states appear incompatible, the one seeming constantly to recede in the proportion in which the other takes its place; like the two buckets, of which it is said, —

“ If to the mouth the one you bring,
The other to the ground must swing.”

It is only with the poet or artist that matters succeed in a wonderful manner; for while he allows the nature of his spirit, or the godlike genius that is in him, blindly to work and gives himself up to it, it is still he himself who thus works, and works to a certain degree with forethought, according to ideas or with design and calculation. He feels himself inspired, *i. e.* possessed as if by spirits, or *δαίμόνιος*, in the oldest sense of the word; he feels an endeavour and a life within himself, an infinite something, which, almost without his co-operation, will press forwards and manifest itself, though this it can only do in finite and limited forms. He is conscious to himself of that endeavour, and expresses it with the most perfect confidence; but he can never express it wholly; for to the true artist there always remains behind infinitely much that lies concealed in the unfathomable, though creative, depths of his spirit. As regards this contradiction, that the in itself infinite and inexhaustible by thought must yet be brought within the limits of an intuition, that the incomprehensibly unconscious must yet be comprised in an intuition,—of this must a true work of art bear witness upon every occasion, for such a work is a voluntary-involuntary, willed and created work, and yet one that has by a miracle been achieved; it is the product of that which, corresponding to the instinct of the animal, we properly designate within the sphere of conscious reason by the word *genius*.

In order to render more distinct the relation of natural and artificial products, I cannot refrain from concluding this section with a passage from the classical discourse delivered by Schelling at Munich in the year 1807, “ Upon the Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature.”*

* *Philos. Schriften*, Bd. i. p. 347—57.

“If art is to imitate nature, she must seek to emulate the creative power of the latter, not to apprehend in a tedious architectonic manner the hollow scaffolding of her outward forms, and from these transfer an image as vacant to the canvass. It was only to the Greeks endowed with taste, who could everywhere feel the trace of a living and working essence, that true divinities could originate from out of nature. If we do not regard things as to their essence, but only as to their void and abstract form, they speak nothing to our inward perception.”—“Contemplate the most beautiful forms, and what remains if you have denied the active principle that is in them? Nothing but mere abstract qualities, such as extension and relations of space. That one part of matter lies near or outside another, does this contribute any thing to its inward nature, or the reverse? Obviously the latter. It is not the bare juxtaposition of parts that makes the form, but the *kind* or manner of juxtaposition: this, however, can only be determined by a positive force opposed to the disjunctivity, and subordinating the multiplicity of the parts to the unity of a single idea, from the force that operates in the crystal, up to that which, like a soft magnetic stream, gives to the particles of matter in human structures such mutual arrangement and dependence, as serves to render visible the idea of their essential unity and beauty. It is not, however, merely as an active principle, but as intelligence and effective science, that the essence must be manifested in the form, if we are fully to comprehend it. For, if all unity can be only intellectual in its nature and origin, whither does all investigation of nature tend, if not to the discovery of the same science in her? For that in which there is no intelligence cannot be an object of the intelligence; that which is devoid of perception cannot be perceived. The science by which nature works is not indeed like human science, which is associated with reflection upon itself; for in nature the idea is not distinct from the deed, nor the design from the execution. Hence the crude matter strives blindly, as it were, after regular shape, and unconsciously assumes pure stereometric forms, that belong indeed to the domain of ideas, and are something spiritual in the material. With the stars is inborn the most exalted number and geometry, which they execute in their movements without any notion of such plan. More distinctly, though still incomprehensibly to themselves, appears the living perception in animals, whom we see, though wandering here and there without deliberation, to perform countless works far nobler than

themselves; the bird, intoxicated with music, excelling itself in tones that are full of soul; the small art-gifted creature, without practice and instruction, producing light works of architecture; but all guided by a superior spirit, which already shines in single flashes of intelligence, but nowhere comes forth as a full sun except in man."

We had in following out the dynamical process of nature, arrived at that stage where the subjective as *A* of the fourth potency had struggled up to the state of pure knowledge or intelligence. Hence upon this stage it is nothing more than *knowledge*; and thus as spirit in this sense it is no material substratum whatever, endowed with consciousness, but now exists purified at length from every material element, in its perfect subjectivity as a pure idealistic activity only, or as knowledge, which has before itself the whole real world of being as something opposed to it, or as being; it has, in short, become the intuitive perception of its own intuition. As such it exists among the objects of terrestrial nature only in the human race. By this knowledge, the infinite or spiritual, the knowledge of nature, and (in so far as man himself is a real product of nature) the human being stands opposed to himself; in himself, however, a new process is declared into which the ideal enters by itself alone; in other words, the thinking process renders itself in a constantly ascending scale of instances the object of self-intuition or of reflection upon itself. Thus, for example, the already, in itself, ideal intuition or representation becomes, as a product of thought, the object again of a higher self-intuition of the thinking subject; the whole activity ascends in the individual both theoretically and practically, from the stage of feeling and sensation to that of intuition, representation, and desire, and from this finally to rational thought and action, because even the individual, by virtue of his innate nature, cannot remain in any state of imprisonment or bondage, and so the human spirit gradually attains in itself, as we are taught by a true psychology, the stage of the clearest consciousness of itself and of the world—an elevation this, which is at the same time also a real internal self-liberation of the mental activity, as has been shown above.

At this period in which the human being is conscious at first only of itself, and acts as an independent essence, it is, as it

were, furthest removed from God, as the central essence, or is, together with its freedom, completely severed from him, and with the perception of this state is also given, at the same time, the disposition to return unto him. The infinitude, however, which is present in man as the finite being, as an ideal, knowledge, or consciousness, and takes part in his finitude, bears to this, his practical freedom, the relation of necessity, law, conscience ; so that there originates within him an antagonism of necessity and freedom, and from this originates a new process — that of *history*. The human being discerns a knowledge, a providence, that overrules his freedom, — a spirit, to which he subjects himself, and of which he becomes the instrument. As a free man, he still sees this power external to or without himself, and, as an independent essence, opposes himself to it in the self-consciousness, or submits himself to it, though still as to an external and to him foreign power. He does not, as yet, perceive the true relation, namely, that he himself is an integrant part of that power, or that the Absolute is not really separated from him, but that the infinite is also in him the finite. This identity he does not as yet discern ; nevertheless, it is eternally and constantly present, for the infinite spirit works in him and through him, but first of all in such a manner that the human being, in the noble works which that spirit produces through him, bears only a partial or involuntary relation to it as its organ or instrument ; thus, by *revelation* in different degrees, the return of man to God is ushered in and accomplished — this whole period being one in which human nature shows itself to be an instrument of the Most High. This was at first, as we have already seen, the period or stage of art. Poetry, inspiration, or the daemonic element which is here active in man, is equivalent to the infinite spirit, or it is the mind of man himself, which, without perceiving how it is done, reveals itself as the infinite, and thus in its finite state from the side of its infinity. Thus the first revelation of the infinite is art, as we find to have been especially the case among the ancient Greeks. A second stage is that of the religious belief, which has indeed comprehended the All-one as such in the highest abstraction of its essence, but into this has left every sensuous finite, every creature, to relapse as being a mere moment of the All-one, and as being in itself a transient something, which finally disappears (as in several Oriental religions, especially Buddhism). Lastly, the third and highest stage is the insight into the true relation of the subjective and objective, the ab-

solute knowledge or true philosophy, which unites the objectivity of art with the subjectivity of religion.

Such is a preliminary survey of the plan of the whole system, in which lies unfolded the most magnificent and infinite world-drama as a history, whose beginning commences in an eternity preceding the present creation of the world.

Let us now take a glance, in the next place, at the well known doctrine of Schelling concerning the origination of the finite essence in or from the Absolute, *i. e.* at the process which is usually designated by the word creation. It is clear from all that has been hitherto adduced, that we cannot, owing to the positions assumed in the Nature-philosophy, speak of a true creation of things, if by this it is understood that the things are merely effectuated or brought to pass, as in that case the primary essence would evoke the things into existence without itself entering into them and abiding there. Were the Absolute, which is All-in-All, not to enter into the creature, why then the creature, in order to subsist independently of the Absolute, must have a being of its own, and a ground of this being in and by itself, quite independent of the primordial principle of the universe; for were it absolute in itself, and opposed to the first Absolute, why then the latter would be limited and confined by the former, and, consequently, could no longer be contemplated as the infinite. If the identity of both, and, with this, the whole speculative system is to be maintained, then the primordial one and absolute essence must itself, in some way or other, enter into the finite and be immanent therein. Now it is in this way that we arrive at the celebrated Pantheism of Schelling, a second point in our inquiry, which claims a closer examination.

In the first place, as regards creation, we should, according to the principles of the Nature-philosophy, reverse the whole relation of the matter before us if we were to represent to ourselves, as is usually done, first the eternal spirit and then the material world, as being produced with consciousness upon the part of the former; we must, rather in consequence of all that has been hitherto advanced, suppose, in the first place, a real world, within or without which the spirit, as such, elevates and perfects itself. Matter was the *primum existens*, and the principle that preceded it, *i. e.* not in time, but only by virtue of a logical supposition, was the *potentia*, power or potency not as yet *existing*. In matter the subjective constantly elevated itself more triumphantly from one stage to another, as light, life, spirit, up to absolute subjectivity, *i. e.* to pure ideality, unto

which every thing else became objective, or, in other words, *real*. Thus, the spirit was actually not the first, but the last, that originated, and *in this sense* we cannot regard the spirit as the creator of the world.

The absolute subject or universal Ego is, upon its highest stage, the universal spirit, and is, consequently, that very element in the macrocosm which the human consciousness is in the microcosm. Just as the human germ, when once impregnated, unconsciously develops itself up to the perfect organism, and ultimately reflects upon itself, so also did the infinite nature develop itself in the world, and enter upon the stage of spirituality, *i. e.* cognise, objectify itself in its own perfected work, as being that with which it is and remains ever one in itself. Thus, upon the spiritual stage, or in the human being, the activity of nature ceases to be really productive, being, as a thinking process, only ideal; it has become purely subjective, and on that account its products are only subjective products, thoughts, ideas, formal repetitions merely of the real creative activity, apart from the created, seeing that it purely repeats itself for itself, and no longer enters into the product; it is thus distinguished as thinking process from the real, *i. e.* the external, objective, productive vital force. In this state of a purely ideal activity, repeating or contemplating itself ideally, and thus as knowledge, does this activity exist by itself and apart from the product, only in so far as it is no longer, as before, absorbed and imprisoned in the product itself. It exists as a *special function* of the vital activity, namely, as a higher function (in a higher potency or degree), *i. e.* as self-hood (*Ichheit*) or self-consciousness *per se*, without however being in itself really distinct from the vital power, but, as it were, another and second soul together with the latter. Thus, the human individual soul is not only the blindly-working, self-forming vital impulse, but is also, in a higher degree of function, the self-contemplating thought or self-consciousness = spirit. Let us, then, guided by this analogy, endeavour to think of the universal essence, the world-soul, unto whose productions all things, even our own souls, belong as integrant parts or determinations. As a world-soul, an unconsciously self-evolving nature, we have already become acquainted with it. We saw that it elevates itself to the stage of consciousness in the human being, for in this its last product nature has perfectly, as an object before herself, that which previously lay involved or implicitly within its essence and power (*potentia*): the human being is the thought

of nature, in which thought nature represents herself; the perfect transcript or copy of the Absolute, for the thought is itself absolute, *i. e.* free, having the principle of self-hood in itself, and in so far representing the absolute self-hood of the world-Ego. In all real products of nature the producent nature (*i. e.* the Absolute) is one and the same with these its products, and in nowise differs from them; nay more, these products, these natural things, do not even subsist as special essences *per se*, but they are only the nature-activity fixing or embodying itself at certain points of its course. How it is *possible* for such single fixations or antagonisms to originate in the universal fluid has been pointed out in the theory of magnetism and gravity. The Absolute and One, in so far as it works as a material power of gravity, is the universal bond which both establishes each single position in the universe *per se*, and also unites them all together into the whole; in short, it is that all-pervading, restraining, and sustaining force which brings both materially and really every singular, as a something bound or circumscribed, into itself or within its own sphere. In so far the Absolute, as being the primordial unit that differences itself within itself, into light and gravity, was also one and the same with the material world. In this potency of the merely real-objective sphere there is no single or really independently existent essence. But with this potency the Absolute has not yet come to the end of its process; for this process proceeds, of necessity, from the very nature of the Absolute, which consists in constantly objectifying the potentially possible, the concealed intrinsic nature itself, and rendering it a distinct *per se* (*Fürsich*). Thus, this process first attains completion, when the Absolute *wholly*, *i. e.* as Absolute, regards itself as an independent, free process of creation, and truly contemplates itself in its counterpart or likeness, the world. In the world, however, it attains to this self-intuition only upon the stage of humanity, or, what amounts to the same thing, of the reason knowing itself as such, — of the perfected consciousness, or the state of independence and freedom. Thus, in the human being the Absolute is or exists, for the first time, as a perfect subject, *i. e.* as *real knowledge*, being no longer a merely real or natural process of action. It is true that in the human being the Absolute still works as a real process, as organising world-soul or real vital principle; but in its higher function, as spirit, it is knowledge, has the whole world set, as it were, as an object before itself, and ultimately (in philosophy) cognises itself per-

fectly by gazing upon itself as the identity of the two—in the real action as an unconscious, in the ideal as a conscious process of thought.

The Absolute, I said, first attains in humanity to true self-consciousness; for consciousness presupposes a spiritual transcript or copy of what the spirit is in itself; for only in the perfect reflex of its nature does the primordial essence discern or cognise itself. Thus, if this cognition is to be a true one, the copy must so completely correspond to the original as to be the very aspect of the original itself. Now the Absolute or universal nature is never, even in its blind activity, any thing else, or never works otherwise; for, as the real or incarnate law of the reason, it was hitherto the blindly-working reason itself; though nature, and thus this reason which is synonymous, nowhere comes in the whole circle of things to a knowledge of itself until it has arrived at the human being; consequently man in general, *i. e.* the idea of the human being (not this or that individual man), is the first reflex of the absolute reason, in the which it beholds itself; for in that reflex the Absolute arrived, for the first time, at the antagonism of knowing and being. Man himself exists as personality, *i. e.* as a free absolute individual by himself, merely in and by his self-consciousness; this alone sets him free from the general but blind concatenation of nature, and thus his inmost essence, or the very ground of his existence, is an *ideal* principle: he is, in his inmost nature or essence, nothing but actual self-consciousness; and this principle of personality and self-subsistence is, in the innermost ground of our nature, that very Absolute, which first in the form of the special vital impulse, and later on as freedom and self-consciousness, severs itself in a spontaneously active manner from the general concatenation of nature, and indeed for the first time perfectly in the genesis of the human self-consciousness, which Fichte has already described as the primitive power of the Ego or self-hood.

How now is the above severance or separation from the *continuum* of universal being to be thought of? The world-spirit progressed in its eternal process, until it had attained the stage of self-consciousness. The act of becoming conscious to itself of itself consisted, however, in an antagonisation of subjectivity and objectivity; for the last object to which it must arrive, in order that the absolute subject may perfectly discern itself therein, was the idea of the human being, *i. e.* of the reason—the reason as (*qua*) such cognising itself. This idea was the

true likeness of the Absolute; but if it is to actually represent in itself the absolute character of the Absolute, why then it must be absolute itself, *i. e.*, it cannot be represented as a mere *object*, nor as a bare *predicate* of the Absolute (for if so it would not represent the absolute state of self-subsistence), but it must be so posited in the Absolute, as to be capable of being *per se*. Now, since all is really a thinking process, every thing that is or exists being either a thinking process or a something thought of (subject or object), the "thought of" being, however, the dependent, the thinking process the Absolute, it is necessary so to think of what had been originally thought of by God, as being also a self-thinking process, so that the self-subsistent may, as such, be both represented and established. A true self-thinking process is subject, and thus the idea (the thought of) becomes in itself that which thinks, *i. e.*, the perfectly self-active and free, and begins with this act to be *per se*, or by itself. Thus, all that proceeds from the unity of the absolute being, or which seems to disengage itself from this, must have already in that unity the *possibility* of being *per se*: the *reality*, however, of the separated existence can only reside in what is separated from the absolute being; and this separation can only be an ideal one, and can only take place in proportion as an essence by its mode of being in the Absolute is rendered capable of being itself the unity.*

With all this, however, the main difficulty must in the first place be removed, upon which we necessarily impinge in every theory of creation, and which has been already alluded to above; namely, as to how any thing can subsist by itself, thus be absolute, apart from the universal Absolute. If every subsistent owes its origin and continued subsistence to the sole Absolute, or lives and moves in and by it, like a part in the whole, why then it is only to be comprehended as an accident of a substance, and has no subsistence by itself. If, on the contrary, it is absolute by itself, it is then apart from the unity of the Absolute, and accordingly there would be many Absolutes, and above all these there could be no ulterior Absolute, no highest, no common bond, seeing that they would cease, when united, to be absolute. So long as we only continue to contemplate the series of unconscious natural products we do not encounter the above difficulty, but it comes out in full force, so soon as we arrive

* Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge, Berlin, 1802, p. 131. Consult Philosophie und Religion, Tübingen, 1804, p. 20. *et seq.*

at the antagonism presented by human freedom to the freedom of the Absolute. Hence, even with Schelling this point became a stumbling-block; and accordingly we find him cruising for a long while in a cautious manner about this precipice, hard by which lie the ruins of so many former systems, overwhelmed in the depths of time: and lo! the onward course of his bark is stopped; and he seems as though in doubt how and in what fresh direction he shall wend his way.

The doctrine of universal unity, as already promulgated by Spinoza, and in ancient times under a similar form by the Eleatic school of philosophers, appears completely to exclude, if not every real and qualitative distinction, at all events, a genuine self or *per-se*-subsistence of the particular. On this point Schelling, in his philosophical researches into the Essence of Human Freedom*, expressed himself as follows:

If the Absolute is every thing, and things are only the temporary forms which the Absolute assumes, it is clear, so one says, that things in themselves do not really possess any essential character, and so there must merely exist an Absolute, eternally transforming itself in an inexhaustible manner; but apart from this, neither a material nor spiritual world. This system consequently abrogates entirely the individuality of the world's concrete existences and especially that of human beings.

But, says Schelling, matters do not stand thus, "The things certainly contain in themselves some positive or essential element, although not originally, but only in a derivative manner. For if we assume, that the individual essence in itself may be at the same time the infinite substance,—namely, a special modification of it, or, what amounts to the same thing, that the infinite substance has so modified itself in some one point of itself, that this its form or modification appears to be an individual thing,—it follows, that the substance is to be thought of as the immanent ground in the individual essence, by or through which the latter continues to subsist in this its form. Were we further to assume that the Absolute or the substance abides in some of these forms (which, because the Absolute is a something spiritual, we may term also notions or conceptions), as *e. g.* in the human mind, not in a transitory but eternal manner, why then this form and the Absolute abiding in it would be also eternally separated from the universal Absolute. It is true that this form, and consequently the existence of the individual essence, is, from its having its ground only in the Absolute, dependent upon and comprehended in it.

* Von der menschlichen Freiheit: first published in 1809.

"But," continues Schelling, "dependence does not abrogate independence, nor even freedom. It does not determine the essence, and only implies that the dependent, whatever it may constantly be (in itself), can only be a result of that upon which it is dependent: it does not declare what it may or what it may not be. Every organic individual is or exists as a something that has originated only by or through some other, and in so far is dependent as to origination, but not as to being." "It is, *e. g.*, no contradiction that he, who is the son of a certain individual, is himself a man, like the latter. On the contrary, for the dependent or consequent not to be self-subsistent would be far more contradictory. In such a case there would be a dependence without a dependent, a result without a resultant (*consequentia absque consequente*), and hence also no actual result, *i. e.* the whole notion would become self-abrogated or annulled. The same holds good of being comprehended in another. The individual member, such as the eye, is only possible in the entirety of an organism, yet nevertheless it has a life by itself, nay, a kind of freedom, as is clearly proved by the diseases of which it is susceptible. Were that which is comprehended in another not to be alive in itself, why then there would be a state of comprehension without a comprehended, *i. e.* there would be nothing comprehended."*

Thus Schelling affirms in general that the categories of cause and effect, and of substance and accident, when applied to the Absolute and the universe, do not prevent us from regarding that which is contemplated as a result of the accident of the Absolute, being in its turn in other respects both ground and substance; and so by clearing away this logical impediment he endeavours to pave the way for a theory of creation, in accordance with which the human being, although grounded as to his essence in the Absolute, may yet, as to the form of his being, be regarded as absolutely self-subsistent; while, upon the other hand, the Absolute, although entering into and co-operating with all its productions, may nevertheless as Absolute (as to form) appear above and apart from the human being as self-subsistent. We must here, he says, pay strict attention to what is meant by the copula in a logical thesis or proposition. It does not imply an identity of character between the subject and predicate. If, *e. g.*, I say this body is blue, I do not mean by this that the body in question is nothing more than what we call blue (blue colour), but merely that this body, among

* Op. cit. p. 413.

other qualities which it has, is also blue. In like manner, when it is said that the Absolute is the things, or all things are the Absolute, this does not amount to saying, that the Absolute is nothing more than the things; but only that among other predicates it is or constitutes the things. As regards, however, what the Absolute may be besides, and how the idea or conception of it may be completely determined, of this no mention has as yet been made.

Thus, it is not the intention of Schelling to sever things, or even human beings as regards their real essence, wholly from the Absolute and from the connection of the universal forces; for he says, that it is possible, *i. e.* conceivable, that man, as regards his real essence, may be a component part of the Absolute, and notwithstanding may persist in a form of being which would give him the character of the Absolute or of self-subsistence. Man may be justly called a result and modification of the Absolute; but he is and remains such merely in his one-sided relation to the universal Absolute; in another relation he would be probably the direct reverse of this, just as a son, although the *consequens* of his father, is in himself probably a father likewise.

While, however, we must think of the human being as continually as to its essence forming an integrant part of the Absolute, it does not follow from this that he is altogether or in every respect non-independent and devoid of liberty. "But," continues Schelling, "the very reverse; for the immanence or indwelling of the Absolute within us, or our immanence in the Absolute, is the only means we have of preserving our freedom." Most persons, if candidly disposed, would confess that, according to the constitution of their own ideas, the freedom of the individual appears to them to stand in direct contradiction to almost all the qualities of a highest being, as, for example, that of omnipotence; for by freedom a power that is unconditioned as to principle is declared to be both apart from and in proximity with the divine power,—a position this, which, according to those ideas or notions, is inconceivable. As the sun in the firmament extinguishes all the heavenly lights, so also and far more does the infinite power extinguish every finite. Absolute causality in *one* essence leaves to all others only an unconditioned passivity. Besides, the dependence of all concrete existences in the universe upon God, and even their continuance, are but in themselves a constant renewal of creation, in the which the finite essence is still not produced as an indefinite

universal, but as a definite individual form endowed with a certain measure, and no other, of thoughts, endeavours, and actions. To say that God withholds his almighty power, so that man may act, or that he suffers the freedom to exist, explains nothing : were God to withdraw his power for a single instant man would cease to be. Now, against this line of argumentation what other resource is left us than to preserve the human being along with his freedom (since this last is inconceivable as opposed to the Almighty) within the divine nature itself; and to say that man is not without but in God, and that his activity is itself part and parcel of the Divine Life.”—“So little do immanence in God and freedom contradict one another, that only what is free is, in so far as it is so, in God, while what is devoid of freedom, is, in so far as it is so, of necessity without God.”*

In all, however, that has been here adduced, we certainly discern no direct proof of the human being actually holding such a relation to the Absolute; for from the above logical deduction we merely see that it is not impossible, *i. e.* not inconceivable, for man to be immanent in the Absolute, and yet, at the same time, also, to be independent; while the passages last quoted contain more of an apagogic than direct proof of the fact, since they point only to the difficulties that beset the ordinary doctrine of freedom, and which drive us, it is true, to adopt an opposite view, while, nevertheless, this view could only stand at first as a postulate or article of belief, for which we have yet to seek for the intelligible form and solution of the contradiction.

Apart, however, from such a general logical formula, other unexpected difficulties present themselves, especially when from this philosophical standing-point we take a retrospective glance at the sum and substance of Christian theology. By this the freedom of man is at once regarded from the side of his sinfulness or tendency to err, and so soon as we bring this doctrine forwards in company with that of Schelling, we are involved by his theory of the immanence of things in God in other still more insoluble contradictions; for it seems to conflict with the notorious imperfections of the world, and especially with the existence of evil, and, by deifying all, to render all good and wholly to deny the evil.

Here then it was no longer possible to avoid giving a definite answer to the demand which was raised for a closer definition of Pantheism. Thus much is evident from all that has been

* Von der menschl. Freiheit, p. 403. 415.

said, that Schelling teaches an immanence of the Absolute, and, in so far as we call this God, of God in finite things, consequently an identity of the creature with God in a certain sense, though not in that of positive *identity*; for even if we think of the eternal, and in itself sole power of nature, as pervading all the structures of the universe, supporting and maintaining them as its forms, so that without this power the things themselves would be as naught, still we are not justified, upon that account, in saying that all things in the aggregate are God, or that the highest being is nothing more than the complex, the collective of all existing things. The absolute essence may, indeed, although it is, or is in, the things, be yet, at the same time, far more, namely, spirit, *i. e.* absolutely rational knowledge and volition. Did we not detect the same feature in the human microcosm? The vital principle of our body and the intelligence, together with conscience and reason, are not two different souls dwelling near to each other, but are one and the same principle of personality; and yet we map out this principle, and often too abruptly, into its functions, calling it in one case spirit, in the other vital impulse, sensitive faculty, desire, and such like. Now this principle manifests itself and exists in this and that form as the same, but it also opposes itself, as it were, polarically to itself, and elevates itself during the process in the manner above pointed out, from the state of blind instinct up to that of the purest reason, without ceasing, when it has become this last, to act at the same time, upon the other hand, as blind instinct still.

Thus, the Absolute, in its primordial potencies, as light and gravity, can be the supporter or substance of the concrete existences of the universe, while, at the same time, in its highest potency, or in its function of self-conscious reason and freedom, it can elevate itself above the whole world and creature, and contemplate these as objects, or itself in the latter. Now, to the Absolute upon this apex of spirituality, and thus in direct antagonism to the creature, is justly bestowed the title of *Deity*, a title from which, while the Absolute was in the state of the lower potencies, we were obliged to refrain.

Thus, if by Pantheism nothing more is to be understood than *this* kind of immanence of things in God, it follows that Schelling's doctrine is thoroughly pantheistic, and the system will never be able to clear itself from this immanence without renouncing itself entirely. Upon the other hand, the doctrine of identity thus modified, or more closely defined, is, as has just

been shown, no more one of materialism and fatalism than that of Fichte.

Nevertheless, we still encounter in Schelling's system considerable mental obstacles or stumbling-blocks; for apart, namely, from the cardinal question, with which we will not here meddle, as to whether a potentialising of the lower and more imperfect into the higher and more perfect, is logically conceivable, it strikes us, in the first place, that by that immanence of the world in God, the world in its inward nature and laws becomes identified with the sole, and, consequently, highest and divine nature, and is thus declared to be absolutely perfect and rational, a position this with which, upon empirical grounds, the glaring imperfections, ills and sins, of the human being would seem to be irreconcilable; then, in the next place, if nature works in a manner unpremeditated, first as a merely (blindly) existing reason or nature in herself, and after a certain process (effected in the human being), returns as the same reason to herself, or became the conscious reason, it follows, that the whole system of the universe must of necessity be converted into a logico-rational system, into a pure logical mechanism or rationalism, conformable to which all being and becoming could not exist otherwise than as a law of unerring necessity—a conclusion, this, which was subsequently followed out by Hegel; and, finally, it follows, despite all the diversity which the Absolute might possess when upon the stage of the world's spirituality, that it was nevertheless subjected in itself to a process by which it first became the Deity, which it previously was not; a God, however, that has originated or become, or a perfectibility of the Deity, is and remains an idea thoroughly opposed to our own feelings and to the Christian religion.

Hence these three difficulties, so closely connected with one another, must be removed if the system is to be perfectly reconciled with the life of experience and with religious feeling, or is to correspond to the object of philosophy, *i. e.* to impart the highest consciousness, and in this way celebrate the triumph of universal conviction.

It is clear, if I may so express myself, that, if this object is to be attained, we cannot, without depotentialising the signification of the first promulgated system, proceed logically to its redintegration (*zum Theilganzen füglich abgehen*). As yet it has not pleased the author to declare himself in writing

upon these points ; the first of them only, the existence of evil, having been treated of in the Essay upon Human Freedom, with which we may compare the controversial treatise that appeared in 1812, entitled “*Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen* ;” of the second point we have a categorical explanation in his preface to a translation of Cousin’s well known work *, where he declares that he has framed his system as the system of freedom, and as a positive historical doctrine, going hand in hand with, and even resting partly upon, experience for support, and that it is directly opposed to the empty logical rationalism or system of necessity into which, under Hegel’s hands, the beginning of his system, or the Nature-philosophy, was transformed. As regards, however, the third point, namely, that the reason demands an uncreated, aboriginally conscious, free, and consequently personal God, who is to be contemplated as free creator also of the world — upon this we can only gather, at present, some significant hints from Schelling’s immediate scholars, especially Beckers.†

From all this it is clear, in my opinion, that Schelling’s latest doctrine neither stands in any direct opposition to his former and well known doctrine, nor is built upon a wholly new foundation ; but that it will certainly assign to the Nature-philosophy another place and purport in the system to what it appeared to have before, though still the outline to be expected — unless we are altogether deceived — will, in essentials, contain only a more scientific development of what has been already indicated in unmistakeable characters and hints in several published essays, and especially in the *Researches into Human Freedom*.

Thus any attempt to combine what is already well known with what has only recently become so, would, were we to deal even with the subject in the most general manner, be obviously venturesome and premature.

* Victor Cousin’s *French and German Philosophy*, translated from the French by Dr. Hubert Beckers, with critical preface by G. von Schelling, 1834.

† Dr. Hubert Beckers, *über E. F. Göschel’s Versuch eines Erweises der persönl. Unsterblichkeit*, u. s. w. Hamburg, 1836. As to what has been most recently published, whether called for or not, in papers and periodicals, since the time of Schelling’s appearance in Berlin, — all testimony of this kind must be accepted with the greatest caution.

LECTURE XII.

SCHELLING'S RECENT VIEWS.

IN the Treatise upon Human Freedom, one of the most important, as regards the speculative nature of its contents, with which Schelling has furnished us in the later, or at least transitional period of his career, we find him, as it were, summing up and concluding his earlier system in the following words (page 419.): "To bring Realism and Idealism into a state of reciprocal penetration, such has been the declared object of all my endeavours. The notion of the absolute substance, which was regarded by Spinoza as the passive and lifeless (the inanimate image, so to speak, of Pygmalion) obtained by the higher method of contemplating nature, and from the unity that was recognised as subsisting between the dynamical and the psychical or mental, a living basis, out of which grew the Philosophy of Nature, which may, indeed, subsist by itself as a merely physical science, but which, when considered in reference to the whole of philosophy, must invariably be regarded as that real portion of the latter, which, by a process of reintegration through the influence of the ideal, in which freedom prevails, becomes susceptible of elevation into the true sphere or system of rational thought. In this freedom it was said that we encounter the last potentialising act, whereby the whole of nature became transfigured into sensation, intelligence, and finally into will. *In the last and highest instance there is no other being whatever than volition.* Volition is primordial being, and with this alone all its predicates of groundlessness, independence of time, and self-affirmation conform. The whole aim or endeavour of philosophy is but to discover this final judgment or decision."

It is not, however, sufficient to conceive only of the Absolute as an universal Ego and as free will; but it must be shown also that singulars, such as natural essences, and especially the individual Ego of human beings, carry this freedom as their ground or foundation within themselves. This has been already done, in pointing out the identity of the human Ego with the absolute primordial essence.

Now, the positive essence of human freedom, as it is manifested in direct consciousness and in history, consists in this, — that the freedom is a capacity both for *good and evil*; every other notion that is formed of it, such as independence and such like, being only negative, and affording us no information as to its real nature. In this “capacity, however,” says Schelling, “lies involved a point of the profoundest difficulty in the whole doctrine of freedom,” and, since freedom is the positive notion of the essence in itself, of the greatest difficulty also in the whole range of philosophical inquiry; for “we cannot perceive how from God, who is contemplated as pure goodness, a capacity for evil can proceed. Thus, human freedom cannot with justice or propriety be derived from God, but must have a root independent of God, at least in so far as it contains within itself a capacity for evil.” If the Absolute or free essence be the immanent nature of things, and especially of human souls, it follows inevitably that the evil must be regarded as being shared by the infinite essence, the substance of the Deity, the primitive will itself, in which case the notion of an all-perfect nature would be utterly suppressed; — or the reality of evil must be denied, a position which, being inadmissible and contradictory to all experience, would again suppress the notion of freedom. It is true that there are some who, like Leibnitz, do not directly deny the existence of wrong and moral evil in the world, but attribute it only to a privation or want of good, and to a limitation of power; but even in this way the difficulty of the question is not diminished, for the ground of such privation or limitation of good in the world can ultimately be discovered only in the general and primordial order of the world, and consequently in its author. In short, in order to explain the ability in a God-created being of acting in decided opposition to God, we must strike, if possible, into some other road than that which has been hitherto trod; for, from all that has been hitherto said, we must not, nor can we, give up the immanence of the Absolute in the finite, but must assume that that, which, proceeding from the Absolute or divine, is immanent in the finite nature, *cannot be the whole absolute essence of the Deity, nor especially that something which directly constitutes the divine element in the Absolute. This, however, leads to a distinction of something in God himself, which even in him cannot be called divine, or to our regarding the Absolute from a peculiar point of view, in the which it is not divine*; for “if the things are in any way to be separated

from God, and still their immanence to be retained, they must then have their foundation in that *which in God is not himself.*"

What now is that very something in God which is not himself? Or contemplated from what point of view is the Absolute not to be called God? This question leads us back to a new, or, at all events, a modification of the former theory of the Absolute, the leading outlines of which we likewise find in the above-mentioned treatise. Compared and combined with what has been elsewhere made known upon this subject, the above theory admits, to my mind, of being more closely expounded in the following manner.

In answering the above question it is designed to show that the evil does not exist in God, but only in the creature, in short, moral evil only in man. On that account the creature-world must be to a certain extent independent of God, and in this state it is possible for it to exist, either without participating in the will of God, or by being obliged to express this will only in an involuntary manner. In a general sense only *one* original cause can be adopted as being that from which all proceeds and wherein all subsists. This cause was, and is continually to be sought for, in God—in God—though God is, just as he is, not merely this original cause, but, while including the latter in himself, is still, apart from it, something else. The world has the same original cause in itself, and by being this, is thus identical with God, though in like manner it is not this original cause, but is besides something else. Thus, we have two conceptions; original cause and existence. Hitherto we have taken these correlative notions in such a sense as to regard the world as the existence of the cause, and both together as being God, who exists as world; the world being the temporo-spatial existence of God himself: in this way, however, God—apart from his existence or the world—came to hold the place of a mere cause or principle, and this could no longer suffice us as adequate to the true nature of God—for God cannot be a mere original cause, potency or power, seeing we had already developed the notion so far as to inevitably acknowledge him to be *freedom, will, intelligence*; and such he was in his existence and reality as true Deity. Were the world to be the existent God, why then it must be a thoroughly spiritual and perfect being, which cannot at least be said of our present world. Let us then, setting aside for the present the existence

and nature of this present world, follow out the theory of God's existence by himself as Deity, in order that we may see if a point or source is to be found in the latter from which may be derived the existence of the world, without its becoming identified with the existing Deity itself.

"Since nothing is prior to or apart from God," says Schelling (p. 429.), "he must have the principle of his existence within himself; this principle, however, not being God, absolutely regarded, *i. e.*, in so far as he exists," for that is assuredly but the principle of God's existence, and not at the same time this existence also, although neither can be thought of without the other, and they reciprocally presuppose each other, so that as to time no prior or posterior can be predicated of them. "If now the world is to differ or be distinct from God, why then the world must originate from a principle distinct from God: as however nothing can be apart from the Absolute (which is in God), it follows that this contradiction is only to be solved by the world having its foundation in the mere original cause, which is also that of the divine existence, but nevertheless may be also that of things.

Would we bring this cause, with which we have already become acquainted, under the title of the absolute potency or *natura naturans*, "more closely within the sphere of ordinary human capacities, we might say, that it is the longing felt by the eternal one to give birth to itself. Hence contemplated by itself it is also will, but a will, in which there is no understanding, and on that account not a self-subsistent and perfect will," for a nature which has not yet gazed with the eye of consciousness upon itself and its determination, is only a blind impulse. "We speak, however, of the nature of the longing, *regarded abstractedly* or in and by itself, as being that which must be kept in view, although it has been long since displaced by that higher element, which has been developed from it, and although we cannot apprehend it with the senses, but only by the spirit and the thoughts," *i. e.* abstractedly, being partially detached and separated from its necessary correlate—for it is only by a kind of abstraction that a cause *per se* can be retained in thought, since in reality it is constantly and simultaneously in and together with its results, the existence. But let this cause or impulse have manifested itself, or have passed into a state of activity, and then it has in its act (the existent) revealed itself, and can now, as subject and object, become also the unity of both spirit and consciousness.

Regarded in itself alone and apart from this existence, this principle or impulse is to be viewed as devoid of intelligence, as that which in the things is the material noumenon (*Ansich*), "the incomprehensible basis of the reality, the never manifested remnant, or that which with the greatest effort upon our part does not admit of being resolved into intelligence, but which remains eternally at the bottom of all things." "All birth is a birth from darkness into light; the seed must be sunk in the earth and must perish in the darkness, that the fair heavenly form may lift and unfold itself in the sun's rays. Man is formed in the body of his mother, and from the gloom of the unintelligent (from feeling and from longing, that glorious mother of knowledge) spring up for the first time the clear, the lucid thoughts."

Such, then, is the eternal course of nature, out of darkness into light, from the undetermined state to that of specialisation — out of the germ into the blossom. Hence we have, first of all, a "dark or obscure principle," which we may regard as the common root of Deity as well as of the world, and which in itself is neither of these, neither the real Deity nor the real universe, and from which something may thus be deduced, which cannot, therefore, be said to be deduced from the Deity.

In the "Denkmal," to whose pages we now have recourse, we find that to those philosophers who would place as "antecedent" at the summit of the whole system a divine intelligence and a moral will only, devoid of any groundwork of reality, the question is proposed by Schelling as to whether this pure intelligence must also *precede* the intelligence itself in God; whether a mere intelligence so blank and bare could depend upon itself, could be or *exist* as mere intelligence, seeing that the thinking process is the direct opposite of *being*, and is, as it were, as subtle and void as the latter is dense and substantial. That, however, which is the beginning of an intelligence (in itself) cannot be intelligent, since otherwise there would be no characteristic distinction; nor can it even be absolutely *non-intelligent*, just because it is the possibility of an intelligence. Thus it will be of a mean or intermediate character, *i.e.* it will act with wisdom, but, as it were, with an innate, instinctive, blind, and as yet unconscious wisdom, just as we see ecstasies frequently act, who utter sayings full of intelligence, not, however, as the result of reflection, but as if from pure inspiration.* In all this we do but recognise again that absolutely identical, real-

* Denkmal der Schrift, &c. p. 84.

ideal as it is prior to all development, or is to be presupposed prior to all production, as that, namely, which must and will be determined, or which will determine itself, but which, on that very account, must be premised as a something as yet undetermined, or a *being* antecedent to all difference, in the presence of which, however, nothing can be thought of, and which, on that very account, is designated by Schelling under the title of the "*Immemorial*" (*Unvordenklich*).*

This immemorial does not, however, merely precede all the real distinctions that issue from, or which are posited in it, but also the thinking process itself; it is the positive, the existent, which, despite every endeavour on the part of the thinking process, does not admit of being resolved into thought; in a word, it is the primordial existent. On that very account it is no product of the thinking process, no *creature* of the mind, since we cannot posit the thinking spirit as existent prior to it, but it is uncreated, eternal, and present simultaneously together with the thinking spirit. As to ourselves, we must, in the psychological process of our thoughts, rather conceive of the thinking process as issuing from that being, than believe that we can derive this being from a creative intelligence; in short, this being is posited as simultaneously in and together with God, and while it is God's real aspect or original cause, may become also a cause of the universe; hence it is divine, although it is not God himself, and *may* become the cause of the universe, but *is* not of necessity the latter. Thus, it is to be regarded as the material *possibility* or potency of a creation in God, and, by virtue of its nature (which is the immediate identity of reality and ideality), it will feel in itself the ardent desire or longing to become what it may and ought to become; a longing which does not belong to God as God, the eternally transcendent †, but only to that which, though existent in God, is not God. Hence this potential ideal-reality, or ideal-real potentiality, this yearning principle, is characterised by Schelling as the mysterious wisdom instinctively present with, and hovering, as it were, before God, and pointing out to him, as it were, the possibility of a creation, unto which he freely determines himself; though, with all this, it is difficult

* To this absolute principle attention has been directed, among other writers, by Ch. A. Weisse, in his Essay entitled "The Philosophical Problem of the Present (der Gegenwart)." Leipzig, 1842.

† Allgemeine Zeitschrift von Deutschen für Deutsche, i. p. 94.

to discern, by any effort of abstraction, upon what logically necessary reasons an eternal intelligence is to be presupposed as coexistent with that real cause in God, if this real cause can be in and by itself alone a creative potency, without the co-operation therein of the intelligence. Does no other function, then, belong to the latter than that of merely looking on?

All depends, continues Schelling, upon our representing to ourselves this sport of wisdom (this genesis of the world of ideas in which God gazes upon the archetypes of creation, the graduated series of generic forms) in its origination or process of becoming, but at the same time keeping God himself, the transcendent, apart from this process; a process which, nevertheless, occurs fundamentally in himself, and whereby he himself is, in the eminent sense of the word, God, or becomes God the Father, provided only that this primordial principle so pregnant with life be not confounded with him, the Father, since this principle is only the generative potency, the *σπέρμα τοῦ θεοῦ*. The process occurs in God for God; for God is assuredly the ultimate cause and ultimate object thereof, though this sphere of reality in God has at the same time its own peculiar life.

This process is what Schelling, by his newer "doctrine of potency," endeavours to render intelligible, and which, if we understand him aright, is to supply the place of a general and fundamental scientific theory of the Absolute. This position had been originally occupied in the modern schemes of philosophy by the Philosophy of Nature. In this way, however, the Philosophy of Nature, as it was first set forth by Schelling and published as the first part of his system, obtained a doubtful signification, for one could not tell whether thereby, in a pantheistic sense, was truly meant the process of origination and the essence of the real nature, the self-potentialisation of the *natura bruta* up to the absolute spirit, or, in other words, that God sprung from nature; or whether this representation indicated only the development or psychological course of the subjective thinking process, regarded as that logically necessary process, whereby the thought succeeded in at length getting possession of the idea of the Absolute, but then having attained to what the true positive beginning and primitive source of the real creation may be, had, as it were, to cast aside that scaffolding in order to set out from that "Immemorial" to a theory of free creation. So far, Schelling. Hegel, however, was and remained of the opposite opinion.

Before, however, entering upon a sketch of what has been

called the Neoschellingian system, the present is the fitting place for pointing out, in the words of its author*, the mode in which that system is divided and separated from the opposite view taken by Hegel of the Philosophy of Nature. "That very philosophy," says he, "which in modern times has been most positively reproached for its agreement with the doctrines of Spinoza, had in its *infinite* subject-object, *i. e.* in the absolute subject, which by nature objectifies itself (becomes the object), but again emerges triumphantly from out that objectivity or finite state, and only withdraws into a higher potency of subjectivity, until, having exhausted its entire possibility (of becoming objective), it remains as subject victorious over all—in this subject that philosophy had indeed a principle of necessary progress. If, however, the purely rational be not inconceivable, or, in a word, *pure* subject, it follows, *that* that subject, which, ascending in the manner aforesaid, advances from each objectivity to only a higher subjectivity, is with *this* determination no longer the merely inconceivable, purely rational, but this very determination was an empirical one, and imposed upon that philosophy by a living apprehension of the reality, or from the necessity of ensuring to itself the means of an advance or progress. A later comer (Hegel) has done away with this empirical element by substituting, in the place of the *living actual* (to which the former philosophy had bestowed the quality of receding from above and out of its counterpart (the object) into itself), the *logical notion*, to which, by the strangest contrivance, or hypo-stasizing, he ascribes a similar necessary process of spontaneous motion. The *principle* of the movement he must needs preserve, for without such a principle there was no point from whence to set out; but he changed the *subject* of the latter, this subject being, as already said, the logical notion; and the first hypothesis of the philosophy that nominally presupposed nothing, was, that this purely logical notion has, as such, the quality or nature of changing suddenly of itself (as it were tumbling over—for the subjectivity of the philosopher must be wholly excluded) into its counterpart, in order to return, in the next place, by a process of reflection, into itself; steps these which may be thought of as regards some living, real entity, but of the bare notion can neither be thought nor imagined, though utterance may be given unto them. This attempt to return by means of the notions of an already well developed realistic philosophy (for such a philosophy has been worked at since the time of Des Cartes) to the stand-point of scholasticism, and to

* Victor Cousin, *op. cit.* p. xiii.

begin metaphysics with a *purely* rational notion, exclusive of every empirical element, although this was neither discovered nor rightly cognised, while the empirical, which was *a priori* rejected, was again ushered in stealthily through the differentiation or self-belying process of the idea — this episode in the history of the more recent philosophy, if it has not served to develop the latter any further, has at least served to point out afresh that it is impossible to get at reality by means of the *purely* rational, for just as all those forms which are characterised as *a priori* really include within themselves the *negative* element only of all knowledge (that without which none is possible) but not the *positive* (that *by* which it originates), and as in this way the character of universality and necessity which they bear in themselves is only presented to us as a negative one ; so likewise in that absolute prius (which, by being absolutely *universal* and *necessary* — that which is a sheer nonentity and utterly inconceivable — can only be the self-existent, *αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν*), we can discern only the negatively universal, that *without* which nothing is, but not that *whereby* any thing is. If now we aspire to attain the latter point, *i. e.* the *positive* cause of all, and hence also a *positive* science, it is easily seen that we have no power of arriving at the positive (though that which bears in itself the negative) either by starting upon the empirical route only (for this does not suffice for the notion of the *universal* essence, which is in its nature *a priori*, or a notion *possible* only in pure thought), nor by that of rationalism (which cannot, upon its part, get beyond the mere necessity of thought)." By that which must be added to the *a priori* thinking is, however, to be understood, continues Schelling, neither an empirical psychology, nor such an empiricism as is at present upheld by the French and most German writers, under the title of a sensational system, which *denies* all that is universal and necessary in human knowledge ; but it will be taken in the higher sense, in which, it may be said, that the true God is not the mere universal essence, but at the same time a special or empirical one. Now it is in this very way that an *union* of both essences in a sense which has hitherto not been dreamt of, will be effected ; they will coalesce into one and the same notion, from which, as a common source, are derived not only the highest law of the thinking process, all secondary laws of thought and the principles of all negative or so-called purely rational sciences, but upon the other hand the *positive* content of the highest (and alone properly to be so called) science.

We could not avoid making this long extract, because, excepting this, we possess as yet no authentic document of Schelling concerning his new views, which could express in so decided a manner the whole essence of philosophy, and the position it occupies in reference not only to empiricism, but to the whole body of philosophic knowledge. What at the conclusion is indicated by the science, properly so-called, is the positive philosophy itself, though that very portion which must precede it and deduce all principles of the purely rational sciences from one common source, is, so it seems, an universal theory of cognition or doctrine of knowledge.

As regards, however, our own opinion, we consider the acknowledgment made in the beginning of the above quotation to be especially worthy of remark, namely, that the assumption of a pure subject external to, or rather within the formally rational movement of thought, is an empirical determination imposed upon philosophy *by the necessity of ensuring to itself the means of progress*. This determination is no doubt said to be empirical, because this postulate, that may indeed be *furnished*, but not satisfied by a rational process of thought, was filled by the "living apprehension of the reality," in which postulate the very living itself made its appearance as a direct and positive principle.

If now, relying on ourselves, we follow out this investigation somewhat further, it appears to us that Schelling must have found therein, at the very outset, this stumbling-block; that in a purely rational system, *i. e.* in one which, like the Hegelian, presents a series of categories, which are indeed originally forms of the understanding or reason, *i. e.* kinds and modes of the thinking process abstracted from the latter by reflection upon itself, but which, if the thinking process is to hold good as identical with being, are to be regarded also objectively as forms and kinds of being, thus, not as mere subjective categories of the understanding, as with Kant, but as categories also of nature, and ultimately of the intelligence or the whole universe, denoting at the same time, the different kinds of concrete existence, — that in such a system of metaphysics or objective logic, the impossibility is soon discerned of advancing from a lower to a higher category, or of developing, by a necessary sequence, one sphere of conception from another.* If once an entire notion or *genus* be present to our thoughts as *given*

* Jahrbücher der Medizin, Bd. 1. Hft. 1. § 51. "There is no ascent of cognition up to God, but only immediate discernment."

or presupposed, it is true that the same admits of being supplied or filled up with its requisite determinations, or, in other words, the logical *ambitus* (*Umfang*) with the logical *complexus* (*Inhalt*), seeing that the latter does but imply the necessary and not inconceivable conditions under which that whole or *genus* can be *posited*; but meanwhile this logical procedure does not conduct us beyond the given generic notion or *genus*, and if a higher notion is to be framed, it follows, that it likewise must be either given or, at least, engendered in some other way, or by some other method, than that rationalistic-logical one, or dialectic method, as Hegel calls it. In order to arrive at the highest, the highest must be already present in some *a priori* manner in the reason, *i. e.* must be potentially there; the reason must "*a priori* be in possession of the absolute *prius*." To this point, however, we will return, later on, in treating of the Hegelian Phenomenology, having merely directed attention to it at present, with a view of showing why or upon what grounds the reason was by Schelling declared to be a mere faculty of cognition, but not of knowledge, and how, as a consequence of this fundamental view, the reason of different ages or generations must now be said to have first raised itself, in reality, from one stage to another, or rather have been really raised and emancipated ere it could, by reflecting upon itself, comprehend itself as that which it now is; in short, there must belong to the reason a real, historical, self-occurring process, if the self-existent is to manifest itself successively as a higher grade of knowledge. It is evident that, in this way, a moment of experience or a moment of immediateness is admitted as an element of philosophical development, and one which, in a system of pure logical "rationalism" neither has nor could have any place. It is quite a different thing whether we abide with Schelling by this discovery, believe that we must make use of it henceforth as a direct proof of the general impotency of a purely rational science, and simply pointing out the necessity of such a complement to philosophy, adopt this altogether and elaborate it, or whether we allow this discovery to excite in us the hope of discerning in the reason itself some other more comprehensive method, some *genetic* power, by which it is in a condition, though in another way, and setting out from a different principle to that which has been hitherto assumed, to develop itself freely from or out of itself. Now, this genesis or inherent power of production was, as we shall see by and by, the distinct object to which the labours of Hegel were directed: though

whether the method invented by him suffices for this purpose, and whether his fundamental principle of the identity of thinking and being be the correct one is in its turn another question, which the present is not the fitting place to answer. Were the method only a negative one, as Schelling critically characterises it, and one that was imprisoned within the confines of logical necessity, then Schelling would certainly have been justified in his statement, that even after Hegel "Philosophy had to undergo a great revolution, which, on the one hand, would insure the positive explanation of reality without, upon the other hand, withdrawing from the *reason* its great privilege of being in possession of the absolute *Prius*, even that of the Deity."*

In the same way Schelling even now declares that the reason or thinking process is by itself alone without any empirical element able to comprehend the notions or essence of all things, nay, even of the highest essence or God — the *quomodo aliquid sit*—but not the real being or existence; it can only comprehend what and how some thing *may* be, but not that it is, *quod sit*; this last must be somehow or other given, and even the Highest must *give* or reveal itself unto us, if we are to be certain of its existence. We cannot prove by our own thinking process, *a priori*, that God exists, but inversely only, that the existent is divine; and then comes the question how and to what extent the existent is or is not God himself, but only that which in God is not God. So soon as I say of another essence, it *is*, I interrupt the continuity of my thinking process with this being, and there is no longer any identity present of the thinking process and the existence; thus the thinking process or notion can in no wise attain to the being of the object itself, but would on the contrary simultaneously suppress the latter, if it were to identify therewith its act of thought; hence the rational process of thought suffices only to prove the possibility of being or non-being, the objective possibility, but not the reality,—a position this, in which Schelling reverts, it is evident, to Kant, though we are not, however, justified in affirming that he has wholly surrendered himself a prisoner to Kant's subjectivism; the position being, so it seems, but the necessary result of a system which would not be absolutely pantheistic in character.

* Victor Cousin, op. cit. p. xviii.

Let us now return from the above digression to the system itself, and in the first place to the Doctrine of Potency, which is not a new doctrine or theory of nature, but belongs to theology and has to render comprehensible the fact of a real moment united with the spiritual existing in God from all eternity. This real or existent is posited as the *præus*, not as to time, but in the logico-dialectic construction. The being is that with which we must set out, for nothing can precede it, not even the thinking process, for the being can proceed from nothing different to itself, neither from the non-being, nor from the thinking process, nor from a mere potency, and not from the thinking process, seeing that it anticipates or precludes thought, and is on that account the "*immemorial*," or "Unvordenkliche;" if then there is to be any thought, a being or existent must be present which thinks. This being is not, however, the abstract *ἐν* or *ὄν* of the Eleatic school of philosophy, nor is it the *materia prima*, which would only be the *potency* of being, so that of the latter its mere potency would exist, which is inconceivable. The being must on the contrary be presupposed as devoid of beginning, and like Spinoza's substance with all its "modes." This positively immediate being, which has never before been potentially, is the pure immemorially actual existent *in actu puro existentiaæ*. It has not been produced by a present notion, but is in the strictest sense original; it is that which the theologians term *aseitas*; but it does not as yet correspond to the entire notion of a God: to this there appertains another moment, namely, that this existence should include also the *potency* or power; this last is not to be overlooked, but is to be simultaneously posited together with the existence, but not, be it remembered, *prior* to or *before* it. That it cannot be antecedently posited does not prevent us from positing it subsequently; the notion of the existence does not contradict this corollary, although it does not necessarily demand it. The ordinary negative philosophy begins with the potency, the not yet existent, the possible: but such a potency does not admit of being posited to any degree or retained, for it must forthwith pass into actual being; nor can we think of it without this, although we may posit the being without the potency or power. Hence such a potency appears, when posited as a principle, not to be free; but as regards a being this is not the case: we may posit a being at once as bearing in itself an undeveloped potency, for the possible admits indeed of being posited, as not yet existential in and together with an existent, but not by itself alone as a bare or

naked *existere* of mere possibility. Thus, says Schelling, we are compelled by the necessary logical process of thinking *a priori* (or by the negative philosophy) to perceive that the Absolute must be posited as existent *sine initio*, but not to bestow upon it a potency that is awakening in it; this is at present a bare hypothesis, which can be subsequently maintained (upon other grounds); it is one that is only logically possible, not necessary; we can only proceed to it by "thinking freely" from out the first thesis; the "positive philosophy does not set out with the necessary thinking process." In this way Schelling declares, if we are not mistaken in so interpreting his statements, that there is no necessary progress from the more abstract or lower, to the more concrete and higher, but, indeed, from the latter to the former as being its premises. Schelling, however, seems to require for that ascent an empirical ground *a posteriori*.

If now the being has taken up its own potency as we assume, into itself, it follows that the first A appears in the second potency (A^2). Thus, the first being becomes the power of itself, *potentia potentiae*, for the possibility of passing over from the actual being into the mere potency is, or constitutes, the true potentiality and freedom; that which actually exists *can* now remain in its (first) existence, but can also retire from out of it into the mere potency in itself, nothing obliging it to pass over into existence, as was the case when we attempted to posit in the first place the potency. The existent has in its being already the firm point of support, which it requires for its *ability*, for it may or may not pass over into the potency. This possibility presents to the eternal existent a being, or another mode of existence, which it may will and select; so that that first being now becomes, what it was not previously, a being that has been willed, and this other being appears as an *accidental*, which may or may not be. For while the potency presents to that which is imprisoned in the pure being the object of a possible volition, it becomes conscious of itself as *master* of a being which is not as yet, and thereby becomes simultaneously free from the state of immemorial being over which it is lord or master; in a word, escapes freely from itself.

But what now is this other merely possible being, which appears in the eternal? If we call it B to distinguish it from the first pure being A, which in this way is no longer a merely pure being, but in possession of the being = A^2 ; it is an essence which at first is necessary by its nature, and such can only be regarded as opposed to the *accidental*,

while the being of the B becomes for the present only a possible, accidental, or something that may not be; the former alone is the so-called *ens necessarium*, the latter the *contingens*. The necessary being could not, so long as it was immemorial being, *prove* itself to be necessary; it can only effect this in the accidental, though even there it must prove itself to be necessary. It is an universal law that nothing should remain undetermined; it is, however, the law of the Deity itself, and appears to be external to the latter only so long as it (the Deity) is itself thought of as pure being. We have not, however, to think of this law as to time, but the eternal essence looks forth from eternity (without time) upon itself as a being of capacity by a *mere act of its will*; that position was merely a momentary thought. Thus, the *will* is really the first, and hence the moments are inverted as to their order of rank; the blind being proving itself to be the impotent,—the being capable, the positive and primordial. In this *being with capacity*, which hovers, as it were, between the two, resides the power of God, and the true notion of God himself; who has thus raised Himself for the first time to his *idea*, being now transcendent, spirit, or intelligence, and thus = A³. This third possibility of being is that which presents itself to him as what should be, the ultimate and proper design or object of the whole. God is the superabundant and absolutely free spirit, that soars even above that wherein He is spirit, not being fettered in Himself as spirit (in the form of spirituality or the thinking process), but dealing with Himself as a spirit only, as a potency of Himself. Such is the truly transcendent or God; it is related as notion to the pure existent act, though it does not precede this, the being preceding it. If what is immemorial raises itself to that which by its nature is necessary, it elevates itself into its idea, and becomes what it should be; what, as essence, did not at first require the existence, is God. To be lord or master of one's own being is what constitutes the notion of personality; to be lord over all being is equivalent to the notion of absolute personality. As such we must think to ourselves of God from the very beginning. From eternity he saw Himself as Lord suspend his immemorial being, so that it became to him by means of a necessary process the self-willed, and hence for the first time, divine being.

Thus, we have a personal Deity above or antecedent to all the world's reality, in a word, a God, who does not stand in

need of the world in order to arrive at existence and self-consciousness. As regards, however, the world, we have in the Deity only its possibility, but not as yet its reality; its possibility lying still decreed and concealed in God. Is it asked, in what way God can find himself moved, to let this possibility become reality, *i. e.* to create the universe? Not for his own sake, we answer, not by the necessity of a logical process, nor by that of a blind physical process; for God knows beforehand what will ensue, and has not first to learn this. Yet, meanwhile, we have not to represent to ourselves the creation in the usual mode, as a projection of the world from out the idea into the reality. For the creation consists assuredly of a process that occurs in God, namely, in the *suspension* and successive *reinstatement* of the actually necessary being; between these two moments lies the universe or world. God does not renounce himself in the world, or does not become the world—the adoption of this view being compulsory only with those who admit of his being previously present there in himself (*ansich*) or potentially, *i. e.* in idea; but he elevates himself from the world into his divinity, suspends his world-being, and retires into himself, having previously renounced himself as an actually necessary being. At the same time, however, God does not suspend this his act in order to arrive at himself—for this he is already,—but upon objective grounds, in order to let a being different from him come, in place of the first being, into existence. In this way the accidental being steps into reality, and we have here again to bear in mind what was posited above as B; to this B, or potency, existence is by God's will permitted for the purpose of letting an accidental being, different from himself, become ultimately permeated by the necessary being. This B is to be thought of as pure potency, *i. e.* as spontaneity or will, which differs at first from the intelligence, by being a formless arbitrary impulse opposed to the latter; it is only potentially intelligence, and thus it has constantly to potentialise itself from blind will or impulse up to intelligence; it is the potency of life, as primordially present in God, the potency of the divine life. God it was, who as Lord of all three potencies, allowed the manifold positions which these potencies might occupy towards each other to pass before him after the manner of an experiment, and as an image, idea, or vision. This B, as a possibility, sporting, as it were, before him (*maya*, *mater*, *Weltamme*, *materia*), presented itself to him as the potency of a

blind being, as *natura naturans*, imparting to him, the Creator, his knowledge of a future world. In the beginning, unconscious, it retires gradually step by step into itself, gathers itself up into a state of internal potentiality, and so becomes at last *for itself*, self-conscious, or intelligence. In accordance with this its object, it is called in the Proverbs of Solomon, *Chochma* or Wisdom. Just as in God himself we must set the pure being prior to the spirit, so also here and everywhere can the consciousness only originate from the unconscious, and God cannot himself produce what is immediately or directly conscious. The light springs only from out the bosom of darkness; an intelligence that has originated or become, has the unintelligent only for its commencement. (By the way this certainly appears to contradict the above-mentioned canon or rule, that the higher cannot be derived from the lower.) Upon the lower stages nature only assumes the impression or stamp of intelligence, but in Man the intelligence has become of such a nature as to break through this, having become actually what the blind being was only potentially.

In this then lay the purpose or ultimate design of the whole process, for it was only that such an intelligent being might originate as might have a *joint knowledge* of its being for the sake of such knowledge, thus might see itself known and acknowledged by others, — that God could will and set at work the *actual* process, which is called creation, but which is nothing else than a suspension of the directly immanent or indwelling activity of God, in that which in him is not his self, while he himself stands to such a degree as a *causa causarum* above the world-process, that this process or the reality of nature, consists only in a tension of the three potencies towards each other, as of a plurality of causes. Already prior to the creation, God had these potencies within himself, but he alone it was that worked in them, or else they had not been set in a state of free activity towards each other. Thus, the reality of the world or the creation is the permitted appearance of the separation and tension of the potencies from out the unity of the original plan. God himself has, as it were, retired and now holds a negative relation towards them, he being that without which they certainly could not be what they are at present, namely, positive and spontaneously working forces. That such has been the antecedent realisation of the world, we know *a posteriori*, for we ourselves make use of a real world, but it cannot be deduced with logical necessity, for it is no necessary

act of the Absolute, and is on that account not to be comprehended *a priori*, as, generally speaking, no free act can be; but it is a certainty, because we ourselves see before us such a real nature ascending by mediate degrees, and developing itself into the immaterial or spiritual state. Thus, the motive actuating God to creation is this, that, although he knew himself to be Lord of being, there was still something which he required, namely, to be acknowledged or known; this desire or craving to be known is peculiar in the highest degree to the nobler natures, and so we need not hesitate to attribute the feeling of this want to the Deity, though in himself he lacketh nothing. The object of God willing this process, as shown above, is, that the potency set without him may become the agent of a joint-knowledge of the whole creation.

If we here venture to interrupt for an instant the present exposition, it is only with a view of expressing our agreement with this last-mentioned thought of Schelling, in which, by advancing unmistakeably beyond the limits of his former Philosophy of Nature he is led to believe that he must seek the ultimate key to the riddle of the universe, not in physical and blindly working laws or categories of nature, but in the ethical categories of freedom. Here it is obviously the (usually inappropriately so-called) moral necessity, which takes the place of the physical one; for the desire of knowing oneself to be recognised by others is without doubt an ethical motive, and can only be manifested in a personality; for, that the self-conscious and self-recognisant should neither wish nor feel that it ought to know itself recognised by others would only be a contradiction to the idea of personality, but not to that of a physical power, however absolute. Nevertheless, we cannot, in spite of all this, avoid observing, that even *this* ethical category, or that of personal right and what belongs to the Ego (*Egoität*), is not the highest which can set the process in motion, and then, as it were, wind up the account. Even this feeling of what belongs to the Ego, self-justified though it may be, is, when taken in the best sense, neither as yet the will of truth in itself, absolute and entirely free from every desideratum, nor the fully disinterested love; for that feeling would have the creature, the object, not for the sake of the object itself, its aim not being as yet of a purely objective kind, for its dealings with it are only for the sake of self-satisfaction, and the creature is to serve only as its means to that end, being but the throne upon which the splendour of the Deity exalts itself. Such, however, is neither the final nor yet perfect expression of adult human personality; and the

more this serves merely as a means, by so much the more does the Deity remain as regards itself fettered unto means, consequently devoid of freedom, and does remain so, because its will is here bound down to *power* as the object, and that indeed, in the present instance a power potentialised, *i. e. acknowledged*. This power must indeed remain at bottom or potentially unsuppressed, despite the recognition and certainty of being acknowledged, for, without this certainty and truth of the personality, the third element, that of the will of truth, which sets before itself an absolutely objective purpose, in a word, the wise love, would be impossible ; yet, nevertheless, this third element must come into operation, or rather it must, as a final object of the whole, have been that which lay first at its foundation, if all is to be solved in a perfectly clear and satisfactory manner, which, seeing that we are here speaking of the world's object, must be done. Meanwhile, we could hardly have found a better opportunity for weaving these remarks into a connected thought, and so placing them in their proper light, than in this passage where Schelling himself leads us so near to the point upon which the whole matter turns ; and we may be therefore pardoned for having interrupted the thread of a narrative which we now proceed to resume.

Schelling distinguishes this world-process, which, together with its potencies, occurs in God, from God Himself ; so that the first potency is not to be confounded with God the Father, being in him but the generative principle, the *natura gignens*. In like manner the second potency is indeed the Son, but not immediately so, but only after that first potency, the matter, has been brought into subjection by it, controlled, reduced to form, and, as it were, expired. Finally, the Spirit is the third potency with which we have to deal as that true element that should imperatively become and be, as the final object in the whole process. These three potencies are or constitute the Elohim, from all eternity, not being created, but existing only *as real persons* after the completion of the process, in which, seeing that it contains within itself in a definite series of degrees all ideas or generic notions, was contained the archetypal, pre-mundane, or immanently divine world. Thus, by the co-operation of the three potencies this harmonious world came to pass, and the potencies are in itself intertwined or blended together in it in an harmonious manner ; for they enclosed this content, and were held by the same in its harmonious relations. The complex, however, of all potencies, the totality of all genera in

perfect organisation and unity,—is, as is well known, the *human being*. Thus, that complex was and may simply be called man, Adam Cadmon, environed and hedged in as it were, by the potencies — in paradise — and destined himself to maintain the potencies in suitable subordination and harmony. Thus, God with the three potencies of nature and with man in harmonious unity, constituted the first creation, which is not to be confounded with the present order or disorder of things. With this mental image or representation, a monotheism, and one that truly deserves the name, is rendered possible. By such a monotheism we cannot understand either a mere theism or pantheism, for both, when strictly regarded, amount to the same thing. If the theist says there is but *one* God, he does this invariably with the simultaneous thought of a world that is not God, but leaves the relation between them wholly undetermined; thus, the world becomes to him, unobservedly, utterly independent, nay, more, it becomes an Absolute, a god for itself; and so he would have two gods alongside of each other, were it not that this very duality is denied by that miserable theistic monotheism, and so both blend incessantly into one, and pantheism is the result. Now Pantheism, such as we find it in the writings of Spinoza, converts a moment of the Deity, substance, or blind being, into the whole or perfect God; while, indeed, according to our view of the matter, the universe in and together with God is only one, or God as substance is but one; still, however, it is only the true monotheism that sets the question in its right light, its sole purpose being to declare that, apart from the one and only true God, no other being can be God in the same sense, while dualism, tritheism, or polytheism are to be rejected as being mere multiplications of this one and the same idea; but it is by no means said that God is absolutely the one and only being, and that apart from him there is nothing, or (what amounts to the same) that all that there is, is God, for in this way pantheism would be established, seeing that we should then admit of many kinds of existences, though thinking of them only as modes of the existence of the All-one. This identification originates only from our not distinguishing what in God is God from what in God is not God; God in the first sense is alone, but not all that is God (in the second and wider sense) is *this* God (in the first sense). We must affirm of the universe, or whole, that it is the one, and that this one is certainly divine, or is God in the wider acceptance of the term; but as regards this eternal existent we

must now proceed to make distinctions in it, and declare that there is in the same a something that is not God *per se* or for himself. We cannot, as already mentioned above, proceed in thought from the idea of this true God to the other universal being, but, inversely, we may succeed in arriving from out the immemorial being at the notion or idea of God. And this is the characteristic distinction between the positive and negative philosophy, that the former, setting out from the being or existence as that which is absolutely to be presupposed, advances to the notions or conceptions of the thinking process, while the latter starting from the thinking process would arrive at being, or "pluck it out" (*herausklauben*), as Kant said, from the bare notion. The negative philosophy was necessary, and must, so to speak, be pushed to the very extreme, in order that it may render apparent the necessity of the positive foundation by proving itself to be only negative in character. Accordingly the negative philosophy is only to be viewed as the historical propædæutick or preparation for the positive; it is only the ascending or retrogressive part of the road, which the thinking process must take; but, arrived at the summit, we must make ourselves masters of the positive principle, we must lay hold of it in order to possess it, we must *will* to have it, for it cannot be imbibed by the rationalistic process of thought; but we must seize hold of it in order that, setting out from thence, we may arrive again, in our further progress as it were, downwards, at the empirical reality. This return and retrogression cannot, however, consist in simply retracing the same stations or series of categories by which we have ascended; for then we should arrive at the absurd result of God creating man, and then the created man giving issue to the animals, the animals to the plants, the plants to the soil beneath them, and so on. On the contrary, it is from those principles that the historical pathway is to be followed out, so that it may be seen how that the chasm which is met with between the accredited beginnings of the world's history (the historical period) and those antemundane beginnings is filled up, and how the whole process of evolution becomes *one* coherent history, self-intelligible, and explanatory of all, even to the present nature and condition of the world.

As, however, it is impossible, on account of the whole condition of the world of experience, and especially the sin and wickedness that is present therein, to regard the present world as identical with that divinely immanent and eternal creation,

seeing that it exhibits the most unmistakeable traces of a mighty disturbance and of a course of things which is only gradually returning, both in the field of nature as well as history, to the ancient order ; it follows, that, upon these grounds, a mighty subversion must be assumed of that divine and primeval world ; and if such a subversion cannot be proved to be an unconditioned necessity — such logical despotism failing in the present instance altogether — why, then, it presents itself as the only means, not only of achieving the actual freedom of created human beings, but the truly free personality of those antemundane potencies, or the *realisation* of their personality as *such*. Such a subversion as may ultimately lead to the good and to what ought to be, is not in itself, indeed, to be regarded as of an obligatory or imperative character, thus, not as being for itself alone willed by God, although as means to an end it will not have been *unwilled* even by Him. There is a great difference between the evil and that which is merely not the good ; the former is that which ought positively not to be, and which should have no right to exist ; but the latter is only that which is not as yet what it should be, or the ultimate object itself. Of such a kind was that subversion which did not happen contrary to God's will, nor even through or by the latter, did not proceed from God as God, was not willed by him, but was also not *unwilled* ; thus, was only permitted because God saw therein the possibility of a final good. There is even in God a kind of irony which brings to light from out the deed the opposite of that which is intended ; for his thoughts are not our thoughts, and our thoughts were not his thoughts when the *universio* took place through the first man, whereby that solitary unit became both an *aversum* and *perversum*. Thus, Adam, destined as he was to preserve the paradisaical unity of life with which he was created, nevertheless desired to hold a free relation by or for himself to God ; it was sufficient for him to know himself to be a *capable* being, in order to do what he could to disturb the relation of the potencies ; he would in fact exist *per se* or for himself, and thus he would arouse the first potency from the depths in which, as a supporter, a substance, and *ὑποκείμενον*, it had been repressed within him, and actuate it again or restore it to the state of the *actus purus* : had this succeeded perfectly, and had God allowed it, why then the creation and man himself would have been utterly annihilated ; but God would not have this, but prevented it by his will, not indeed by a direct but only

an indirect manifestation of this, for God could really continue to work upon this disorder only negatively, *i. e.* by his displeasure. Thus, man would again throw the potencies into a state of contention or tension; and thus, having of himself aroused the primitive cause within himself, he lost the dominion (of the spirit) over himself and over the potencies of nature. This direct dominion was snatched from him by the "fall of man," but, as will be presently seen, that he might thereby attain, through the instrumentality of a struggle only, to a state of true glory, or from a state that was unmerited to one that was deserved.

The second potency is the Son, by this time, however, in a state of humiliation; he has now to struggle with the first potency, or the matter, that has become limitless; he is the world's soul, which has to reorganise this material, but by this gradual subjugation to bring himself again to himself, to become spiritualised—personified. He is the Logos already active in the world prior to the appearance of Jesus, but in a state of ecstatic being; he has the power over the first potency, which is given up to him to control, to bring back again to its limits and foundation, and so, at length, to surrender this power which was transferred to him back again to the Father; this being accomplished by him with free obedience, according to the testimony of Holy Writ. That perfect restoration or bringing back to the Father will be only perfected at the end of the world; but humanity has already traversed the first or antechristian period up to the decision of the victory, and, in part, the postchristian period, and now progresses in this the perfected dominion of the Spirit towards a far future, the universal kingdom of God.

Thus, the world's history divides itself into two great periods of time, that preceding and that subsequent to the revelation of the Son; its deepest signification or import consists in our comprehending this revelation, and the mythological process that preceded it in the consciousness of different nations: the latter, however, is only the gradual process of development by which the former was ushered in; and thus the revelation is not to be comprehended at all without the mythology. The philosophy of revelation and that of mythology form together the inseparable content of the system of positive, historical philosophy, which is therefore intrinsically, or in its essence, the philosophy of history, but of a history not within the usual

limits of the historical, but stretching from the beginning to the end, from eternity to eternity.

Thus, mythology represents the process of the human consciousness of the Absolute, but is not merely to be dealt with in a one-sided manner, as if this consciousness of the different peoples had subsisted only in a perfectly groundless and inexplicable state of error and ignorance, in a subjective state, to which had corresponded no real relation whatever to the universal or to nature ; but this consciousness has a certain relative truth for those times, peoples, and natural circumstances. The human beings lived and moved actually in the tension of the universal potencies ; and these struggled forth from within the consciousness of humanity, out of the natural state of being, up to self-subsistence and spirituality, to subjectivity from out the ecstatic objectivity. The mythological consciousness is not indeed the developing self-consciousness of God himself, for "God himself," just as he hovers untouched and freely over the world, so also over this process ; it is at once a process of the world and of consciousness, and has for its result the reinstatement of self-consciousness in man, and with that of the true divine consciousness within him.

In him the same potencies are active, and gain successively the power or dominion, as in the first creation ; for simultaneously with the reinstatement of the potencies in their dignity, must the true divine consciousness of humanity be also re-established. This takes place in corresponding historical periods of the world and of religion, which were distributed like parts in a great drama to the peoples of olden times. The first period is that of the dominion of the boundless being, or first potency, which has gained the mastery over the human consciousness and held it prisoner in magic. To this potency corresponds the *astral* religion or Zabism, and together with this, the mode of life of those human beings, who, without any state-organisation or division into separate communities, lived a nomadic life boundless and objectless, as are in heaven the scattered members of the starry host. The movement that prevailed among all these was the source and object of their worship ; they were immersed, so to speak, in this movement, and it was the immanent law of their life, for them such a worship becoming thus a matter of necessity ; for this cosmical potency held them in bondage and together, until the crisis came of the division of nations ; and until then the Divine appeared but as Uranus or heaven's King.

Before, however, the second period makes its appearance, and before the first potency has been thoroughly displaced or subdued by the second, it enters into a state of conflict with the latter; it yields and becomes gradually enfeebled, and this transition from the dominion of the first to that of the second principle is in the imaginative manner of antiquity expressed by the former becoming feminine in nature, or by the Ouranos becoming the Urania. The boundless undetermined being of the first principle is by the accession of the second reduced for the first time to a definite state; in fact, to the dimly felt but mighty power of sidereal motion succeeds the worship of the Queen of Heaven, who, according to Herodotus, was chiefly worshipped in Babylon under the name of Mylitta.

But, meanwhile, the second potency is only a means, not an object or end; the object, as being the third imperative, or that which really should or ought-to-be, is with the entrance of the second principle already kept in view at each period of the process, and is foreboded by the religious consciousness. This third imperative, which lies at the root of the anti-Hellenic mythology, is or is represented by Dionysus. Before, however, this idea gains an actual entrance into and dominion over the minds of the people, there previously occurs, as already mentioned, a protracted struggle in history between the first and second principle; the first principle rebels afresh against the second and reassumes the male aspect or form, as is directly exemplified by the Baal of the Phœnicians, Egyptians, &c. This Baal does not as yet acknowledge the other god, but has him exclusively beside him as Moloch or Cronos, and so the third free and emancipating principle cannot as yet appear in its state of freedom, being still a suffering vanquished son of God, such as is presented to us in the idea of Hercules, whose lot it is not to obtain dominion or power. Finally, even Cronos becomes feminine, becomes the Rhæa, who is the *magna mater* of many gods, just as Urania indicated that consciousness, to which the Uranus, the *one* power of Heaven dispersed among the numerous material constellations, had become objective. So long as the consciousness itself, by being still rapt or ecstatically merged in the Absolute, as the dominant potency, was identical with this, monotheism prevailed. But this direct or immediate monotheism is not the right one; for just as that in itself formless potency becomes, when reduced to form and subjected to the organising power, lowered to the material of the latter, so also does it become now in this form

an object to the consciousness ; the consciousness stepping forth from out of it, setting itself free, and entering into an antagonistic relation to it. Hence, the human consciousness is the result of this theogonic process, and upon it the latter is built up ; it is, however, the final cause also, not only the hearth or central fire, but the deeper ground also of that theogonic process, by which the spirit as such obtains dominion in the world, the spirit being the third potency self-reproductive in that conflict and struggling into the light of existence.

Now, the Egyptian and Indian mythology are a direct transition to this birth, which becomes perfected in the Grecian. We must, however, distinguish the popular polytheism of the Greeks, taken in its true sense, from the meaning which was implied by the mythical process in the mysteries ; for these mysteries, which had essentially to do with the birth and dominion of Dionysus, represented the nucleus or kernel of the Grecian mythology. Dionysus, the coming, the triumphant god, is the god of the human consciousness ; he is the deliverer of the latter from the real or physical powers, and invests the spirit with dominion over nature. He and Demetrius are together the deities of vinedressing and agriculture ; this, however, is not to be regarded as the superficial symbolisation of an idea, but simply as expressing that among the Greeks, definitely organised as they were, both politically and legally, the human consciousness was as subjective as it was objective in the earlier nomadic movement of Zabism.

The peculiar signification of the Grecian mythology, and that which distinguishes its content from that of the earlier beliefs, is this, that in it the third principle, the intelligence, gains at once the supreme power. The Grecian gods are no longer merely real potencies, but formal ones, of a spiritual kind ; the reality is echoed, as it were, in them, but it no longer rules over the consciousness. The first potency is there brought completely to a state of rest, for it has become invisible, Hades ; the real principle having here been repelled and subdued as to its intrinsic nature, now stands again below all as the ground and basis of the whole plurality of gods, the whole Olympus resting upon it. As a single real principle, however, or as the substantiality of all, the overruling form of the plurality stands opposed to it ; it is no individual god, excluded together with his power from the rest, but it is in all ; and thus in the Grecian consciousness the idea of unity is united consistently enough with the plurality of the formal gods.

Now, this essential feature of the Grecian mythology was comprised in the mysteries, and in them was represented not as traditional doctrine, but as contemplative history. That potency, Dionysus, which had from the beginning really worked upon the whole process as a *final cause*, was here now in his historical metamorphosis the true content. He was in the first place, or when in the form of the first material potency, Dionysus Zagreus, who being reduced to his real or intrinsic nature, became Hades, and was so called, from the fact of his giving up his formless monarchy, and becoming the founder of all kinds of wealth (Pluto), both in the world of nature and of humanity; Dionysus being thus the giver or dispenser of all gifts. Between, however, the first formless unity and the third living beauty, propitiated with every profusion of form, lay the period of the so-called Theban or second Dionysus, a time of wild conflict between this god and the material deities of a past or older time, when Orpheus, Pentheus, and others, who opposed themselves, as adherents of the old principle, to the coming god, were dispersed. Finally, the third, triumphant Dionysus, is the joyful, exulting, blessed and blessing Iacchos; he reconciles the still mourning consciousness (Demeter), with the plurality of gods; for this and the unity of this principle, form and matter, are united in that beauty which prescribes measure and harmony, a beauty this in which the life of the Greeks, freed from natural constraint, first attained to a state of youthful freedom.

Nevertheless Iacchos was only exhibited at first in the mysteries as an infant, to distinguish him, it would seem, from Zagreus, the god of the past, as well as from the then existing plurality of gods; for he was first thought of only as a god of the future, and thus, in a manner replete with meaning, was mystically made the symbol of a truth that was yet to come; though it is true that the mythological consciousness could not know, but could at best only have a presentiment of that truth. Hitherto religion has been seen to be a spontaneous growth of nature; being not as yet revealed. This last must in its content be an event, a deed, not merely a doctrine about realities long since past; for the founding of Christianity is in itself such a reality manifested for the first time. God has only suffered the "subversion" to exist from the beginning for the sake of this fact which was to ensue, or because of the *redemption*; this is the object to which all that hitherto occurred was but a preparatory work; but on that very

account the ante-Christian consciousness could know nothing of the redemption, and no human consciousness could ever attain thereunto, so long as this fact did not actually ensue in an historical manner.

From all that has been just stated, it will be easily perceived that in the content of the Philosophy of Revelation, into which we cannot now enter any further, Schelling has recourse to a verbal interpretation of Holy Writ; for, from the most difficult passages of the latter, when regarded from the above points of view, a surprising sense or meaning is frequently elicited, though at the same time we should find it hard to affirm that in doing this the spiritual interpreter agrees in every instance with the orthodox believer. The decree and work of the redemption can, says Schelling, be no more apprehended and comprehended *a priori* by the reason than that of the creation; revelation contains a supernatural content, and must do so, or else it would be no revelation, no something truly revealed to the human reason; but it is not on that account absolutely incomprehensible, for it does not contend against the reason; but we must *will* to comprehend it, we must say, with Anselm, *credo ut intelligam*, and then that which at the first glance appeared offensive to the intellect finds *in the whole* its necessary place and meaning: much that a superficial system of rationalism has given up on the plea of accommodation appears then to be invested with the deepest sense, as *e.g.* the doctrine of Satan and of evil spirits or angels. This doctrine hangs in the closest connection with the natural resistance of the material principle to being led voluntarily back from the state of actual reality into that of intrinsic being or potentiality. Satan has been called the principle of negation, and he is such, for he is constantly resisting the formative and proportioning potency, and would, if he could, destroy all form and reduce the world to nothing. As a potency, however, and kept within due limits, as it is so long as the will does not abandon itself to its influence and so create for it an existence—in short, as a potency,—it need not be wanting in the divine economy. By the subversion or “fall” this principle became universally prevalent, but it had not on that account a personality; this, or a semblance of such, being first of all obtained, when hemmed in, as it were, by the oppositely working potency, it became placed in a state of extreme tension. Hence these powers were most violent at the time when they were brought nearest to their subjugation, and what

is reported to us of the frequent demoniac appearances and of the temptation in the time of Jesus and the apostles, is not to be set aside by any thoughtless or inconsiderate interpretation. Satan is no creature, but his essence is laid in one of the eternal potencies ; he does not, however, appear from the very beginning, as evil, but first becomes so : in himself he was and must be the principle that solicits or renders the evil manifest, without being the evil itself ; he cannot, as it were, brook that *naïve* and ignorant innocence should be in possession of blessedness without having deserved it. On that very account we must neither ridicule nor slander him, but must rather take care lest we voluntarily give to him room and existence ; for by himself he has no existence, but exists only in and by the will giving itself up to him—being, in a word, the principle that is constantly hungering after existence and unobservedly stealing in. At present evil has not been brought to a full state of expiration or been put to death in the world ; it will be first completely vanquished on that day when there is one fold and one shepherd, and the Son shall again resign the dominion to the Father.

I cannot, my friends, close this sketch of the characteristic features of Schelling's Philosophy without this double reservation ; in the first place, that I may be allowed to retract any errors that, owing to the imperfection and obscurity of the sources from which I have been obliged to draw, may easily have crept in ; and also, in the next place, that from the position given to this system *before* that of Hegel, no previous conclusion should be formed as to its rank. In placing it there regard was only had to convenience of exposition, for if we had once buried ourselves in the doctrines and formulas of Hegel we should not so readily have found our way back again to Schelling ; and thus, indeed, we are enabled to furnish an account of philosophical opinions which, though more recent than the Hegelian system (next to be treated of), not only encroach upon, but are framed in most decided opposition to the latter. An opportunity will, however, present itself, at the conclusion of the present lectures, of instituting a comparison between the two, so that we will here rest content with directing your attention to the Theory of Potencies in general, *i. e.* to the theory and method of deducing from the lowest or most inferior stage, or from

the formless matter, every thing that is higher, up to the highest intelligence and freedom. Such a theory seemed, as we have already seen in Fichte and Schleiermacher, to be first of all requisite in order that the Absolute, the sole substance, might not appear as a dead substratum and feeble passive matter, which would be contradictory to their idea of Deity as an abstract principle of unity. Thus, the substance must, somehow or other, be animated or endowed with life in itself. This however was done by regarding it as the *potency*, real possibility, or *δύναμις* as with Aristotle. In order now to truly animate this substance and represent it as the sole generative and productive principle, it did not suffice to posit it as the mere *possibility* of an ulterior and cooperative development : for, let even such a possibility be or remain what it is, there would still be required a second principle external to it in order to excite it to formative metamorphoses or changes ; thus, what — if this beginning and this evolution be once presupposed — is demanded as a matter of logical consistency, is the *necessity* that must reside abstractedly in such a principle for developing itself ; it is only when this has been pointed out that full satisfaction seems to be given to the *scientific* or philosophical demand for such a conception ; and this, then, was the problem set before himself by Hegel.

LECTURE XIII.

HEGEL.

THE first impression that was made upon the age by Schelling's Philosophy of Nature was, with the majority of his younger fellow-workers, that of a brilliant, nay, dazzling phenomenon, while to the rest, especially the older students, it appeared like an extravagant phantasmagoria or vision. While writers, such as Oken and Steffens, by following out in Schelling's spirit the natural sciences, were led to the happiest results*, Hegel, setting out, just as Schelling had done, from Fichte, undertook to reduce what the author of the more recent Nature-Philosophy had scanned with a genial eye, and aphoristically sketched, into the strict form of a regular, scientific system, and entered therewith upon a far more difficult and arid task than the numerous admirers of Schelling, who, revelling in the new light, "*hastened only to enjoy it*," as Hegel himself said, and in their hurry were well nigh upsetting the lamp from which it blazed. In fact the new organon of philosophy disclosed by Schelling in his doctrine of "*intellectual intuition*," was so exposed to the risk of being confounded with the flights of a poetic fancy, that the misuse which had been made of it by ignorant enthusiasts, brought the more recent philosophy itself, which was simply called Nature-Philosophy, into great discredit with more intelligent and judicious minds. Against this disorderly procedure Hegel has worked successfully with uncom-

* To Lorenz Oken, in particular, belongs the merit, not of having been the first to surmise, but to *discover*, *i. e.* to make known by demonstration, that the Cranial bones in the Vertebrata are constructed upon the same type as the bones composing the spinal column,—that they are, in fact, "vertebræ expanded and otherwise modified to enclose the expanded termination of the spinal cord, the brain." The Essay containing this beautiful thought is entitled "Über die Bedeutung der Schädelknochen." Jena, 1807. Recent researches, conducted under the guidance of this Essay, have but served to prove the truth and justice of Oken's theory, and so make good its claim to be regarded as the most definite contribution that has yet been made to the study of Animal Morphology, or that branch of organic science which investigates the laws that determine, within certain limits, Animal Forms. (*Tr.*)

promising rigour; and whatever opinion may be formed in other respects of his labours, it must still be acknowledged without party prejudice, that he has, by his systematic example, put a stop to the confusion, and reawakened and shown to the assiduous spirit of the educated German that we must not, in order to find the truth, "*go-a-hunting in thought after adventures.*" In fact Hegel's system has, during the last ten years, gained such a general influence, that it is impossible at present to hold any discourse upon philosophic subjects without having thoroughly studied and comprehended this system; besides, to utterly ignore the system in a state of despair as to the results, or to wish to get at the goal of the inquiry by some roundabout way, instead of traversing the proper road, is but the step taken by a self-satisfied ignorance.

It is true that Hegel was convinced of his agreement with Schelling in all essential points, and intended only to give, as above mentioned, a scientific form and fixity to the doctrines which had been already expressed, *i. e.*, to render them for the first time a perfect science. But, already in his first work, the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, which embraced a wider field than that of any of his predecessors, we see that the essential points assumed a different form to what they had done with Schelling; and though the latter has recently agreed with their author no more than Kant formerly did with his pupil Fichte, still we cannot dispute the praise that is due to the pupil for having carried out in a consistent manner the first idea that was common to them both, while, on the other hand, it remains a doubtful matter, whether the first inventor has in his own plan, which in the beginning did not embrace all parts of the science with equal caution, remained in the sequel perfectly true to himself.

We have already treated of what Schelling called his method of Intellectual Intuition, and have endeavoured to ascend under its guidance to the standing-point, which is also that from which Hegel viewed the world and commenced his speculations. He did not, however, merely set out from that point, but treated the ascent to it in a scientifically systematic manner, and expressed his theory thereof in the "*Phänomenologie des Geistes.*" This book is now regarded as the propædæutick, which brings the consciousness by a systematic route to the same height which we have ascended upon the historical.

Let us transport ourselves, before proceeding to this height, once again to the earlier standing-point of Schelling. The

Absolute, or that which was called by Spinoza the universal substance, and thus that essence which forms the infinitely numerous things from out itself, or fashions itself into the infinitude of things, which is or constitutes the world — this universal æther which is first of all to be thought of as simple and devoid of determination, was not by Schelling regarded in the light of a dead substance into which life and motion might be inspired or infused from without as if by some higher spirit, but as being the living, universal, and primordial essence of all things themselves; and then in order to express at the same time in this notion the most general fundamental law, the archetype or rhythm, which it obeyed in all its moving and living, he declared the Absolute to be the unlimited eternal Subject-Object, *i. e.* the living principle, which in obedience to its own nature eternally transports itself from the state of subjectivity into that of objectivity, and then returns as from an elastic tension within itself to the subjectivity, yet in such wise that its new state from being after each return more enriched in internal determinations, as well as in the freedom of determining itself, becomes more elevated in character, so that *ipso actu* by its working, *i. e.* the carrying out of that which lay potentially (*implicitly*) in it, it becomes gradually *for* itself that which it had the *intrinsic* power of becoming. Now in this lie unmistakeably the direct outlines of a pure rationalism and absolute idealism, such as Hegel arrived at, when, holding fast by this rhythmical movement of thought, he declared that it was itself the sum total of reality. Still, upon the other hand, there must be constantly retained an original and in every thought-movement insoluble element, namely the identical basis of the ideal and real, and this has been without doubt Schelling's opinion always. Let us, however, bear in mind that even in Schelling we have encountered propositions, such as the following: — all motion and activity, all vital impulse, even that of nature, is only an unconscious process of thought, or happens in the form of the latter; the more in nature what is normal or conformable to law becomes apparent, by so much the more spiritual do her workings appear; optical phenomena are but a system of geometry, the lines of which are traced by the light, and the perfected theory of nature would be that by virtue of which the whole of nature should resolve itself into an intelligence; finally, let us remember, that this utterly unconscious, but teleologically working life comes at length in man to itself, *i. e.* comprehends itself as the

absolute rationality, so that the Absolute and Universal itself was characterised as the *Absolute reason*, which, present objectively, or leaving its impress everywhere, becomes in man conscious of itself: if to this we add, that all that exists, all things apparently persistent in form, in a word, that matter in the most universal sense consists only of forces, and the forces themselves only of life or activities, it follows, that in the end nothing remains but an universal normally self-forming process, a *natura naturans*, which in its inmost essence can be nothing else than a striving and living, expanding and extending, shaping and organising process, obedient to an indwelling natural law, and that this law is all in all, that it is the absolute reason, or yet more, that the Absolute itself is the living reason. Thus, all that has been hitherto thought of as the essence, in which the reason dwells, disappears, nothing being left than just a law, an universal mode of action or natural necessity, a *reality* (*Ansich*), which must be acknowledged to be an utterly empty abstraction, unless it had for its consummation the self-activity, the absolute life, or, in other words, unless it is acknowledged to be just as really practical as logically formal. We have, so to speak, a living law, which fulfils itself, or an absolute power which is simultaneously and in itself its own law, a *logical* cosmos, or system of the universe, instead of the moral one as previously propounded by Fichte. All that is or exists is nothing but the actual self-moulding of the reason, all being motion and activity; the inmost essence of things themselves being but this process of action and life, and this living process being the form of the thinking process, or more correctly speaking, the actual thinking process itself. Thus, what previously hovered constantly before us as a substantial essence lying at the basis of things, is in the present instance dissolved at once and at length utterly disappears, seeing that we cannot imagine this essence to be either a material supporter of life intrinsically dead and only animated for the first time by motion, or anything else than the actual energy of the thinking process only, concerning which the only doubt that remains at present is, whether in the very beginning, and at one stroke, it must be presupposed to be the perfected active system of thought, or absolute spirit, or must be conceived of as a thinking process, at first void and abstract, but gradually fulfilling itself so as to be subjected in itself to a history or intrinsic process of development. In either case, however, we have, at the very outset, an absolute activity; and

that indeed not merely a determinate activity, but one that by its absolute form of movement is simply necessary and could not be otherwise than what it is. Now, how can we express in the most concise and characteristic manner the form of this activity as an universal form of being and thinking (such as it has already revealed itself to us)? Hegel does this by the word, *absolute conception*, and puts this in the place of the subject-object of Schelling, declaring thereby, at the same time, the universal activity—the thinking process*—to be substance itself, or a something that admits in nowise of being separated from its form: if, however, this form-activity is, as it were, to be exhibited in its inmost kernel, or quintessence, the latter then appears as the immanent infinite *negativity*, an expression this, the sense of which will become clear in what follows.

Although Schelling had advanced to this point—to that, namely, of pronouncing the absolute substance to be the absolute Subject-Object or world-Ego, beyond which there was nothing else that might determine it, but which as the living and universal primitive essence absolutely determines and moulds itself; and although Hegel familiarly declared in the same sense†, that, in his opinion, the whole question depended “not upon our apprehending and pronouncing the “true” to be a substance (dead, like that of Spinoza), but positively to be *subject*,” still it is evident, at the same time, that even in this apprehension of the matter, these two thinkers occupy no longer the same standing-point. Schelling, despite the above declaration, takes his stand *before* the absolute substance, and regards it as a matter of observation, being by virtue of his method engaged in the process of *intuition*; Hegel plants himself, so to speak, *in* the substance, and is the substance itself, or it is his immanent thinking process, his method being that *process* in a direct state of logical movement. For Schelling the subjectivity as well as the objectivity is objective, and hence both appear to be something real, the difference between them being only quantitative; Hegel’s substance is the ideal

* Hegel’s Encyclopädie, § 86., “If the Ego = Ego, or the intellectual intuition be really regarded as the first (most immediate, or principle of the system), it is evident that it is, in this pure and immediate state, none other than *Being*, just as the pure Being is inversely none other than this abstract, pure process of *thought* or *intuition*, including, however, within itself, the mediation.”

† Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 14.

self-determining unity, the idea (*Begriff*), the differences of this being with him logically different determinations.

This identity of thinking and being was, however, as Hegel says, first advanced only as a bare assertion, but not yet proved. With Kant dualism still prevailed, with Fichte subjectivism; but from the latter having regarded his Ego in the very outset as subjective and finite, he had simultaneously and immediately acknowledged an objectivity and infinitude apart from the Ego as subjective, for with the one statement the other also is made. This dualism, remaining thus unsubdued, was suddenly gathered up by Schelling into an absolute unity, an identity of real and ideal. A statement, however, of this kind not appearing to be justified, but, to use Hegel's expression, "shot as if out of a pistol," was now to be proved and shown to be a necessity. Now, in making this attempt, Hegel likewise set out, which is to be well borne in mind, from the dualism of the ordinary consciousness; for the *goal* or object in the present instance was the monism in which that dualism should coalesce so as to enable us to start from thence as a world of antagonisms or opposites. Thus the "*Phänomenologie des Geistes*," which undertook that office, was to form the first and, as it were, analytical part of the system.

If, however,—we may observe beforehand—the Phenomenology had been in fact the first and fundamental part of the system, it follows that, from its having as an hypothesis that dualism, that this would have become the basis of the whole system, and the latter have consequently obtained, like the Kantian system, a double principle, an empirical and an *a priori*, or an objective and subjective principle; so that the system would in this way, instead of being built upon a pure foundation within itself, have rested upon a point of support external to or without itself. Besides, it is seen in the Phenomenology itself, as it lies before us, that it does not actually comprise a definitely circumscribed portion, but the collective content of the whole system, however unequally this may be carried out. We have, in fact, in the Phenomenology the system in its first form. Thus, its original position must be altered, especially as regards its third part, so that, while holding good as a propædæutick for philosophical minds of the present day, it may step forth as a whole from its connection with the system, and distribute its content, newly elaborated, over different points of the latter.

In the Phenomenology as a propædæutick to the whole system,

the philosopher, first of all, retraces the stages of the ordinary unphilosophical consciousness, or transports himself into the common mode of sensuous intuition; he traverses, as it were, in recollection the formative or developmental stages of the philosophic consciousness, and shows how and by what necessity the latter has felt itself impelled from one step to another. This necessity obviously depends upon this,—that between each subordinate stage of development and the mind, as it exists at present as philosophical consciousness, a difference is met with that becomes the contradiction, because on all stages of development it is the one identical subject which appears dissimilar or unlike to itself, *i. e.* otherwise than what it already is intrinsically or in itself. This state of being and yet non-being, but still of being imperative or being that should be, continues to urge on the process until the contradiction is removed, *i. e.* until the mind has arrived at a cognition of, and certainty concerning itself. Now the stages which are inevitably met with in every mind or subject that is educated up to the philosophical standing-point of the present, have been at the same time the general fundamental views of the different ages of humanity and the standing-points of the different systems of philosophy, so that the Phenomenology can hold good not only for a psychological history of the development of the individual subject but for a history of philosophy reduced to its leading or essential features, in the which, names, dates, and all other accidental adjuncts with which the systems have been entangled in their historical appearance, are omitted, and the pure progress only of the developmental process itself is displayed.

This developmental or formative process passes through three cardinal periods, which may be characterised, first, as bare consciousness; secondly, as self-consciousness; and, thirdly, as absolute consciousness or reason. Each of these three stages has again the same number of gradations in itself, and the relation of all these progressions among themselves is this,—that the consciousness does not only advance from the lower to the higher stage in the manner above mentioned, but carries up and retains the method of intuition and thought of the lower stage to and upon the higher, seeing that the former does not absolutely disappear when the latter has made its appearance, but is subsumed by this, taken up in itself, or, as Hegel says, *suppressed*. This word "*aufheben*," to suppress, has in the German the double sense of *tollere* and *conservare*,

and means just what is here intended, namely, the assumption and retention of a mode of intuition, which hitherto was itself the point of view from which the world was regarded under a higher aspect, so that that mode now becomes, with all its content, a fresh content and object of the consciousness. Thus, *e. g.* does the consciousness regard, in the beginning, all things as fixed, persistent, and self-subsistent essences; later on, as unsubstantial, transient, and perishable phenomena; finally, as necessary limitations grounded in the universal essence; why then that first mode of intuition is explained at the same time in the higher consciousness, is justified to a certain degree, and continues, though lowered to its definite value. We will now attempt to point out the course of this phenomenological development in its leading momenta.

Not only the child at the first dawn of reflection, but the ordinary individual as well as the philosopher, finds himself, as often as he opens his eyes and gazes upon the outer or existing world, brought, at least, for an instant into that direct relation to the objects which must be constantly vanquished and mediated anew. The first glance is one of an always more or less unconscious character, or one in which the objects infinitely numerous and manifold, while presented to us with a certainty on our part as to their existence, are, however, neither understood nor comprehended as to their principle and essence. We imagine, indeed, that with this gaze at the world without us, we have at once received an infinite abundance of perceptions, but this appearance depends upon the fact of our having, as adult and educated beings, been already provided with a store of notions and knowledges, with which we bring every novelty for the moment into connection. It is no easy matter to separate from the pure act of intuition that which lies already known, cognised, and comprehended in our soul, and which becomes amalgamated simultaneously with the above process. Could we, however, distinguish exactly what is present alone and primarily in the act of intuition as such, it would then be seen, that of the object at the first glance we can know and affirm nothing more than—it is there, exists, is a “there,” a “present.” At the first glance the object reveals to us no greater fulness and multiplicity, nor is a representation of it within us mapped out and endowed with that precision or limitation, which is present to us later on.

Thus, what in the first intuition or upon the first stage of the sensuous consciousness we are able to affirm of the object, is

simply this, that it *is*. We ascribe to it, in other words, a being or existence. It is, however, soon seen that this being is nothing more than a being "there," "here," or "at present," linked to the moment, transitory, in short, no true being; for, upon the one hand, by the same experience which showed to us the being of the object is the disappearance or non-being of the latter forthwith declared,—as when *e. g.* we have said it is warm or it is fine, the conviction is immediately forced upon us that it is no longer warm and no longer fine,—while, on the other hand, the being which we ascribe to the object independently of our sight, hearing, or general sensation, is present itself only in and with the sensation; for warm or clear, and indeed every quality of this kind, implies only an affection of *our* sensitive faculty, and thus a determined state, which is present rather in *us* than by itself or objectively.

It follows from this that the objective being of this first stage, or that of *sensuous certainty*, and this direct certainty itself has been dissolved. The qualitative distinctions, in which the objective being consisted, we must take to *ourselves*, inasmuch as they are far more subjective than objective. With all this, however, the objectivity itself is not yet suppressed; for, granted that the distinctions fall within *us*, or within the sphere of our own subjectivity, still that, upon the occurrence of which the distinctions are felt by us, and which calls forth these sensations in us, is *the thing in itself*, as something constantly objective, existent, and antecedent, as we suppose, to the sensations. If the single qualities have no objective truth, it follows that we must derive instead the true from all the qualities, and call this on that very account *perception*: the qualities cannot certainly be *per se* or by themselves, but they must inhere in something that constitutes their common substratum. This is the second stage of the consciousness, and the latter rests for a long time content with this new fund of certainty. With, however, the dialectick of the thing and its qualities, we are already familiar through former systems of philosophy; but it is here reinstated in such a way, that, inasmuch as we are necessitated to acknowledge the qualities as inherences of *ourselves*, and as such to appropriate them, we must of necessity take even the thing in itself in like manner to ourselves, *i. e.*, must confess that *we* are the thing or subject itself in which those qualities inhere; for that very something, in which the qualities are, is still the same as that which *has* the qualities, and this we ourselves were.

Hence, the consciousness or the subject itself has become not only the nucleus but substratum of the chequered world of differences, which in the beginning were presented to us with a direct confidence on our part of their being an objectively existing world; the whole has consequently become subjective, or the subject has become a whole, a totality of determinations. With this, however, the consciousness itself has, at the same time, become a thing with many qualities, which are just as much and just as little self-subsistent as the thing in itself. In the dialectick of this relation, it is seen, on the one hand, that I can as little subtract the common element or the thing and essence in itself, without therewith suppressing the qualities, and so being obliged to leave either both or neither simultaneously posited; while, on the other, that so soon as I posit the one as a self-subsistent being, I thereby suppress the being of the other, and inversely.

This condition of relation and reference, or, in other words, this vitally restless process of self-reflection within itself, is the third stage and the result of the first process; herein the consciousness has cognised or become acquainted with its own nature, *i. e.* itself; or it has perceived itself as reflection, *i. e.* as *understanding*. In this stage, however, by virtue of its connection with the two preceding stages, the nature and essence of the things or objects, as they floated in the beginning before the consciousness, is at the same time revealed to and pervaded by the latter. It was seen, that the subject itself must be regarded as a thing possessed of many qualities, and as being in itself that reflection; consequently nothing else can be declared and known of the things, than that their being in itself is likewise this reflective process. Hence, the understanding in cognising its own nature, has unveiled to itself the nature even of the things; the spell is withdrawn from the eyes of the physical inquirer, and silence imposed upon the old complaint that no created spirit can dive into the interior of nature, but must only content itself with the external husk or shell. That transition and conversion of the simple state of a thing in itself into the development of qualities, and the return of these into that state of singleness, out of which they are at the same time born anew — this incessant living process, is the essence of the things themselves. The hidden *forces* from which phenomena are generally derived, imply nothing more than this form of subjectiveness or real being, in the which, however, nothing else, no further mystery, lies concealed than what is constantly

being divulged; for force is merely the abstract expression for the latent quality of that which is obviously the phenomenon, or for the identity of the manifold or diverse, the which, while it appears in the phenomenon, is and remains simultaneously also that reality, just because the latter is the process of manifestation. The reality or essence is the manifesting, self-determining essence itself in a state of inward and inseparable unity. Both sides of the essence are thus present together simultaneously, and though the essence *per se*, as being that which is persistent in the change, may be distinguished from the latter; still nothing more is implied by it than the self-persistence of the process itself—the *law*. If then we seek for a transcendent world in or behind the reality, it follows, that it can only be regarded as this intrinsic reality or formal kingdom of persistent laws, which are, however, abstractedly for themselves alone nothing existent, but only the persistent state of the reality itself.

Hitherto, the consciousness has been occupied with the representation of a distinction of itself as subject and a world as object, though recognising at the same time also the identity of both. Consequently, the distinction could not be one of a real and qualitative character, but only a formal one; *i. e.*, the natural being, which is utterly the same as the consciousness, is only the consciousness doubled in the representation, or is itself only the representation, which the subject has made of itself and set before itself (*sibi*) as a something existing. For, if we retain again closely in our minds the course of the above-mentioned development, we perceive that the subject must gradually take to itself all objective being, and consequently acknowledge, that that which was previously presented to it as objectively existing, is its own subjective action; it has, in short, while stripping off the objectivity bit by bit, preserved itself to the last, and has altogether and in all cognised nothing but its own action and essence. The self-reflection has consequently arrived at a standing-point, where all being apart from the subject disappears, and it is solely in itself by itself. If the first standing-point of the consciousness, where the latter relied upon the reality of things, or, in other words, upon the noumenon, or thing in itself, may be regarded as being Kantian in character, we do but recognise in the present one, where the consciousness is solely in possession of *itself*, and may be consequently called self-consciousness, the standing-point of Fichte's subjective idealism.

The thinking process has here in the knowledge of itself, or as a self-consciousness, dived into its own hidden nucleus or essence, is a totality of subjective determinations, or is in itself *per se*; but now comes the question, what is its real relation in this process, and *how* does it think these determinations? By virtue of its origin from direct consciousness it has indeed taken this form of immediateness into itself, but has not at the same time subdued it in its own interior. It is still only the category of the quality of the thing which is subjectified; the subject has indeed retired into itself, but has not as yet thoroughly mediated the thought-determinations which are directly present within itself; so that the consciousness is imprisoned within itself in a peculiar amphiboly or state of doubt. For, not having as yet fully dissolved *per se* the quality of the thing, *i. e.* still knowing itself more or less as a thing, and things being only finite individualities presupposing other things beyond them, there thus originates to the self-consciousness, while negating them, a constant series of objectively self-subsistent things. The self-consciousness is placed as a middle state or condition between the lower and higher consciousness; so long as it is self-consciousness, it is also the continuous process of mediation, and works uninterruptedly at the task of reinstating itself as a triumphant subjectivity from out the objectivity, for in this action it consists, this being its inward nature or essence, and it continues only so long as this labour lasts, seeing that it has therein its self-certainty, or feels and maintains itself solely by virtue of this activity or process. Thus, while it has constantly to be freeing itself from the objectivity, it yet required the latter, and is inevitably or by its own nature related to it; being, as a self-cognisant reflection, this very state of relation and amphiboly. Since then the Ego or subject is this reflection, it follows, that it is the necessity not only of positing but of suppressing the self-subsistence of things; so soon as these appear to be established and self-subsistent, the task devolves inevitably upon the Ego of negating this self-subsistence, in order that it may prove itself to be the positing activity, the self-determination, and, in like manner, when the things are suppressed, of letting them be again posited.

The process of the self-consciousness advances in like manner by definite stages, and this already mentioned action is first of all the *desire* of suppressing the exclusive being of the objects, or, in other words, of not suffering them to oppose any

limit or barrier to itself, the exclusive Ego. Hence, the Ego becomes practical, feels certain wants and requirements, and undertakes the task of subjecting the objects to itself by elaborating and digesting them, or by an assimilation and intussusception of them, of converting them entirely into itself, rendering them organs of its will, or, what amounts to the same thing, organising itself into the condition of an object, and then dealing with this as with its own body and possession. It follows from this that the self-subsistence of the natural objects is suppressed, for they are reduced afresh to accidents and qualities of the subject; but we know also from the dialectick of the quality of the thing that this self-subsistence of qualities reoriginates so soon as it is suppressed; and this is also seen to be the case in the present instance, where the satisfaction of the desires alternates in like manner with their reawakening, just as was the case with the origination and disappearance of the noumenon or thing in itself in and together with its qualities. The difference is only this, that the practical process presupposes the corresponding theoretical one, for the groundwork of the impulse is the feeling.* It is true that the Ego is here simultaneously placed upon the practical standing-point, while in the bare consciousness it stood only upon the theoretical; but this distinction is *none* whatever for the consciousness, for even in the practical sphere we have just as much to deal with sensations, and thus, with moments of consciousness, or with the inward perception of self-satisfaction or of want; and the will makes no difference, for in the theoretical process there is present, as in the practical, just the same endeavour or volition to suppress the negation or limit of the objectivity, save only that this endeavour is in the former a direct, in the latter a reflected effort, or one that falls within the pale of the consciousness. Willing and thinking are, as was already said by Spinoza, in themselves the same; being and thought, apprehended as activity, are in themselves identical.

As regards this point it will be difficult for those who have an unprejudiced sense of reality to agree with the philosophy now before them, nay, even to follow it, and we have certainly come now to a point in which even the idealism of Fichte is converted into realism. The ordinary consciousness will find a difficulty in persuading itself that hunger and thirst, cold and heat, are only a something that by a process which takes place in the subjective self-consciousness admits of being suppressed.

* Compare Hegel's *Encyclopädie*, § 359.

If matters were to depend only upon the energy of one's self-determination, why then the person in distress who is in danger of starvation, or of perishing by thirst or fire, would have the means of his deliverance close at hand. In order then that we may set to rights objections of this kind, such as are raised by the so-called common sense of humanity, we must hold fast by the systematic connection of thoughts, from or out of which reflections like these tend inevitably to withdraw us. Thus, when the negation of objectivity is spoken of, the distinction only is meant of sensation and bare representation, though both are, despite this difference, states of the consciousness; whether or no the finite Ego can in every situation in life freely determine itself, is another question. Moreover, we must bear in mind that the subject in this its subjective idealism, if it does but resolutely accomplish and wholly perfect the latter, stands at once in the midst of the reality, seeing that then there would be no more distinction between the ideal and real, or, in other words, the ideal would be at one and the same time real and the real also ideal; lastly, if we bear in mind that an imagined danger, *e. g.* such as is presented to us in sleep, alarms us no less than a real one, it is then seen, that a representation, of which we do not know that it is merely such, has no less reality for us than the real itself; or more correctly speaking, that the real itself in the representation can only in so far as it is known, believed in, and felt, be a practical moment for us, but not so in so far as it does not enter in any way into our consciousness. The self-consciousness is, as was said, from its very nature, in this constant state of amphiboly or doubt, and oscillates between a real and ideal world, being itself this ambiguity, while the will is a "divine irony" or mode of declaring the objective to be and also not to be. Now this it is which, as the mystery of dialectick, belongs to the esoteric student of philosophy. The unbiassed human understanding either does not reflect at all, and its intuitions hold good to it as things, in which case it is the common, or what is called cosmopolitan consciousness; or it does reflect and is conscious to itself that it has representations, and that these, as being its own, are not the things, though it presupposes at the same time that by them the things are cognised as they are, and in this case it is the *naïve* synthesis of idealism and realism. The philosophising self-consciousness of this stage will, however, needs be sceptical upon the one hand and subjective on the other. It is this dialectick which the mind, after traversing,

must survive, in order that the synthesis of the human understanding may become certain or positive as to itself, for, if it had not this very amphiboly behind itself, it would not be a certainty ; now this is just (in our opinion) the standing-point, at which the dialectick finds its momentary justification.

With all this, however, the self-consciousness is not yet at one with itself. We have hitherto regarded it as opposed merely to the nature that is devoid of self ; its content consisting only of its own determinations, which are not personalities but that which objectively, not persons, but natural objects, *matters* are ; thus, the subject was justified in declaring itself to be the power of things, the ruler and lord of nature. The self-consciousness has not yet discovered among the objects its like, and on that very account will fall far short of having wholly discovered itself ; or, in other words, it cannot as yet find its like because it has not as yet fully comprehended itself. So long as the person knows only of himself as of a thing the self-consciousness has no representation in itself, which it can objectify, and in doing this cognise another as person. The self-consciousness as personality awakes simultaneously with the recognition of another self-consciousness as person, and inversely. Is it asked from what side this potentialisation is to proceed ? Hegel sets it before us as a process in an external historical form, though one which is strictly of an internal kind, not admitting of being brought to pass by itself in *one* isolated subject, but only among several subjects standing in reciprocal relation, yet, nevertheless, in such a way that they all obtain simultaneously in themselves their now true and personal self-consciousness. He calls this process one of *recognition*, and carries it out in such a way that in the concurrence of the subjects, which are at first only objects of the consciousness to one another like natural objects, a struggle is brought about of life and death ; which struggle, however, cannot terminate with the actual annihilation of the one, because thereby that something which should be attained would be negated, namely the consciousness of free personality which the stronger one must, by virtue of his being a man akin to others of his kind, acknowledge even in the weaker, and not injure without injuring himself. Such is the dialectick of the notion of justice, or right, which is involved in many difficulties, but, such as it is, is here presented to you in its first or leading outlines.

In this process each Ego has attained for itself, as an in-

dividual "this," the recognition of its freedom and self-subsistence, and that indeed from other Egoes, and acknowledges the latter in turn to be its equals, or to be the counterpart or equivalent of itself. This then is the "*universal self-consciousness*," the positive knowledge of oneself in some other self, each of these selfs as being a free individuality having absolute self-subsistence. All are consequently in and for themselves free, as regards action and self-consciousness; we have, in short, an atomistic plurality of Egoes, but all being alike and not qualitatively distinct in their nature from each other, it follows, that they will now feel themselves to be an *universal spiritual substance*, and will inwardly perceive, and, especially as family and nation, declare themselves, in exalted outbursts of love and patriotism, to be this substantial unity.

"With this the third and highest sphere of the consciousness is attained, the *consciousness of the Absolute* or the reason, and the reason is the above-mentioned substance or substratum of all subjects. Now, seeing that the individual finite Ego recognises itself to be a part of that universal, it acknowledges also that its determinations, which were previously regarded as subjective, are in this common element determinations of the universal; for every Ego belongs, together with its content, to that universal substance; and in this all is objective as well as subjective; it is objective or opposed to itself in itself, and subjectivity as well as objectivity implies nothing more than the antagonism of the finite Egoes to each other; what, in a word, is subjective in the one is objective to the other, and the reverse: but in the universal Ego all is subjective, and this subjective has all that is objectively correlative, subdued, or put under itself. We thus encounter the same relation in the absolute world-Ego as was held by subjective idealism in the finite Ego; as in the latter there were only internal, subjective, or thought-objects, so in the absolute idealism or monism, the distinction between the ideal and real is suppressed, all is just as real as ideal, and in this way is perfected and attained what the Phenomenology had set before it as an object, "that the true be apprehended and expressed, not merely as substance, but, to an equal degree, as *subject*."

This rational process of thought,—which is now no longer apart from and contemplative of the substance, but is itself the substance, *i. e.* the subject, which contemplates and determines itself,—is *the truth of all knowledge*, in the which being and

thinking are no longer apart from each other, for being is no longer an object for the thinking process, but the thinking process is itself the object of the thinking process, and on that account is called being though this in itself is only what has been thought by the thinking process, the reason having become objective to itself, and so perceiving and determining nothing but itself. We thus arrive as a result at the Aristotelian νόσις τῆς νοήσεως, the self-thinking process of thought, or the self-knowing truth, Absolute Idealism, which in itself is absolute realism, or an identity in which these antagonisms have coalesced, in order to generate or engender themselves anew, without positing therewith a duplicity of principles; seeing that the production of the antagonisms or, to speak more concisely, the process of self-opposition or *absolute negativity*, is the one absolutely self-moving principle.

LECTURE XIV.

HEGEL — (*continued.*)

HITHERTO we have been tracing the course of the Phenomenology, in order that we may with the principle there obtained and justified, namely, that of the Identity of thinking and being, proceed in the next place to the system itself. But in doing this we must not omit to mention that Hegel begins the whole of his system, as well as most of its leading divisions, with a preliminary scheme or survey of its general arrangement, but does not forget to declare expressly at the same time that such preliminaries have only an historical value, determine nothing beforehand as to the end and object of the investigation, and therefore hold good for nothing more than a prefixed table of contents; for to regard them as any thing belonging to the subject-matter itself, would be in opposition to his postulate or assumption, namely, that philosophy has thoroughly to refrain from all preconceived opinions and quietly to await the steps by which its own methodical development will inevitably conduct it. Philosophy must not presuppose any thing, and must therefore begin with the most abstract and void of all propositions, with the naught itself, and then give up to the power of the method to show how this beginning will develop, and by a process of spontaneous growth gradually fashion itself into a more concrete and perfect organism. Hence the beginning of the system is obviously distinct from that of the Phenomenology; for in this the consciousness was placed in the midst of reality, the intelligence, already in a state of philosophical education, transferring itself back to the beginnings of its education, and so falling by this abstraction of itself into a kind of tension; while in the system itself we have a purely objective beginning, an empty indefinite "being", which the philosophising subject is not in any way to violate nor interfere with. It is true, as *we* already know, that this being is *in itself* the intrinsic identity of being and thinking; but this foreknowledge of ours lies, like the Phenomenology itself through which it is obtained, external to the system and its contents. That beginning is ex-

pressly defined to be the abstract, immediate, objective being, and with this nothing more is to be thought of, or mixed up, each thought of a definite end, or of an ultimate object already given, being kept perfectly in abeyance.

Thus, in order that we may not transfer to the system any thing that, according to the author's view does not reside therein, we must refrain strictly from all accessory thoughts and suppositions, and, starting from the first and simplest category, the lowest and "most empty" being, abandon ourselves confidently to the genetic power of the method. If, despite of this, we previously fix our eyes upon the whole system, its beginning, middle, and end, this must not be done, according to Hegel, with a view of anticipating in a secret manner, the end or goal of the system, in and together with its beginning, but only with a view of obtaining for ourselves a preliminary survey that may help us in gaining information more readily upon the whole subject.

We have already in the *Phenomenology* learnt thus much of the method, that everywhere the idea or notion appears first of all in its immediateness, or intrinsic reality, that it then passes judgment upon itself or becomes resolved into its opposite, and ultimately coalesces from out these antagonisms. From this very method results the whole structure or subdivision of the system. The Absolute, the being-thinking or *Idee*, has to pass through three momenta, and in the first place to present itself as bare idea in and for itself; secondly, in its differentiation or objective state, externality; and thirdly, as the idea that has returned from its externality into itself: in the first state it is the purely logical *Idee*, the *thinking process* taken in the stricter sense as such in and for itself; in the second, it is the *Idee* in its externality, or departure from itself into a temporospatial disjunctivity, *i. e. nature*; and in the third, it is the *mind* or intelligence. Accordingly, the whole of philosophy, or the thinking process, which has comprehended itself in this its active state, has three cardinal divisions, — the Logic, which with Hegel, as is readily seen, implies also *Metaphysics*; the Philosophy of Nature; and Philosophy of Mind. If, forsooth, we regard the material objects of nature as such as they are in themselves, why then we who contemplate or regard them have discovered what they are in themselves, and have become acquainted with their inward nature or essence; but they, the objects, do not know themselves, they are not present *for themselves*, but only for others; the essence that is working

and (as we know) *thinking* in them, or the absolute *Idee*, is veiled in them from its own gaze, or does not comprehend itself; it is *only present* absolutely, without being what it really should be, namely, *per se* or *for itself*; and thus nature is the idea (*Idee*) in its *differentiation*. Directly opposed to this natural state stands that of the *Idee* as bare, abstract thinking, where it is only by itself and not in the condition of differentiation, or has this last only within itself (as thought-objects). If now, as such, it believes in the outset, that it apprehends itself as a subjective thinking process merely in its subjectivity, and has nothing in common with the objective and real being, it follows, that this view is proved within the very sphere of its own thinking process to be false; for it perceives that the essence and action, the real and the true, are not an *alterum*, or something that differs from it, and accordingly, guided thither by its own thinking process, it comprehends itself at the end of the logic as the subjective and objective activity, or as the only true reality; in short, what it is and how it is in itself—as mind. Hence the mind is the return from the state of exterioration to that of being in and for itself, and this syllogism eternally returning into itself is the synthesis of the logical and natural course, which constitutes the third part of the system, the *Philosophy of Mind*.

Within each of these three cardinal divisions the same rhythmical movement repeats itself and produces a like three-fold division. The Logic has to deal (*a*) with the first immediateness or with being (*b*); this divides itself into the antagonism of essence and existence, and these finally coalesce together to form the idea (*Begriff*) with which we have already become acquainted both in its real as well as ideal import, as the living circulation of momenta including itself within itself.

In like manner with the *Philosophy of Nature*. It resolves itself into *Mechanics*, *i. e.*, into the doctrine of the external relation of many singulars, in which each appears as a whole and self-subsistent; into *Physics*, which corresponds to the logical category of the essence, and into *Organics*, which comprises the real idea, as its immanent or own proper object, or the process of mineral, vegetable, and animal life.

Finally, in the *Philosophy of Mind* is developed, in the first place, the being of the *subjective* mind, or that which otherwise is commonly understood by psychology; in the next place, when in the manner essentially laid down in the Phenomenology, the individual has arrived at the stage of rational con-

sciousness, we encounter the *objective* mind, *i. e.* this very rationality represented as externally organised in the social life of human beings, in order, finally, at the conclusion of the whole, or in the absolute science, to perfect itself as the universal spiritual process of art, religion, and philosophy, which is the ethereal life of the mind itself.

Each of these nine divisions of the system resolves itself methodically into three momenta, these again into three, and so on in the most special manner, except in the Philosophy of Nature where a departure takes place from the general rule, since we there meet with a quadruple division. Now, if in this systematic arrangement, it may appear as if attention was paid only to the constantly more definite and special individuation of the singular, and as if the latter were to be determined and comprehended only from the whole, still, if by the whole or universal is understood an ultimate object already declared or *expressed* in the beginning, such is not the case, for the development runs on, so to speak, along the threads of the individual categories, so that from the more abstract originates the more concrete, from the lower the higher, from the less perfect the more perfect, and that solely by virtue of the method, *i. e.* by means of negations, without to this end the vivification of any other element, whether empiricism or a presupposed ultimate object, being required; in short, Hegel in his system and its method, rests content with the declaration, that in the introductory category or abstract being, all the content which is aimed at lies already implicitly or *in itself*, by virtue of the intrinsic identity of this being with the rational process of thought, and as for the rest he refers us to the logical experiment of the development, which we will now proceed to trace as far as is possible in a brief manner.

The Logic begins with the most simple abstraction of all, that of *being*. We know indeed, that this being is identical with bare thought or is the thinking process in itself; but, at this its first appearance no evidence is afforded us of such identity, and we are not aware that the being which is now presented us is the very reflex of the thinking process which objectifies itself therein. The thinking process is of an exceedingly moveable self-determining nature, but in the being at the first glance

nothing of this kind is as yet to be perceived; it will soon, however, be seen, upon fixed attention being directed to it, what occurs; for we have nothing to do but to watch the transformations of the being. This being holds the same relation to the thinking process as the predicate does to the subject in the logical judgment, for it declares (or predicates) what the subject is; it is the perceived for the perceiving Ego, the reflex of the eye in a mirror for the eye that sees; now just as the latter cannot gaze directly at its own form and movement, but only at its reflected image, while this again only yields a facsimile of that which is looking into the mirror, so also in this objective being will the whole subjective nature of the thinking process gradually reveal itself.

In the first place, what is this being, or what do we discern therein? We can only say that we distinguish as yet nothing in it, nay more, that we cannot distinguish it from the void or absolute naught. We bestow "being" as a predicate upon all possible things, all qualities, nay, all thoughts without distinction, *i. e.* we say of every thing, *it is*, or that to every thing being belongs, though not in a prominent sense, as if by this it was meant to affirm that every thing *is* self-subsistent, eternal, and absolutely *per se*, but in the general and utterly indeterminate sense in which the logical copula is used for all that is but possible. If even we set aside all other predicates, by which objects are more closely defined, there still, however, remains this common, though in fact, non-affirmative being, which we may predicate of every thing without distinction. Thus, this being is a purely indeterminate state; it is the thinking process, which thinks of nothing; the intuition, which looks directly forth, without gazing at any thing; it is as though we gazed upon the wide heavens, of which we cannot say, they are blue, or are not the earth, or are not ourselves; for we have here made utter abstraction of every thing, have clean forgotten every *alterum*, and hence have nothing with which to compare this objectivity, or whereat, by distinguishing, to determine it.

Although we might now imagine, that we have got in the being something fixed and self-subsistent, or, at all events, the very reverse of naught, we shall, notwithstanding, discern and be constrained to acknowledge, upon Hegel's method, that this being is in fact naught. Thus, being and naught are identical; *i. e.* the supposed being has changed before our eyes into the naught, or proved itself to be such; it has wholly and

utterly become naught. Being does not merely border upon naught, as if the former were here and the latter there, or the one were to commence where the other ceases, both meanwhile excluding each other; but no, they are both one and the same *eodem loco et tempore*; I may speak at one time of being, at another of naught, but by this I do not mean that they are two, but only one and the same. Such then is the contradictory contradiction as posited or existing, which was formerly held in logical works to be an absolute impossibility, namely, that being and non-being are the same. Yet, nevertheless, matters stand thus. For it is just this very contradiction or actual self-contradicting process that *is*, for it is in itself the movement of thought, the absolute negativity, the continual opposition or antagonization of itself to itself (*se sibi*), the process of dividing and judging, the sub-objectivity of the Ego in itself.

Now, with this point we have gained at once what we were in search of, and what *must* follow as a matter of course; for behold, as if present before you in its first and purest form, the moveable nature of the thinking process. It has, unobservedly, become to us an object of intuition, and appears as *origination* or *becoming*. In this origination, being and naught are suppressed, *i. e.* simultaneously preserved and contained; for if we analyse what is implied by the act of becoming, it is seen to be an alternating process of origination and evanescence, or of evanescence and origination, a continual transition from the being into the naught and a continual proceeding from the naught into being.

Such is the first Trilogy; the unity of being, naught, and origination, or of position, negation, and limitation; but, as has been already said, we have not by the latter term to think of any external limitation, but only of the internal self-differencing of this movement, or of the oscillation and vibration between being and non-being. In this first methodical thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, whereof the latter consists in a process or course of gradually closer self-determination, we have at once an example or type of all succeeding theses, and shall understand these the more readily, by referring to the above simple movement of thought.

Thus, what appeared in the beginning to be a simple, not to say pure, being, has now become one that is in itself of a more definite kind; for it has, as a result of the above process, proved itself to be such, and has, as it were, as a new product, retired from active life, in other words, it has shown that the

being, as we imagined, is, more correctly and definitely speaking, to be called only an *existence*. Existence is a "here" or "now," a demonstrative *this* or present *being* (for as yet it certainly does not admit of any closer definition), the same, in other words, that was presented to us as an object in the Phenomenology. Hence it is that which admits of being predicated of each definite being or *something*—in short, of *every* something, *i. e.* it is the general predicate which declares that that something is a "there"- or "here"-existent.

In this bare existence, however, is comprised the disappearance, or process of continuous cessation, which characterised the origination or becoming, and each something is by virtue of this, its predicate of mere present being, a *finite*; that whereby it is distinguished from another finite is a mere quality, nay, closely considered, it is itself a mere quality, and this word, in its most general acceptance, means nothing more than "being not this or that," or being otherwise—*i. e.* an *alterum*. We can take no note whatever of its existence, or cannot distinguish *any thing*, unless simultaneously or successively an *alterum* were also to be present from which it might be distinguished, or, rather, from which it objectively distinguishes itself, for *on that account* only do we distinguish it. Returning to the example already given, we can only say, the heaven is blue because it is not any thing else, *e. g.* not green, like the earth. That, however, which, apart from all examples, must in a general and logical sense be predicated of the existent, as its nature, is, as a consequence of what has been stated, the *finitude*, by which at the same time the character of mutability is to be understood.

It now devolves again upon the existence or the definite positive something, and upon the other hand its negation, namely the limit or finitude, to coalesce together into a synthesis. Since, however, the *alterum* of the something is itself an *alterum*, or because something is constantly limited by an *alterum* or something else, finite being limited by finite, it follows, that, in the present instance, an endless finitude, a constantly progressive differentialisation, comes at once into play, and having itself no end or termination appears on that account as *infinitude*. Finitude and infinitude are, indeed, usually regarded as opposites, which fully exclude each other and enter our thoughts only by turns. But with this supposition only, an endless change of position or negation, or a reciprocal line of demarcation between the finite and infinite,

would be brought before the intuitive faculty, a *progressus in infinitum*, which Hegel calls a miserable kind of infinity; for we may easily convince ourselves that in this way the true infinity has not been thought of, for we let it cease precisely at the point or moment of time where the finitude begins, so that the former is as it were on the other side, the latter on this; for so soon now as one is bounded off and suppressed by the other, the infinity itself becomes again a finitude. What is imperatively required is an identity of the two, like what occurred in the origination or becoming, as the synthesis of being and naught. Thus, the true infinity and at the same time the truth of existence—consequently of the being also that has been simultaneously resolved into that—is, that the infinite be regarded as a constant transition into qualitative determinations, and that indeed from one to the other, so that it does not therewith pass out of itself, but coalesces in itself together with itself. It is itself this process of self-transformation; for just because it is throughout a determination or a finitude that distinguishes itself from itself, each one of these determinations, when effaced, is by this process the opposite or reverse of itself, *i. e.* has become different to, or is *not* that which it was before, or has become that which previously it was not, but which previously the other determination external to it was. This other determination was, however, the direct *negation* of what the first was, thus directly that whereunto the first has now become, so that one has become reciprocally the other, or regarded *in toto*,—and this is true infinity or change—the general origination is again present, but with this difference, that it is a definite, qualitative origination, a determination of itself in itself, or to use the language of Jacob Böhmen, a qualification of itself.

In this way the second phase of being is perfected and its result settles down as a quiescent precipitate, but only to begin the process at the same time anew. This result is the *being per se*; and this being *per se* is that infinite *relation to itself* which, in the infinite, proved itself to be direct self-determination. In the present case there is nothing external, no *alterum*, to which the infinite could hold any relation; for the infinite must be the whole and can only be related to itself, can no longer distinguish itself from an *alterum*, but only in itself, being throughout this moveable process of relation. Thus, the existent *per se* appears at first as *one*, or as a singleness in itself that excludes every *alterum*. And in all this we now

recognise the revealed nature of being, namely that that which we really understand by being, this being *per se*, is not a being related to an *alterum* or something else resting or dependent upon this, but is a state of self-subsistence. It is the being which the Atomist, for example, ascribes to his atoms or monads, which, in a negative sense, implies a complete independence of an *alterum*, in a positive sense, a perfect being *per se*, having its own centre or gravitating point within itself.

We have, however, to bear in mind that in this being *per se* the existence and infinity are suppressed, and that thus it is not the abstract being which the Atomist would insist upon, yet cannot preserve from the process of origination and transition into its *alterum*, into which it is irresistibly drawn in order finally to reappear or originate in this more definite form. Each essence is in itself what all others are, or each regarded by itself alone would become all in itself, and consequently the collective content, which was represented as existing apart from it; and this very dialectic phenomenon is the process which here again originates. If I regard a unit *per se*, why then all other units are excluded or repelled from it; for the positive relation of self to self, this attraction or contraction in itself, the retention of self within self, or self-preservation, is simultaneously and intrinsically the repulsion of the *alterum*. Look at the movement of several molecules in a single substance; while each of them attracts intrinsically and in itself the parts of the fluid that immediately surrounds it, they will appear to retire from the other molecules, diverge from each other in opposite directions, consequently repel each other; and this same movement, which appears as repulsion, is at the same time the above process of becoming attracted. Thus, repulsion and attraction are identical, and in this identity the first relation of self to self as well as its negation (repulsion) have become reunited in the process: those opposites are not to be regarded as two forces and principles operating through each other, and together constituting matter, but to be thought of dialectically as one and the same, or as this negativity, of which they furnish the most distinct proof.

With the being *per se* or for itself the first part of the doctrine of being or the so-called *quality* is perfected. We have traced this doctrine through the moments of each separate thesis, in order that in these we might at the same time furnish examples of the dialectic method. Now, just as the

latter moves between the momenta of each individual category, so also does it prevail between the categories themselves, and we now proceed to ascend by somewhat larger steps the following stages.

The quality, as exhibited at length in the being *per se*, was the being of the things themselves, recognised in its truth: the differences of objectivity, which we call matter, consist of qualities, or are themselves thoroughly qualitative, the quality being identical with the being. This identity is now to be negated. The negation of the quality is not, however, negation in the absolute sense, so that through it the abstract naught may reappear, but it is the determined negation or direct opposite only of quality or of the immediate unity of quality and being, so that this unity it is which is suppressed, whereby the quality becomes established as a quality indifferent to the being, *i. e.* to the qualitatively determined being, and distinguishable from it, *i. e.* the quality turns out to be a *quantity*. Into this the quality has itself passed over; for the quantity is the same as what the quality was ultimately proved to be, the attraction and repulsion of the latter passing over in the present instance into the two momenta of stability and discretion, in the mutual relation of which consists every process of figures and calculation. Thus, the definite quantity, the state of *plus* or *minus*, is something by which the specific quality of matters and the matters themselves do not appear by any means to be changed; for we can subtract more or less from one and the same body without its qualitative nature being thereby converted into something different. Quantity is in its nature that which is externally definable, every quantity appearing as a *definite* quantity or *quantum*. The difference of quantity is, however, or amounts only to, *limit*. This limit or determinate state of quantity can, however, taken as it here is in a mathematical sense, be either an extensive or intensive determination of quantity, which last is called *degree*, a determinate state which does not indeed express in itself any internal determination of the essence or nature of the something, but is only measured and determined by external and in like manner merely quantitative determinations. For example, ten degrees of cold, or the tenth degree, is an intensity only in reference to the ninth or eleventh degree, and so on; though still an approximation is already made to the quality, which seemed above to have wholly disappeared in the quantity. Thus, the cold is cold only, and the heat only heat, through its degree,

and thus by virtue of quantitative determination ; and we may now see how it happens that by change of quantity the quality, or inversely, becomes at the same time different to what it was ; thus, ice becomes by a change of temperature fluid water, water passes into the state of vapour, &c.

Hence, the degree, as being a quantitative determination with which a certain quality must be associated, is proved to be really the ratio of *measure*. Measure, however, is a *relation* of two quanta to each other, as is seen clearly and perfectly in relations of potency, square root of numbers, &c. In the midst of the quantity, which a thoroughly external and indifferent relation of the numbers to each other seemed to comprise, thoroughly definite and unchangeable relations of quanta to other quanta are declared ; and the cubic root, for example, is no longer an external scale or rule, but an internal law of growth or increase, by which the so-called infinite quantities may be determined. Lastly, the fundamental relation of quantity, which has just been seen to be a continuity and discretion, or an unity and plurality, is most distinctly declared in the relations of potencies, where the calculation is no longer made with quanta as such, but with their relations (exponents), whereby this abstract category gains in itself again a resting point and organisation, nay more, the most definite ratio, which suffers it to reappear as an expression of quality or rather to coalesce itself with the latter. Thus, it is distinctly seen in stoichiometric tables of chemical combinations, how the quality is directly dependent upon quantitative relations, or really consists itself of these, and how the specific (the quantity) is itself of a quantitative nature, an internal measure, a *relation to itself*.

Thus, while the quality is determined by the quantity, and this again by the former, the one becoming simultaneously changed together with the other, we again encounter the well-known *progressus in infinitum* ; from each relation of quantity that passes beyond a definite specific measure another and new *quale* must originate, and this again must pass over by continuous enlargement into a new one, and so on *in infinitum*. This process into the infinite is, however, solved both here, and everywhere else where it comes into play, by the fact of reflection being brought to bear upon the act that accompanies it. For, even here nothing more really occurs than the interchange or shifting to and fro of two opposite determinations, a reciprocation, which, repeat it as often as we please, leads to no goal,

and means just as much at first as it does at last. Thus, this movement, just as it is, is the synthesis which is to be firmly retained, the thought that was actually thought, the true; and hence the category of measure is elevated as a mutual and abstract relation of two quantitativo-qualitative determinations up to the movement of the *reflective process*. It is the same movement which has already been shown to occur in the being *per se* as attraction and repulsion, and then in the quantity as continuity and discretion: but here in the measure, it has become objectively and fully apparent through the fact itself, seeing that the measure directly represented a relation of two sides, *which are, however, in themselves the same thing*, namely, *quanta*; thus, a relation of what is related to itself, so that the quantity being now a simple relation of self to self, proves itself to have therewith receded into quality, or to be identical with this.

Now, with this identity we have reached a new, a higher logical stage. With quality, quantity, and their synthesis, or the process of measure, the first logical cycle, or the sphere of being in general, is completed. Its result was the movement of reflection within itself, and this, objectified or posited, is or constitutes *essence*. Regarded phenomenologically, we have now stepped from the stage of direct intuition into that of the understanding.

If, hitherto, all the points that we have been contemplating appeared to lie near or external to each other, or successively to make room for one another, and then to disappear, so soon as a new something entered the field, just as in the sensuous intuition when the one, for example, the clear sky appears, the other, the cloudy atmosphere, has passed away, without the one being the ground of the other, or capable of maintaining itself as present in and together with the other; so also does this relation of externality change into its counterpart, into the mutually involved being of the opposite, and the relations now to be regarded are concrete identities of two momenta simultaneously existing in, with, and by each other. The intuition was previously of a direct or immediate nature, *i. e.*, not as yet objectified; the contemplative subject saw not the process of contemplation itself, but only its determinations, the objects; but it now sees objectively the above process or determination, and its determinations at one and the same time; and the objectivities, which now appear, are or imply just this objective unity of determination and determinate state.

With the *essence*—in which, that we may recognise its moveable nature, we must think of the infinitive mood of the obsolete verb *wesen*—a deeper insight is afforded into the nature of the Absolute or absolutely existent; and we no longer persist in calling this directly being or existence, but now call it *essence*, indicating thereby that double nature, internal binary division or state of antagonism, which now lies stamped, as it were, or impressed, on the subject-matter itself, as well as on the titles by which we shall henceforth designate the Absolute. These titles are thorough ideas of reflection, relative or correlative ideas, correlates which no longer involve their relation or antithesis in a merely hidden manner, or merely *in themselves*, but exhibit it openly *per se* or for themselves. The determinations which the *essence* assumes are, therefore, of a different nature, and endowed with a different character to those that occur in the sphere of being; for there these determinations or qualities were directly the something, that is, disappears and becomes another, while here, on the contrary, the determinations are posited by the essence itself, seeing that it resolves itself into them, and is in them its own reappearance; for, since neither of these antitheses, *e. g.*, cause and effect, can *be* without the other, it follows that they appear to be *conditioned* by, and dependent upon, one another, neither by itself alone sustaining the absolute position, but *a* being only through or by *b*, and *b* through *a*; thus, in this category, true being, being *per se* or genuine self-subsistence, is really absent, and is found again, for the first time, in the third sphere, in that of the, properly so-called, *Idea*; here at bottom only the *appearance*, but not the true *being* occurs. The essence reveals itself at once as the process of reflection, as the activity of self-polarisation, inward self-opposition, division, or *negativity*, though still occurring immediately and in itself. Thus, we may say that the essence of things is the intelligence of nature, being the same act as the understanding is in us, namely, a judging, self-discriminating or reflective process, an internal reflection or manifestation within itself.

We must now take a closer glance at the peculiar nature of all the determinations of reflexion that are here mentioned. We saw that, as correlates, each one of them has its subsistence and being only with and by the other, but not for itself alone. This state of being conditioned, the one by the other, is what the understanding does not usually regard with sufficient attention, for by virtue of its own nature or disposition, to distin-

guish every thing, it sets them all as distinct and self-subsistent essences over against each other, not bearing in mind that when placed in this isolated position, not one of them can maintain itself. Such is the self-contradictory nature of all determinations of reflection, which, with internal unity, still preserve to each other the appearance of isolated self-subsistence, because they are derived at once from the category of mere existence; while in the category of the essence that appearance is completely stripped off, and the reflective determinations must, by virtue of the *dialectick*, *i. e.*, of their own self-suppression into each other in the act of thought, be completely transferred to the sphere of the true, and, in the stricter sense, so-called *Idea*.

Now, those counterparts, or opposites, bear reference altogether to the definite antagonism of indifference and difference, identity and difference, matter and form, internal and external, and especially positive and negative. It is true that by essence we usually think at first of the substratum, which has in itself certain determinate states, or which lies at the bottom of these. These determinate states, modes, and forms could not, however, subsist, or *be* in any manner apart for themselves alone, seeing that they are *per se*, a mere appearance, though, in reference to the essence, they are its phenomenon or manifestation. Hence they are not to be separated from the essence, but to every present appearance there must be at bottom a real or essential element, or, to use the expression of Herbart, for every appearance there must be a real to which the former points. Thus, the appearance is not, according to the usual mode of representation, to be severed from the essence, nor laid down in any way as a self or *per se*-existent. The whole question depends upon how inwardly and essentially, or how superficially we think to ourselves of this connection.

The simple, as essence, holds good in the first place as the *positive*, or self-existent, while the determinate state, on the other hand, is, as the *negative*, non-existent in itself, posited only by another, namely, by the positive. But it has been already shown previously (for even by Herbart this dialectic expression has been used for the *idea* of being), that the positive is only to be thought of and determined as the non-negative, or as negation of negation, just as in turn the negative is only thought of as the negation of the positive. If, however, we would separate the negative from the positive, and affirm that the positive is not at the same time negative, but still, with all

this, let the negative — at least, as appearance — be and subsist as *actually* present, why, then, this appearance, existing apart from the positive, must subsist *per se*, and consequently be again a positive; hence it is seen that while this negative is at the same time positive, the positive holds at the same time a negative relation in it, *i. e.*, the whole question amounts to this, that in the reality both determinations are suppressed in the identity. Thus, both hold through themselves, or through their own idea, a mutual relation, or can only be comprehended through each other, the one by and with the other. Hence the essence, which is truly thought of in this process as the existent, is the very process of relation or reflection; this negativity, as being thought of and represented, is the true object, the nature of the things, the interior, the essence, the noumenon or thing in itself.

Position and negation are the two determinations which, in this category of essence, are, so to speak, quite at home, and they repeat themselves dialectically (just as being and naught did above) in all kinds of formulæ and modes of expression, which here gradually come to pass. Thus, for example, even in nature the universal matter is apprehended as the positive, the form as the negative. Matter must be in itself the absolutely simple and self-subsistent, the form or shape, on the contrary, the negative, transitory. But, regarded more closely, the matter itself appears upon its side to be self-subsistent, only because it is no longer thought of as simple, but is reflection in itself, *i. e.*, involves ground and existence simultaneously in itself, and hence, as existing or real matter, has at once the definite state or form in itself, which we would separate from it as a form-determination. The same relations hold good of the expressions power and manifestation, and with what is understood by inner and outer; for these two are only apprehensions of one intrinsically present *relation* of the fact itself, and succumb to the same dialectick which befel the positive and negative.

In order now to vanquish all these abstract antagonisms of the understanding, Hegel sets out first from the side of the *essence*, and shows how this of necessity thoroughly resolves itself into phenomena, leaves behind no fixed substratum, but is the thorough activity of the manifestation itself. And then, upon the other hand, he shows that this manifestation is not a void, unsubstantial appearance, but is, on the contrary, the same as the essence, a real and actual *existence* or process of existing. Thus, at the end is again revealed to us what was said at the

beginning, that it is altogether the reflection, which lies at the root of these antagonisms, and in them only carries out its essence, *i. e.* is what we call by this name. It is this antagonising process, and relation of self to self in the antagonisms; or, in short, it has the import of the copula in the judgment, and the whole sphere corresponds, in the closest manner objectively to the logical judgment subjectively. The copula, in the judgment, falls or steps in between the subject and predicate, consequently separates these two momenta, which in the idea were immediately one, — divides or judges them, — but is at the same time, what its name implies, their conjunction, or rather relation and unity, and as this double function it is here seen to be objectively the essence.

We have, therefore, in the first place, an *identity*, which we suppose to be such without any differences, just as we are commonly in the habit of thinking the essence only as a simple *ground* or principle from or out of which certain determinations proceed. But the well known proposition of the *ratio sufficiens* requires that in this ground the grounded should be contained in a definite manner—ideally, potentially, by possibility, and such like. Thus, we transfer at once the grounded, the result or phenomenon itself, involuntarily into the ground or principle. But, since here this developed multiplicity of determinations would be again directly present, the ground would again be wanting to it, or it would be a phenomenon without ground, *i. e.* a mere appearance, and this in turn cannot be posited as existing or actual without the ground or essence, so that the reflection sees itself finally necessitated to abstain from all attempts at separation, and to recognise as dialectick the formulæ in which it sought to complete the identification of the sides.

LECTURE XV.

HEGEL—(continued.)

IN the conflict into which the thinking process fell with dialectic necessity, while within the category of essence, it is chiefly the relation of possibility and necessity that interests the understanding, and it may be well regarded as no mere incapacity upon the part of the latter, if it refuses to acknowledge the momenta of the antithetical state as being thoroughly identical. It is, doubtless, a certain ethical instinct, by which the understanding is led to maintain at least the *possibility* for itself, and not to let it effect a sudden transition, as it were, blindly into reality, since it discerns therein a point of support, which human freedom, as a possibility, but not as a necessity of manifesting itself, seems absolutely to require. Nevertheless, it struggles in vain within this sphere to free itself from the dialectic power; it escapes like a very Proteus by passing from one form into the other, but everywhere attests, that within the reflection no single momentum vouchsafes a secure resting-place, for every one of them changes suddenly into its opposite, nay more, every one is at once the *alterum* in itself.

Thus, even here there remains only the involuted process of self-contradiction, the living negativity or reflective process, in which the nature of the intelligent thinking process has become the object to itself; and hence the *law* of nature, as it hovers before us objectively in the play of physical phenomena, is to be recognised as the immanent special nature of the understanding, while the laws or categories, as Kant termed them, of the latter, are to be regarded as nature or *reality* itself. All subjectivism is consequently overcome, for all subjectivity *per se* has been transferred to the phenomenon; nature, no more than the human understanding, conceals within itself an unvealable something or profound mystery; the veil is lifted from the Isis; nature — as we have already become convinced in the Phenomenology — having no interior which is not an exterior, internal and external power and manifestation being the same in *one* act, — one, because there is in truth but

one process of self-manifestation and recollection, *i. e.*, because in fact, it is only the reality, this actual *operation* or process itself, which we call the actual or real.

The reality, which results as the truth of the essence and manifestation is, in itself, the absolute relation, and appears as *necessity*, so long as the sides of that relation are regarded as self-dependencies, though nevertheless, by virtue of their internal identity, they cannot declare themselves to be self-subsistent, but subject only to control. The reality now appears like all categories, first in its immediateness, *i. e.*, in the sense in which we commonly use this expression, when we think thereby of the existing universe, nature, and so on. The reality is, indeed, by virtue of its origin from that relation (of the essence and phenomenon), a relation always, but is, as it were, a resting-point of the inward relation to itself, *i. e.*, it is *substantiality* and *accidentality*, and the unity of this relation is substance. Substance is the same as necessity, the inevitable process of self-mutation and conversion, in short, the contradiction or negativity of the essence in itself. Substance and accident are indeed opposed to each other, but they hold exactly the same mutual relation as do essence and phenomenon. The substance is the totality of the accidents, and the accidents are nothing but the manifestation of the substance, which is not a formal or external complex and *ambitus* of the accidents, but is itself the process of transition into these determinations, and consequently the form-giving activity, in which transition it is at one with or retires into itself. Thus, the substance has with Hegel a far more comprehensive meaning than in other systems of philosophy, where it is partly regarded as being a dead substratum, and partly as being that which, as the abstract essence, the one formless side or basis, has been already overcome. The substance is here the direct permanent process or absolute transition of the form and content into each other; it is the same process which the reality, the absolute or immediate action, is: action or activity is, however, an achieving of something, a determining, particularising, formative process, while at the same time what is formed, or the content, is not in itself to be separated from this formative power. All that is formed appears for itself to be devoid of individuality, to be accidental, transitory, and evanescent into the substance as into a dark, formless abyss. Such is the old eastern mode of contemplating the Absolute; one which, revived by Spinoza in modern times, has been justly styled pantheism or pancosmism,

and which finds its direct reverse in Leibnitz, who admits, in place of the mere accidents, monads as independent free individualities, and so debases the substance to an utterly passive condition.

As regards that formless abyss of substance or gloomy substratum (amounting, in fact, to its entire absence), it would be impossible to comprehend how it is to arrive at definite shapes and forms of its own self. Hegel justly misses in the ponderous or leaden substance of Spinoza all beginning and ground of movement, and posits in its place the necessity of movement, the restless negativity. This amphibolic power is the constantly actual operation, an active and determining process, which the reality already was, and is therefore to be recognised as *causality*.

In so far as the accidents must not merely exist as such, or accidentally in the substance, but the substance is their ground, which as substance determines itself, it follows, that it is *cause*, *i. e.* that it is the original *fact* in the sense already mentioned, namely, the substantial identity or real possibility, which, as such, must be thought of as continuous and immanent in the reality; for were the internal power to be withdrawn from the effect, why then the former would forthwith collapse into itself; and were the power not to *act*, why then it would be powerless, inefficient, or no power whatever. There is no content in the effect that is not in the cause, but there is nothing also in the cause which is not of an active nature. In the representation to ourselves of finite things, cause and effect are usually regarded as two distinct existences; first, we say, comes the lightning and then the thunder, first it rains and then it becomes wet. A slight reflection, however, serves to teach us that the effect cannot be separated by any interval of time from the cause; the same bursting asunder and movement of the air, which is the lightning, is at the same time the vibration of air which is the thunder; and where rain is, moisture or wet is present also. Any lapse of time in the sequence of events does not appertain at all to the intrinsic relation of cause and effect; each cause achieves its proximate effect, *i. e.* its own effect immediately, this in turn the next one, and so on. Thus, here again, there originates the well-known *progressus in infinitum*, in the which, however, by going backwards, we do not arrive at a first cause, or, if forwards, at a terminal effect. We have had the same phenomenon already brought before us by Kant under the title of an “*antinomy* ;” of the same kind are all such

relations of reflection and dialectical opposites of the category of essence. In this reflective process, matters do not depend alone upon our making the *distinction*, and so repelling, as it were, the effect produced from the cause, but just as much upon our retaining firmly in our minds the identity of the two, or that which was before indicated as their common substance. If we proceed in the infinite series only from cause to effect, and from this effect as a new cause to a new effect, which is in turn a cause of some other effect, it follows, that we wholly disregard what lies directly involved in the relation of causality, namely, that something is merely a cause, and is so called, in so far as it has or achieves an effect, and something in turn is only to be termed an effect in so far as it has a cause; so that the relation doubles, as it were, upon itself, or is seen to be one of a reciprocal kind, the effect being as much the cause of its cause, as cause is effect of its effect, or both being thus the same or identical.

The relation of causality merely extends into the infinite, in those cases where we omit to notice that one of the two momenta invariably appears at first as the immediately present, and on that account as *cause*, while the other appears as mediated and posited, and therefore as effect. But in good truth, that first immediate is itself something posited. We have already declared, that moisture is result of rain, but we may just as well declare that it is a cause of the latter, the whole question depending upon which of the two we set out with; the moisture evaporates, forms clouds, the clouds dissolve in rain, the rain produces the wet; the moisture or wet is thus as much a cause as an effect; and in like manner the rain, in like manner the clouds, each member, in short, of the chain, being this binary partition or amphiboly in itself. The same remarks may be applied also to the Ego as subject-object. The Ego-object or contemplated Ego is indeed that which is posited originally by the Ego-subject, but seeing that it is present as immediateness, it acts as cause, *i. e.* the Ego is only through the non-Ego an Ego, or the subject is only through the object, although the non-Ego and the object has first been posited by the subject, and was not present prior to or before it. That which was in a hidden manner the posited, turns out to be the positing, the cause; but it is just as evident that the object was a something posited or the effect; in this way the relation is turned roundabout, the one member of it becoming first mediated through the other, and then the latter through

the former, so that both now are in truth reciprocally mediated, while neither of them any longer immediately exists.

In fact, with all this, casualty has in the fullest sense of the word become a *reciprocal action*, and this action or mutual mediation is consequently the truth of what was previously apprehended in a one-sided manner as a category of cause. "In the reciprocal action," says Hegel, "the infinite progress of causality is truly suppressed, while the rectilinear progression from causes to effects and from effects to causes is in itself bent round and back to a relation included or comprised within itself. Thus, for example, in political speculations it has been said, that the character of a people depends upon its form of government, and then, in the next place, that the government itself is derived from the people's character, until, finally, we now come to regard both as mutually conditioned by or through each other.

Nevertheless, this relation is and remains always an incomprehensible one, so long as its two sides are assumed to be separate substances, the one passive, the other active, acting in an external and mechanical manner upon each other. If the internal identity of both sides is not at the same time firmly kept in view, that reciprocal action cannot be comprehended, a fact this, which is strikingly exemplified in the reciprocal action of body and soul. It is in every instance comprehended for the first time, when that which is usually represented as a bare relation, or, as it were, the void mean or distance between the two members, is itself posited as the substantial energy of the spontaneous act of distinction, or as the real indifference which undergoes a partition of itself into the two sides, *i. e.* as that which is the energy of the absolute negativity, and in which we now recognise in turn the unveiled or posited necessity, or the substantial identity in its original reality and activity.

Now, this truth of necessity is *freedom*, and the truth of the substance is the *Idea*, *i. e.* the self-subsistency, which being the process of self-repulsion from itself into distinct self-subsistents, is, as such a process, identical with itself, and is in itself this continuous reciprocal action.

We have now reached the *third division of the Logic*, the theory or doctrine of what Hegel terms the speculative *Idea* (*Begriff*). We need not be reminded, that with this word is associated another and far more definite meaning than is usually done, when by idea is understood every abstract and

empty form of thought, a formal complex, a class of essences, or what in language is commonly indicated by appellatives or generic names. This vague meaning has, in short, given place to one of a very definite and peculiar kind, to the closer consideration of which we will now turn.

What the Idea is, may be recognised in the clearest manner in the self-consciousness or the Ego, "for the idea, in so far as it is to grow or thrive into an existence that is free, is naught else than the Ego or pure self-consciousness." In the present instance three momenta admit of being distinguished; the Ego as pure Ego is, 1st, the thinking process *in toto*, thought in itself, or potency of thought; 2ndly, it is the same process determined, *i. e.* it thinks something, has an object, definite thought, or is in some state of determination, for only when it thinks of something definite is it an actual thinking process, and because the thinking process and the thought are one inseparable unity, it follows that the self-determining thinking process is, 3rdly, individuality or Ego. The sphere of the idea is not, however, limited merely to the self-consciousness; but this last, the self-conscious idea, is a direct ascension or continuous education of the idea itself within its own sphere, up to a higher existence, more commensurate with its nature. To the conceivable being corresponds in nature the organic element, or that which bears its own proper object and its power of development or production within itself. We cannot, however, with any propriety declare the three parts of the Logic, the doctrine of being, essence and idea, to be the metaphysics of the inorganic, organic, and spiritual; for such a view of the matter would be distorted and incorrect; but, according to Hegel's own statement, we must regard as corresponding to being, the abstract representation of space and time, to the essence, space replete and time replete, and lastly, to the idea only, the whole as organism and life. Thus, the doctrine of the idea discloses the higher standing-point, from whence what is inferior is to be regarded, and in which it first appears in its true light, just as naturalists, while admitting to a certain extent the division of nature into organic, animate, and inanimate beings, have yet acknowledged and declared, upon regarding the universe from the higher and true point of view, that all is but a great organism, an universal life, and "that nothing in nature is dead." For nothing can appear to be dead and inorganic, except when it is sundered from its connection, and regarded no longer as a vital moment and plastic form of the

universal, but isolatedly as a thing *per se*. We set out, in fact, with this ordinary mode of contemplation, as being that which prevails in the two first spheres of the Logic; but the dialectick of these spheres constitutes at the same time the progressive steps to the higher and true comprehension of being, namely, to that of the Idea, in which that lower existence is also brought under consideration, and by not being suffered wholly to evaporate, becomes placed in its true light.

Thus, the truly real or actual is that which from its inward nature can itself subsist and appear as a *singular, per se*. In the beginning, or in the sphere of being, we had, it is true, individualities also before us, but they were not strictly entitled to the rank of intrinsically individual essences, but were only finite determinations, qualities abstractedly retained *per se*, thus mere determinations, and hence something posited, conditioned, dependent, which, passed by as a change and, without stopping, became suddenly converted into an *alterum* or other. In the sphere of the essence the existence was seen to be divided, on either side, into two determinations reciprocally conditioning each other, but forasmuch as each had *per se* its essence extraneous to itself, they were exposed or given up to the necessity of the connection, and thus had in themselves only an apparent self-subsistence, or semblance of such. Finally, in the idea this relative state of being has become the absolute, the true being *per se*, and this self-being has declared itself to be an absolute reality, or actual process, which at the same time bears reference to itself, and as such a singular actively maintains itself. Thus, here in the individual, so far as it is isolated *per se*, resides the special power, also, of becoming, being, and remaining such; the individual is a whole, a totality for itself, whose determinate states are self-determinations; self-determinations in whose alternation or change the self, namely, that power or the universal, neither does nor can change and pass by, just because it is the universal, not the individual definite state. The ideal is thus eternal, but eternal only, in so far as it is the universal, or nature itself; but what, on the contrary, is in it an individual and particular limitation, is given up altogether to change, for it is a mere *modus existendi*. We shall return to this point further on; at present it is seen that the essence, as idea, has far more taken into than separated from itself all multiplicity, or at all events the power thereunto; that it has consequently become not abstractedly simple, but in this sense *concrete*; it is seen too that in order to portray an individual being as durable, truly being and outlasting all change,

we must not think of it as qualitatively simple, and by abstraction dispose of all diversity and multiplicity, but must strike into a road the direct reverse of this. Thus, the singular, which each existing idea is, is not on that account abstractedly simple, but comprises the power within itself of all possible determinate states, and is, in so far as it attains to existence, present itself in these states, and is thus every time itself something determined or definite. The individual is thus from its fundamental essence or its identity with itself simultaneously and constantly the *universal*, and at the same time, from its determinate state, the *special*. Universality, speciality, and individuality are accordingly the three momenta of the idea, and are present in it as an unity. The universal is that which in the logical definition the genus is, the particular what the *differentia specifica* or species is, while the individual is the defined object.

The idea, however, as it is first of all presented to us prior to all further development, is at first a direct or immediate ground, and corresponds to the immediately existing principle of life or organisation in the organisms previous to the state of its realisation or self-exposition. Yet, as such a ground, it is already one that is potentially rich, concrete, and self-determining, and, in reference to that which it is to work out and become, an immanent *object or purpose unto itself*. Thus, it is as yet in its *subjective condition*, present as a subjective idea, and to be regarded as such, *i. e.* as that which from its nature it is indeed in itself but has not as yet realised to itself. Thus, it hovers in the present instance directly before our thinking process as the formal process itself, being still the thinking process of the observer; the observer has indeed discovered what the idea is in itself, and sees also in the things without himself a comprehensible being; but the idea, which these objects include in themselves, has in them not as yet entered into or become a matter of the consciousness; thus, while the thinker thinks the idea, he thinks and observes his own thinking process, and in this the nature of the true being or idea altogether, but at first only as the idea is *formally* in itself, or without any reference to its reality.

The second point is now to observe how this subjective idea imparts its existence to itself, or represents itself in its own objectivity, as the *real* idea that has emerged from its inward state and passed over into existence. Thus, it has its own existence, is and is actually *per se*, seeing that from its own

nature it cannot be without existence. Nevertheless, it is even in this state still immersed at first in its own existence, being wholly absorbed therein: for just as it was heretofore wholly subjective, so at present it is wholly objective, being not as yet that which it is *for itself*, but only for the observer; being, as an animal and vegetable soul, as creative life, still immersed directly in the body, distributed and absorbed therein, being internal and external, soul and body in one. But this internal state is only that of universality, while the externality, or materiality is but the determinate state of one and the same idea; this idea has *become*, from being a mere principle, a now existing body, and this "becoming" or self-realisation continues, until the idea is *perfectly* realised — the idea which is already free in itself, existing *per se*, and thus *becoming* perfect also, a perfect *being for itself* of that which it is intrinsically or in itself, *i. e.* arriving at self-consciousness and the conscious freedom of the self-determination. It becomes and is this, and *is* thus present for the first time in a perfect state, or is the thinking self-cognisant or conscious idea in this its simultaneously, material, and objective existence; thus, the Idea (*Begriff*) is Subject-Object, or, to use Hegel's own expression, the Idea in its Identity (*Idee*).

We return now from this preliminary survey back to the *Idea (Begriff)*. Thus, the idea in the stricter sense, regarded purely as to its form, yields that which is usually called *formal*, but which, properly speaking, ought to be termed subjective logic; the latter accordingly finds in the present system its subordinate place. It has been seen, how the idea undergoes partition into the *judgment* and in the *conclusion* again coalesces into the totality of the momenta. We pass over this section "of subjective logic," observing only, that the whole familiar content of ordinary logic is here brought before us, though arranged in an essentially different manner and viewed in an entirely new light. For while, namely, the different relations of the idea, the forms of the judgment and conclusion, are successively derived without any immanent principle from the practice of thought, the exposition of those relations here depends upon our developing in this subjective sphere the formative momenta of the thinking process, as being that genesis which of necessity continuously determines itself, and in like manner repeats and verifies itself also in the remaining parts of the system as a logical form-activity that has become objective.

The momentum of universality is the idea, as the substance which remains identical with itself in the midst of all differences, the thinking process or infinite negativity itself; the particularity is *determinate* universality, the species or that which Plato called the ideas; while the identity of particularity and universality is individuality. The universal is only *actual* as a singular, *i. e.* the genus exists only in exemplars or individuals, each of which represents the whole genus, so that the singular is the universal. The idea is consequently an immediate and inseparable unity, but not an abstract or empty one. The differences which are *included* in it, are manifested in the judgment, or become, so to speak, logically existent. The judgment runs thus; the subject is the predicate; for example, the individual (Caius) is mortal. Here the copula seems at first to express a *diremption* of the momenta; but it expresses just as much their identity or substantial bond; and this is seen to be the case in the conclusion, where the copula unfolds itself into the definite middle term, which is the common ground, or that in which both the momenta are identical, as in the common race, *e. g.* Man; Caius is mortal upon this ground, because he is a man. None of these three *termini* or momenta is for itself; Caius (the individual) is here the same as man is, and man is the same as mortal; each has consequently the distinction of universality, particularity, and individuality, in itself, which distinction is by the three judgments, whereof the syllogism consists, just as much posited as suppressed, so that the conclusion represents in itself the now unfolded unity of the idea, or the course and process (mediation) of the idea, the result of this being an acknowledgment of the now consistent unity, in which none of the three momenta subsists for itself, but each only by means of the other; so that that which is the whole, is constantly and immediately present at the same time. The result is therefore a fresh immediateness, which proceeds from suppression of the mediation, *i. e.* it is a being, which is identical in itself with the self-mediation in itself, or is itself the latter.

At the conclusion of the "subjective logic," we again encounter the sudden conversion of the merely subjective into the merely objective. The being of the idea is a being in itself and for itself, a fact this which takes place in and for itself, and is consequently again the objectivity.* The idea is that in which

* Hegel's Logik, iii. p. 171.

immediateness and mediation are the same, or in which the idea and being, *essentia* and *existentia*, are identical, the subjectivity being immediate objectivity, the thinking process the being. This transition or sudden conversion of the pure subjectivity or idea into pure objectivity is a necessary consequence, seeing that the idea has been acknowledged to be the absolute negativity or the self-determining and self-subsistent. It is the same transition as that of the idea of God into the existence of God, and the self-dissolution of the logical idea into the reality of nature: a sudden conversion or self-mutation of the subjectivity directly into objectivity, or the manifestation of the identity of the two in themselves, the same act of reflection, in which consisted phenomenologically the transition of the consciousness into the self-consciousness, or the direct belief in the objectivity of what is represented in the perception of subjective idealism, which self-same act here turns into a perception of the subjective ideality as objectivity; for where *only* subjective determinations hover before it, this subjective objectivity is at the same time the *only* objectivity, which is present, and which is not to be distinguished from an external real.

We are consequently suddenly withdrawn from the sphere of the subjective logic, and transported into the region of objectivity, or into the "*doctrine of the object*," which resolves itself into "mechanism, chemism, and teleology." The content of the so-called "objective logic," or the doctrine of being and essence, must here return, though comprehended from a higher point of view; for now stands before us, for the first time, the whole, the totality, as *idea*, *i. e.* in its truth. Now, we are already familiar with what lay *in itself* at the foundation of that finitude and dis severed state of the shifting phenomena, namely, the substantial unity of the idea; for this is—we know—the *intrinsically* working ground or principle. The idea itself had directly entered into and been converted into the entire fulness of its determination, and had become the soul of its several members, without, however, being as yet in this organization a soul for itself, *i. e.* mind; it had therewith lost its being for itself, and been obliged to reinstate itself from out this material or natural state, *i. e.* to return from the objectivity into the subjectivity in and for itself. As a formal totality (universality) of the members it is estranged from itself, and enters into relation with them as with a something alien and external, for the whole of nature thoroughly consists

of this externality, disjunctivity, and temporo-spatiality, and thus all things in her hold an external relation to each other; and this relation is *mechanism*, which must occupy a place in the sphere of logical thought, just as much as in nature, for the latter reflects itself in the former, and there is altogether nothing that cannot be thought of or cognised in an adequate manner.

In mechanism the influence of one object upon another is so manifested, that both objects remain during its exercise as self-subsistent, as they are, but impart a determinate state to each other. Thus, one and the same determinate state is here continued over from one to the other. In this the essence of the objects holds the relation only of the abstract-universal, in itself indeterminate but determinable element, which is in all the same identity; the form of the individuality of external objects is in this wholly unessential, and can offer no resistance to that determination which pervades them. Thus, bodies are altogether permeated by heat, magnetism, electricity, and the imponderable agents, and show, in this way, that their passive determinability by external communication, is founded only in the identity or universality of their essence; even common sense here acknowledges the rule, that like can only act upon like. Thus, the identity or universal essence is seen to be that very side from which the objects have an existence open for others.

With all this communication, however, the objects still remain at the same time single and persistent in their self-subsistence, or they reinstate again the individuality which belongs to them as ideas, in the universality; in short, they re-act. But this does not imply that they suppress the action, but that they transfer it to themselves, and receive it as their own, so that the process is dispersed among the objects, disintegrated among them, or in them undergoes a particularisation. Thus, the universal disperses itself among the objects, so that each object obtains in itself a share thereof, and asserts itself as a singular while it suppresses the influence as an universal one in itself. Now this influence becomes in the singular *centrality*, and so constitutes the individual self-subsistence of the objects; but the action has with this passed over at the same time into a state of rest — into a *per-se-being* of the individual objects, which owe that which they now are, or the “how” of what they are, only to that communication from without, and to such a degree, that this quality does not appear as one that

was derived from the nature of the object, but externally imposed upon it from some foreign source.

Accordingly, the object is proved to be, upon the one hand, the indeterminate universal, which behaves in a passive, unelastic, and dependent manner ; though, upon the other, it has at the same time a self-subsistence or independence impenetrable by another. Now, the same contradiction or difference which the individual object here exhibits in itself, the objects have also among themselves, namely, that of self-subsistent individuality and dependent universality. The greater and stronger embraces and pervades the weaker, seeing that it adopts it and constitutes *one* sphere along with it. Still it subdues the latter only in so far as the latter presents some resistance to it : thus, were the latter to be thoroughly passive, porous, and dependent, no relation with it would be possible : a ball traverses, indeed, a firmly fixed board, but not a handkerchief flying loose in the wind. Now, it is in truth easy to perceive that in this way the passive object directly maintains itself, and does so only in so far as its essence is identical with the influencing power (a character which was formerly declared to be its unprotected state or weakness), thus is itself universal, and gifted with a capacity for what is communicated ; it succumbs, however, to the power with all the particular determinate states that are not adapted to this (as, for example, the board, with its brittleness and immobility), which it cannot take up into itself and render its own states or predicates, or in the which it cannot preserve itself as subject. Thus, the power is only in this second aspect something foreign to an object ; as being universal, it is the power which is not foreign to the *individual* object, but is its own substance, in which it encounters itself as in its own possession, and has its subsistence or definite existence, and this, indeed, because or in so far as the individual object is itself an *essential* determination of the universal. Thus, the merely external individuality, depending upon no universally essential distinction, *i. e.* the individual exemplar, as such, certainly and invariably succumbs, while the universal subsists in it as an essential determination, and continuously renews itself in the singular.

The self-subsistence and unity of individual essences, which, as objects, consist of a multiplicity of predicates, is manifested, as we saw, in the sphere of mechanism as their middle point (centrality). This multiplicity, as being a spatial disjunctivity, is seen to be a collection of numerous objects distributed within

a certain range, which are dependent upon the centre, and find in this their point of union or relation. Now, what appears to be an attractive force of the centre traversing all the objects, as, *e. g.*, in the atmosphere of our planet, together with all its creatures, is, in fact, only the momentum of universality or identity of essence, whereof all such manifold formations consist, just, for example, as the terrestrial creatures are but the determinations and specifications of the earth-essence. The earth, as one of the heavenly bodies, is an individual; it is an idea, *i. e.* an universal, which is at the same time a something in itself manifold, determinate, and thereby remains a singular, individual, or *one* whole, because all its parts hold a mutual relation, and hence constitute an unity that appears in the material world as centrality. Among themselves those definite single parts again hold the relation of a whole, being, as objects, in a state of disjunctivity and proximity to each other, and on that very account exercising repulsion, pressure, and so on towards each other. This relation does not, however, take place between the peripheric objects and the central body; for the latter is or constitutes the objects, is their essence, and they all consist essentially of the universal essence of the central body, and are in it in a state of rest, depending in it upon themselves. Such central bodies are no longer to be called *mere objects*, for their determinations, the whole multiplicity of essences, which the central body has as its own modifications in itself, are immanent in it, or it is as an universal essence immanent in these as their determining principle.

Since, however, as essence it is distributed among the individual, and for themselves non-self-subsistent objects, and because as essence it still exists in the form of a spatial disjunctivity, all those objects participate not only in this fixity of essence, but also in its form, and so carry each of them a centre in itself, and are, as relative centre or individuals, placed spatially without or external to that first absolute centre. Thus, the latter represents the logical universal idea under which those relative centres, as species or particularities, are subsumed or taken in, and as these relative individualities are centralised in themselves, and bear relation to that which in them is of a persistent nature or essence, they are consequently related to the universal in them, which was, however, nothing else but that universal centrality. Thus, logically regarded, they form likewise a conclusion, in which the relation to itself is at the same time a striving after an absolute mid-point or centre,

which in the material world is manifested as centripetal force, or as the identical gravity of the central body, which the peripheric individuals strive towards as to their subject, while they maintain themselves simultaneously as subjects.

Hence the mechanism has become at once a *free* mechanism; the different objects have in the universal and pervading persistency of essence (which maintains itself in the particularisation identical with itself), or in the gravity, *their* essence, and are consequently subjects that are not subjected to a purely external mechanical pressure and impulse, but to a *law* only. Every law, however, is, in the true sense, just as much an *internal* as external power, *i. e.* it is a peculiar power, will, and *obligation* inherent in the individual itself. As, for example, in the state, while the general laws are felt by the individual to be at once a prescript or command, a foreign external will or constraint, it is still seen that if the laws be rational, they do but express the collective will of all, and thus that wherein each individual has his part to play, or in which he recognises again his own will and freedom of action. So also in nature. The world is *one* great whole, *one* real idea. It lies, as we saw, in the nature of the idea, not to remain an abstract, empty universal, but its existence is the particularisation itself, and the actual world is this particular. In nature, the idea is the self-particularising universal gravity, the universal process of self-relation to self, or self-contraction, which in every point is related to itself, posites relative centra, subjects, in itself, and even in these never ceases to hold relation to itself. Now it is in these individual subjects that nature succeeds in first escaping from the rigidity of spatially separated parts into free fluidity and unimpeded mobility, which then potentialises itself, as we have seen, still further on into persistency of soul.

Nevertheless, the universal does not as yet exist as an antagonism to the material, but is omnipresent in it as its fundamental substratum or essence, and constitutes the nature and power of all determinate states, though it is not as yet for itself, but only as an immanent law of nature. The centre has here diverged asunder into its periphery, has distributed itself over the whole, and while it still remains, as idea, the collective relation to itself as a whole, it has placed itself in the parts themselves into states of tension with itself, or rather, these parts themselves are but the actual states of tension of the universal in itself. As tensions, however, they are opposites and counterparts, consequently, *determinate* qualitative states

or differences, which tend towards each other, and would return together into the unity. Hence the centrality is at present a relation of these negative and tensed objectivities to each other, and the free mechanism has now passed over into *chemism*, i. e. the self-judgment (*Sich-ur-theilen*) in the sphere of objectivity.

The chemical relation wholly corresponds in turn to the judgment in the subjective logic, and to the category of essence in the objective. The chemical element is not like the individual in the mechanism, an existent, or totality *per se*, but is a difference, a determinate state, which declares at once its one-sidedness and non-independence, points to an "*alterum*," and has thus fallen anew under necessity; for the whole, to which it belongs, is indeed an universal, formless, but nothing individual, being but an idea, whose momenta are found to be distributed over two different objects; it strives, therefore, to free itself from this existence, which is incommensurate with its intrinsic nature or its idea, and to return to an unity with itself; yearns constantly to render itself a real whole in the existence, and that indeed with an irresistible and most inevitable natural force. Thither tend not merely the phenomena and laws of chemistry in the real sense, but this logical fundamental relation embraces all which occurs in physics as an elementary, meteorological, magnetic, electric, and, finally, chemical process.

Mechanism was only the first and wholly external form of objectivity, which obtrudes itself upon the empirical observer; we, however, abide by this too frequently, and transfer it to the region, for example, of life and mind, to which it does not belong, or in which it plays but a subordinate part; for it is only in nature among the utterly abstract relations of matter that mechanism prevails. The same remarks hold good of the chemical process with which, as was remarked, there is in the Logic associated the ulterior signification of dynamicism as opposed to mechanism.

Still, we may well wonder, how these ideas and the idea even of life are to come within the range of logic, unless in every instance we bear in mind, that content and form, or that which is thought of and the mode in which we think it, are never to be separated, that the logic is accordingly at one and the same time a doctrine of metaphysics or cognition, and that the doctrine of the idea must be the doctrine also of its formation. In mechanism as well as in chemism, the logical form is

to be recognised as that which confers rationality upon objective nature, and renders it comprehensible for our understanding as a process of logical necessity. This logical form or this intelligence of nature is the syllogistic form, in which the momenta of the objectivity are manifested, whether we view them as mechanism from the quantitative, or as chemism from the qualitative side. As in the syllogism, each terminus in the series can be regarded as a radius or middle one, which judges as well as unites the two others, so also is this exhibited in the momenta of mechanism, especially in the so-called mechanics of the infinite — in absolute mechanism — which, nevertheless, repeats itself also in the singular. We can, for example, regard the central body, the universal space, and the bodies of the periphery, as such termini, the identity of which is gravity, *i. e.* attraction and repulsion. This latter, the material or nature existing in a spatially disjunctive state, this negativity, appears as the *medius* or judgment, which extends to both its extremes, and, consequently, as the universal or positing; or, even the momentum of particularity, *i. e.* the individual bodies themselves, may be regarded as centra, but which, by virtue of their material nature, have just as much their centre out of themselves, and, consequently, through this their “internal” coalesce with each other; or, finally, the whole may be regarded as a singular whose centrality bears reference to non-independent objects by a medium which unites in itself their centra as non-independent momenta. Even in ordinary consciousness, we take at one time the earth’s attraction as the cause of the fall, at another the weight of the falling body, and then again this movement itself as the identity of the two; here also we posit as ground, now the one, now the other, and with this affirm but one and the same thing, the union or substantial unity of the two in themselves.

In chemism the object has or is itself a definite quality; but as *idea* it must not only be a determinate state, but the totality of determinations; it is thus involved in the contradiction of the actual existence and the noumenon or real being, and it strives to suppress this contradiction. As in mechanism, the falling body has its centre of gravity out of itself, so has the object the chemical “*alterum*” out of itself, to which it is attracted by its so-called affinity. The ground of this attraction, to which it succumbs, is the identity which both extremes are *in themselves*, the indifference, which is projected into differences. Even here these extremes may appear at one time

to be the agent or middle-term, at another the substantial identity itself.

Now, the course of the chemical differentiation, neutralisation, and reduction, yields as a result the suppression of the externality or objectivity of the momenta themselves. This objectivity consisted in the immediateness wherein the momenta were found to exist. Just as cause and effect were elevated into reciprocal action, so also, in the present instance, the differences met with proved themselves to be, in the first place, immediate, though they were in their relation proved to be only dependent momenta, which endeavoured to return to their identity; thus, the latter was recognised as being produced, mediated, and posited by the former; but still with all this, the identity is simultaneously acknowledged and presupposed to be the original element, or that alone in which the differences could have their ground or foundation, and by which they themselves were in fact, for the first time, posited and mediated. Now, in this way the immediateness, in which the objectivity consisted, is suppressed upon both sides, both sides are mediated, the one indeed by the other, and the result is the self-mediation of the whole in itself, and consequently, the idea itself is again represented as a living unity, this being a self-mediation, and the self-mediation a self-objectifying or self-realisation. This, however, is the living organism. "The idea, which has herewith suppressed all the momenta of its objective existence as external and posited them in its simple unity, is by these means perfectly freed from objective externality, to which it bears only the relation of an unessential reality; this objectively free idea being the purpose or object."

In here speaking of *designs* or purposes, we must not merely think of certain representations of a rational essence, which it would realise, and to which it uses certain materials as means. For, by design is here meant that *immanent* design, which Kant, as already pointed out by Schelling, was the first after Aristotle, to introduce into philosophy in his "Naturlehre" and "Kritik der Urtheilskraft." The immanent design manifests itself in such essences as are still in the form of an embryo or germ, as a direct living impulse to grow, develop, evolve themselves bodily and spiritually, in short, to realise or become actually what as to their capacity, tendency, potency, or internal determination, they may and *ought to* become. The execution or carrying out of this design is the *organic process*, or life.

Thus, the design, or the subjective idea, as being essentially an endeavour and impulse to posit itself externally, is exempt from the transition; *i. e.* as being idea and self-purpose only—not mere cause and effect,—the essence maintains itself under every change, as that which it was from the beginning, and does not pass over into an “*alterum*,” thus, it alone has, as was already shown above, all change under its power or control, and does not fall in the dissolution into an unconnected externality of mechanical parts, nor into the perishable state to which all other previous forms of being fall a prey. Now, in so far as the design is a subjective one—and this it is in the outset—it is the immediate design, and ranks of itself still within the sphere of immediateness or objectivity, is still affected by externality, and has an objective world opposed to itself, to which it bears relation. The design is here, in the beginning of its process, still subjective in itself, and has first to realise itself *as design*. As a living something it is also a particular and singular, and is, consequently, related of necessity to an “*alterum*,” which “*alterum*,” though still an external, is indeed finite and transitory in itself when compared with that living something, and is dealt with by it as such. Life, as the immediate purpose to itself, is the negation of this externality, or of the objects or *means of life*; it is the process of self-activity, which is continually engaged in suppressing the contradiction, which consists in that which is proper to the life of the individual, that over which it has power or control, still yearning to announce itself as something strange and self-subsistent, a state of separation this which is felt as want and requirement, hunger, thirst, &c., by the individual. Hence, life is a continual negation of externality, and this process is its own proper object, wherein it both has and feels itself. But just because it is in itself this alone, it follows that it cannot be, unless that externality were at the same time present; the negation would cease, so soon as there were nothing to negate; the perfected negation of the objectivity would be its own negation. Since then it is thus necessarily or dialectically related in itself to externality, *i. e.* is itself external (as body) in itself, it must constantly reinstate the objectivity, or this constantly re-originate to it—like the desire from the gratification. The immediateness met with is only suppressed by the movement of the object, in order that it may be posited, as determined and posited by it, the idea itself, thus, only in order that the subject in this suppression and positing may

satisfy and maintain itself as a process of spontaneous activity. Thus, the true final purpose is the freedom of the subject, or the development of itself as a subject triumphant over all.

The definite finite subject encounters objects directly in the sphere of finitude, unto which it has to impart its own internal determinate state, and render them equivalent to its subjective object, *i. e.*, to deal with them as *means*. That which is used as means is indeed an existing object, but does not hold good as a final purpose, but for an intrinsically worthless being, which we may use as a merely mechanical or chemical object, but which cannot maintain itself independently against the activity of the design. Hence the object has the character of being powerless against the design, and being obliged to serve it; for the design is its subjectivity or soul, having in it its external members; for "he who can count six stallions may go up to four and twenty," while the child has in the beginning not even its own limbs under its own power. Even our own limbs, so long as they assert their external nature against us, or are not as yet permeated by the subjective design, are not as yet our own possession.

Since, however, the design in the present instance relates to a determinate natural and finite object, it follows that it is itself a determinate, finite, and hence external design; it required, in order that it might be negation, and this a determinate negation, that determinate object also, and accordingly a mean or series of means, because all are finite, in order to arrive successively through them at the totality of all; it is not as yet itself the design carried out, but is first the beginning, which constantly re-originates as it is laid aside, *i. e.*, the designs themselves constantly become means, the executive subject being constantly engaged in traversing this series, which is a *progressus in infinitum*, and being in itself the constant process of mediation.

With this, however, this process is itself suppressed, and as process converted into the design, for the life has itself for the design or purpose, and takes delight in a constant activity of mediation, and yearns to be this. Man makes for himself the plough as a means for agriculture, this again being a means for sowing, the sowing for the crop or harvest, while the latter, as the purpose and product of the whole process, is itself again consumed, is a means of supporting life, while the life itself consists and passes by in this restless process of mediation; hence in itself it is a retrogressive process, and this pro-

cess is the activity that bears relation to itself, the design now *carried out*, or the self-executing final purpose. Thus, the execution or mediation does not differ from the design in the whole or absolute, for they are identical. The design is, therefore, as regards its content, none other than the chemical and mechanical relation, or it has this very relation as its content, for these relations come under its dominion, or pass, as was shown, by themselves back into the design, which lies at their foundation, and consequently includes within itself the whole riches or totality of finite designs, as a continuously progressive process of nature. In other words, such is the pervading order, conformity to law and purpose, which is the objective reason eternally present in nature. This collective content now appears as one that abides in the constant realisation of the design, and the teleological process, whereby nothing comes into the world that was not in itself already involved in the process, is but a "translation or transference of the idea, existing as idea, into the objectivity; this transference into a presupposed '*alterum*,' being confluence or conjunction of the idea by itself with itself." "It may therefore be said of the teleological activity, that in it the end is the beginning, the result the principle, the effect the cause, that it is a becoming of what has become, that in it that only which already exists comes into existence," and such like. Thus, the *causa efficiens*, *instrumentalis*, and *finalis*, are the perfectly posited three momenta of the idea or the three termini of the syllogism, and in this their circulation have become manifested as a living unity fully unfolded in itself.

Thus, the final purpose, as accomplished and absolute, does not go beyond itself, double itself, or does not posit an object as its equal for the final purpose, but it is in itself the *objective* design, *i. e.*, the absolute self-subsistent and self-relative teleological activity, or the whole as its own purpose is immediately in itself the true *objective* design, because it is the perfected *subjective* design, in the same sense that the absolute subject is in itself the absolute object also. The dialectick, which has been already expounded, repeats itself here also, namely, in the mutual action of the idea in itself with itself as an identity of subjectivity and objectivity. The objectivity appeared indeed as the first-given, the immediate; but the activity of the subjective design consisted in suppressing this immediateness, not indeed the content of the objective world, but only this its form, the objectivity. Thus, this side of the subject

was first suppressed in order only that it might be *itself* re-established ; in short, it must remain what it is, but only that it may be permeated by the subject which enters into it, or, what amounts to the same thing, adopts it into itself, renders it its own. The subject or the design is a conqueror, with whom we have nothing to do but to acknowledge his power ; in the conquered domains every thing abides by his laws and customs, he himself ruling only by them and as conqueror accommodating himself to them. Now, since the subject (as living body) has in this way gone forth into externality, and now supports this in itself, it follows, that the former has the latter for its own content, and is thoroughly occupied and filled with this real externality. Hence, the synthesis of these two momenta, subjectivity and objectivity, is here also, like all syntheses, the movement of the transposition or translation into both kinds of form, in which process, as was said, the content remains the same, but the activity or becoming is the form-activity, which distinguishes itself as such from the other form of itself, namely, the immediate existence, for this only is the external reality, and becomes conscious of itself as the identity of both. As this identity of subjectivity and objectivity the idea (*Begriff*) is now the *Idea in its identity (Idee)*.

LECTURE XVI.

HEGEL—*conclusion.*

WE have now arrived at the *Idea in its identity (Idee)*, *i. e.* at the Identity of subjectivity and objectivity. This idea is the highest truth, and in it all the other inferior standing-points of the Logic are suppressed. The truth is the thinking process, knowing itself as being, or the same process which has become the being *per se*, or the self-knowing. Thinking and being are in the absolute truth thoroughly identical, as has been already seen at the conclusion of the Phenomenology. Even the idea in its identity is, like every synthesis, a process*, because the identity of idea and objectivity, which it is, *is* or exists and maintains itself, only by being dialectic, *i. e.* by being the negativity itself, which, as substance or principle, namely, as a continuous act of negation, maintains itself in all the opposites through which it passes, seeing that the idea or potential object (*Begriff*) imparts to itself objectivity, and from this withdraws itself back into the subjectivity. Hence, it follows that the expression *unity* of subjectivity and objectivity, infinity and finitude, thinking and being, and so on, is really inadequate and false, if by such unity we were to think only of a rest or neutralisation of the two sides. On the contrary, by the idea in its identity is essentially implied a state of incessant activity, or a *process*. Although, as we see, the idea in its identity, as absolute synthesis, takes the place of the origination or becoming, still Hegel's language, elsewhere in his writings, would make it appear that the origination is incidental only to the side of material nature and external reality, and that at the bottom of this, as being the finite and transitory, lies the idea as the internal *being*†; a view of the matter which has doubtless been retained by one branch of his pupils, although, if consistently carried out, it would displace the whole ground-plan of Hegel's system, and must be by this rather suppressed, seeing that the idea (*Begriff*) is the substance of the phenomenon; while the substance, as we know, is the absolute negativity, the

* Encyclop. § 315.

† Logik, iii. p. 241.

actuality of the judgment itself. In the idea in its identity, the idea and reality or subjectivity and objectivity are indeed to be distinguished, but in such a manner that the idea in its identity is itself the distinguishing act or absolute judgment, namely, of a subjectivity, which *per se* would be abstract, and of an objectivity, which *per se* would be a groundless multiplicity devoid of unity. The objectivity is the realisation of the design, or is that wherein the subject realises itself, it is an objectivity *posited* by the activity of the design, and which, as posited being, has its subsistence and form only as being pervaded by its subject. As objectivity it is externality, and hence is itself a momentum of the idea, or the finitude, mutability, and phenomenon which was the immediateness of the existence, from which the idea always elevates itself triumphantly, or which it suppresses in itself, so that the latter always succumbs to the unity of the idea, in order that, posited afresh by it, it may issue forth or proceed from it.

Now, although the idea in its identity is this process, still at first it is such only immediately; the idea is in its own commensurate and teleological reality not as yet for itself, but only at first in itself as idea; it is still an immediate process of self-realisation, *i. e.* it is *life*; as idea it is in this external incorporation and life only the omnipresent *soul* that is effused into the totality of its members as an universal organising process. It consequently enters upon division, that is, exists as single living individuals. But as absolute negativity or universal soul it is just as much the suppression as positing of this form, and hence is the process of the genus, which maintains itself as such, while the individuals, as being indifferent, constantly succumb to and relapse into the universal, which is the same unit in them all. So soon as the universal idea realises itself, it enters upon a material state, but this by virtue of its nature is a disjunctivity, a plurality, a thorough objectivity in itself; so that from this realisation the idea has again to withdraw into unity and being in itself, *i. e.* into the ideal state. Hence, the death or suppression of that being out of itself, or of the reality in the ideality, is the second momentum of the process, just as the first was the immediate posited being. This second momentum or conversion of the reality into ideality is the act of *cognition*.

In cognition the subject has become *mind*; as mind the idea in its identity exists freely for itself, for it has itself only for the object, or the objectivity itself for its idea; it has become

this pure identity and substantial unity by means of itself, this unity being now a pure distinguishing of itself within itself. It has the whole fulness of the objective being in itself for itself, as objectivity, but this objectivity is its own, being no longer a heterogeneous objectivity, obstructing and limiting it externally; it has the objectivity as a subjective objectivity within itself, because it has recognised the former as pervaded and posited by itself, as an objectivity indeed, but, as was evident in the teleology, as one that, opposed to the universal substance, has no power of abiding self-subsistence. The idea, in its identity as *life*, posites, it is true, the objectivity from the very commencement, but without being cognisant of this act; hence when it becomes cognition and reflects upon itself, the objectivity is present to it as existing, given. This form of the world's immediateness, which is, properly speaking, an illusion and universal error, from which the mind has by dint of labour to emancipate itself, becomes now suppressed by the act of cognition, and this act is itself the successive process of suppression. For the first time at the end of the process has the absolute subject — and every individual subject, as truly cognising, is itself this universal subject in its own internal substance — attained to a thorough knowledge of itself, and presupposes itself as universe, and that indeed directly as an external, but already intelligible and understood universe, pervaded by the idea. We now comprehend how, at the very beginning of the logical process, where the subject was as yet direct intuition only, a certainty, cognition, knowledge of the truth, and consciousness could be present, seeing that the identity of thinking and being in itself was constantly present, which has now become for itself a certainty, and been cognised as such.

Cognition, in the stricter sense, or theoretical cognition, is, it is true, only the one side of the process, but this side reveals itself also as identical with the other, namely, the practical side, or that of the *will*, as has been likewise pointed out already in the Phenomenology. As cognition, as theory, has for a product the *truth*, so the practical process has the *good*. The identity of the subjectivity and objectivity, or of the ideal and real, is eternally in the *idée* and in itself. On that very account, the subject sets out in the very beginning with belief in the cognition, that its cognition is true, that it cognises the world, and, indeed, a true and actual world. Since, however, this identity is, in the beginning, not as yet known by the subject itself, it follows that the *impulse* is there, to posit

it, or, negatively expressed, to point to the intrinsically perishable dualistic antagonism as null and void, and to suppress it. So long as the subject stands opposed to an objectivity, and this, again, to a subject, or ideality and reality are exclusively opposed to each other, *both* are finite; but the subject has to free itself from this finitude and one-sidedness, and to subject itself to the objectivity. This is effected by taking up the existing universe into the thinking process, or, what amounts to the same, by an infusion of the thinking process, *i. e.* of the rational design, into the objectivity; both are in themselves one and the same process; but viewed from this or that side, the process appears different, *i. e.* either theoretical or practical. This gradual and progressive assimilation of the given material, is the education of the understanding, which it is the special province of the Psychology and Phenomenology to carry out, the logic having here only to deal with the nature and method of this process in quite a general sense, *i. e.* to point out the *method* of this education of the intelligence, or the so-called logical analysis and synthesis.

Parallel with this merely intelligent, and not as yet absolutely rational theoretical action, runs the practically intelligent or will-principle, which is first to make the world what it should or ought to be. "The immediate or present does not hold good to the will as a fixed being, but only as an appearance or nothingness in itself. Contradictions here occur, in which we find ourselves driven round to the standing-point of morality. In a practical relation this is altogether the standing-point of the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy. The good must be realised; we have to work so as to produce it, and the will is but the self-working good. Were, then, the world to be what it ought to be, why then, with this stage, the activity of the will would cease. Thus, the will requires that its design should not be realised; and in this way we rightly speak of the finite character of the will." We here encounter the same process which was previously present in the teleology as the course of *mediation*, which mediation was, as life—its own design. The solution, therefore, of the contradiction, or the synthesis of the two sides, consists here also "in the will returning in its result to the supposition of the cognition, and hence into the unity of the theoretical and practical idea (*Idee*). The will knows the purpose or design to be its own, and the intelligence regards the world as the actual idea (*Begriff*). Such is the true rank or position held by the rational cognition." It is

not, as already said above, changed in content or in fact. What is suppressed and changed, "constitutes only the surface, not the true essence of the world. The latter is the idea existent in and for itself, and thus the world is itself the idea in its identity." The good, the final purpose of the world, *is* or exists only by constantly producing itself. The good and rational is constantly actual, and all that is actual or real is rational, seeing that it (namely, the world itself) externally posites itself as design or purpose, and as activity or process eternally produces itself.

Such, then, in conclusion, is the *absolute idea* (*Idee*), the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, or of the idea of life and cognition: it is the life in its rational necessity knowing itself, while this necessity is the self-knowing truth or reality. *For itself*, the absolute idea is the pure *form* of the idea (*Begriff*), as being this fluid or living process of self-movement and determination. This pure form is the *method* which has moved and ramified itself throughout the whole course of the system, and filled itself with determinations. The methodical movement, this immanent necessity or negativity, is the principle which pervades and governs as a soul the whole organism of the science, includes and is the true being in itself, and is finally also the result: it is the idea as judgment and conclusion; the thinking process in its spontaneous movement; the reason, the eternally genetic, restless origination or becoming both within, from and to itself.

We have thus traced in detail the content of the Logic which forms the nucleus of the system, as far as was admissible for the object of the present discourses. As regards the second and third parts of the system, the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind, we must limit ourselves partly to an examination of the systematic position which they hold in reference to the Logic, and partly to characterising their content by bringing forward the results.

The most difficult point appears to be the detection of a necessary transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature; and it is this very point, also, to which the opponents of Hegel, with Schelling at their head, have been busy in directing their most vehement attacks. According to Hegel's opinion, the Logic has, in its final result, returned again into the idea of the

idea as a logical process circulating within itself, or into the idea of the method, which from the beginning was its soul and hypothesis. This methodical process, together with its whole potential content, or the *logical* idea in its identity, now reassumes the place of a reality (*Ansich*), or one that is not as yet actual, but which has to pass over into reality. It becomes the new and now universal thesis of the universal process. But, if we say not *yet*, by this is not meant that the logical is anyhow to be posited as *prior* to the reality in time, but as present rather with this, and this again with it eternally and simultaneously, as will be pointed out further on. Hence the transition of the thesis into the antithesis is here also, as in each particular member of the system, an unlimited conversion or metamorphosis into its differentiation, namely, into the direct opposite of the logical being in and within itself, or of the unreality into the reality, *i. e.* into the absolute exterioration of nature*, from which it will have to gather itself up again into the unity, which, however, like every synthesis, is a process of eternal and simultaneous self-dissolution and retrogression, *i. e.* is *Mind*.

Of this differentiation and state of alienation from itself, which is or constitutes the immediateness of nature, we have already spoken in the Logic, and it was the original state, from which the Logic had to liberate itself; so that we must now expect to find this doctrine in its principles completely exhausted, and the natural objectivity substantially resolved into the idea; but "seeing that the object is here dealt with according to its *thought-determination*, it follows, that we have now in the course of our inquiry to make mention of the *empirical* phenomenon which corresponds to this, and to point out that it does actually correspond thereunto."† The whole connection of the system does not, however, admit of our regarding the Philosophy of Nature as only a *logic applied* to a given empirical material, nor as a further exposition and distribution of logical principles in the detail of natural genera and species, but the import of the being of nature is only to be systematically apprehended as the universal judgment into which the absolute idea relapses in itself. As little also should we get at the sense of the whole system if the Logic were regarded at once as an actual thinking process, as a divine self-consciousness maintaining itself behind or above nature in a theistical fashion; for this notion would forestal the conclusion, that the

* Hegel's Encyclopäd. § 244, 247.

† Encyclop. § 246.

Absolute first comes within the nature-process itself, and indeed in man, to itself, *i. e.* to self-consciousness. If, therefore, it is said of the logic that it is the Absolute or God, as it were, prior to or *before* the creation of the world, it follows, that we must add to this the clause, and simultaneously before his own self-realisation, although he is never unrealised, *i. e.* is, as an universe, eternal. Thus, to the logic there belongs no real or actual being, for it is nowhere else actual than in the thinking process of the human being; it is for itself an *abstractum*, it is the — scarcely definable—*noumenal being* (*Ansichsein*), a kingdom of laws, a shadow-land of unessential forms — the same as the categories were with Kant, as being neither innate nor ready-prepared notions or ideas; and on this very account, that it is such, it is not and cannot be *per se*, but only identical with the world's reality, so that we have not so much to search for or crave a transition from the logical mind into nature, there being none such in itself, as rather to perceive or gain a glimpse of that identity only. Nevertheless, in nature, which by virtue of its idea is a being thoroughly objective in itself, external, and one that has passed disjunctively into its momenta, there remains in force that "Ansich," active as it were in the background or in the depths; for "nature is indeed to be regarded as a system of stages, whereof the one necessarily proceeds from the other (the higher races from the lower), but not as if the one was *naturally* engendered from the other, but only in the internal idea in its identity which constitutes the ground or foundation of nature. The *metamorphosis* belongs only to the idea as such, seeing that its change alone is or constitutes development.* Of nature, on the contrary, externality is a characteristic feature, the distinctions falling asunder and appearing as indifferent existences."

Now, as regards the content of the Nature-philosophy, we find that, for the very sake of that subdivision and externality, the categories of quantity here precede those of quality, and that for the same reason the antitheses are not simple negations of the theses, but are themselves antitheses of two members, seeing that the thesis itself declares a continuous existence together with its negative determination; for the rest, however, we here encounter, for the second time, the logical division and development of the categories, with names altered and borrowed from their empirical sense. The division corresponds to the momenta of the idea; the universal is here the absolute

* Encyclop. § 249.

disjunctivity, the space with its negation, time, and their synthesis, the movement; this whole doctrine, which corresponds to the logical quantity, being called *mechanics*. The absolute mechanic (that of the Infinite), which corresponds to the category of measure, and contains the universal principles of astronomy, leads to qualitative, *i. e.* *physical* determination. With the externally qualitative relations of the heavenly bodies is also given their qualitative nature, namely, the light as a substratum, and its negation the darkness. The former manifests itself in the single body of light, the sun, the latter partly in the lunar, partly in the cometary bodies, *i. e.* partly in the positively solid, partly in the nebulously dissolved, cosmic matter. The synthesis of both is the planet *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the earth, which is regarded as a "body of individual totality," in which the rigidity is resolved by the separation into real differences, while solution is restrained by the individual centrality. These liberated differences are the elements, not the chemical ones, but the ordinarily so-called elements or true processes, which continually pass into each other and constitute the life of the earth, *i. e.* the meteorological process. To this change of forms, however, the earth is opposed as a real unity, subject or ground of the elementary process, and that change struggles against the connecting gravity of the earth's matter. The matter separates itself within itself according to the specific weight of its differences, and in it appear the different degrees of density and cohesion; while elasticity, sound, and finally the solution of the specific form into the formlessness of the heavy matter, together with heat or caloric, are the phenomena of this antagonism. By heat, and finally by the process of combustion, the previously united elements relapse into a totality *per se* of existing individual forms, and are, as such, an object of the third part of the *Physics*. The immediate form as such, the simple difference passing through a state of tension from the absolute formlessness or indifference-point, into extremes, is magnetism; nevertheless, this is, so to speak, only the abstract form of the form itself, namely, the simple activity of the immediate process of self-differencing, which, having passed over into its quiescent product, becomes the crystal. If, now, the opposite poles of magnetism separate *per se* into positivity and negativity, why, then, this is the phenomenon of electricity; while, lastly, the neutralisation of this tension into different relations constitutes the chemical process, its products being the so-called chemical elements.

The suppression as well as positing of these real contradictions or tensions, has its ground in the identity of the essence, to which they all belong as to a substantial unity, and which is the living negativity itself. Thus, the external reciprocal action, as in the logic, so also here passes over into the *organick* or biology. Now here the process presents itself as an universal earth-life or organisation of the planetary mass—*geological* process—which nevertheless appears as a past evolution that has come to a state of rest, and only continues in the youngest formations. The individual or particular life next breaks out into the *vegetable* nature; but the plant is as yet only an individual, which consists of many individuals, each single twig being a fresh addition, a growing plant repeating itself upon the plant; the individuality has not as yet become lord of the particularity. The organising unity pervading all, which as such reflects also within itself and becomes subjectivity *per se*, soul and self-feeling or consciousness, is the third stage, — the *animal* process, or life, as it is called, in the stricter sense.

The animal process of life is not only one that fashions itself for and from itself into the individual, but it is also in relation to inorganic nature one of *assimilation* or mediation with the external world, and that indeed both theoretically by the senses, as practically by the nutrient functions. The teleology of mediation here repeats itself on both sides. Both processes, however, that of the formative individuation and that of the mediation, unite synthetically in the *generic* process. For since the individual life is related to the universal substance, and finds the latter not merely out of itself in inorganic nature, as in a sphere that is foreign to it, but, as its possession, its own internal element, and one that is common to all individuals, or that wherein they live, it follows, that the individuals therein are as *genus*, a substantial unity, which, as generic substance, may be regarded as universal, which realises itself and exists in many individuals. Thus, while the individual, by virtue of consciousness or self-feeling, retires into itself, it coalesces in this interior with the general universal. While now, in the externality of the nature-process, this coalescing of the genus into itself is in like manner only an external process, the process of sexual union remains, and in its production falls again asunder into the difference of the sexes; so that the genus only, but not the individuals, maintains itself, and continues as this process of origination and decay: in short,

that which has been inwardly manifested in the process as an active principle, namely, the *genus* or substantial universality itself, the *life as such*, has here arrived at the state of being *per se*. We here pause at the same transition, which the Logic had to make when it advanced from the objective idea (*Begriff*) to the idea in its Identity (*Idee*); the step is now from nature to *mind*, and in the system itself from the Philosophy of Nature to that of Mind.

The *Philosophy of the Mind*, the third and concluding part of the whole system, is divisible into the philosophy of the *subjective* mind, where, together with anthropology, the previously developed content of the Phenomenology as propaedeutick finds its systematic place; then into the doctrine of the *objective*, and finally into that of the *absolute* mind. By "objective mind" Hegel understands the rational organisation of the idea (*Idee*) of justice, morality, and custom having become objective and real. The Phenomenology terminates in its last, theoreticopractical part, which is specially called "psychology," with the idea (*Idee*) of blessedness, *i. e.* the representation produced by reflection on the part of the understanding of the satisfaction of *every* impulse; in this *universal* object the particular wills of the many coalesce into a common rational will, in the realisation of which each finds also its particular object, individual satisfaction, and consequently *freedom*. This universal *objective* will is the "*objective mind*." Now the free will first of all realises itself as individual, *i. e.*, as person, by which we are not to understand the personality of mind and body in the stricter sense, but all that belongs externally to the perfect organisation of the individual freedom, such as property of any kind, for all, in fact, is preordained or established to become an involuntary member of the human being, his means and instrument, so that he first possesses within this compass his own self, his own ability and capacity. In that case, however, the free will also returns at the same time from this externality and reality to reflect upon itself, and is in that also for itself; such being the privilege of the subjective will, namely, the *morality*, to be also particularly and individually determined *per se*. Morality has, as we perceive, in the present instance, a subordinate, nay, more, an ambiguous meaning: as a moral inclination locked up within itself it would become a beatific state, an inactivity or want of action, and would consequently degenerate into immorality: for its content is that which is upright and just, and what is upright must be done, must be

realised. Justice and duty being thorough correlates, there is no duty in me to which also the justice of another would not correspond, and inversely. There is no distinction to be drawn between duties of right in the stricter sense, and those of the so-called moral conscience or duties of love. Justice and morality do not bear the mutual relation of stages, but of sides or momenta to each other, the former being the objective, the latter the subjective momentum, the content being one and the same; and there is altogether no ethical content in the subject which must not also live out and realise itself, nor any holy state of disposition which is not to be also a work of sanctity. Hence both sides comprise in their synthesis, the truth, or that which Hegel designates specially as the prevailing moral, or dominant *morality*.

Morality is the substantial, universal, and rational will, as the reality which is commensurate to the idea, the willed and consummated necessity, which being as such a self-realised act of the mind is the existing freedom. The family, the community of citizens, and the constitution of the state, are the momenta of this objective and really existing rationality. In this the mind is the free substance, the universal, which has its reality in the individuals, and coalesces into the particularity, which constitutes the special mind of the people or its national spirit. By virtue of this speciality which characterises the universal mind, at each period of time and in each people in whom it realises itself, it is constantly imprisoned within a limit, from which it strives to free itself successively by the education of the people; but seeing that the nationality, *i. e.* the existence of a people as a definite people, is essentially connected or bound up with this limit, it follows, that the people themselves succumb in that process of emancipation; for each has only in his due time and as member of this succession his right to exist and to govern; the world-spirit does not regard all its members as entitled to equal rank, but only that people which is dominant at any period as being the one absolutely entitled to govern the rest; these last being not even acknowledged by the rulers themselves to be of equal birth. Thus, nomadic races are not regarded by the stationary and civilised races as sovereign powers, but are styled barbarians that have been left behind upon the lower stages of civilisation, and as such they are treated, warred against, and subdued. There resides in the absolute idea (*Idee*) of each people only as much as it is worth in its life's principle or core, and has the power to perform;

hence what is most powerful in a people resides actually in the right and that of the stronger class, and strength is their right, ideally as well as really; the physical power and the rational right here coinciding. If then one people must submit to being subdued by another, this is only the actual and necessary result of the principle or idea (*Idee*) which animates it being a rationally subordinate one, or a category to be negated by the higher one in the absolute mind or thinking process. "The world's history is the world's judgment."

Since, however, peoples or nations are, by virtue of their individuality and particularity being connected with physical relations, still burdened with the limits of the natural state, it follows, that the absolute world-spirit or intelligence has in no single people its actual totality and universality. Of these wants and antagonisms of the finite state, the Absolute has still to divest itself, in order that it may be for itself a *knowledge of itself as the absolute mind* or as *the actual truth*. The subjective mind, as in the Psychology, and the objective, as it has been presented to us in the doctrine of right, are the momenta of the absolute mind, which is their identity and reality. We can call this whole sphere of the absolute mind religion, knowledge of the absolute substance of itself: in the special and proper sense, however, this *sphere* is confined to one, namely the middle, of the three stages of this knowledge, for this knowledge is itself a process, and indeed the absolute process which passes through the form of immediateness, being *per se*, and being in and for self.

The immediate form of this knowledge is that of intuition and representation of the absolute mind in itself, the form of *beauty*. God or mind is here only manifesting itself to the senses as the immediate unity of mind and nature. The moment of universality is here as yet abstract for itself, has its content only in natural determinations, and hence relapses again into finitude; finiting and objectively particularising itself into the particular or local deities of a people, or becoming, in a word, polytheism. The Absolute has here its subjectivity or consciousness only in the inspiration of the artist and prophet, or in a slavish pathos, which yearns to express the Highest, but feels itself as yet *driven* only or impelled to this by the instinctive impulse of genius. Such is *Art*, which produces the Highest, but, as it were, blindly, *i. e.* immediately, for this is the nature of the idea of beauty, that itself and its product are directly one, the idea manifesting itself immediately to the

senses, and both having, as it were, grown up together in a natural way. This fair or beautiful art, as being the still unantagonistic consciousness of the Absolute, or the religion of art and beauty, is directly impelled, however, on account of this undecided state, above and beyond this stage. For because the subject has not itself for itself, and in distinction to the external, finite and transitory phenomenon, but is only with and through the latter, it follows, that it must appear to itself as transient, its feeling of self dying out in the nothingness of its finite existence; for this last was only the self-consciousness of an individual, but not that of the race maintaining itself eternally in the midst of all change.

This latter phase is mediated by the life in the state, which subjects the self-will to the collective will, and thereby sinks the individual self-consciousness into its universal substance, the moral mind, from which the living organisation of the individual subjects is again born anew, because the substance has its very reality only in this form. The Absolute is accordingly this revelation of itself in the organised plurality of subjects, who upon their side know themselves to be identical with the Absolute, which in them attains to being *per se*, and unto self-consciousness. Such in its essence is "*revealed religion*," a relation of the absolute to itself, God's self-consciousness of himself in the human being. But, because this knowledge here stands upon the stage of the intelligent self-consciousness, *i. e.* of reflection and representation, it follows, that it imparts to the momenta of its content a self-subsistency in reference to each other; human beings thinking of God as an essence existing *per se*, and of themselves likewise as free beings existing for themselves. This, however, is a contradiction, just because with this self-subsistence, the identity is present at the same time in the religious consciousness, and the subject distinctly feels himself to be *dependent* upon the Deity, and consequently negates as much as posites his self-subsistence and freedom. This contradiction must be, and is, suppressed, seeing that the religion of the mind or Christianity pervades and develops in thought the true doctrine of atonement already contained in it, but expressed as a mystery, and the notion of the divine humanity and so-called Trinity, which constitute the speculative nucleus of this "absolute" religion, and with this elevates belief into knowledge, religion into *Philosophy*.

Here again we encounter the three momenta of the idea (*Begriff*), which pass over in a threefold syllogism into each

other, and effect by their mediation the unity. The universality can be regarded as the absolute essence (the Father) which by the world's reality (the Son, as the momentum of particularity) mediates itself into the identity (the Holy Ghost or Spirit); in like manner can the mind, as being the concrete identity or unity of these two sides, and finally also the mean or mediating process itself, the world's reality or the Son, be elevated to the rank of mediator. Philosophy thus completely resolves the rigid self-subsistence of the momenta of the Absolute, which the religious consciousness still opposes to each other, into the living stream of the absolute process, which is the true form of the idea, and wherein the thinking process has vanquished all antagonisms and arrived at reconciliation with itself, *i. e.* at the state of absolute spirituality, as being the truth cognisant of or knowing itself. This idea of philosophy, as being the self-thinking *Idea in its Identity*, is thus "the Logical, in the sense of its being universality established in the concrete content as in its reality. The science has in this way retired into its beginning, and the logical result is the *Mental*, which has proved itself to be truth existing in and for itself."

LECTURE XVII.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.

WHOEVER has succeeded in surveying the Hegelian system in its totality, will now have presented to his intuitive faculty the revolving epicycloid of its categories as universal mind, and this ultimately in the absolute idea (*Idee*), as the eternally self-thinking truth. Philosophy, now perfected, stands no longer without and prior to the universe, but is the real being itself which has arrived in it at perfect self-consciousness. The antitheses of ideality and reality are only internal self-distinctions of the Absolute framed within itself; we may call the *whole* system just as well Absolute Idealism as Realism, and in this very way is attained what should be attained, the all-pervading self-cognition of the universe in itself, which has this point of penetration of itself in the consciousness of the human species, and knows itself in the science of the latter, so that the human being knows or becomes cognisant of itself in its science as the all-pervading absolute knowledge. Arrived at this point then, it was asked, what more can possibly be left for us to attain, what higher standing-point for philosophy can be thought of? The absolutely highest point seemed to be gained, philosophy, at least upon the whole, to be perfected, and what remained to be a mere matter having reference only to details. Accordingly, the Hegelian workmen gathered themselves together, in order that they might celebrate the final erection of an edifice which it had taken thousands of years to build. The voice of the exoterics was then — now fifteen years ago — scoffed at, when they called to mind, that the same festival had been so often celebrated before, and the same cry of exultation raised successively in each school of philosophy by the heralds of her universal wisdom; for the founder of every new system must of necessity feel convinced that he it is who to the building has affixed the key-stone. As regards, however, this the most recent or Hegelian system, if it makes the idea of absolute progress the direct principle and law of the universe, it does but deal ironically with itself, in hoping for the absolute

persistence of such a scheme; for this new and pretended key-stone will but share the fate of the stone of Sisyphus.

That which was not acknowledged at the time, soon, however, declared itself to be a fact, for in the school itself a schism took place concerning the authentic interpretation of Hegel's doctrine and opinions. His followers divided into a Right and Left, into Hegelians and Young Hegelites, and in the middle remained a feeble centre, which was in good truth only the *ἑίδωλον* of Hegel, the body of his posthumous and collective works. For as has happened hitherto with each philosopher of repute, that while embodying in his writings a deep amount of truth, he has but partially elaborated, fashioned, and systematically evolved this, or else left it behind him ill-shaped or moulded in itself, so also, in our opinion, was the same the case with Hegel. The immediate problem of philosophy subsequent to Kant, was to overcome the subjectivism of his stand-point, and advance to an actual knowledge and willing of objective truth. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel have grappled with this problem, and the latter has methodically carried it out. While, however, it might seem as though the whole matter was in this way completed, it is evident at once that that direct passage from subjectivity to objectivity has been effected *at the cost* of the subjectivity, and thus a third problem presents itself as left for solution, namely, the concrete union of the two sides, in which the objectivity is not, as in Kant and Fichte, extinguished, nor the subjectivity demolished, as with Schelling and Hegel, in the objectivity, but both arrive at their just claims — a point this which was, doubtless, by Hegel *wished* and *intended* also. If now, we were to abide by this deeper intention, why then we must, in order to bring it into the light, as it were, of day, complete the form also; but if we abide by that form of the Hegelian philosophy, which is represented by the disciples of the Left, it follows that we must separate from it all that, strictly speaking, does not appear therein, and so must depart from Hegel's intention, nay more, as a direct consequence, from his very principle and standing-point also: there will come out, as has been already proved in fact, a one-sided objective Neo-Spinosizm, utterly opposed to the deeper subjectivity, which Hegel strove to attain; and this of necessity, on account of its one-sidedness, may at the same time be just as well regarded as a subjectivism, which ends anew in empiricism or scepticism, and in this very way completes before the eyes of contemporaries the true critick of the original system as such, *i. e.* as to

its scientific form; for it is not what a philosopher intends and wishes, but keeps to himself with a feeling of self-assurance, that renders him a philosopher, and ensures him any amount of influence upon the science, but the logical forms which he evolves, the *systematic* despotism which he knows how to grasp, this is what constitutes the philosophical element within him. No one has more striven after this unity of content and form than Hegel himself, and by this he must accordingly be understood and judged of.

In the beginning, the system, as being opposed to the Kantian rationalism, held good as orthodox, especially since it reassumed the doctrine of the Trinity, which had been set aside; and pretended to commemorate the mysteries of Christianity from behind the veil of its terminology in a clearer or glorified light. Criticism, however, speedily dispelled this cloud, and the community of initiated followers, divided partly into such as openly confessed that they were no Christians at all, and levied war against the church with downright zeal and abuse; partly into those who, being undeceived as to the system, renounced Hegelianism altogether, and either sought, as has recently occurred, for satisfaction in Schelling, or else returned, in far greater number, back to the standing-point of Kant; and, finally, into those whose intention was to stop where Hegel did, and who recognised in his system, as its true content, a theism that could be retained in conjunction with Christianity. Attention has been directed, in our former lectures upon this doctrine, to several passages, showing how and to what extent a certain amphiboly admits of this mode of interpretation; but with this, how we inevitably enter, not only into contradiction with the principle, but with the method and arrangement of the whole system.

Philosophy must certainly look with indifference at the so-called consequences of a system, even if the latter were to consist of discrepancies with the orthodoxy of the church; for granted, even, that Christianity is the pure truth, who can answer for the orthodoxy prevalent at any one period being pure Christianity? A philosophical system, which opposes the latter, may possibly be more Christian than the latter itself; and, in fact, history proves that it is philosophy which has incessantly co-operated in the laboratory of the church as a most active servant in assisting to purify her dogmas. Still, among all consequences, there is one which philosophy does not endure; the inconsequence or contradiction whereby a

system negates itself — a system, *i. e.*, a certain form of philosophy, but not *the* philosophy itself. For were *the* philosophy to declare that it rested *tota quanta* upon the contradiction only, and that it had therein its sole existence as philosophy, why then this existence would assuredly be only an apparent or phenomenal existence; and then (seeing that every appearance must have a ground or substratum), it would be requisite yet further to explain how philosophy could merely busy itself with that which, regarded *per se*, has only an apparent self-existence, *i. e.*, with the sensuous world of phenomena, or with nature in the stricter sense, whereby, indeed, a certain elbow-room is permitted it within the pale of true knowledge, but, at the same time, all beyond this — such as the region of positive belief or religious truth — must, as a necessary foundation, be undermined. All this, however, may in its turn be affirmed from out the logical principle of contradiction, and for the sake of this principle, and in this way may be claimed by philosophy as a something proved, or a philosopheme, and consequently as its own possession: in short, if the question is not to degenerate into a logomachy or battle of mere words, it follows, that, if a radical distinction is to be retained, philosophy must either render the contradiction that which distinguishes *it* from belief (but, then, observe, philosophy gives itself up, and we must, with Aristotle, leave such sophistry to stand unheeded, because it proves that nothing admits of being proved), or if, on the other hand, *philosophy* would have the contradiction respected and rational, why then *belief* must take it under its protection, but would, with its *credo quia absurdum*, make now-a-days but few proselytes, and, as a Protestant form of orthodoxy, would negate itself just as much as that sophism negates itself, by the same procedure, as philosophy. Thus, between the two, no absolute antagonism whatever can exist, but only a relative distinction; and if in all thinking and knowing content and form are inseparable elements, the hope, at least, for the present, is left us, that at some future period, when philosophy with the true form shall have found also the true content, and theology, for the true content, the true form, that then, in fact, there will actually be but one truth reconciled in itself, and this truth a certainty also: until then, however, theology would commit as great a wrong by entering into an intimate alliance with philosophy, as philosophy would do by proclaiming itself to be absolutely perfect, while it still had but one content (mere nature) abiding by

which it would, although unable to comprehend Christianity, declare its specific content to be only a retrograde movement of humanity, or a now—God be praised!—episode in the world's history, out of which we have escaped.

Thus, if as a rigid consequence of the Hegelian method, we find that not only of necessity, but avowedly by the progressive part of his school, the existence of a personal God is admitted neither without nor within the universe, but is reduced simply to the knowledge of the human being; that, furthermore, the hope of an individual continuance of the soul after death is scoffed at as a sensuously selfish illusion; and, finally, that the antagonism of good and evil is, in this way, indirectly suppressed, the latter being regarded as necessary, the former as relatively good—according to time and circumstances,—while both may relapse into each other; still, in these results, hard even as they are, we could not, taken by themselves, find any means of refuting the system, but only the strongest challenge set before us for entering upon its criticism. The criticism, however, of an entire system, as such, cannot meddle with isolated points; for the fate of a system does not depend upon single errors, which are here and there met with as interwoven with its general structure, but upon the totality, the systematic arrangement, of the whole; for this is the test of the principle, and the more logical and exclusive the system is, by so much the more summary must be the process by which we have to deal with it. Now we cannot discern in the principle, by itself alone, that which lies implicitly therein, and still less the method, which takes its starting-point therefrom; for every principle yields a definite method in conformity with itself, and lets a definite content be developed from it; while what does not reside in it, it repudiates or denies. All this, however, is seen, for the first time, in the explication—the system itself,—and in this sense we may certainly declare the consequences or results of a definite philosophy to be its critick, provided only that by results be understood the collective organism of the system as regards both its content and compass. As regards the latter, this is seen most immediately in its historical connections, and finds in the History of Philosophy the full measure or value of its relative deserts. A principle may be justified in so far as it is a principle for a *part* of the entire systematic organism—for example, the abstract being, the idea of life, and other notions of the same sort; but it may, at the same time, also, be unjustified, when it is made to hold good for

the fundamental principle of the whole. All the chief categories have gradually come forward historically as principles of philosophy, and all have, in conformity with their own nature, produced systems more or less comprehensive. Each nation and epoch of time has its spiritual principle, *i. e.*, it has attained to a certain stage of mental profundity, which has been brought by some later or subsequent philosophy before the consciousness, and adopted into the organism of the whole at the proper place. That which is present simultaneously in the system as fulness of content, was manifested successively as an historical fact; so that each historical standing-point is a part of the system, and the last comprehensive system includes the collective content of history within itself. If, now, the historical principles lose in the system, where they appear as subordinate, the absolute character to which, at their time, they pretended, it follows, upon the other hand, that every system which raises itself above the antecedent ones, must substantiate its appeal to such a position by providing for, and organically receiving, those principles; in default of which procedure, it must be itself acknowledged to be a one-sided or actually lower stage of consciousness. Thus, history exercises for itself a certain criticism over the systematick, just as the latter does over the former; so that we should justly view with suspicion a system which would transport us back to the Aristotelian standing-point, or to the mode of thought prevalent in the early ages of Christianity. To become, however, fully aware of all this, it is requisite to compare the different systems, and consequently to possess a comprehensive historical knowledge of, and intimate acquaintance with, them, — conditions to which our own times are at length sufficiently matured, — so that at the present day we seem provided with all the necessary requirements both for criticising the past and detecting any peculiar feature which *our own* age may summon into life. Thus, whether we tackle the problem of criticism from the systematic or historical point of view, it will, at the present time, when history and speculation scientifically pervade each other, be achievable only in a comprehensive manner, by taking a survey of the whole, and not merely setting out from any one principle, unless this principle is itself the idea of the totality, the systematick, the organism of philosophy, or by whatever other name we please to call it, and which, strictly regarded, is none other than the idea of the *absolute design*.

Returning now from these general observations back to Hegel,

and connecting with them the assertion that philosophy is unassailable by any article of belief that lies external to it, it follows, that this security cannot be based upon any thing else than the positive notion of the philosophy itself, which implies that the latter carries its point or centre of gravitation within itself. A system which were not to rest on itself, but to seek some other point of support out of itself, whether in positive dogmas or in empiricism, could not presume to be treated according to that privilege of philosophy, but would renounce itself. True philosophy will, indeed, exclude neither empiricism nor Christian articles of belief from itself, but rather adopt and preserve them, though unable to make them its *starting-point*. So soon as we perceive any indications in a system of its depending upon those elements or upon hypotheses (which are not constructed out of itself, *i. e.* are not the exclusive products of its own conception), it follows, that as philosophy such a system is at once refuted. Hegel's system lays claim to being *the* philosophy itself; so that above all things it must stand the test of being free from hypothesis.

Here, however, at the very outset of our inquiries, we encounter a suspicious circumstance in the fact that Hegel, in his systematic consciousness, held it necessary to give to the principle of Logic, or being-thinking, a phenomenological foundation, which sets out and commences itself from the *dualism* of the empirical consciousness. This dualism is, indeed, to be elevated into the monism of the thinking process, the empirical moment is to vanish by degrees entirely from the content, but at the same time nothing is absolutely to *disappear* or vanish, but only to become elevated while "*suppressed*." Now, we will not enter at present so far into the question as to ask, whether these steps are arrived at, or, if they were so, whether, along with the immediateness to be mediated, the mediating process, *i. e.* the essential content, would not disappear, and the whole result become null and void,—we will set this point aside for the present, seeing that it entails upon us *nothing less* than a justification of the dualism and empiricism in the principle,—but we simply ask, what could justify Hegel in setting out from the antagonism of the sensuous consciousness as an *original* element? Is this originality any thing else than an historico-psychological element, and has it any other meaning for philosophy than that only of an exoteric or propaedeutic nature? Why set out from the dualism of the actual consciousness, which is obviously an hypothesis, and not rather

from monism, — “in order,” says Hegel, “that this might not be shot as out of a pistol?” But is it any the less a dualism? Philosophically regarded, the monism is the original element, or the unity of the idea, the dualism, the second element, or the judgment, into which the original idea resolves itself. Now, Hegel, it is true, remains absolutely in the judgments as the original element (the negativity in itself); but by what right? Has this consequence originated only from that half-empirical beginning, or is, inversely, this beginning (which is still dealt with itself as a mere hypothesis) a consequence of the judgment being the logically original element, the principle? With Hegel the method supplies the principle, and finally supplies also the result; it is all in all; and whence comes that? Is it based somehow upon that impure empiricism of the beginning? Nevertheless the system in contradiction therewith deals everywhere with the idea, the unity, as the original element, or thesis, — posites it in every instance as the first immediate and the judgment as the second element.

Hegel himself appears to have recognised this contradiction, and on that account to have eliminated the Phenomenology from the system, in order that by casting aside all empirical elements, he might start from a pure monistic principle. But the question arises whether Hegel, in freeing himself from this form, although unessential, *i. e.* as regards the whole method, could have remained imprisoned in it, and have unobservedly admitted this hypothesis into the system. The principle itself, or the absolute negativity, appears to bear testimony to this. Negativity is nothing else than what is usually called the power of forming a judgment, the movement or process of diremption itself, which, as proceeding directly from itself, is the origination or becoming, and as a contradiction of itself in itself, the necessity; a turning about, an oscillation, which, so to speak, must have under itself an hypomochlion or lever, but which cannot float freely in the air. This origination, though everywhere apparent at first as a third element, namely, as synthesis, turns out with Hegel to be in truth the original element in itself, and the form of immediateness or the being of the idea (*Begriff*), as unity is in this way lowered to the condition of a falsity, nay more, declared to be an error. The real being everywhere resolves itself into a being *per se* in the sense, as if there had been no such real being given, as seemed to be present; in short, the real being is no being, but an origination or actual activity. Thus, there is either no real being

whatever, not even as such in the origination, or the whole logic, which is the real being of the whole system, is as such present *per se*, *i. e.* as an actual thinking process *per se* or as subjectivity within the world's reality. Now, this would be the view entertained by a Platonising theism, and decidedly contradicts the Aristotelian character of the Hegelian system.

Now, if the system in this point falls into contradiction with itself, it follows, that the source of the latter is to be sought for in nothing else than that which has been made the principle, namely, in the absolute negativity, which, as diremption, lacks in itself the inseparable point of unity, or in which the unity as substratum and origin does not uphold itself, so that a *change* only of unity and antagonistic duality exists and is acknowledged, but not an irremovable fundamental unity continuing in the antagonism. The ordinary human understanding gives utterance to this when it declares that there is no movement by itself alone without a something that moves, and that it is impossible to think of movement without a something quiescent or at rest. Without that fundamental unity the negativity itself becomes as that which it ought to be, namely, as contradiction and necessity, annihilated, because a duality can only be a contradiction, and on that account a restless negativity, when it preserves at the same time the unity and immediateness of the being in itself, but not so soon as it is *itself* rendered the single immediateness, which, logically speaking, is impossible. As a pure abstract principle *per se*, the negativity and necessity suppresses itself, *i. e.* it can only be, when it preserves the fundamentally essential identity as its own ground within itself, and thus is not regarded as a principle but only as a momentum of the principle; by this is meant that the necessity is not the Absolute, but, indirectly, that what is free is the absolute principle, yet a free element, which subsumes the necessity as *momentum*, without being identical with it. In *this* synthesis, being and origination are not neutralised so as to become the *dead* unity, because with the being there is not combined a quiescent attribute or quality, but synthetically the moveable origination itself; so that being and origination now present themselves as the true essence (not indeed in Hegel's sense) or as the idea (*essentia*). The naught, which Hegel places at the beginning of the logic alongside of the being, or into which he rather leaves the being to convert itself, can in *this* place, *i. e.* as negation of the being-thinking, be only the so-called *nihil negativum*, or that naught only,

which, to be truly thought of, must not be thought of at all, so that thus in the principle itself thinking and non-thinking may have place alternately, or the principle itself be or be not alternately, or, as it were, may blaze up and be extinguished. But in fact, that naught is with Hegel only an heirloom of the scheme of Fichte, namely, the non-Ego, whereby is meant not naught, but another Ego (an Ego, but not *my* Ego), and is thus posited rather as the duplication of the real Ego than as its annihilation. This admits indeed of being said of the definite individual and finite Ego of Fichte, but not of the Absolute, to which Hegel has transferred this scheme of thought.

Now, what holds good in a general sense of the principle, the so-called absolute negativity, that it is none other than the moment of judgment which already presupposes an idea that is to judge itself, must be asserted also concerning the *dialectick* — the word being taken in its true and definite sense: in which in like manner we may gaze only upon this *momentum* of the method, but not the whole speculative method itself. The idea, which must be first presupposed or previously given, in order that we may advance to the activity of judgment, is the definite genus, but at first only abstractedly thought of (without any explicated content), a definite, more or less lofty, category of essence in its immediateness or being. Now this moves itself dialectically in itself, in conformity only with its own nature; but by virtue of this nature or its own conception, it does not get beyond itself to a higher genus, but only fills itself with *its own* content, *i. e.*, with the lower special ideas or categories, which are necessary to it as hypotheses and conditions of its own existence, or with whose non-existence it would itself be suppressed, just as the triangle could not exist unless it were to include in itself, as its premises, space, line, and angle. Thus, the dialectick, as a necessary movement and determination of thought, depends in its turn upon the contradiction, that what is posited as existent cannot also be simultaneously regarded as non-positd. The whole, however, is posited or presupposed in so far as it is genus, or category, or conception; and with this must also of necessity be posited the *essentially* particular. This necessity, however, or the contradiction, which *would* originate if that were not done, presupposes itself the antecedent position of the idea, without which it would not itself be present. Thus, to the dialectick is at once prescribed a definite object or goal, for it is first set in movement by that supposition, and that goal is the definite

special idea within which it elevates itself, and which is consequently for it the goal or purpose set before it, and which it strives towards, or which, as final cause, first really evokes it. Now this purpose cannot in our opinion be originally produced in a genetic manner by the dialectick, but the *object* rather produces the dialectick, and is itself the originally present. Accordingly, there can be no dialectic method, which, without any hypothetic element, can start purely from the lowest category, and then contemplate this as potentialising itself beyond its own nature into higher genera. We miss, with Schelling, this power of the mere idea in the sense already alluded to (in the thirteenth Lecture) in making mention of Cousins' Essay; but, nevertheless, we differ from him in this, that we do not find ourselves thrown back, by this circumstance, upon the necessity of an *empirical* foundation for philosophy, but perceive therein only the higher necessity of seizing the absolute idea as the original and immanent self-object which constitutes our mental nature, as the ground or substratum which brings out the philosophising process of thought, phenomenologically, from each lower category of essence up to the absolute state of spirituality and freedom. This absolute idea, however, from which philosophy has to set out, or which, as principle, unfolds itself into the system, is none other than the idea of philosophy itself.*

On that account, this process has with Hegel its steady progress, for he begins by speaking only of the philosophising subject; and this is his hypothetical starting-point, nay, more, it is the philosophising process, and, as such, is from the beginning elevated *in itself* above and beyond all natural existence, into which it only admits itself with its representation, without abandoning or giving up itself. Where, however, Hegel takes the natural categories as truly objective, *i. e.*, so thinks them as they must be thought of, if they are actually to be or constitute the real universe, as in the Philosophy of Nature, he acknowledges himself "that they are a system of stages, one of which is not engendered from the other in a natural way, but only in the internal idea in its identity, as constituting the ground or substratum of nature." Thus, he here acknowledges that the mind must phenomenologically grapple with its subjectivity, or descend into itself as the absolute idea

* For an attempt to carry out systematically the system of pure Philosophy from this, its own principle, see the author's *Entwurf eines Systems der Wissenschaftslehre*. Kiel. 1846.

in its identity, in order constantly to kindle anew its promethean torch, as often as an advance is to be made from lower notions or categories to higher ones; and thus by this is implied that the human mind must be somehow or other already in possession of the highest idea (*Idee*), if it is to find its definite content by descending, retrogressively, into the necessary conditions, without which even that idea could not exist: for it cannot arrive from below upwards through the graduated series of these conditions at the highest idea, since it cannot by the help of any method—at least, not by the negative-dialectic one—engender them, as it were, artificially, without practising a deception upon itself. If the natural categories thought of as truly objective, and as holding true relations with each other, corresponding to the reality, do not, as Hegel himself confesses, lead of necessity from below upwards, how, then, could this take place in that very part of the logic which bears the name of objective, and busies itself with these natural categories? We are of opinion that the apparently objective progress is here also no true or genuinely objective one, but a hidden phenomenological one, which results only from the *ultimate design* known and willed beforehand, namely, the absolute subjectivity, although Hegel does not admit this, but aims at going to work in a purely objective, genetic manner. If, upon the one hand, we take away this ultimate design, *i. e.* the ready-prepared subject of the philosopher with its fundamental activity, and then, without, upon the other hand, letting ourselves be blinded by the potentialising aspect of the dialectick, abide only by the objectivity, it follows, that we must necessarily seek for the progress of the thinking process from one category to another by the empirical route, and arrive also at the conviction that, without experience, there will be no such progress or advance.* In this light Schelling, also, among others, appears to regard the present question, and in this way to indulge a hope that experience itself may be strengthened to becoming a necessary postulate for philosophy as a system. The very same notion was also present to Aristotle with more or less distinctness, for even he does not discover and furnish any necessary transition and connection of the categories from below upwards, but takes them up singly as empirical, and then arranges them. Hegel reproaches him for this, and finds therein, as a result, a want of organic unity in the whole system, declaring that Aristotle was not acquainted with the principle

* Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Bd. i. Sect. iii.

of absolute negativity, as being that alone which could dialectically mediate this progress. From genus to genus, however, we are impelled by no immanent necessity : each principle (or generic idea) gives forth and lives out what resides in it ; for it continues to reproduce its genus, and produces nothing better than it was itself. There lies no absolute contradiction in the lower special ideas in themselves, for such would involve the *impossibility* of these ideas themselves ; so that, as such, they would not exist even a moment, setting aside the fact of their being able to form a concrete system of nature.

Thus much will suffice in order to explain the motives for affirming that the dialectick, just as Hegel has elevated it to the method of philosophy, is not the *whole*, but only a part or moment of the speculative method. No dialectick can *originally* posit and begin ; it can only originate from behind the positing, and point out what must be posited simultaneously and together with the first position, or what, if not simultaneously posited, would suppress the posited itself : it has, in truth, a critical value ; but for itself alone, without a positive moment, it degenerates into a negative action, which has been already pointed out, by Aristotle, with a perfectly clear insight into the matter, to be sophistic. As regards the characteristics of true speculation, we can only indicate these at present as far as is necessary for affording some insight into the deficiency of that method. The speculative method, as is clear from what has gone before, posites beginning and ending both at once : it posites, in the first place (to use a familiar expression), the *ambitus* of the idea, in order, in the next place, necessitated by this, to fill up the idea with the *complexus* that belongs to, and lies already involved in, it ; *i. e.*, it begins with the abstract notion of design, both in establishing the individual categories, as also in devising the whole system of the science of truth. For were it to posit, in the first place, only a part or a moment of the same, why then it would indeed arrive dialectically at the filling up of this portion, but not beyond this at the totality. What else, however, can this unity of beginning and end be than the very unity of the idea, and that, indeed, in the very first place, the idea of philosophy, *the love of wisdom* itself ? Beginning thus purely from itself, *i. e.*, from its abstract notion, and utterly unconcerned, at present, about every thing else, it grows and mediates itself as a pure love of science thoroughly from itself, — is its own ground, its own means, and its own object — in a word, its own phenomenology

or teleology. The further progress, however, is this, that abstract, indeed, though all-comprehensive, as it at first appears, it discedes, in the next place, into its most universal and comprehensive momenta, *i. e.*, into the proximate distinctions of the collective content, which will be the leading divisions or parts of the system; but each of these is itself again a notion or sphere of categories, which perfects the same judgment in itself, and hence particularises and determines itself. Thus, the determination and judging proceeds from the more comprehensive to the particular, while still the whole remains as substantial unity and pervading substratum unsuppressed in power, and ultimately reappears, as embracing that particular content in itself as *concrete* unity of essence. Hence the system sets out from the strictest monism, and has for its final object or goal the specific individuation; while in that rigid monism alone is found the scientific justification for attaining that goal. Without, however, venturing, in the present instance, to depict the leading outlines of a new system, let us return back to the Hegelian, that we may point out therein the traces of such a specified teleology as that which would originate and is impelled towards the light, but by Hegel himself is still misapprehended, nay, treated with scorn.

In doing this, I am reminded of what has been previously, though cursorily, said (in the fifteenth Lecture) about the systematic arrangement of the whole system. Attention was there directed, upon coming to the beginning of the Logic, to the fact that Hegel, as a rule, prefaced both the whole and the principal sections of his system with a table of contents or schematic survey of its subdivision, but constantly accompanied this with the express declaration that it was not to serve as a means for anticipating or determining the end or object of the whole system. Nevertheless, the ternary divisions into which the universal idea previously resolves itself, would appear, such as they are, to be, in themselves, dialectically and methodically justified, had Hegel only confided in them, and not, with an almost superstitious fear, been withheld from determining any thing beforehand as to the limit or goal. For why should not the dialectick hold good of the most universal and comprehensive notions, as well as the most special, and effect, within the limited range of the latter, what it cannot do in the comprehensive sphere of the former? A determination anticipating in this way the special through the universal, and hence an *a priori* determination, would be what

we call an intentional method, or one that sets an object or purpose before itself; but, regarded in this light, the whole system would obtain an essentially different character to that which it now has, where the categories, so to speak, are spun out in a linear manner, and the lower is by negation of itself to engender from itself the next higher one — a negation this which, as a contradiction of itself in itself, or as an internal *impossibility* of being, reduces, such as it is, the principle of necessity to the most rigid state of coercion that can possibly be conceived. This, however, it is said, cannot be the case, because in this process each principle, while it works, always negates itself, and while turning over into its counterpart, loses itself. Through the pretension that is constantly being insisted upon of conserving what has been, and thinking of it as a condition of the higher together with this, that higher itself comes into existence only by a momentary death of the antecedent, and we are at a loss to know where the genetic power of transubstantiation — for such it is, and not a metamorphosis — must really reside, unless the thinking subject changes itself into the means. The antecedent element is obviously extinguished only by the fault of the method and systematick, and the subsequent element steps into the spot that has become empty upon the disappearance of its predecessor. Thus, a movement of constant negation is present which resembles that which is made by workmen in a tread-mill, who, while always lifting their feet, do not get away from one spot, because the basis upon which they stand is at each step withdrawn; so that this beginning, seen from a distance, appears to be utterly without result and aim — a labour of Sisyphus, or one that is undertaken only for the sake of the movement.

In this image we recognise at a glance the fundamental category of the whole system: where, as in physical life and prosperity, the means themselves are a design or purpose, here that category supplies their place; but where the mediation extends to the being of an *objective* purpose, and thus is itself truly posited as that which is, namely, as means, there this method and systematick is insufficient and contrary to design. If we agree with Hegel, in regarding form and content as inseparable, it follows, that we must also declare that his system, by virtue of its form, does not get beyond that very content, which is the idea of life and the prosperity of temporal existence. All higher ideas and purposes, however, so soon as they have been dragged into or under this form, can themselves appear only as life, or

as this sensuous-psychical reality, this being the case also with the category of substantiality, which, not being throughout the whole system truly vanquished, is ultimately manifested everywhere as the restless movement of the process, the mediation being the object itself.

Is, however, the Hegelian system, it will be asked, acquainted with no category of design or purpose, and has it not in its own course a pervading teleology or argument from design? Certainly, but the subordinate, mistaken position of the category causes the design to be one only of a subjective, selfish, and self-interested character. Hegel is not acquainted with the meaning of the *objective* design, *i. e.* the *Love*; the tendency of the whole system, by setting out from dualism, reverts of necessity into an absolute monism; it consumes and digests in a selfish manner every self-subsistent within the insatiable unity of the absolute substance, while a system, that sets out from monism, would have the opposite disposition, *i. e.* the tendency to posit true objective purposes of its own. The same lot befalls Hegel's system as is encountered by every philosophy which, in order that it may justify with positive certainty the empirical element, adopts at once into its principle the empirical dualism of a subjective Ego and an objective world: such a procedure leads to nothing else than to monistic subjectivism, while this again is of such a kind that, in order to maintain itself, it veers round into immediate objectivism, empiricism, and eudæmonism, though, as is well known, it does not arrive there at a state of rest, but remains the eternal origination or becoming, which never arrives at reconciliation with itself, to say nothing of its attaining to the thought and desire of positing an object for the sake of such object. Theoretically regarded, the knowledge which is here attained is only a knowledge of the subject touching its own being, and hence a subjective knowledge, a self-consciousness of the intelligence only, which thinks the existence of objects to be their non-being *per se*, *i. e.* the negation of the truth of the objective being. And seeing that to the system in this way the true notion of objective being is wanting, it follows, that this defect veers back again also into the being of the subject; this also not being a true being, but only an origination, an appearance. As regards the strict and definite comprehension of the notion of the objectivity of being; of this, Herbart's system, though excluding from it all origination, is in possession, while to the Hegelian it is utterly wanting. On that account the intelligence is and remains with Hegel,

theoretically as well as practically, a dialectic and necessary process of suppressing as well as positing the objective, and hence it is a knowledge and craving which has *no true* being for its object and content, no objective truth — a position this, which Hegel converts into the directly opposite one, seeing that he never escapes from the dialectick of the understanding, and never penetrates through it to the idea of the real concrete truth, in which the objective has subjectivity also in itself, and is, on that account, the truth, which may be *known*, not merely *thought* of. That an object may by the absolute subject be willed into the state of real subject-being *per se*, *i. e.* into one of actual freedom, and may be dismissed, *i. e.* rendered with the special self-satisfaction of the subject the objective purpose which it has in view, is a point utterly foreign to the present system, though in that we recognise the most essential truth not only of knowledge, but of the good, and thus the only true principle of Ethics also, this principle being the goal that is to be set before philosophy, which by its name and idea declares itself beforehand to be not only a craving (*φιλία*) after knowledge, but also after practical wisdom (*σοφία*).

What, on the contrary, is here called morality, and which is craved unreasonably from the human being, is only a sacrificing of the condition of self into the abyss of the absolute substance, which, being in itself devoid of love, does not justify the duty of this sacrifice; for the so-called goodness of Hegel's Deity consists only in the gratification of its own activity, by positing individuals incessantly; its love only, in getting exclusive possession of itself in them, while, finally, its justice is declared to be but the power of exposing the nothingness of all that has been posited, *i. e.* annihilating the latter according to the principle of Mephistophiles:

. . . . "for, of all that rises, never
One thing appears but what deserves to go
To ruin and destruction."

In good truth, the Platonic god was better than this modern child-devouring Saturn; for when he created self-subsistent divine beings, he said, "I am your creator and father; all the works generated by me are by my will indissoluble; for all that is bound is soluble; to desire, however, to dissolve what is beautifully harmonised and well-disposed, is the mark of an evil nature. Now, inasmuch as you have been generated or have become, you are not indeed immortal nor wholly indissoluble,

yet you shall never be dissolved nor become subject to death, because in *my will* you have got a stronger and mightier bond than that by which you were bound when first created.

The Hegelian fundamental schema — Being, Naught, Origination — does not correspond to the scheme of objective teleology, — principle, means, and effect ; but the origination or process, *i. e.* the means, is interposed as an eternal self-mediation in the place of the purpose. The system cannot, therefore, evolve itself to the point at which the ground or principle might range as the self-thinking subjectivity opposite to or over against a definite objectivity, but the former has and maintains even as idea (*idee*), its own intrinsic value only upon and in the objectivity, which hence is no more any thing *per se* than the ground or principle ; all lies only involved in the midst of the origination, and this process, proceeding from an empty principle, passes out into an abstract naught, produces nothing, but reproduces only itself, being thus a null and void act of production. This is the circle, or, strictly speaking, the oscillation between two extremes, the alternation or change, within which the Absolute may not merely be said to move, but which it actually is or constitutes in itself ; it is, as has been said, the eternal and inevitable process of self-mutation and gyration, or that necessity which *is* or exists only as an eternal process of conversion or sudden change. The momentum of the subjective principle is indeed to be in the Absolute, or, as it is represented in the system, to be the logic in itself (God, as it were, before the creation of the world) ; and this expression of Hegel's is still retained in part by his earlier pupils ; but this logical principle is still, as a consequence of the whole systematick, not a thinking process in the sense of an actual mental activity *per se*, but is only actual upon the domain of the world's reality, *i. e.* in so far as men think, or God has his consciousness, his spiritual existence, not *per se*, but in human beings ; and the human beings are God, in so far as they think and will the universal, and that which in the universal is persistent and rational. That the human being objectifies and hypostasizes this his own thinking process, is the idea of the religious standing-point, but one which, when dragged, as has been very recently done by the Left-hand party of the school, in a perfectly logical and barefaced manner, into the light of noon-day, turns out to be only an anthropologico-psychological standing-point, which, in philosophical thinking, suppresses itself and turns out to be false. In this way, such philosophising, instead of having actually

progressed, has returned in essentials unmistakeably to the Kantian standing-point, and the Critick of that author, so far as it was subjective in character, has in this way in a most unexpected manner concluded its course; for as we remember, even for that Critick, the ideas of the reason were not justifiable hypotheses of the mere mode of subjective thinking, personified laws of thought devoid of objective truth and being, and containing no knowledge of truth, but they were only a belief, the truth of which was with Kant to be imperatively based upon some other grounds, namely, the ethical — while in the present instance such belief relapses utterly as a deception into naught, which would have been impossible in the historical course of philosophy, if the author of the Critick had succeeded in achieving what he wished for and acknowledged to be necessary, namely, the elevation of the ethical categories of freedom into a “Metaphysics of Morals,” *i. e.* into a special and absolute series of fundamental principles, concluding and, as it were, crowning the system of the doctrine of science.

Let us now return, in conclusion, once again back to the systematic arrangement of the whole system. Hegel had at first, as has been mentioned, the intention of placing the first part of the system in the Phenomenology; had this been done, the Logic would have formed the second, and the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind, taken together, the third part. The Phenomenology would then have presented an ascending, analytically retrogressive tendency, or one that returns back to the true principle; the Logic would, as it were, have vibrated at the apex or centre of the whole system; and the last part would, as that which has been called by Weisse and others a real philosophy, have represented the synthesis of the two preceding stages, but at the same time also the reduction or return to the beginning of the first part. In the sequel, however, another arrangement of the system was preferred, the real philosophy being separated into two parts, and the latter, the Philosophy of Mind, brought to a state of reduction in the Logic. Now, here it is obvious that two different kinds of fundamental views, the dialectick reflection and the ternary division of the idea (*Begriff*), intercept each other in a confused manner, for the former has not suffered the latter to arrive at the thorough stage of objective teleology; the *subjective* design or principle must once more yield to the mysterious reality, the transcendent or antecedent being, as to an unutterable abstraction, the spiritual personality of God lost its existence, and, because the

reality had to obtain this, it first found this immediately in the world's reality, whereby this obtained in the real philosophy such a doubtful position and meaning, by blending again together with that reality into a bare or wretched unity, that the whole became a monism devoid of subjectivity, and, in fact, repeated that Spinozism which Hegel had set before himself in the Phenomenology as a problem to be overcome. If we regard the system as it lies before us, we can, by insisting upon the content, recognise therein only a threefold repetition. The system in its first form is the Phenomenology, the second elaboration of it is the Logic, and the third the Philosophy of Nature and Mind; each begins from the beginning and is thoroughly carried out, but the transition from one to the other is, as Schelling first declared of the connection of the Logic and Nature-philosophy, thoroughly indistinct and unaccountable; for, according to our view, it is not a transition or progress, but rather a conversion which is there to be recognised. Had Hegel abided by his first view of the matter, why then the Logic would have taken a more decided post than at present, and instead of representing in itself a perpetual whirl or circulation, would have taken a place like that of the *philosophia prima* with Aristotle, *i. e.* it would have soared to the summit of the whole system, and have rendered itself what at the present day an universal theory of science must be, a confirmation of the principles of all sciences or so-called individual disciplines, which derive their origin in all directions from it as the main-stay of all scientifick, resting in itself or gravitating upon the idea of absolute truth.

As to that mysterious "Ansich" to which the logical mind has been, by virtue of the systematick, degraded, we have been unable to discover in it any thing else than a new word for the old notion of *potency*. In fact, this is shown to be the obscure point upon the meaning of which the two different views of the schools, namely, the theistic and naturalistic-monistic, part company with each other. It is the same point, too, upon which impinges the principal opposition between the neo-Schellingian and old Hegelian philosophies. If we set aside the theistic notion as virtually Hegelian, it may then be said that Hegel regards this fundamental reality as ideality, Schelling as reality, so that the old Hegelians reproach, upon that account, the doctrines of Schelling with letting the mind originate from the matter, while they themselves profess to have, as a principle, the absolute intelligence as the eternal reason. If, however, we

look, upon the one hand, at the state of suspense in which the idea of the reason "existing in itself" is ordinarily regarded, and, upon the other, at the obstinate retention of the "negativity" and method, it follows that we must, if a decided opinion is now demanded of us in regard to the position held by these two systems, declare, without reserve, that Hegel appears to have advanced in so far beyond the stand-point of the earlier and later Philosophy of Nature, inasmuch as he recognises the Absolute to be intelligence or *mind*; for since, as has been already observed (Lecture xiv.) Hegel does not stand *before*, but *in*, the thinking process, it follows, that if we regard the pure result of the whole, and in doing this, disregard the methodical contradictions in the details, an absolute monism is that alone which ultimately remains as the Absolute and One, the only truly existent; if however, we estimate this result very highly, or insist upon its importance, we must not, at the same time, also omit to notice what to us appears a defect, namely, that this absolute idealistic monism is not recognised for what it is, namely, as idealism and subjectivity of the Absolute, but is, at the same time, and under the same aspect, declared to be the reality of the universe. To have recognised this latter point is, without doubt, Schelling's most recent merit, so that we must acknowledge that, with this consciousness, Schelling goes beyond Hegel, and is justified in declaring that all philosophy hitherto is only a propaedeutick, destined to prepare and conduct the consciousness up to that point, and that he has here grappled, for the first time, with the true, real principle as a positive deduction, from whence must now begin a wholly different method of philosophising, a progressive one, corresponding with the categories of creative freedom: in fact, we see in this statement, for the first time, the prospect of a system, which, setting out from a Deity existing in itself, and abiding by such as the principle, strives to comprehend the creation of the universe as its free act, a problem in which alone a glimpse seems to be afforded into the true content of our modern Christian act of thinking and willing, and not merely into that of the Pagan epoch. If now we openly declare that this very problem appears to us to be insoluble in any other way than by virtue of the *ethical* categories, and that we express ourselves the more confidently the more we are convinced that the method leading to this goal—the teleological—is *none other than the dialectico-logical which has arrived at a perfectly definite state of perfection in itself*, it follows, that we must still, as is but just or equitable,

refrain from passing any definite judgment upon the performances of the great master so long as they themselves lie before us in an imperfect and unauthenticated state.

We will conclude our present labours with a general historical sketch. As in judging of the last system we found that a philosophy which had attained to the possession of a comprehensive systematic consciousness of itself afforded to criticism no other point of attack than that of its general arrangement, so also a perfect critical view and survey of the present standing-point of philosophy is not to be obtained from any single system, not even the last, nor to be expected from those persons who hold by this system only, or regard it by the light only of modern precedents. Upon this point a clear and perfect consciousness is only to be gained by contemplating the antagonism between the philosophy of the Middle Ages and of Antiquity, or by taking a survey of the whole developmental course of the culture of the human mind.* History, though philosophically regarded, here enters upon its true privileges or rights. Accordingly, to take up this position in a perfect manner, it is necessary to enter upon a wider survey of the subject than that which is conceded to us by the standing-point usually chosen. We have in the present work traversed but a comparatively small, although rich, division of the whole development of Philosophy—in short, its last or modern phase only; and have seen in this that the chief business of human thought is and must be to discover and comprehend principle, means, and end, both in the singular and in the whole. All three moments ought to be one or united; but they must also be distinguished, and, each in its own place, must necessarily be that to which, by this place, it is entitled or justified. To find the true formula for this relation has been, as the whole history of philosophy teaches us, the problem from Pythagoras down to Hegel: incessantly has the human mind laboured with this intention, and, without having in itself a distinct consciousness of the fact, worked within the pale of this formula, in order to obtain possession of it for it-

* In this respect we especially recommend *Braniss*, Uebersicht des Entwicklungsganges der Philosophie in der alten und mittleren Zeit. Breslau, 1842; and as regards the epoch preparatory to that of Kant, *J. H. Fichte*, Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, Ed. 2nd, Sulzbach 1841; *Erdmann*, Gesch. der neueren Phil. Bd. ii. Abth. 2. Leipzig, 1842. Consult also *Hillebrand*, der Organismus der Phil. Idee, &c. Dresden u. Leipzig, 1842.

self. It has, however, succeeded only by degrees in evolving the method, and, with this form, the appropriate content also. The method has its own development and history, but this latter coalesces, in every instance, with the principle as well as with the system or the objective product and result. Pagan antiquity and Grecian philosophy stood within this idea; though, in its immediateness, this idea is only that of *Beauty*. There the principle is present as the psychical essence, the purpose or end being the direct phenomenon, or reality; the means is the life, but the life itself is still all, being consequently the object also, and must be so, seeing that the principle in the phenomenon and the phenomenon in the principle are, at bottom, incessantly blossoming and decaying: neither of them being in itself *per se*, it follows, that neither of them can be the object, and nothing remains than to erect into the object or purpose the blossoming and decay, or this mediating movement itself, although in this way it falls into a state of contradiction, and cannot, as life, support the dignity of the absolute teleological being, but relapses into the *progressus in infinitum*—into that which absolutely should be, *i. e.*, into an infinite ending.

The human self-consciousness cannot rest content with this, for it is thereby placed in a state of most trenchant and painful contradiction—into the negation of itself, so soon as it reflects upon the true meaning of this category. Antiquity stood, in the beginning, in this idea (*Idee*) without reflection, like a child that does not yet think of death, because it has life still before it, and the *first* question is, certainly, how to live. It could not, however, remain in this state, the content of this idea or its truth admitting of no abiding satisfaction, for it does not consent to positing, as object, what in itself is only means. The ancient consciousness broke forth; Christianity rendered prominent the true purpose or end; but with this a dualism and relation of the two elements was at first posited, namely, of the purpose as product, the principle as producent—of man upon the one side, and Deity upon the other. The thinking process of mediation began afresh, and this time it began, of necessity, in a negative direction, *i. e.*, in one that resolved or led back the doubt to unity, a direction, however, which could not, upon the other hand, have furnished the Pagan result.

Fostered in its infancy, and brought up upon the mother soil of Greece, philosophy now applied herself within the early Christian, *i. e.* Grecian church, in a direct and wholly objective manner to the problem of the Deity. To this it transferred

the Platonic formula, the idea of beauty; elaborated, moreover, the dogma of the Trinity, but, by defining this only in an objective manner, without setting it in its true relation to the world and humanity, it remained on that very account a dogma only, not a philosopheme. In this point philosophy forgot both the world and itself, while Oriental Christianity, utterly immersed in the state of objective contemplation, could find but little activity in its own bosom, seeing that the external relations of its people and states were but ill adapted to awaken the self-consciousness: the mind preferred seeking refuge from reality and itself in the supramundane objectivity as in a perfect asylum, there to lose and bury itself in the unattainable depths of the Deity. The Christian Neoplatonist could not preserve the one-sided state in which he oscillated; and if he wished that the category of his consciousness should bear relation to God and *also* to humanity, it followed that the latter fell back, as an empty accident, into the substance of the Deity, from out of which it could be lifted only by the grace of belief, but not by *the* idea of philosophy.

A more powerful individual feeling or self-consciousness was infused, for the first time, with the fresh blood of Germany into European humanity. It blended at once with the Græco-Roman element into the Romanism of the Middle Ages, both as regards morals, language, and modes of thought. But humanity, or the anthropological element, as it was termed by the dogmatists, was soon put forth by these Orientals so soon as they began to philosophise, nay, more, it advanced so far as to become Pelagianism. The reinstated energy of the subject, the human being, and, indeed, of the individual, of personality, soon asserted its rights; and as it knew how to put itself in just possession of a worldly possession in the state, as opposed to the church, and to declare itself by its practical activity, it again succeeded in gaining a scientific possession of nature, culled from the Arabians mathematics and physics, which were all but lost, and, finally, the Grecian sources of learning themselves from out the dust of cloisters, and ultimately the whole treasure of antiquity from Italy and Byzantium, in order to re-elaborate within itself, under the form of a new humanity, the art, and with it the *καλόν και αγαθόν* of the Grecians. The fruit of all this was the triumph of the world's energy, as elevated to the stage of merit in works, and of individuality, although of an abstract kind as in Nominalism.

The third, which was really a *German* period, began in the

universal sense and spirit so characteristic of the people. If, since the times of Augustine and Anselm, the elaboration of the subjective state had been, upon the whole, uninterrupted, though engaged at the same time in struggling with a clerical realism, which endeavoured to stifle its individual independence, it follows, that it was now the problem of the Protestant world, —and this problem is certainly a most difficult one, only to be solved ultimately and fully by a scientific method, —to bring the objectivism of early Christianity and the subjectivism of the Middle Ages into an unity of reconciliation. The Protestant belief has constantly, though dogmatically, clung to this problem in so far as its most vehement representatives were inwardly conscious of its origin. Philosophy, however, in order to play the part of a mediator *scientifically*, was obliged, of necessity, to drive the antagonism to its ultimate point, *i. e.*, to the most trenchant antithesis, and, as Philosophy, she was wholly justified in taking part with the subjectivity, and reinstating the subject where possible, as the Absolute. Hence we encounter the atomism of the finite Egoes in a similar manner with Fichte as well as Herbart. As regards the content of their systems, both have that atomism, although under an opposite phase of representation (the former in the subjective, the latter in the objective method); and from this we may well infer what has really been the deepest ground of the atomism, and what common interest it is which has led, at different times, powerful minds to oppose it as a doctrine to that of an overwhelming pantheism: we shall, for such an interest, ultimately discover an ethical ground — the ground of individual self-feeling. Now, however, as opposed to this subjective or objective atomism, the monism must reassert its rights. The Fichtean subject, comprehended at first as a totality, utterly shut up within itself, launched out with Schelling and Hegel partly into an objective realism, partly into an objective spiritualism, but in both cases into pantheism; and the present age is now sufficiently matured for distinctly recognising in these forms and phases the problem at which it has hitherto laboured with more or less consciousness of the final purpose that emerges in unmistakeable clearness from out the whole.

Having arrived now at the end of our labours, let us return once more to that question which has been already mooted twice, though interruptedly, in the course of our history, namely, as to whether, upon the one hand, it is not a mischievous pretension upon the part of the philosophising subject, and one that admits

only of being had recourse to through a kind of thoughtlessness, when it endeavours to elevate itself to the standing-point of the Absolute, and in absolute knowledge to occupy, as it were, the place of God; and whether, on the other hand, this hazardous enterprise is not necessarily craved by philosophy itself, so long as it aims to be philosophy alone, and does not content itself with a relative certainty. This problem we see Hegel responding to, by assuming a pantheistic identity of the human being and God, in which identity, when regarded at least from a strict and logical point of view, the Deity itself arrives, for the first time, by virtue of human cognition, to the state of consciousness — a solution this of the problem, which explains perfectly, it is true, the absolute knowledge in us, but on that very account affords little satisfaction to the religious ideas, and to this we may add the philosophical notion also of Deity. In Schelling, on the contrary, we find at present, unless we are deceived, that an entirely different, nay, opposite tendency, is at work, towards the solution of that difficulty: a system is sought to be attained in which *experience* is to come into its full rights, which it must have if the knowledge of the Absolute in us human beings is to be rendered comprehensible by *revelation*, and justified from a personal relation of God to humanity. To this phase of philosophic development we naturally look forward full of hopes, but meanwhile we content ourselves with the following view of the matter, which, in our opinion, is as free from mystical pedantry as it is satisfactory from its simplicity, which neither blinds by its glare, nor is yet deficient in light and heat, a view by which we certainly arrive in our reason, at the means and justification of the knowledge of the Absolute, because God, by virtue of his love that sets before itself objective purposes, comes also in these his designs to us, and this so soon as we acknowledge him to be the holy and sanctifying spirit; and this we recognise in that which is our own yearning nature, when it is as it should be, *i. e.* when it has attained in itself to a reconciliation that is free of contradiction, or to the freedom of contradiction in thought and will. With this purpose of the Absolute realised in ourselves, the Absolute itself has been recognised and comprehended not only in its eternal being as intelligence, *i. e.* not merely according to its so-called metaphysical qualities, but also in its will and eternal councils or decrees, as objective *truth* also, unsuppressed by any theory of identification with our own nature. How far this idea may lie within the compass of a speculative method, and be thus scientifically possible, upon this

point the present is not the fitting place for entering any further ; attention has been only directed to it with a view of showing how upon this standing-point both absolute monism, as also atomistic monadism, have their full rights ; and hence we, with our present knowledge, seem fully justified in the position we have assigned at once to the systems of Hegel and Herbart, seeing that to the mediation of these two standing-points, which theoretically may be reduced to the simplest formula of becoming and being, we would direct attention as to the problem not only of the present, but the future. As to the root of all evil, *i. e.* of all unsuccessful and sophistical torment — this from the very beginning we have declared dualism in the principle to be ; it is only a freely self-determining, in the strictest sense monistic, but by no means abstract Absolute, which has the power in its all-sufficient omnipotence to press forwards to the objective establishment of its designs, and, elevated above all egotism, to create out of love to the object, which last must not be dualistically given and originally set aside, but must be grounded as to its existence in its will. In this way only can the principle maintain itself as such *per se*, and it is only when the principle has the power to do this that it can also create, so that the created is, remains, and is immortal *per se* ; for he who so wills it is himself immortal, *i. e.* elevated above our death and our life. Belief is in direct possession of this truth, but *as truth*, it can only *know* a knowledge that has become adequate to its idea ; the human being is itself a self, and will, on that account, have a certainty of his own, which he cannot in turn attain without the certainty of Deity, *i. e.* not without knowing the Deity itself to be intelligent ; for if the Deity neither desires to know nor does know the human being such as he is, it follows that he cannot know himself to be such ; and on that account in his knowledge there must be both truth of knowledge and knowledge of truth at the same time. We see how, with Hegel, a further division of the history of mind has run its course, and in this relation we acknowledge him to be the achiever of a great philosophical past, such as his own philosophical consciousness when directed backwards towards the past — not to what should be, the future — gives utterance to in these words : “ For the first time in the maturity of reality the ideal appears opposite to the real, and the former builds up to itself the same world, when apprehended in its substance, in the form of an intellectual domain. If philosophy paints her grey in grey, then a form of life has become old, and with grey in grey she does not grow

young again, but only admits of being recognised ; for the first time with the break of day begins the Owl of Minerva her flight." It is the evening star which in this philosophy shines upon us, but we hope to gaze upon it again as morning star also, and meanwhile exclaim with the poet,

" No bar the spirit world hath ever borne —
It is thy thought is shut, thy heart is dead.
Up ! scholar, bathe, unwearied and unworn,
Thine earthly breast in morning's beams of red."

INDEX.

CHALYBÄUS,

Remarks upon Hegel's pretensions to a perfect system of Philosophy, p. 364.

On the Division of the Hegelian School into opposite parties, p. 365.

Conditioned by internal contradictions unsolved both in the Principle, p. 370.; the Method, p. 372.; and Result, p. 379.

General criticism of Hegel's Systematick, p. 382.

Comprehensive survey of the whole historical course of Philosophy, p. 385.

FICHTE, p. 146.

Review of Kant's Critick of Pure Reason, p. 146.

Review of Jacobi's philosophy, p. 147.

Subsequent division of Philosophy into Realism and Dynamico-Idealism p. 147.

Fichte's individual Subjectivism, p. 148.

His Theory of Knowledge (*Wissenschaftslehre*), p. 149.

Endeavour to account for the non-Ego by supposition of certain "absolute and inexplicable limits" inherent in the constitution of the principle or Ego, p. 157.

The Ego as principle of all philosophy, p. 158.

Subjective idea of God as active moral order, p. 169.

General estimate of Fichte's system, p. 171.

Criticism of it by Hegel, p. 174.

Fichte's later Realistic or practical views, p. 176.

Relation of Absolute to finite free Egoes, p. 180.

His Philosophy of History, p. 181.

Idea of a Blessed life, p. 182.

HEGEL, p. 295.

Retrospective glance at Schelling's Philosophy of Nature, and Doctrine of the Absolute, 295—99.

Principle of Hegel's system — the Idea in its incessant process of self-realisation and self-recognition — in contradistinction to the Objective subject-object of Schelling's Intellectual Intuition, p. 299.

His Phenomenology, p. 300.

Identification by Hegel of the Rational Process of thought, self-opposition or *absolute negativity*, with the Aristotelian doctrine of *νόησις τῆς νοήσεως*, p. 311.

Hegel's system and its divisions, pp. 313-14.

Logic. Categories of Being, p. 315.

Categories of Essence, p. 324.

Continuation of the latter, p. 328.

Categories of the Idea (*Begriff*), p. 332.

The Subject or Subjective Logic, p. 336.; the Object, p. 338.; and Idea, (*Idee*) in its Identity, p. 349.

Continuation of the *Idee* as Identity of Subjectivity and Objectivity, p. 350.

Transition from the Logic to Philosophy of Nature, p. 354.

Survey of the Nature-Philosophy, p. 356. Philosophy of Mind, p. 359.

HERBART, p. 68.

Realistic tendency of his Philosophy, p. 70.

His defence of the Empirical as opposed to the Dynamical standing-point, p. 71.

His notion of Philosophy as being an analysis and investigation of our Ideas, p. 71.

Definition of the word Being (*Seyn*), p. 74.

Problem of Metaphysics, p. 86. Its division into Ontology, Synechology, and Eidology, p. 86.

His Method of Relations, p. 87. Difference between Herbart and the advocates of the Identity-philosophy, p. 93.

His Accidental Views, p. 94.

His Ontology, p. 95.

His Synechology, p. 103.

His doctrine of Intelligible Space, p. 105.

Space not merely a subjective form, as with Kant, p. 108.

Leading object of Synechology — Matter, p. 108.

His Philosophy of Nature, p. 112.

His Eidology, or science of Mental phenomena, p. 116.

Definition of the State, p. 130.

Difference between Herbart's Practical philosophy and the views of Kant and Fichte, p. 133.

General review and Criticism of Herbart's philosophy, pp. 137—45.

HUME, p. 12.

His Scepticism, p. 12.

Theory of Causation, p. 14.

JACOBI, pp. 58—67.

His characteristick of Kant, p. 37.

His doctrine of knowledge, as based upon faith or intuition, p. 59.

His points of agreement with, and difference from, Kant, p. 59.

His doctrine of Reason as a perception of spiritual things, p. 61.

Criticism of Jacobi's opinions, p. 65.

Hegel's remarks upon Jacobi, p. 66.

KANT, p. 16.

Problem of the Critick of Pure Reason, p. 19.

Matter and Form, the elements of Knowledge, p. 20.

Universality and Necessity, p. 21.

Difference between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments, p. 24.

How far Synthetical judgments *à priori* are possible? p. 25.

Categories of the Understanding, p. 27.

Space and Time, as forms of the sensuous intuition, p. 30.

Syllogistic forms of our Reasoning faculty, p. 33.

Distinction of the Reason from the Understanding, p. 35.

Ideas of the Reason as a faculty distinct from the Understanding, p. 35.

Regulative (but not constitutive) character of such Ideas, p. 36.

The Reason of a purely formal nature : its paralogisms, p. 38.

Antinomies of the Reason, p. 40.

Criticism of the proofs of the Existence of Deity, p. 44.

The proper objects of Metaphysics wholly inaccessible to our cognition,
p. 48.

Autonomy of the will as a ground of moral action, p. 50.

Categorical Imperative, or absolute moral law, p. 51.

Critick of the Faculty of Judgment, p. 53.

Criticism of Kant's opinions, pp. 55—58.

LOCKE, p. 9.

His Sensationalism, p. 9.

The mind a *tabula rasa*, p. 10. Our general Judgments rest upon
experience, p. 11.

METAPHYSICS.

Its fundamental question, p. 13.

OKEN.

Discoverer of the Homologies of the Cranial Vertebræ, p. 295.

PHILOSOPHY.

- Its object, p. 2. Love of it innate, p. 3. Triumph over blind Faith, p. 4.
Not stationary, but progressive, p. 7.

SCHELLING, p. 197.

- Review of Fichte's subjective Idealism, p. 197.
Schelling's admission of an universal Objective reality, p. 198.
Realistic principle, p. 199.
Its potentiality and actuality, p. 200.
Method and Theory of Cognition (*Erkenntniss*), p. 201.
Space and Time not mere forms, but activities of the Intuitive process,
p. 202.
Speculation, theory and method of, p. 204.
Doctrine of Intellectual Intuition, p. 215.
Division of Philosophy into Transcendental Idealism and the Philosophy
of Nature, p. 218.
Philosophy of Nature, p. 221.
The Absolute essence as Subject, *natura naturans*, or power, possibility, or
potency of becoming the Absolute object or universe, *natura naturata*,
p. 222.
Blind or unconscious working of the Absolute subject-object, p. 223.
Differences of the Subject-Object or absolute Identity only quantitative,
p. 227.
Inorganic nature, in its first potency ; matter, p. 231.
Light and Gravity, p. 232.
Magnetism and Electricity, p. 234.
Second Potency or Chemical process, p. 236.
Organic or living nature in third Potency, p. 237.
Transition from the sensibility of animal nature to consciousness, p.
243.
Immanence of the Spirit in Nature, p. 246.
Analogy of this with the Artistic activity, p. 248.
Arrival of the dynamic process of nature at pure knowledge or Ideality,
p. 251.
Art, Religion, and Philosophy, p. 252.
Pantheism of Schelling, p. 253. Perceived by the author himself, p. 256.
Becomes again the problem in his theory of human Freedom and Sin,
p. 258.
Criticism of that doctrine, p. 261.
Author's concluding remarks, pp. 263-4.
Schelling's recent views, p. 265.
The universe has its ground in what in God is not God, p. 266.

Schelling's distinction of his own doctrines from those of Hegel, p. 272.

Doctrine of Potency, p. 277.

Origination of the present state of the world through the "Fall of Man," p. 287.

Reduction of that process to the mythological course of History, p. 288.

Remarks on the doctrine of Potency as a theory of the Absolute. Its insufficiency as a doctrine of mere *possibility* leads to that of *necessity*, as with Hegel, p. 294.

SCHLEIERMACHER, p. 183.

His views of Philosophy intermediate between Kant and Fichte, p. 184.

His religious principle, p. 185.

His doctrine of Feeling as that of absolute dependence upon God, p. 188.

His Platonic idea of Philosophy as a central science, p. 190.


His notion of true knowledge, p. 191.

His Dialectick, p. 192.

His Theology and Ethics, p. 192.

Criticism of Schleiermacher's philosophy, pp. 194—196.

THE END.

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